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ABSTRACT

The 20 items included in this document were prepared by teachers from the United States who traveled to Egypt in 1990 to participate in a seminar. The items are as follows: "Egypt and the Demographic Transition" (J. Bannister); "The Educational System: The Situation and the Challenge" (R. Bush); "Teaching Naguib Mahfouz' 'Midag Alley'" (J. Eret); "Islamic Art" (T. Ferraro); "Ancient Egypt: The Five Fundamental Themes" (E. Fletcher); "Agriculture in Egypt: Lessons for the Middle School" (N. Haberhauer); "The Book Publishing Industry in Egypt: An Informal Study" (R. Johnston); "Understanding Egyptian Culture" (S. Knight; G. Brogoitti); "Egyptian Painting and Relief" (L. Kreft); "French in Egypt, On-Site Research in Cairo: Suggestive of the Current Status of French Language Instruction in Egypt" (C. Leggett); "A Lesson Plan for Discussing the Problem of Housing: An Egyptian Example" (J. Manzo); "Views on Egyptian Women in Arab and Islamic Culture" (G. Nolan; L. Louis, L. Prior); "U.S. Policy in the Middle East: Some Possible Implications for Egypt" (G. Olson); "A Teaching Unit on Islam: A Teacher's Question-And-Answer Guide" (K. Penick); "A Lesson on Arab Society and Culture" (P. Petrianos); "Egyptian Journalism: An Overview" (J. Piro); "Contemporary Egypt: Peace without Prosperity" (B. Predmore); "Suggested Sources: A History of the Modern Middle East" (F. Sakon); "Cairo as the Center of the World of Trade and Commerce During the Middle Ages" (E. Santora); and "Factors Related to Employee Productivity in Egypt: A Case Study" (J. Smith). (DB)

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RESEARCH REPORTS AND TEACHING MATERIALS PREPARED BY THE PARTICIPANTS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION-FULBRIGHT/HAYS SUMMER SEMINAR, JUNE-JULY, 1990.

THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY IN CAIRO
in cooperation with
THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION

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5. Ancient Egypt: The Five Fundamental Themes by Erin Fletcher.

6. Agriculture in Egypt: Lessons for the Middle School by Nancy Haberhauer.

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15. A Lesson on Arab Society and Culture by Paul Petrianos.

16. Egyptian Journalism: An Overview by Joseph Piro.

17. Contemporary Egypt: Peace Without Prosperity by Bill Predmore.

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19. Cairo As the Center of the World of Trade and Commerce During the Middle Ages by Ellen M. Santora.

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EGYPT AND THE "DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION"

Background Information for Teaching Secondary Senior High School Students or College Freshmen

Population is a significant dimension in the efforts of developing countries, like Egypt, to meet the social needs of their people. Although the relationships are often complicated, birth and death rates may be used to illustrate population trends over long periods of time. The most famous illustrative model of population trends in Northern and Western Europe is called the "Demographic Transition". It should be noted that the Demographic transition was originally offered as a predictor of the direction of world population trends. However, it is used here to illustrate, and to compare and contrast the context of European changes in birth-death rates and size of population with the very different context of the Third World, with Egypt representing a case example.

Demography simply refers to the study of population; the increases/decreases due to birth/death/migration rates, and the composition—such as gender and age—of the population. In the phrase "demographic transition", the word "transition" refers to changes from relatively high birth-death rates to relatively low birth-death rates.

Data for the European demographic transition is obtained for the 1600's from Scandinavian church records and from a wid range of records for the period 1700 to the present. Both the birth and death rates are averaged annual rates per 1000 in the population.

Question: What kind of population change would you expect to be associated with the birth rate for 1600 to 650?

Answer: Gradual increase.

Question: Human kind has been on earth for a few million of years. The agriculture revolution occurred a little over 10,000 years ago. Would any one like to guess when the earth achieved its first billion?

Answer: About 1810.

Question: What is the population of the earth today?

Answer: About 5 billion.

Question: What kind of population growth would you associate with the years 1650 to 1800?

Answer: Rapid growth. Accounts for 1810 bring the year of the first billion.

Question: What kind of population growth would you associate with the period from 1800 to today?

Answer: Gradual—completes the "transition".

Historically global population increase is not due to people having more children but to the fact that more children survive than was previously the case. The two age groups in a population that have the highest death rates are infants and adolescents.

In the 1600's a gradual but significant second agricultural revolution was taking place. Intensive agriculture had tended to take place along flood plains. Floods replenished farming soil. Farming outside of flood plains tended to follow a slash-and-burn pattern: burn a piece of the forest, plant for one or two years, and then move on to

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
"DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION" GRAPH
annual rate per thousand
50
40
30
20
10
1600 AD
1700 AD
1800 AD
1900 AD
2000 AD
BIRTHS
DEATHS


THIRD WORLD
BIRTHS
DEATH
annual rate per thousand
50
40
30
20
10
1900
1920
1940
1960
1980


EGYPT
annual rate per thousand
50
40
30
20
10
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990

the next area to be burned. In short, planting mined nutrients from soil, and when these nutrients were gone, crop productivity failed. However, in Northern and Western Europe between 1400 and 1600 a pattern of crop rotation slowly emerged which utilized different crops being grown in the same fields at different times, and with at least one season of no planting. Different crops take out different materials and put back other nutrients. Trial-and-error resulted in crop rotation schemes that made high productivity a possibility even away from flood plains or irrigated fields.

Monasteries also played a major role in the second agricultural revolution. Gardening was emphasized within monasteries and experimentation with hybrid seeds, resulting gradually in greater grain yields.

Question: What do you suppose might explain the fall in death rates?

Answer: Not medicine; mass medical procedures developed later in time. Rather, it is the greater availability of food.

Question: How does food make an immediate and dramatic impact in the death rate?

Answer: Remember that the age group with the highest death rate is infancy. Malnourished pregnant women have a high probability of giving birth to an infant who will die. Food for pregnant women greatly enhances the chances that their infants will live

Question: Examine the graph's dropping birth rate and time frame. What historical event is associated with 1750?

Answer: The Industrial Revolution. The Industrial Revolution had a major impact on the redistribution of population in Western Europe—from decentralized rural villages to centralized, industrial cities. Among the first customers of the industrial productivity were landlords who found that entering into a market economy using mechanized devices allowed greater productivity with fewer cultivators. City factories needed labor: a combination of "push and pull" factors brought people to the cities.

Question: What effect did the industrial revolution have upon the birth rate?

Answer: In the village a large family makes economic sense. Children can always b employed, particularly at harvest time. When the parents are elderly the children will care for them.

In the industrial city a large family does not "fit" as well as in the village. The employment of children is marginal at best. For those families who become part of the industrial work force money factors work towards a decision to limit the size of their families. Education is the major route to mobility. The fewer the children the better the educational investments that can be made, so that the children will have better opportunities than their parents. (See Graph concerning population growth in the third world.)

Question: What kind of population growth is shown on these two graphs?

Answer: Very rapid. The world reached its first billion around 1810; by 1990 the population has passed the 5 billion mark with China having a billion and with India to achieve a billion by the year 2000.

Annual growth rates for the Third World nations vary between 2 to 4%. Egypt's annual growth rate is 2.8%. (A growth rate of 2% doubles population in just 22 years.)

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In the "Demographic Transition" Graph the third stage of European population change is associated with the growth of an industrial, urban society. In the third world, societies are still largely rural, and industrialization may involve some sectors of the population and ignore the majority. This type of industrialization is often referred to as "dual economies", or "enclave development".

]Contrasted to the Demographic Transition of Europe, the Third World death rate fell primarily because of mass population preventive health practices, such as using DDT against malaria-bearing mosquitoes or drilling village tube wells capped with a hand pump to protect village water from contamination from surface drainage. Improvement in food supplies, in fact, came in the 1970's as part of the "Green Revolution" productivity increases. Income disparity still makes malnourishment common place, and a leader in the causes of infant mortality.

Question: Why is the birth rate for Egypt and the Third World not dropping as sharply as the death rate?

Answer: Although there is significant migration to the cities, the populations in question are largely rural.

Egypt's rural population is 56%. Moreover, in the cities economic disparity places a significant part of the population in poverty. Often kin are the only kind of assistance that may be available to the urban poor.

The graphs for Egypt and the Third World both indicate a gradual decline in population between the 1970's and the 1980's. There are several apparent reasons: (1) the decline in the death rate due to medical and health practice, coupled with (2) an increase in food grains for pregnant women (even with maldistribution). Both factors are enabling parents to see that they do not have to have so many children in order to ensure having the number they want live to maturity. Egyptian and Third World parents are making decisions to limit the size of their families.

Egyptian and third world counties generally have established "family planning" programs designed to assist families to have the number of children they want. Often the programs also attempt to persuade people to have fewer children; and, sometimes, as in China, coercive measures may be adopted against families who have more children than the state wants them to have.

Egypt and the third world generally have family planning programs that focus on women as their target audience, as opposed to men. Most of the women these programs serve have already "had their family" and they are looking for the prevention of future births. Younger women do not tend to come to family planning clinics for assistance with actual planning of when to have children and how many to have.

Traditional rural societies give men a pre-eminent position, but they are largely ignored by family planning educators who, in turn, are ignored (or ridiculed) by men. Men often keep their wives from going to the clinic. Also, the clinic seems to be something of an immodest and intimidating environment for young, illiterate women, particularly traditional Muslim women in Egypt.

But these are problems which can be—and to a degree are being—dealt with by family planning education.

A far more difficult area to change is the economic disparity of Egypt and the Third World. The Demographic Transition seems to most clearly show that a society which gives its population economic opportunities and a sense of at least generational mobility (children doing "better" than their parents) will be a society characterized by falling birth

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rates. To address that challenge, Egypt and the Third World and international agencies must work together to develop effective ways to generate rural and urban employment.

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RUSS BUSH:

THE EGYPTIAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM: THE SITUATION AND THE CHALLENGE

Background

To understand the educational system in Egypt today, one must trace the history of modern Egypt.

Prior to the 1952 Revolution, the British controlled Egypt. They educated their own and were not concerned with educating Egyptians, although the wealthy Egyptians did seek to educate their children.

After the 1952 Revolution, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's President from 1953 till 1970, initiated a socialist program that instituted mass education. Everyone was to receive an education free from first grade through the University, if they met certain standards—the passing of the National tests. If they graduated from the University, the government promised them a job.

A minister of education under Nasser stressed that Nationalism and education go hand in hand. They both teach independence and education create an upward mobility for the masses. It was an ideal method for Egypt's modernization process or so Nasser thought.

Levels of Education

There are four levels in the Egyptian educational system. They are: the Primary, Preparatory, Secondary, and University.

Primary Education

The primary levels include grades one through six., and attendance is compulsory by law in Egypt. A fine can be levied against a parent for failure to make his child come to school, but this law is not strictly enforced.

All the basic subjects that are taught in most countries of the world at this level are also taught in Egypt. One distinction that stands out is that of religion class. If you are Muslim you would attend an Islamic religion class. If you are Christian you would have your own Christian class also. In some schools they start a second language, English, around the fourth grade level.

In the past. passage to the next grade in the primary level was based on attendance. This has changed drastically since the 1970's. General tests are given at the end of each year and passage to the next grade is determined by the results of this test. Failure of a required subject—and they may fail several—necessitates a re-examination in August. Failure of the re-examination means repetition of that grade.

At the end of the sixth grade year the first of the three national tests a student must take during his educational career is administered. Failure of this test means repetition of the grade. The Ministry of Education does not have a set score to allow passage as it may change the score every year. In rural schools, especially, failure of the first test sometimes means the end of the student's educational career as parents feel their child could be more helpful in the fields.

Preparatory Education

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Until recently the Preparatory level included grades seven through nine and was very similar to our junior high system in America. The Ministry of Education is now implementing a program that has the preparatory level including only grades seven and eight. These two years are used to prepare or find out the particular skills a student may have and start guiding him in the direction of technical training or general (academic or college prep) training.

The curriculum is expanded in the Preparatory school to include more technical or vocational classes along with the general studies. Some schools begin the second language at the level although, as I mentioned above, others start at the primary level.

At the end of the last year of Preparatory school, the second of the three national tests is given. Test scores on this test will determine the course of study in the Secondary school. The higher scores will guide the student in the direction of general studies and lower scores will point the student in the direction of technical training.

It is at the end of the Preparatory level that compulsory education ends, and this is where most of the students who drop out, do so.

Secondary Education

It is at the beginning of the secondary level that the technical and general studies programs separate and go to their own buildings of instruction. The implementation of the new government reform has changed the grades of the Secondary level from ten through twelve, to nine through twelve. In the past, all students at the Secondary level had one year of general studies; now they will have two. Upon completion of these two years the student will pursue their area of interest. During the two years of general studies a third language, usually French, is introduced.

The technical curriculum consists of Agriculture, Industry, Economics, and other vocational avenues.

The general curriculum branches off into several avenues also: Arts and Languages, and a Math or Sciences avenue. This curriculum is a basic college prep course.

General tests are again given each year and at the end of the twelfth grade year the last national test and the toughest is given. This test, for the college prep curriculum, is called the *Thanawiyya Amma*—the "General Secondary". This test basically decides the future for the student. Failure of the test usually means immediate entrance into the job market. Passage of this test allows you to enter a University. The Ministry of Education assigns certain avenues of study at the University to certain test scores. The highest scores usually are channeled into the field of medicine, then law and so on down the line with certain scores associated with certain programs. A student does have the right to choose an avenue of study whose comparative score is lower than the one he achieved. The reverse is not permitted. Again, the score for passing this test is set by the Ministry of Education and the score changes every year.

The technical schools have an exam similar to the *Thanawiyya Amma*, but based on technical material.

University Level

In the past, graduates of the secondary level have only had three universities to choose from: one in Alexandria and two in Cairo. Now there are eleven other regional universities scattered throughout Egypt. As in most countires, some Universities are much better than others, and the top scorers on the *Thanawiyya Amma* get selected to attend the best universities.

The students who continue their technical or vocational training receive two more years of training to complete their education.

The academic students pursue a variety of degrees similar to our four year courses of study in the United States.

Public Schools

Before discussing the public schools themselves, one must look at the major problem facing Egypt today—the population explosion, which in turn has a tremendous effect on education.

One million babies are born every nine months in Egypt today. Egypt will have a population of over seventy-five million by the turn of the century. Cairo, the capital of Egypt, is growing by a thousand people a day.

Nasser said "I am a believer in calling on people to exercise birth control by choice or persuasion." He also commented that we would do better to direct our efforts to expanding the area in which we live instead on concentrating on how to reduce the population; we will soon find the solution.

He was wrong! In Cairo's most crowded districts the population density has reached over 240,000 people per square mile. The United States has spent sixty-seven million dollars trying to help Egypt develop a family planning program, but to little avail. Barely 25% of married Egyptians use any form of contraception. Half the population is under fifteen, and despite more education, illiteracy is increasing.

The biggest problem facing public schools today is overcrowding. As recently as 1980 some schools had three sessions a day. Today, several schools, mostly rural, have two sessions a day. Most, however, meet just once a day. For the schools that have two sessions a day a student may receive only four hours of instruction daily. The schools that meet once a day have school days similar to the length of one school day in America.

Student enrollment in classes varies greatly. In talking with public school teachers, and with a state inspector, I found that the average class size is between fifty and sixty students. The Minister of Education stated that class size was one of his priorities, and he would like to see the number decline to forty students per class in the future. With the population growth rate the way it is, I would believe that this will be a very tough goal to achieve.

At the University level things are not much better. One graduate from Cairo University said that he had over 5,000 students in one of his classes. Students were standing in the aisles, sitting on the window sills, and lined up outside the classroom to hear the teacher. What kind of educational environment does this create? It has been said that some students never do attend a lecture, but just show up to take the test, and thus get their education in absentia.

The large classes in public schools today have limited the use of effective teaching techniques. Rote teaching has been the only effective method to convey the material and keep the students quiet. The discipline in these schools is not very good. The rooms are overcrowded, and there is no air-conditioning. The furniture is old and there are few visual aids.

Free education for the masses has placed limitations on education in Egypt. Teacher pay is low. Materials are scarce. Teacher support and teacher training have been limited. Discipline in a hot, confused, blank room is not conducive to good education. The government has placed quotas on the number of students who can move from one level to the next, but they still have too many students for the facilities.

The differences between urban public schools and rural public schools are immense. Several years ago a teacher with a secondary education or just two years of college training could teach at the primary level or in rural schools. They were paid less than urban teachers, received little professional support, and were not competent enough to benefit the educational process.

The public school system must undergo a re-direction if it is going to stop the rise of illiteracy, because the environment it has created will never educated the masses.

Private Schools

I found many different nationalities of private schools in Egypt. Some of these "language schools", as they are called, are French, German, Italian, Greek, British, and American—just to name several of them.

Most Egyptian families, if they can afford it, send they children to private schools. There are three basic types of private schools and they are

1. **Old Private Schools**: These schools were established before 1980 and are usually run by religious orders. The annual fee is between LE 300 and LE 400 and they are not in business to make a lot of money.
2. **New Private Schools**: These schools have been established within the last two years and charge from LE 800 to LE 2000 annually and are definitely in the business to make money. These schools also charge an acceptance fee which can be as high as LE 1,000.
3. **International Schools**: These schools exist for foreign students only, although a few well-to-do Egyptians will pay to send their children to them to obtain a purely foreign-style education. Usually, the parents of the students who attend these schools are working in Egypt for a short period of time. The cost is between five and eight thousand dollars. The students are educated as if in their native country and will seek further education abroad one completing their studies here.

Admission to private schools requires both an interview with the parents and the child, but the institution retains the right to accept or reject the child.

The Old and New Private Schools must buy government books that are direct translations from Arabic to their language of instruction. The only exception to this is Social Studies, and that must be taught in Arabic because of the cultural implications. Most of the private schools supplement the government books with their own, but have little extra time to use them. All students buy their own books. The government checks on these schools by sending inspectors who evaluate the teachers and ask the students questions to see if they are being taught the correct information. Tuition can only be raised up to 10% per year; so with inflation and the rising cost of school materials, the Old Private Schools are struggling.

Most of the private schools teach four languages: Arabic, English, French, and their language of instruction. They administer and their students take the same national tests as the public schools. When talking to a teacher who taught in a private school about America's lack of bilingual success, he said "English is the universal language, and [the United States does not] need to learn any others.: He went on to say that Arabic will never gain world popularity, and that he thought that the schools should concentrate more on English and French.

The private school curriculum is supplemented by other textbooks and enhanced by smaller classes. Its highest student/teacher ratio I heard about was thirty-five, with most classes being twenty-five or less. Better pay and smaller classes attract better teachers and produce pride in the educational institution.

In talking to several groups of eleven, twelve, and thirteen year olds from private schools, I found out several interesting facts.First of all, they liked school! Some even loved it. I asked them about homework and, like their American counterparts, they said they had too much of it. My most interesting insight was when I asked them about audio-visual aids, maps, and bulletin-board materials. The students from the Old Private Schools told me that their families would donate a map, bulletin board items, a tape recorder, or other materials for use in the classroom.

In interviewing several parents of private school children I got a sense of the tremendous pride they have in their son's or daughter's education. I talked with an A.U.C. employee whose daughter attends one of the Old Private Schools run by American nuns. He said that they taught love and discipline with a dedication as great as their faith. He said that that dedication certainly would not be found in the public schools. Although the parents are supportive, the private schools teachers pointed out that they do not hesitate to criticize when they want things changed.

In comparing private and public schools, one has to Accept the reality and conclude that the public schools cannot possibly educated the average Egyptian student as well as the private schools. The sheer multitude of students, the lack of financial support, overcrowded facilities, few supplies, poor discipline, and frustrated teachers indicate why in spite of mass education, illiteracy is rising. The competitive tests at the end of the primary, preparatory,, and secondary levels are designed as a weeding out mechanism of those who choose not to or who cannot be educated, but that is hardly fair: If one fails in general studies he is pushed toward technical training. There are no remedial; classes and only one public school for the gifted at the national level—and it is for boys only. Finally, if a student graduates from a university, the possibility of finding a job is minimal.

In all fairness, the private school facilities do not measure up to the American public schools, but stand in sharp contrast to the public school environment in Egypt.

Teachers

Teachers in the public school system average LE 108 a month in salary, or the equivalent of about $40.00 per month. Base pay for a beginning teacher is LE 60 per month, or less than $25.00.

A high score on the national Secondary Exam is not necessary to pursue a teaching career. Therefore, one concludes that the government does not support the teaching field as an important profession—or, at least, as a profession as important as medicine or engineering.

The differences in the educational background of teachers is vast. In the past, primary and rural secondary teachers only needed to have a secondary education in order to qualify as teachers. Later, they were required to complete a two-year teacher training program at the University. Today, the government requires four years of university education regardless of what level one teachers.

Upon graduation, a new teacher's name is, for all practical purposes, thrown into a hat for the drawing of assignments. The prospective teacher is given an assignment and has a week to make a decision about whether to accept it. Rejection of the offer will require that the graduate seek employment independently.

The life of a public school teacher is difficult. Little, pay, little respect, large classes, shortage of materials, and lack of support create a chaotic situation. School teachers are observed by a person called an inspector, whose job is to evaluate the teacher and to find out if the students are learning the necessary information. Today, these inspectors set up teacher training workshops to help the teachers. How many of these workshops are set up and how effective they will be remains to be seen.

Many teachers have other jobs to supplement their anemic pay. Tutoring, driving taxis, and waiting tables seem to be the most frequently chosen fields of outside employment, at least as regards those whom I interviewed.

Many new programs are being talked about with regard to trying to help the teacher, but if the students and parent do not respect the profession, then there is going to be a long, up-hill struggle ahead for the teachers.

The private school teachers, on the other hand, have it much better. Old Private School teachers get paid only a little more than the public school teachers, but their working conditions are much better. One of the Old Public School teachers I talked to made LE 200 a month ($74.00), but had been teaching for twenty years. The New Private School teachers do much better. The owner of a New Private School said that she paid her teachers a base of LE 200 per month with an increment of LE 10 added for each year of experience. Much better pay, better working hours, more materials, a better quality student, and a much more desirable educational environment makes the private school teacher the model for Egyptian public school teachers.

Future Prospects

Every year 400,000 Egyptians enter the job market to compete for jobs that do not exist, and every year 40,000 students are graduated from the nation's universities. Most graduates do not find meaningful employment and are forced to take low-paying jobs in the government. In the Ministry of Agriculture alone, there are 2,000 Ph.D.'s—the majority of whom sit at empty desks without telephones or typewriters or notepads. Until 1986, every university graduate was guaranteed a government job by law, a policy started by Nasser. As a result, the bureaucracy has grown from 370,000 to two million in three decades' time. Today, a graduate may have to wait five years for a government job.

Why all this bureaucracy? The answer lies in Cairo. When Nasser centralized the government, he centralized everything by locating all of the ministries in Cairo. If an Egyptian needs a passport or has a question about his war pension, he must come to Cairo. Industry, government, education, and commerce are all concentrated here. One in four Egyptians lives here. Cairo *is* Egypt, in many ways; and little of significance involving the government happens outside of the capital.

What does the future hold in store for young Egyptians? More than one million Egyptians—one out of every eight adults—have left their country to work abroad, many as laborers and technicians in the oil-producing countries, others as professionals in cities ranging from Los Angeles to Jiddah. The remittances they send home each year now represent Egypt's largest source of foreign exchange. Egyptian teachers are the backbone of Saudi Arabia's educational system; Egyptian doctors keep the hospitals in Kuwait and Qatar functioning; Egyptian academics, economists, and buisinessmen have become prominent in dozens of American and European cities. Most expatriates give this reason for leaving: the limited opportunities at home, where per capita income is only $560.00 and where promotions and advancement are often based on loyalty, not ability.

The Government's Response

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The information is from an open interview conducted by Dr. Fathi Serour, the Minister of Education, with the 1990 Summer DOE/Fulbright group.

The Minister opened the interview with the statement that nationalism and education go hand in hand. Nationalism teaches independence and is a large and important part of Egyptian history. He went on to quote Taha Hussayn, who said "Education is like air and water: you must give it to everyone."

The Minister continued by saying that we must have reform before his educational goals are to be reached for Egypt—as he called it, "a fair education for Egypt."

As with every program in government, one of the primary problems is finances. The Minister stated that three billion dollars was allotted to education by the government. One third of this money went to the University level, which has 800,000 students, and two-thirds to the other three levels, which serve 11.4 million students.

The Minister;s Five-Point plan for reforming education in Egypt is summarized as follows:

1. Continue democratization of education
    - A. Free and fair education for all
    - B. The building of more schools, which will help to achieve this goal
2. Quality education, not quantity education
    - A. Must change the curriculum
    - B. Use modern technology in education
    - C. Create an educational research center
    - D. Create an organization for the building and designing of new schools
    - E. Create a center for the development of tests and testing
    - F. Meet the needs of gifted as well as remedial students
3. Give more attention to technical education
    - A. The goal is to get 70% of the students who finish preparatory school to go to technical training schools
    - B. The goal is for 30% of the students to enter the general or college prep curriculum.
    - C. Must change the curriculum
    - D. Need for more equipment (the Minister noted that the financial budget places many restrictions on the technical schools are creates many challenges
4. Create a good teacher
    - A. At first there were two different levels of teachers, primary school teachers (with two years of university education) and secondary school teachers (with four years of university education)
    - B. Now, everyone has to complete a four-year course for their teaching degree
    - C. Creation of teaching centers for both primary and secondary teachers
    - D. Creation of teaching centers for industrial teachers
5. Reform of Secondary Education
    - A. Two years of general studies rather than one (as the ninth grade is taken from the Preparatory level and placed in the Secondary level)
    - B. A marriage between Technical and General education for the ninth and tenth grade years
    - C. Bring the class size down to forty students in a class
    - D. Have all the schools have just one session a day
    - E. Bring in foreign experts in education to help design a new curriculum

The Minister was very sincere and open about the problems in Egypt and is trying to carry out reform in a country where change is not accepted easily. His openness was refreshing. He knows that reform is the answer to improving education in Egypt.

U.S. Assistance to Egyptian Education

In an interview with a member of the U.S. AID educational staff located in Cairo, I was able to find out how America is supporting the Egyptian educational program.

A program designed by Jimmy Carter and implemented by Ronald Reagan has helped the Egyptian educational system immensely. Started in 1981, 190 million dollars was to be spent over eleven years in Egypt. The monies were designated to support basic education in Egypt, from grades one to eight.

The program's primary focus is on building public schools in rural Egypt. To date, 1400 schools have been built, and at the present time they are constructing 1.21 schools each day. The schools consist of six, nine, or twelve rooms. They are two-story buildings with two staircases. There is a room for the director and one for the staff, plus a separate building for the bathrooms. Basic furniture such as student desks, benches, blackboards, and a desk and chair for the teacher is provided.

Forty million dollars' worth of equipment, including such items as maps, chemistry kits, preservation materials, home economic type cookware, and audio-visual equipment, was purchased for these schools. Several basic problems surfaced initially, but these problems were solved with education. American-made items that had voltage and current differences were being ruined. Some teachers could not read the manuals because they were written in English. Another factor was that if a piece of equipment broke while a teacher was using it, that teacher would have to pay for it. It is unreasonable to expect a teacher who makes between $30 and $40 per month to pay to repair or replace a piece of equipment that costs $100.00; for that teach it is not worth the risk to use it. Recently, U.S. AID has begun to train teachers, inspectors, and directors in the proper use of this equipment, and to date, 14,000 teachers have received such instruction.

In the last five years, U.S. AID has built 60% of the new rural schools in Egypt, which are located in every governorate except Cairo and Alexandria. Under the present Minister of Education in Egypt, education has been evaluated by foreign countries, and the United States has been a major consulting partner. The discussions involve avenues or directions that education in Egypt might take; paths of thinking; and the planning and designing of new programs.

It is frustrating but exciting to work with the Egyptian government, I was told by an AID official. Like the American government, the Egyptian government features a huge bureaucracy. This official believes that it is not so much the faith in the system that makes the U.S. AID program go, but his faith in Egyptian friends who work within the system. He said that the Egyptians were a people who value friendship and that this is what make progress possible.

The U.S. AID and the Egyptian government plan to continue co-operating after this eleven-year program runs out in 1992. The two governments are already set for phase two, a five-year plan with a price tag of $200 million.

Has the United States helped Egyptian education? The answer has to be yes. We are not just building physical structures, but planning, designing, and co-ordinating many different aspects of the Egyptian educational system, including a major revamping of the curriculum.

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Interviews

(1) Dr. Fathi Serour, Minister of Education in Egypt
(2) Peter Kresky, U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) Educational Expert in Egypt
(3) Dr. George Gibson, Provost of the American University in Cairo (AUC)
(4) Dr. Waguida El Bakary, Associate Director, Educational Programs, AUC
(5) Mrs. Aleya el-Kerdany, English Instructor, AUC
(6) Mrs. Ma'aly Kera, Principal of a Private School in Cairo
(7) Mrs. Fayza Fauzi el-Gawil, Former Senior Inspector in the Egyptian Public Schools
(8) Professor Angel Boutrous Sama'an, Professor Emeritus, Cairo University
(9) Naguibai Kamel, Private School Teacher
(10) Freres St. Jean, Private School Teacher
(11) Tahani Samy, Seven year-old student in a private school
(12) Three random interviews with individual students aged four, eight, and twelve
(13) Three small group interviews with members of the AUC summer program
(14) Mr. Ezzat Naguib, for a parent's point-of-view
(15) Mrs. Mary Kickham-Samy, for a parent's point-of-view

Fulbright Project

by John Eret

Teaching Naguib Mahfouz' MIDAQ ALLEY

The intention of this project is to present a teaching unit based upon the Mahfouz classic Midaq Alley. This unit may be used in teaching courses relating to modern fiction, world history, multicultural literacy, Arabic studies, or any area of the humanities. The unit is not designed for any discipline in particular, rather it is intended to be used as a foundation upon which individual teachers may build or use as they see fit for their instructional purposes.

I) ABOUT THE AUTHOR: NAGUIB MAHFOUZ

Naguib Mahfouz, an Egyptian author born in 1911, was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1988. He was the first successful Arabic novelist. Mahfouz grew up in the heart of Islamic Cairo and went off to study philosophy at the University of Cairo. At age twenty-five he decided to devote himself to writing. His artistic history has followed the pattern of the development of the European novel. He began writing historical romances in the style of Victor Hugo, and his first novel was published in 1939. Mahfouz' next direction was to social realism. His five novels published between 1945 and 1949 all picture life in lower middle class Cairo during the 1930's and 40's. MIDAQ ALLEY is one of these books. Mahfouz's culminating work in social realism was his CAIRO TRILOGY. These three novels trace the saga of a Cairo family from the 1919 Revolution to World War II. This trilogy established Mahfouz's reputation in the Arab world and beyond. His works since the CAIRO TRILOGY have been varied and experimental is style, placing him in the mainstream of modern Arab literature. He is considered by many to be Egypt's greatest writer.

II) ABOUT THE BOOK: A BRIF OUTLINE OF MIDAQ ALLEY

This summary of the plot Midaq Alley is taken from pp.215-16 of The MODERN EGYPTIAN NOVEL by Hilary Patrick.

Zuqaq al-midaqq

This novel has no central plot, but is the story of an alley in the Al-Husain quarter of Cairo, during the period 1943-44. The main character is Hamida, a beautiful, illiterate, sharp-witted and insolent girl, who is admired by the poor good-natured barber, Abbas Al-hilu. Hamida realises that he is the only man in the neighbourhood who would be a suitable husband for her, but is disgusted by the prospect of poverty, toil and an endliess succession of children. Abbas is persuaded by Husain, Hamida's foster-brother, to work in a British army camp outside Cairo and make some money, and before leaving he persuades Hamida to become engaged to him, although she is not enthusiastic.

After he leaves, Salim Alwan, a rich merchant who owns a flourishing store in the alley, shows an interest in her. Although he is already married he wants a young and attractive girl to be his second wife, and Hamida and her adopted mother accept his offer, ignoring their previous promise to Abbas. But Salim suffers a heart attack and is no longer fit for marriage, so Hamida's hopes of a wealthy home are frustrated.

Her contempt for the alley and its people grows stronger, and she is determined not to marry Abbas. A handsome outsider, Ibrahim Faraj, comes to the alley and sees her, and he skilfully prevails upon her to desert her home and come to live with him. She finds out that he is a pimp who owns a 'school' for training girls to entertain the foreign soldiers, and before long she becomes one of its most assiduous pupils.

On his return, Abbas hears that his fiancee has disappeared, and although the people of the alley know nothing of her whereabouts he learns that she has eloped. By accident he comes across her in her new clothes and make-up and reproaches her, but she, seeing in him a useful tool in her plan to revenge herself on Ibrahim whom she now hates, persuades him to meet her in a few days time so that he may see and kill the man who has deceived her. Before that day, however, Abbas notices her with a group of drunkes English soldiers in a tavern, and attacks her with a bottle. The soldiers turn to him and beat him to death.

Other characters in the alley include:

Muallim Kirsha, Husain's father, the homosexual owner of the alley's coffee house. His eternal hashish smoking, his frequent affairs with young men and his continuous squabbles with his wife punctuate the novel.

Zita, a resident of the gutter, whose profession is to counterfeit diseases and deformities on the bodies of poor people who wish to become beggars, so that they may gain the pity of passers-by.

'Doctor' Bushi, the self-styled dentist of the alley, whose treatment is cheap enough for the poor people around him. It transpires that he gets his artificial teeth by digging in the graves with Zita's help. The two are caught red-handed.

III. AN APPROACH TO TEACHING MIDAQ ALLEY USING JOURNAL WRITING AND DISCUSSION

After presenting the students with the necessary background information, but before having the students begin reading the book, present the students with the following set of journal/discussion questions. Require that the students respond in a journal to a given number of the questions presented in the following list. The depth of the student response to the questions will reflect the student's understanding far better than any factual quizzes. The journal writing provides an opportunity to respond to what he/she finds intriguing in the novel and offers a chance to use critical thinking skills. In addition, the journal questions and their responses may be the basis for class discussion. Thinking about the questions in advance should make the students more willing to state their opinions and be able to defend them.

SUGGESTED JOURNAL AND DISCUSSION QUESTIONS: The following list of topics does not pretend to be comprehensive, authoritative, or complete. There are numerous questions which may be formulated about the issues dealt with by the novel.

1) MIDAQ ALLEY has been called a "novel of compliance" by critic Halim Barakat. In his VISIONS OF SOCIAL REALITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY ARAB NOVEL he states that these "Novels of Compliance portray human beings in a state of schism as a result of social pressures, censorship, and repression. . . . Their main preoccupation is to adjust to their social situation and to mask their real feelings from others. . . Externally, they pretend to accept the system but deep inside they [illegible]." Do you agree or disagree with this assessment of the novel?

2) Islam is an important force in the lives of the people in the alley. Choose several characters upon whom you think Islam had a beneficial effect. Did you see any negative effects of Islam on the lives of any characters?

3) What changes do you see being brought about in the lives of the alley's people because of the British control and the presence of WWII?

4) Most of the characters in Midaq Alley have limited economic opportunities. What do you see as the causes of this condition? What do you see as the psychological results of these limited opportunities in the characters' lives?

5) Many of the characters strive to escape the alley to the larger world outside. All fail in some fashion or other. Pick one or more of the characters and discuss the following

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questions. Why do the characters want to leave the alley? What are the forces arrayed against their success? Are those forces external or internal? Why are they ultimately unsuccessful?

6) It could be said that even those characters who don't try to physically leave life in the alley are also trying to "escape" the conditions of their lives on some level. Are there any characters about whom you would say that this is true? Examine their actions.

7) Radwan Hussein is one of the few admirable characters in the book. Do you think his views on life are the correct ones for you? Do you think Hussein's views closely mirror those of the author? What do you see as Hussein's role in the novel?

8) American women today claim to be "repressed" in a male dominated society. Most women would say that the situation was far worse in America during WW II. How do you view the position of women in Midaq Alley? Do you see similarities with the position of women in America at that time? What good and bad do you see in the position of the women in the alley?

9) How is sex perceived by you, the reader, as a force in the novel? Is sex a purely destructive force? If sex is seen as a suspicious power, do you think this is cultural or universal trait? What do you find the author's view toward this issue is?

10) Some critics have viewed many of the characters and events of the novel as symbolic. Himida has been called a symbol of Egypt. The man is her seducer at a political level. She is ultimately a whore for the British soldiers. Do you see other symbols in the novel? Mahfouz claimed that he did not intend the book to be an allegory. What is your opinion about this?

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Fulbright Project
by John Eret

THE NECESSARY BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON ISLAM

It will be difficult for the average American student to understand MIDAQ ALLEY fully without having at least a basic knowledge of Islam. Islam is more than a religion in the Arab world: it is a way of life. It is important that the student know that Islam has religious, cultural, and political aspects which overlap and interact.

The student should know at least these basic facts about Islam before reading the novel. The religion is complex and students should be encouraged to learn more about Islam than the very brief and incomplete summary which follows.

Islam was founded by Muhammad Ibn Abd Allah of the Arab tribe of Quraish, who was born in the city of Mecca in 570 A.D. In 610 A.D. Muhammad was meditating in a cave on a hill outside Mecca when he saw a vision of an angel(Gabriel) who spoke to him the first sentences of the Koran(the holy book of Islam). The creed of Islam is simple -"There is no God but Allah(Arabic for God) and Muhammad is his prophet." God revealed his message to a number of men throughout history. Among these prophets were Abraham, Moses, and Jesus, but Muslims believe that Muhammad is the last prophet. Muslims believe that the Koran exists in heaven, and God revealed it in it's completed form to Mohammed. The Koran is the literal word of God, and its importance to Islam cannot be underestimated.

The Five Pillars of Islam

1) There is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his prophet. Islam is purely monotheistic. God is eternal. God has no son. God created the earth and man.

2) Muslims are to pray five times a day, facing Mecca. Wherever a Muslim happens to be when the time for prayer comes he/she kneels, bows touching the forehead to the earth and recites the opening chapter of the Koran and any other prayers deemed appropriate.

3) Giving money for charitable purposes. This usually amounts to 2 1/2 per cent of the capital one possesses throughout the whole year.

4) Fasting from dawn to sunset throughout the month of Ramadan, the ninth month of the lunar calandar.

5) The pilgrimage to Mecca, once in one's life, if one can afford it financially and is physically able. This is called the Hajj.

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RELIGIOUS RULES GOVERNING DIET AND DRESS

Muslims are forbidden to drink any intoxicating beverages and are also forbidden to eat pork.

There are no proscribed rules for dress. However, men and women are asked not to act or dress in a provocative or indecent way. During the time of the events of Midaq Alley Muslim women in Egypt would traditionally be covered entirely except for their faces and hands. Dancing with members of the opposite sex was also taboo.

WOMEN AND MARRIAGE

The Koran states that men and women are equal in the eyes of God. Women, like men, are independent responsible beings who are legally entitled to act on her own behalf to work, to earn and to manage her own affairs. Sex within the bond of marriage is meritorious, but sex outside of marriage is a very serious punishable crime. Marriage is important and strongly recommended in the Koran. Dating as most Americans know it almost never occurs. Marriage is an offer of marriage by one party to another accepted in front of at least two witnesses. Marriages are often arranged. If the couple finds they are incompatible before the marriage takes place, the engagement may be called off. A girl should not be compelled to marry against her will. It is possible for a Muslim man to marry more than one wife. However, the wives must all be treated equally. The man is responsible for taking care of the total cost of maintaining the home and raising the children. A divorced woman has the right to alimony and the custody of her children to a certain age. Women who are divorced or widowed may remarry without any stigma.

OTHER POINTS ABOUT ISLAM

Islam stresses the good of the group as a whole. This stress on the collective, rather than on the rights of the individual, conflicts with the traditionally stressed values of the West. Muslims want to preserve their cultural identity, but their values often conflict with the Western culture introduced by colonialism,e.g. the British in Egypt.

Consultation and arbitration as a means of solving disputes is stressed in Islam.

The Koran contains many verses which say that man is responsible for his actions. However, there are also verses which say that God decides everything. One of the results is a folk belief in fate- "God wills it."

Muslims know their scripture. They know what their holy book says much better than the average Christian knows his Bible.

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Muslim life is centered upon the family. The Koran says that men are to be in charge. Woman's place is to take care of the home. Cafe society is entirely male. It would be improper for women to go to a cafe. For a woman to go to a bar would be especially shameful.

V) BACKGROUND INFORMATION ABOUT BRITISH COLONIALISM IN EGYPT

In 1881 Egypt, a possession of the Ottoman Empire from 1517, had found itself in a state of turmoil as a result of financial debt incurred from the building of the Suez Canal and attempted industrialization, a nationalist revolt, and insurrection in the army. The Turkish ruler, the Khedive, asked the British, who had a considerable financial stake in Egypt, to intervene to help him keep control of the country. The British invaded, defeated the Egyptian army, and stayed until 1954.

By 1872 the British had made over 100 promises to leave Egypt, but only continued to tighten their control. The country, to the dismay of Egyptian nationalists, was run by and for the British. There were a series of insurrections and the British finally granted limited independence to Egypt in 1922. However, the British continued to control the Suez Canal, stationed troops in Egypt, maintained the right to interfer in Egyptian affairs to protect foreign interests and to defend Egypt from foreign aggression.

The 1930's was a period of severe economic depression in Egypt. There was disillusionment with Egyptian politics, over the economy, and the inability of Egypt to free itself of the British. There was a strong Muslim religious revival which found especially strong support from the masses of people who lived in poverty in urban areas.

Following the outbreak of WWII Egypt was threatened first by an Italian invasion which was pushed back by the British, and then a later invasion by the Germans under Rommel who were stopped seventyt miles west of Alexandria at El Alamein, in October of 1942. Many Egyptians suffered during the war. Inflation caused the price of food and necessities to skyrocket, and the poor especially suffered. Cairo's airport was bombed almost daily during 1942. Hundreds of thousands of British troops entered Egypt. The soldiers' search for women and drink caused consternation to the devout Muslim population. The fact that many poor women turned to prostitution was of special concern. Many Egyptians didn't care who won the war. Some saw a German victory as a chance for the Egyptians to get rid of the English. The British actually used its military to force a change in the Egyptian government to insure that Egypt remained under British authority.

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PROJECTS

Islamic Art

Tatiana Ferraro

I. Introduction
  What is Islamic Art
II. Monuments and Buildings
  A. Mosques
  B. Tombs and Mausoleums
  C. Citadels
  D. Homes and Palaces
III. Decoration
  A. Purpose
  B. Types
  C. Techniques
  D. materials
IV. Bibliography
V. Lesson Plan
VI. Important Events
VII. Photo descriptions
VIII. Vocabulary and Materials
IX. Background Notes

I. Introduction

- A. Characteristics of Islamic Architecture
  - 1. Interior and enclosed spaces are given more attention than exteriors.
  - 2. Function of a building cannot be easily identified from the form.
  - 3. Forms can be adopted for multiple purposes, for example, a four-iwan courtyard can be used for
    - a) palace
    - b) mosque
    - c) madrasa
    - d) bath
    - e) caravanserai
    - f) private home
- B. Characteristics of Islamic Art
  - 1. Use of non-representational decoration
    - a. arabesques
    - b. geometric patterns
  - 2. Use of calligraphy as a form of decoration

C. Reasons for distinct art

Need to differentiate from Jewish and Christian Churches

II. Monuments and Buildings

- A. Mosques
  - 1. Types
    - a. Individual-it can consist of a prayer rug or part of a room
    - b. Congregational-this is used mainly for Friday prayers
    - c. Community-used for entire community for special feast days.
  - 2. Forms
    - a. primitive mosque (example Ibn Tulun) mosque)
      - 1. Characteristics
        - a. made of brick
        - b. has pointed arches
        - c. entrance faces the quibla
    - b. cruciform mosque (example Sultan Hasan) mosque.
      - 1. made of stone

            2. main enlarged iron contains mi rab. pulpit
            3. madrasa-built upwards
            4. entrance-indirect with a mastaba vestibule
        C. Turkish style
            1. one main dome surrounded by many semi-domes (example Mohammed Ali Mosque)
            2. Slim slender minarets
    3. Common Elements of Mosques
        a. open interior courtyard
        b. fountain
        c. minaret
        d. mihrab
        e. pulpit
        f. dikka-place where person repeats prayers and sermon for the people outside the mosque
B. Tombs and Mansoleum (example Sultan Farag Ibn Barguq)
    1. Regarded as a dwelling place, therefore, they assumed forms of houses

2. Expressed the power, wealth and prestige of the deceased

3. Characteristics

   a. vault

   b. axial burial at right angle to the quibla in such a way that the deceased would face Mecca if he were turned on his side.

   c. incenses or an elaborately decorated squat pillar with the top scooped out to receive frankincense

   d. may be domed

   e. may have a textile tomb cover

   f. may be located as a separate structure or as part of a mosque

   g. has a detached headstone bearing the epitaph

C. Citadels (example citadel of Cairo)

1. Purpose

   a) to defend the city (all early cities had fortified walls for protection

   b) a residence for the ruler or commander

2. Characteristics
    a) Massive walls with towers
    b) Wallways-exterior and interior
    c) crenellations
    d) Gates
        1. Types
            a. straight gate with massive doors
            b. bent entrance
        2. Techniques used for construction
            a. used squinches, pendentives
            b. based vaults with cross vaults
        3. Can be used as a gauge of the most common method and materials used in that period
        4. Decoration
            a. used as a symbolic statement of power
            b. used as magic to protect inhabitants

D. Homes and Palaces
    1. Characteristics
        a. Austere exterior and a relaxed interior

   - b. separation of private and public areas
      - 1. male reception area
      - 2. harem, the family sanctum.
- 2. Features
   - a. courtyards-one semi-public and an inner private one
   - b. fountain or pool which serves as a decoration as well as a method of cooling the house
   - c. fenestration-windows extending to the street covered with iron or wooden grills
   - d. use of mashrabiyya screens to control light, insure privacy, decorate areas.
   - e. mag'ad-sitting room overlooking inner courtyard from the first floor facing prevailing breezes from the north
   - f. roofs
      - 1. flat roofs were used as extensions of living space
      - 2. storage areas for food
      - 3. drying areas for foodstuff
   - g. domed roof-usually over bedrooms providing light and ventilation

h. rooms had multiple uses, especially the semipublic ones

4. Types
    a. gra'a arrangement
        1. open courtyard or when covered served as a reception hall
        2. fountain centrally located
        3. could be multistoried
    b. rab'-apartment house complex
        1. constructed above a row of shops
        2. apartments consisted of 2 floors
        3. windows opened onto the street
    c. palaces
        1. essentially the same plans as the single private home but with larger proportion
        2. major decorations
            a. stain glass stucco windows and domes
            b. stalactic over portals
            c. polychrome marble dadoes
            d. painted and gilded wood for ceilings

    - e. inscriptions of poetry
    - f. tiles
- 3. furnishings
    - a. carpets and wall hangings-silk for summer, wool in winter
    - b. built in shelves often inlaid with ivory or mother of pearl
    - c. brightly patterned cushions
    - d. bronze lamps and candlesticks

III. Decoration

  A. Purpose-to cover a core material with an outer skin using complex and intricate overlays to create
    1. an illusion of space and weightlessness
    2. a sense of serenity by resolution of tensions
    3. an appeal to the intellect rather than emotions
    4. a symbol of the singleness of God and His omnipresence
  B. Types
    1. geometric designs especially the star
    2. use of calligraphy-kufic (angular), Naskhic, Thuluthic (cursive)
    3. floral and figural motifs-used mainly in miniature paintings and in decorating secular objects and buildings
    4. Arabesque
    5. use of water and light-used mainly to create layers of pattern

C. Techniques

1. repetition of architectural forms (series of arches, domes, columns).
2. manipulation of planes
3. use of positive and negative contrasts
4. continuous formulations of motifs and designs
5. changing the scale of motifs
6. interlaying and overlaying different patterns

D. Materials used for decoration

1. brick
2. stucco
3. stone and marble
4. metal
5. glass
6. tile and ceramics
7. wood
8. mother of pearl and ivory
9. paints
10. textiles

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V. Lesson Plan

Aim: To have students appreciate the beauty and intricacy of Islamic Art.

Objectives:

1. To have students be able to see the underlying feature of Islamic architecture.
2. To have students recognize various patterns in Islamic Art.
3. To have students evaluate the significance of Islamic Art

Motivation: Show slides or photographs of different types of architecture and art objects either from those tested or ones of your own choosing.

Topics for discussion:

What kinds of patterns can be seen?

(Geometric, floral, stars , script, repetitive motifs)

Why did these patterns develop?

Influence of geography, need for separate Islamic Identity.

How has religion influenced the types of patterns? Religio belief in the unity of God and His Omnipresence, prescription against fig r representation.

Evaluation: Here students list common elements of mosques and reasons for having them

Here students write an essay on how Islamic religion affected the patterns of Islamic Art.

VI. Important Events

610-632 AD-	Period of Revelations to Mohammed
622 AD-	Hijirah, beginning of Islam
639 AD-	Conquest of Egypt by the Caliph Umar's General 'Amr Ibn al- 'As'
641-2 AD-	Foundation of al-Fustat as city and capital of Egypt
661-750 AD-	Umayyad Dynasty, Damascus
750-1258 AD-	Abbasid Dynasty, Baghdad/Samar a
868-905-	Tulunid Period/Aḥmad Ibn Tulun (becomes governor of Egypt)
969-1169	Fatimid period
1096-	First Crusade begins
1169	Salah al-Din al Ayyubi takes control of Egypt.
1171-1250	Ayyubid period
1250-1382	Bahri Mamluk period
1382-1517	Circassian Mamluk period
1517-1914	Ottoman period
1805	Mohammed Ali expels the last of the Ottomans from Egypt

VIII. Vocabulary:

mosque	place of worship
mihrab	niche indicating the direction of Mecca
minbar	pulpit
imam	leader in prayer
iwan	an enlarged niche
madrasa	school attached to the mosque
caravanserai	warehouse, inn and marketplace
mastaba	stone bench
shahid	martyr, one who witnesses the truth of Islam with his blood

Materials:

Slides, postcards, prints

Film: Patterns of Beauty (Traditional World of Islam Series) (1976) 30 min.-examines Islamic traditions in art, architecture and colligraphy.

Mathematics of Islamic Art (1975) Metropolitan Museum of Art, N.Y. N.Y.

IX. Background Notes

Islam plays an important role in every aspect of Muslim society and has profoundly affected the fields of science, literature, art and architecture. Most Moslems are very familiar with the Koran which is regarded as the word of God transmitted verbatum to his prophet Mohammad in Arabic. It is considered the final and complete scripture superceding all previous scriptures which are regarded by Muslims as inaccurate, fallible and incomplete. Therefore, every word, punctuation mark remains unaltered and the Arabic language attained special stature. Since the Koran can only be in Arabic, Arabic has become a common unifying element for all Islamic countries.

The most impotant beliefs can be summarized by the Five Pillars of Faith: the shahada, "There is no Go, but God and Mohammed is his prophet", prayer five times a day, almsgiving, fasting during the Ramadan and hajj-the pilgrimage to Mecca. Besides the Koran there are other sources for behavior and beliefs of Moslems such as the Sunna (examples of practices of the origianl Moslem community) and the Hadith of the prophets (Mohammad's non-prophetic statements).

1.



Mosque of
Ibn Tūlūn
an example of
a primitive mosque
type

2.

Mosque of
Sultan Hasan
an example of
a cruciform
mosque type

3.



Floor plan of
the mosque
of Sultan Hasan

4.



Mosque of Muhammad Ali an example of Turkish style mosque

5



Tomb and mausoleum of Sultan Faraj Ibn Barqūq

6.



Gate of Conquests in Cairo



Ayyubid wall of the Citadel of Cairo

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7.

home of rich and powerful families

8



fenestration: windows looking out onto a street

maq'ad, sitting room over looking an inner courtyard

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9



Geometric

10



Star pattern

Dome of
mausoleum of
Sultan Qāytbāy

11



Calligraphy

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12



floral motif

13



repetitive architectural forms

14



repetitive patterns

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15



Brick used as a decoration

16



mashrabiyya - wood screen

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ERIN FLETCHER

ANCIENT EGYPT: THE FIVE FUNDAMENTAL THEMES

Introduction

The state of geography education in American schools has been severely criticized in recent years. However a review of the literature reminds us that criticism of this type is nothing new. The need for more geographic knowledge among our population was pointed to as early as 1903.

Lack of geographical knowledge about places among geography students made national headlines and the television news in 1983 when the shocking results of a survey were announced. This news spawned other such surveys, and it was found that the ordinary U.S. citizen had very little knowledge about places of critical importance throughout the world. Indeed, "geographic illiteracy" has become a cry of alarm about a very serious problem.

This heightened awareness has stimulated educators and geographers to re-examine the basic context of the discipline that a "geographically literate" person should possess. Traditional forms of presenting geography have been regional or topical. However, regional courses at the global level often have attempted to include everything that could be mapped or described about an area. The most recently agreed-upon approach to introducing geography to non-geographers was carefully constructed by a committee of academic geographers and classroom teachers. These representatives combined the unique essence of geographic thinking into five fundamental themes which have met with unprecedented success in catching the attention of the public and geography teachers across the nation.

The themes lend themselves to the study of almost any place. Taken together they utilize the advantages of both topical and regional approaches to geographic thinking and minimize their limitations.

The following definitions for the five themes are taken directly from Guidelines for Geographic Education by the Association of American Geographers and the National Council for Geographic Education.

(1) Location: Position of the earth's surface. Absolute and relative location are two ways of describing the positions of people and places on the earth's surface.

(2) Place: Physical and human characteristics. All places on earth have distinctive tangible and intangible characteristics that give them meaning and character and distinguish them from other places. Geographers generally divide places by their physical and human characteristics.

(3) Human-Environment interaction: Relationships within places. All places on earth have advantages and disadvantages for human settlement. For example, high population densities have developed on flood plains where people could take advantage of fertile soils, water, resources, and opportunities for river transport. By comparison, population densities usually are low in deserts. Yet flood plains are periodically subjected to severe damage, and some desert areas, such as Israel, have been modified to support large concentrations.

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(4) Movement: Humans interacting on the earth. Human being occupy places unevenly across the face of the earth. Some live on farms or in the country; others live in towns, villages, or cities. Yet these people interact with each other. They travel from one place to another, they communicate with each other, or they rely upon products, information, or ideas that come from beyond their immediate environments. The most visible evidences of global interdependence and the interaction of places are the transportation and communication lines that link every part of the world. These demonstrate that most people interact with other places almost every day of their lives. This may involve nothing more than a Georgian eating apples grown in the state of Washington and shipped to Atlanta by rail or by truck. On a larger scale, international trade demonstrates that no country is self-sufficient.

(5) Regions: How they form and change. The basic unit of geographic study is the region, an area that displays unity in terms of selected criteria. We are all familiar with regions showing the extent of political power such as nations, provinces, countries, or cities, yet there are almost countless ways to define meaningful regions, depending on the problems being considered. Some regions are defined by one characteristic such as a governmental unit, a language group, or a landform type, and others by the interplay of many complex features. For example, Indiana as a state is a governmental region, Latin America is a region where Spanish and Portuguese as major languages define a linguistic region, and the Rocky Mountains as a mountain range define a landform region. A geographer may delineate a neighborhood in Minneapolis by correlating income and educational levels of residents with the assessed variation or property or tax rate, or distinguish others by prominent boundaries such as freeway, park, or business district. On another scale we may identify the complex of ethnic, religious, linguistic, and environmental features that delineate the Arab world within the Middle East or North Africa.

This resource unit for teachers is intended to be just that—a resource from which teachers will, it is hoped, develop their own lesson plans and activities. The purpose of the unit is to introduce students to the five fundamental themes in geography and to apply these themes to the study of Ancient Egypt.

Objectives: Students will

(1) Be able to locate places by means of mathematical co-ordinates and a grid system.
(2) Be able to describe location in terms of relationships with other locations.
(3) Be able to explain how location influences activities.
(4) Know the locations of major water bodies and land masses regarding Ancient Egypt
(5) Know that places are distinctive in terms of their physical and human characteristics.
(6) Describe several ways in which people inhabit, modify, and adapt culturally to physical environments.
(7) Give examples of ways to evaluate and use natural environments to extract needed resources, grow crops, and create settlements.
(8) Describe ways in which people move themselves, their products, and their ideas.

(9) Explain why human activities require movement.
(10) Understand that regions are basic units of geographic study.
(11) Explain how regions may be defined by cultural or physical features or a combination of both.

ANCIENT EGYPT: THE FIVE FUNDAMENTAL THEMES

I. Location: Position on the Earth's Surface

(1) **Absolute**: 24 degrees and 36 degrees east longitude, and 22 degrees and 31 degrees north latitude

(2) **Relative**: Egypt lies in the northeast corner of the continent of Africa, bordered on the north by the Mediterranean Sea and on the east by the Red Sea. To the south lies the country of Sudan and to the west lies Libya and the Libyan Desert.

II. Place: Physical and Human Characteristics

Egypt is a country of approximately one million square kilometers (06 600,000 square miles). Ninety-five percent of this territory is desert with only a 5% area which is cultivable. The fertile valley of the Nile is a natural oasis within the Egyptian deserts formed by the Nile River. The Nile Valley is a unique and enormous oasis, a garden in the wilderness. The Nile flows north to Egypt for 4,000 miles, from its rise in the vast lakes in the African interior to the Mediterranean sea.

On each side of the winding ribbon of water in Egypt runs a narrow carpet of soil which supports a teeming population. The contrast between the soil of the Nile Valley and the barren desert is sharp and striking. For five hundred miles, from Aswan to the edge of the Delta, the river forces itself through a steep-walled cleft in the rocky plateau of the Sahara. This five-hundred-mile stretch is known as Upper Egypt.

The environs of Memphis and the Delta comprise Lower Egypt, which is flat and marshy; it differs in scenery and atmosphere from the arid severity of Upper Egypt. Lower Egypt is short in length and broad in width; Upper Egypt is long and narrow.

By the time of the unification of Upper and Lower Egypt, the tribes of the dynastic race, both in the north and the south, worshipped the sky-god Horus as their supreme deity, while the descendants of the indigenes appear to have acknowledged Set as their chief god. In early times, these Set-worshipping people were a powerful section of the population of the Nile Valley, occupying a large area of Upper Egypt.

Other gods of the dynastic people, mostly local and tribal in origin, were soon absorbed into the circle of sky mythology, but the mass of the population still gave their allegiance to the tribal gods of their ancestors, and above all to Set.

There were other major cults, notably of Re at Heliopolis, Ptah at Memphis, and Osiris at Busiris. Other deities of lesser importance are known to have been worshipped in Archaic times. Anubis, a god of the dead and a protector of the Necropolis, was also an important figure. Hathor was a sky and cow goddess who in later times was considered to be a patron of love and joy.

Whatever his religious beliefs, the Egyptian firmly believed in life after death, and whether he travelled with the sun-god in the heavens or dwelt with Osiris in the underworld he believed that a certain vital part of him continued to exist in the neighborhood of the body. The body must therefore be preserved so that this vital force could return to it and be sustained in every comfort by food and drink, games, furniture, and weapons. In fact, all the objects which made life comfortable were to supply the same service in the after-life.

The tomb was designed as the deceased (yet alive in the after-life) person's house—a sub-structure was built below ground level and was covered by a brick superstructure in the form of an oblong rectangular platform built in imitation of the dwelling houses or palaces of the period.

Archaeologists speak of these superstructures as "mastabas". The whole of the exterior of the mastaba was painted in gay colors in designs which imitated the network which adorned the outside of the dwelling places of the living; for of course, the tomb was a copy of the house or palace of the owner in life.

III. Human-Environment Interaction: Relationships between Places

Herodotus said, "the Egyptians live in a peculiar climate on the banks of a river which is unlike every other river, and they have adopted customs and manners different in nearly every respect from those of other men." The civilization of Ancient Egypt owed much of its character to the climate and curious configuration of the Nile Valley.

For Egypt, the Nile is its source of life and its chief means of transport. In the Pharaonic Period, the Nile Valley was the only part of Egypt capable of sustaining a population of any size. It was Herodotus who noted that Egypt was a "gift of the Nile.:

The Nile flood determined the farmer's seasons. The control and utilization of the flood waters of the Nile was effected in a number of ways: by the building of dikes to protect certain parts of the countryside from flooding, such as gardens and villages; by the construction of enclosed areas or "basins" to hold the flood-waters which would be released at the right moment by the piercing of the dams; by the laying out of canals for distributing and conducting water from the "basins" for irrigation purposes; and finally, by sinking wells and using the *shaduf*, a water-raising appliance, for the irrigation of gardens.

The river began its annual flood every summer in June, over-flowing its banks and leaving water and a light layer of silt over much of the river valley. By late October the flood had receded and the peasants were able to plant crops in the newly-irrigated lands.

The Ancient Egyptians farmed the land with skill and energy. Every available foot of soil was under cultivation. For this reason, the villagers were willing to set back their huts from its precious earth on to the edge of the desert. They knew only too well that they were dependent on Haapi, the Nile god. A meager Nile would cause famine, while an excessive Nile would damage the dikes and canals.

The Nile dwellers early developed a close acquaintance with the habits of their river. They measured its rise and fall and entered the figures in a written record. Thus, through the Nile and its flood, the Nile Valley in Egypt became a land of abundant harvest.

IV. Movement: Humans Interacting on the Earth

There is ample evidence of well-organized internal trade in Egypt during the Archaic Period, and an examination of non-Egyptian materials shows that the exchange of goods with her foreign neighbors was extensive in the earliest times.

For example, in the important industry of stone-vessel manufacture, alabaster probably came from the Eastern Desert of Egypt and from an area behind Helwan; basalt from the Fayyum; diorite from the Eastern Desert, from Aswan, and (a special variety of this stone) from an area forty miles northwest of Abu Simbel in Nubia;

dolomite from the Eastern Desert; marble and porphyric rock from the Red Sea coast area; and rock crystal from the Eastern Desert.

Although in building it was usual to use local stone, the transfer of stone from areas far afield was not unknown—such as the granite from Aswan which was used in the early dynastic tomb of Udimu at Abydos. In transporting the product of the quarries overland the early Egyptians must have used sledges, for the cart was unknown to them, although its use had been discovered by their contemporaries in Mesopotamia. Once it was on the banks of the Nile, the stone could be easily transported to its destination, for all important centers were within easy reach of the river. Of areas outside of Egypt proper, Sinai was a source of various raw materials, the most important of which were copper, malachite, and turquoise. At this early period, foreign imports, although limited in number, were indispensable, particularly timber for building purposes. Undoubtedly, a great lumber trade already existed in the First Dynasty, for the architects and boat builders depended on the import of considerable quantities of cedar and cypress from Lebanon and Syria. Ebony, used in the embellishment of furniture, was also imported from the far south, where a certain amount of elephant ivory was also obtained. Other important materials of foreign origin were obsidian and lapis-lazuli from Western Asia and resin from the far south.

Little is known of Egypt's exports, but Egyptian-made stone vessels have been found in Byblos, Palestine, Crete, and even on the Greek mainland at Mycenae and Asine. So that, by the time of the Second Dynasty, as well as raw materials Egypt was exporting the products of her craftsmen to distant lands.

The trade routes were probably the same as in later times: by sea to Byblos for the Syrian trade; by the El-Auja road across northern Sinai to Palestine; through the Wadi el-Tumilat to southern Sinai; through the Wadi el-Hamamet to the Red Sea and then south to Somaliland and the Arabian coasts; and finally by the Nile to the Sudan.

V. Regions: How They Form and Change

Archaic Egypt was—as Egypt has always been—an agricultural country dependent on the Nile for the rich products of her soil. Due to several geographic factors, Ancient Egypt was influenced little by cultural developments outside the Nile Valley. To the east and the west lay the great desert, which could be crossed with only the greatest difficulty—particularly since the camel, the so-called "ship-of-the-desert" was not present in Ancient Egypt; indeed, there is no evidence of the presence of camels in Egypt before 700 B.C.. The Mediterranean Sea on the north was not a link with the countries along its coasts, for there were no good natural harbors or ports along the Egypt littoral to facilitate trade and communication. While the lack of good harborages did not prevent trade and contact completely (indeed, as noted above, Egypt received woods and other items from Lebanon and Syria, and these came into the Nile Valley primarily by sea), the fact remains that this lack made travel by sea to Egypt difficult and dangerous—and this, in turn, necessarily limited the scope of seaborne commerce. Making things more difficult yet is that fact that the waters along Egypt's coasts were shallow and featured strong currents which were dangerous for ancient ships.

Within historic times the unification of the two lands, Upper and Lower Egypt (the Nile Valley and the Delta) followed from the emergence of a flourishing agricultural civilization dependent upon the Nile's bounty. The land of Egypt was created by the rich alluvium brought down by the Nile which served to constantly renew the valley's fertility. This was left on the fields by the annual rising of the Nile as a black deposit contrasting sharply with the reddish-buff desert areas on either side.

The oases of the Western Desert were always regarded as frontier zones. Except for these oases, this area was little used; but the Eastern Desert, lying between the Nile and the Red Sea, was extensively exploited. It was a mountainous region, full of minerals and rocks which were collected and mined. Sinai was similarly exploited, being rich in copper and turquoise.

Egyptian Civilization, from the earliest times, was based upon an extremely effective agricultural system. This in turn relied upon irrigation and was dependent for its effectiveness on the annual flooding of the Nile.

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AGRICULTURE IN EGYPT

LESSONS FOR THE MIDDLE SCHOOL

BY

NANCY HABERHAUER

FULBRIGHT SUMMER SEMINAR
1990

Agriculture of Egypt

In this lesson I intend to explain the background of the Nile Valley, clarify the types of aid given to the Egyptian farmers by the United States and explain the background of the Agaraian Reforms and the Aswan High Dam project. I have 3 major objectives: 1. Give the students background information on the development of the Nile Valley and farming methods in Egypt so that they will be able to compare those methods with those in the U.S. specifficaly in their own regions. 2. Enable the students to be aware of how the U.S.is involved in aiding the government of Egypt in terms of government and private programs to equip the farmers with improved methods, systems and techniques. 3. Equip the students with an understanding of the Aswan High Dam project and the problems and solutions associated with it.

I will also include some sample lessons which a teacher could possibly use in their classroom with some modifications depending on their classroom situtation and age level. Following the lessons is an anotated bibliography of texts and information available on these sources.

Other ideas for lessons will be developed in the future. These lessons will be based on the information from the Musha and Morgani families/villages from the Hopkins and Saad books. Because of time constraints I will develop lessons based on various interviews and references from these texts. My ideas are to make writing assignments and oral history lessons from them. Also photographs taking of various farms throughout my stay in Egypt will be used for the students to see first hand how farmers currently farm their lands.

Background information:

The Nile is the longest river system in the world. It flows 6,695 km from a source in Burundi to its mouth at the Delta in Egypt. The Nile drains 2.978 million sq km, almost one tenth of the land area of Africa. Although it is the longest river in the world, the drainage basin of the Nile is only the fourth largest (after the Amazon, Mississippi, and the Congo), and at least 30 major rivers carry more water in the course of a year.

The most distant source of the Nile rises in a rain forest near the Equator. From here the river flows north passing through sub-tropical savannah terrain in the southern Sudan and traversing the width of the Sahara before entering a semi-arid Mediterranean climatic regime in the last few hundred kilometers before its discharge enters the Mediterranean. No other river crosses so many different climatic zones: no other river flows so far without receiving any perennail tributaries. The head of the Nile is represented by a large number of streams that drain the highlands of the land contained between the two branches of

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the African Rift system in East Africa. These streams flow into Lake Victoria, a broad shallow body of water that is the world's second largest fresh-water lake in terms of area. Lake Victoria driians to the north over Ripon Falls and flows into Lake Kioga.

The Nile flows out of the west end of Lake Kioga and plunges down a steep slope through the dramatic gorge of Murchison Falls on to the floor of the western rift. There it enters the north end of Lake Mobutu(Lake Albert). Another arm of the upper White Nile enters the south end of Lake Mobutu, having passed through Lakes George and Edward (Lake Idi Amin). Nile water remains for a long time in the great volume of Lake Mobutu. The Nile (Bahr el-Gebel at this point) leaves the north end of Lake Mobutu only a few km west of lake Kioga's outlet. It then flows down onto the alluvial plain of the central Sudan. This is the area known as the Sudd, an enormous swamp choked with islands of floating vegetation this is the largest fresh water swamp in the world. The Bahr el-Ghzal enters the Sudd from the west, while the Sobat river flows into the swamp form the east, off the southwest flanks of the Ethiopian highlands.

The White Nile leaves the Sudd and flows across the more arid terrain to Khartoum where it is joined by its principal tributary, the Blue Nile. The Blue Nile rises from Lake Tana, on the volcanic tableland of Ethiopia and joins the White Nile after traversing an awesome canyon that was not fully explored until 1968. Below Khartoum the Nile enters the stretch of six cataracts: the Atbara River. Below the mouth of the Atbara River, the Nile receives no further inflow (execpt for the runoff from the extremely rare desert storm) until it reaches the Mediterranean, even though its course is marked by many well-developed tributaries.

There are presently six major dams and a series of light barrages managing the Nile water. Present water quality in the Nile is generally good in terms of salinity. The water carries 220 ppm of dissolved solids as it leaves Aswan. This figure increases to about 300 ppm at Cairo. There is concern that water quality might be a problem in the Nile before quantity becomes an issue. Both Egypt and Sudan are undergoing agricultural expansion and have plans for rapid increase in the next decade. Both are heavily dependent upon fertilizers and pesticides, and Egypt's levels of application are higher than both the U.S. and Britain. Salinity in the upper Nile is to increase due to several existing and future projects, mainly: agricultural expansion; increased evaporation due to heightening of the Roseires Dam, control points of the second phase of the Jonglei project, and the Baro reservoir in the Machar Marsh project; increased man-made storage in the Sudd, Lake Kioga and Lake Mobotu; and a decrease in the filtering of suspended solids from the White Nile's water in the Sudd and the Machar Marsh. There is

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some localized pollution due to sewage where population is high, mainly in the Delta and Jinja areas. The fact that pollution is generally negligilbe is however due to the vast dilution allowed by the river. Cities with waterborne sewage disposal such as Cairo and Khartoum re use their effluent after partial treatment for irrigation.

Egypt's population is increasing yearly and increasing food production to meet the needs of the expanding population is a primary concern of the government. Official strategies include improvement of land and water use, increase in yields. and addition of at least 150,000 acres/year of agricultural land until the year 2000 in order to keep the alreay low per capital share from decreasing further. Productivity is already high at 1.7 crops/year/feddan, and over 99.5 percent of farmland is irrigated. Almost 99 percent of Egypt's population lives in the Nile Valley and the Delta, three-fifths of them are engaged in agriculture, but there are plans to increase this figure to 5 percent by the year 2000.

- The Nile has been the site of some of the most ambitious and most successful schemes of water-resource management in history. In the Pharaonic era, Egyptian hydraulic engineers constructed an elaborate system of irrigation works in the part of the lower Nile basin where the river flows on alluvium it has deposited. Pharonic water-management basins for retention of excess water that arrived with the annual flood; a complex series of irrigation distributaries that even included special low elevation drainage ditches to permit the final few percentages of the retained flood waters to drain through the soil in the irrigated lands, carrying off the accumulated salts in the soils; and a carefully engineered canal, the Bahr Yusuf, that allowed Nile water at the peak of the annual flood to flow over the low divide separating the river into the Fayum depression, 60 km west of the Nile Valley. This water was used to irrigate a major agricultural development in that valley.

The Romans who entered Egypt in the first century B.C. were also accomplished hydraulic engineers, but they failed to appreciate the significance either of the low-elevation drainage ditches or the Bahr Yusuf. A major Roman town (Dimae) built on the shores of the lake in the Fayum was left high and dry by evaporative losses from the lake shortly after it was constructed---the Roman engineers failed to maintain the Bahr Yusuf as a forum to provide sufficient annual inflow to the lake to balance evaporation losses.

In the early 19th century, when Britain controlled much of the terrain drained by the Nile, water-controlled schemes of varying complexity were proposed for parts of the Nile. They were primarily devices to retain the high discharge of the annual flood and parcel it out to irrigation developments over a longer portion of the year than Pharaonic basin irrigation had allowed. The first facility to be implemented

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in the modern era was the Delta Barrage, a system of two impoundments constructed to permit irrigation water to be used throughout the Delta on a year round basis in most years. After nine years of planning, construction on the Aswan High Dam began in 1961. An emergency spillway (the Toshka, or Sadat Canal) to carry flow from excessive Nile floods into interior depressions of the Western Desert was conceived in 1970 and completed in 1980, after its originally planned size was halved. Owing to the impact of the High dam, the total length of irrigation channels in Egypt has increased from 22,5000 in 1965 to 33,000 at present.

In 1981 serious debate about the impact of the High Dam emerged openly in Egypt. The High Dam's ecological and social ramifications trancend Egypt's borders and include such negative factors as the spread of schistosomiasis, strain on economic resources (such as degradation of soil followed by intensive fertilizer application, which is very expensive), and the effect on other ecosystems (such as erosion of the delta coastline and the adverse impact on aquatic life in the Mediterranean). Most aspects of the High Dam's impact--positive and negative have been well documented. These observations need to be protected from international and domestic polititcal manipultation before accurate conclusions can be drawn on the real influence of the Dam on the regions and its people.

The agreement reached between Egypt and the Sudan in 1959 regarding future development of the entire Nile system is considered an historic example of the quality of cooperation possible between riparian neighbors. It is significant that no other riparian country was involved in that agreement and that the Sudan was very much under the political and cultural dominance of Egypt.

The High Dam Controversy: After the 1952 Egyptian revolution the Egyptian government proceeded with the Aswan High Dam project which added complications to the Egyptian-Sudanese relationship. The storage capacity of the High Dam was projected at 156,000 MCM of which 30,000 MCM would be dead storage (unusable). The Dam was expected to expand Egypt's cultivable land by 1.3 million feddans to convert some 900,000 feddans of basin irrigation into perennial irrigation. This would permit multiple cropping and expand agricultural production, an important goal given Egypt's burgeoning population. The Aswan project however, reopened debate on Egyptian-Sudanese conflict issues.

Issue One: Whether the Aswan High Dam would be a unilateral or cooperative venture. Egypt claimed that it would carry out the program, in 1954 Sudan bought into the venture. In that year Sudan challenged the Egyptian claim that the Aswan High Dam was the most efficient way of utilizing the Nile waters, they argued that the storage of the water constituted a more rational approach to water management.

Issue Two: Water sharing quotas. Egypt said it had

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primary needs of the water base on the fact that the country had no other alternative water resource and it population was totally dependent on the Nile. Egypt also claimed that Sudan could use alternative water resources and that its population was much smaller and was growing at a smaller rate than Egypt.

Sudan rejected the second issue claiming that its population could not rely on rainfed agriculture and that it was entitled to share in the stored water at a larger rate than what Egypt wanted. Negotiations in 1954 were soon broken off because both parties were hardened by domestic nationalist politcs (especially in Sudan which was fighting for the independence it won in 1956). Also responsible was the concern of the Sudanese government that acquiescense to Egyptian demands would intensify unrest in the southern provinces.

The crisis deteriorated into a military confrontation in 1958 when Egypt dispatched an unsuccessful expedition to reclaim disputed border territory. Relations between the two countries reached a nadir in 1959 when the Sudanese abrogated the 1929 Agreement by unilaterally raising the height of the Sennar Dam.

Throughout the conflict, Britain, owing to its dispute with President Nasser over his demand for evacuation of the Canal Zone, supported the Sudanese position; Sudan reciprocated after the 1956 Suez war by endorsing the Eisenhower doctrine which promised U.S. aid to any Middle Eastern country threatened by Communism. Egypt, determined to proceed with the Aswan project, turned to the U.S. for financing, but to no avail. In frustration, Nasser turned to the Soviet Union which agreed to provide the necessary financial and technical aid, thus adding a cold war dimension to the already international character of the Nile dispute.

Impact of the High Dam: The Aswan High Dam is one of the largest constructions of its kind. It was expected to fulfill several objectives: 1) to protect Egyptian agriculture from both annual and periodic variations in the flow of the Nile: 2) to extend multiple cropping along the Nile Valley: 3) to expand the total area of cultivated land by 1.2 million feddans: 4) to convert 800,000 feddans from basin to perennial irrigation: 5) to generate 10 billion kwh of electricity annually.

Problems with the Dam: 1)Massive losses of water through surface evaporation on Lake Nasser (the storage facility of the Dam: 2) trapping of silt in the lake that would deprive downstream users of soil nutrients, thus necessitating widespread use of fertilizers: 3) waterlogging in soil channels leading to the rise of salinity and degradation of water quality: 4) erosion of the coastline and incursion of seawater into the Delta: 5) spread of schistosomiasis (bilharzia-a highly dangerous parasitic disease transmitted by snails): 6) proliferation of the "killer mosquitos" from the Sudan that spread malaria.

Impact of the Dam: Impact on Egyptian agriculture is

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perhaps the most significant dimension of the project. The records show that the major goal of dramatic improvement in Egyptian agriculture had not been attained. About 60 percent of the Egyptian population is employed in agriculture. Furthermore Egypt's population growth rate is 1 million every nine months. The amount of land the government hoped to reclaim and add to the 6 million feddans under cultivation has fallen far short of expectations. Official figures are vaired greatly and are unreliable, tending to mix marginal with productive land in the statistics. About 350,000 to 400,00 feddans of land have been reclaimed. Owing in part to considerations of labor intensity, effort and resources were put into land reclamation rather than into development of those agricultural technologies that would have increased productivity per feddan. Although Egypt has achieved impressive yields for some crops such as cotton, wheat, maize and rice, total productivity cannot keep pace with local consumption. In any event, any policies which trade off higher production for jobs or loss of land ownership carry the risk of political upheaval.

US AID to Egypt: USAID has made a long term commitment to assisting Egypt in developing and improving its agricultural sector. USAID returned to Egypt in the mid 1970's and has contributed more than $990 million. Agricultural and credit programs are with the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MOA) and irrigation with the Ministry of Public Works and Water Resources(FWWR).

The first agricultural USAID developed in the late 1970's contained 14 projects with a total USAID contribution of $330 million. These projects were primarily targeted at the promotion of productivity grains and included emphasis in such areas as poultry, cereal grains, farm and agricultural machinery, horticulture, aquaculture, water management, small farmer credit programs and data collection and analysis programs. Several hundred Egyptians received graduate degrees under these projects and literally thousands received non academic and in-country training. Seven major research and experiment centers were built and a host of Egyptian government facilities were renovated. More than $20 million of agricultural equipment was procured and more than a dozen laboratories were equipped. The research carried out under these "first generation projects," which were phased out by 1987, have benefitted roughly 1.4 million farmers who are not using high-yielding crops.

The current portfolio of three major projects has been developed with a total of USAID contrubution of $763 million. the major objective underlying these three projects is the development of the basic sustainable agricultural system which would enable farmers to generate the highest possible return from their very small farms. The following three programs are 1) National Agricultural Research Project (NARP); 2) Agricultural Production and Credit Project (APC) and; 3) Irrigation Management Systems Project (IMS).

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NARP: the purpose of this project is to improve Egypt's capability to provide farmers with productivity increasing technologies in a supportive policy envionnment. The design of this project emphasizes increasing crop and livestock yeilds by the creation and transfer of appropriate technologies, and by facilitating a policy enviornment which encourages their generation/use and removes constraints to agricultural production and marketing.

The project's strategy calls for enhancing the effectiveness and extent of a broad range of public and private insitutions involved in Egypt's agricultural development. It was revised in September 1983 to include 5 areas of concern: 1) agricultural research; 2) agricultural policy analysis; 3) seed technology; 4) technology transfer; and 5) project management/new initiatives.

APC:is a complementary approach to the NARP activities concentrating on policy evolution and strengthening of farmer credit systems. The project has two elements: 1) a capital transfer component in which cash transfers are made to provide capital for the Principal Bank for Development and Agricultural Credit (PBDAC). Egyptian farmers now receive world market level prices for several key crops, most crop-delivery quotas have been relaxed or eliminated, and wasteful subsidies for imported annual feed have been phased out. 2) technical assistance component designed to assist the PBDAC enhance its ability to provide credit for Egypt's farmers and agro-businesses. This technical assistance will enhance the financial viability and effectiveness of PBDAC for supplying the credit needs of the rural sector. As part of the project the US Center for Privatization is working with counterparts from the PBDAC to develop a plan for the gradual phasing-in of private sector participation in the supply of agricultural inputs which are currently supplied by PBDAC.

IMS: is a project which is a complex umbrella project authorized for $340 million and is scheduled for completion in September 1991. The project is comprised of ten components administered by eight FWWR Project Directors. the project has activities in all 17 Irrigation Directorates and focuses on the six million feddans of irrigated old lands in Egypt. To date (May 1989),the project has accomplished six major activities involved with aiding the farmers directly through training and use of irrigation technology.(see Agricultural Briefing paper May 1989, for specific details).

In conjunction with the USAID Program the American University at Cairo has a Desert Development Program which helps farmers develop new techniques and strategies for farming in the desert. It is headquartered in Cairo and has two experimental farms: 500 acres in South Tahrir,and laboratories and non-conventional agriculture facilities in Sadat City. The Center employs 20 high-level professionals, 30 researchers, and 62 support personnel including field workers; they cover a wide range of disciplines and skills.

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Areas of the Center's special expertise may be combined under three broad categories: planning desertification control and formulating integrated desert development programs; identification, appraisal, and implementation of desert projects; and management of desert farms. Together, these areas constitute integral elements of action plans for the development of the Sahara areas. In addition, the Center offers upon request special training in its areas of competence. It depends on grants and special fundings in order to maintain its opperations. (See Yearbook and long term plans for more specific details)

SAMPLE LESSONS: THE FOLLOWING LESSONS ARE SOME THAT COULD BE USED IN A 6TH OR 7TH GRADE CLASS STUDYING EGYPT AND COULD WITH MODIFICATION BE USED IN A 9TH OR 10TH GRADE CLASS.

1. After receiving background information on the Nile River, the students could complete assignments like the following: On a large blank map of Africa and the Middle East, locate Egypt. Then on a blank relief map of Eastern Africa including countries of Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Central African Republic, and Zaire; have them locate the following items:

Red Sea
Blue Nile
Atbara
Aswan Dam
6th cataract
Sudd
Ethiopia
Zaire

Mediterranean Sea
Lake Victoria
1st cataract
4th cataract
Cairo
Egypt
Kenya
Central African Republic

White Nile
Lake Nasser
3rd cataract
5th cataract
Khartoum
Sudan
Uganda

(Use of maps in both the Naff, and Waterbury books would be an excellent reference.)

Additionally: the students could using a blank map of Egypt, locate the Nile River and all of the dams and water projects mentioned in the background text.
Follow-up activity: After finishing the maps, have the students compare the two maps and write a one page paper on the effects which the dams may have had on the regions involved and how they feel the geography of the land may have changed. Also what kinds of problems do they see that these dams could create and also what kinds of benefits could these dams have on the various countries in the Nile region.

2. Have the Students examine the Photos of the Aswan High Dam, and the dimensions of it (use guide books and Waterbury book for dimensions and actual photos of the Dam from books) In a one page paper, have the students describe some of the advantages and disadvantages to the people of Egypt, Sudan Nubia, and Ethiopia which this dam may cause.

3. Have the Students evaluate the possitive effects of such

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a major project by UNESCO in undertaking the Abu Simbel Project. Is it worth the time, money, energy and cooperation which these nations used in order to preserve this ancient monument. They should write a one page paper with their opinions expressed completely.

4. Write an essay comparing a river system in the United States (i.e. Mississippi, Colorado, Missouri) with the Nile. Should the U.S. dam it to prevent floods or to help provide more water to people in these regions. Be sure to include how this endeavor would affect the enviornment and the natural ecosystems of the area.

5. Using the graphs and charts in the USAID materials, especially the Agricultural Briefing Report, have the students interpret the charts which compare the data from 1955 to 1970, have the students project why Agriculture is still the most important sector of the economy in Egypt and have them explain why the GDP fell from 34.4 percent in 1955 to 17 percent in 1987 and at the same time why employment fell from 56 percent to 70 percent. They could write this or graph it on a bar graph using pfs graph.

6. Have the students work in small groups to develop a plan to solve the problems with the farmers in Egypt. Given the policies, institutions, resources, and techonologies, what would the students change to help the farmers produce better crops in a more efficient manner. Each group should have one written page on what they would do.

7. The Students should be able to describe the NARP and find the locations of the various projects on a map. They should be able to also list the types of crops grown in each region.

8. The students should be able to write a paper about the benefits of a new variety of rice which is disease resistant, has a high yield and has desireable cooking and eating qualities (one of the programs being implemented by the USAID program under NARP)They should include: 1) How could this benefit Egypt's Economy? 2) How could it benefit the people living in cities? 3) How could it benefit the farmers?

9. Have the students imagine that they were a specialized U.S. Farmer who had been selected to go to Egypt to help the farmers there. Have them write a paper on the kinds of things that they could give to the farmers or what information/techniques they could share with them. (This would mean that the students would have to talk to farmers in their community first to get an accurate account of what techniques the farmers have in the U.S. which work in the U.S. (See the Yang book for survey proceedures)

10. Students need to prepare a set of questions to be asked

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of local farmers.i.e. How much did they grow in their fields last year, how many head of cattle do they have?, what kind of fertilizer do they use?, how many people work on their farms? and then compare it to the information supplied by the USAID. Have the students make a graph comparing the two sets of data.

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Robert F. Johnston

THE BOOK PUBLISHING INDUSTRY IN EGYPT: An informal study.

INTERVIEW - Ibrihim El Muallam, Dar al Shorouk Publishing Co and bookshops.

The family publishing house was first started in the pre-revolutionary period by Ibrihim's father, Muhammed under the name Dar al Kalim. In 1966 that house was nationalized by the Nasser regime. In 1968 Muhammed then started Dar al Shorouk publishing, with presses in Cairo and Beirut. They also opened bookstores in Cairo and Alexandria. Ibrihim joined his father in the business after graduating from the University of Cairo with a degree in engineering. They were later joined in the business by Ibrihim's younger brother, Adel. Adel runs the bookshop on Talat Harb Square, where the interview took place.

The Talat Harb bookshop is more like a privately owned "fine" bookshop in the U.S., than the larger chain counterparts such as Waldens, Atlantic or Barnes and Noble. The shop was small, about 20' by 40', with high ceilings and a Mezzanine second floor in the back half. The shelves were crammed with books from floor to ceiling, in all languages (Arabic, Japanese, English, German, French, Italian), and on all manner of subjects ranging from childrens books to world literature to Quranic literature to philosophy, computer science and professional medical and technical materials. There was a staff of half a dozen, all busy helping customers in several different languages. From the conversations I overheard, the staff also knew their stock well.

Ibrihim al Muallem is characterized by friends and colleagues as a dynamic and outspoken force in the Egyptian publishing industry. He has not only been successful in a [illegible] business, but has also been vocal and forthright about problems with the industry, when others have been less inclined to speak out.

After sharing a cold drink in the second floor mezzanine, and getting to know a litte about each other had the following interview.

BOB: If I understand correctly, you publish only in Arabic. is that correct?

IBRIHIM: We did publish in English and German, but very few titles. They were primarily children's books, but I think they are no longer available and out of print. We had this experience about six years ago. Now we publish only in Arabic.

BOB: What is the main focus of your publishing now?

IBRIHIM: We publish mostly literature. By our standard, this is a very broad meaning. But, in addition to literature

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we also publish modern Arabic and Islamic thoughts.

BOB: Philosphy as well as...

IBRIHIM: You can say it is Philosophy, you know new Age thinking.

BOB: Would this be the same type of New Age thinking that we hear about in the United States?

IBRIHIM: No, I think it is different. More like trying to find a better way than the more traditional approaches to our problems. But not only that. We publish mostly literature and childrens books.

BOB: I understand that childrens literature and childrens books are a great interest of Egypt's first lady, Mrs Mubarak. Do you work with her in any capacity?

IBRIHIM: We didn't work with her, but she comes to our stand and she likes what we are doing and appreciates it. She also selects some of our titles for the bookshops that she is supervising.

BOB: How do you go about choosing the titles that you do publish? I'm sure that there must be thousands of Egyptian men and women trying to get published.

IBRIHIM: Generally it is a mixture between selecting from what we are offered and what we commission. Sometimes we try to commission in certain subjects for only one title or a series. We have a committee that decides this.

BOB: The committee that decides this, is it your staff or people from outside the company? Also, do you ever pay advances for manuscripts or commissioned projects?

IBRIHIM: We use outsiders mostly. We have some from the staff. but it really depends on the subject that we are dealing with. We have many friends that are the best in their fields to help. Advances are rarely paid in Egypt, and normally only to extremely well established writers such as Naguib Mahfouz.

BOB: In general, in Egypt, what is the publishing environment like, Does the government get involved? Are there efforts to control or censor? Are a lot of different things published or only certain types of materials?

IBRIHIM: Everything is relative, and relatively speaking if you compare what is going on in Egypt with the rest of the Middle East and other Islamic countries, we are the most liberal. Very few titles are prohibited, almost everything is published. As for the government involvement, they very

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seldom get involved, and even then, they must go through the courts. In addition, the few cases that have gone to the court, the government lost. I can only remember one or two titles in the last five years that have been prohibited.

BOB: There was a recent article in the New York Times about Naguib Mahfouz, in which he was criticized by a rival Egyptian author, Yousef Idris. Idris stated that Mahfouz did not take chances in what he wrote. Can you comment on that?

IBRAHIM: I am aware of what's going on between Idris and Mahfouz. I think that Idris is a talented writer, but there is a real difference. It is really a matter of the taste of readers. Some people like Mahfouz. Mahfouz is more classic and traditional. There are also some political differences between the two. Naguib Mahfouz is in favor of peace and Yousef Idris is against what is going on between Egypt and Israel. He believes that there is a great Jewish influence in the the Nobel prize, and that Mahfouz's approval of the Camp David accords were why he won the prize.

BOB: As an aside to my question about government intervention, what sort of effect do the religious authorities have on what is published? Do they try to censor material, and if so, are they successful?

IBRAHIM: You know, sometimes they do. But for me as a publisher and as a member of the Egyptian publishing syndicate, I think nobody is really suffering from the religious authority. The bureacrary and slowness of decisionmaking has a much greater impact. I think there are more problems from the readers and not the religious authorities, that they don't like the books. In fact, there is the story of one of Naguib Mahfouz's books, The Children of Gebelawi. The people did not understand it when it came out in serial form, and so Mr. Mahfouz decided himself not to publish it. I think he feels this is not the right time for a battle on this.

BOB: While we are on the reading public, I was amazed at the number of bookshops, kiosks, and stands that I have seen in Cairo and Alexandria. Egyptians must be a very literate people and must read constantly.

IBRAHIM: I don't agree with you. I think the number of bookshops is too little for the Egyptian population. Out in the country there are very few bookshops in the towns and villages. I think this is one of the problems affecting our publishing industry and education system. Also, that there are very few public libraries. The children do not have access to books and do not grow up being accustomed to reading. I believe also that the educational system in Egypt is not encouraging the students to read a lot. The school system concentrates on materials for their courses, and a lot

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of memorization: and that takes all their time. Then there is the long summer vacation, four months, and they do nothing during this time. There are very few programs for them.

BOB: Over the last forty years, since the revolution, have there been major changes in how the publishing industry has been treated, with the different leaders and regimes?

IBRIHIM: Overall, I think the effect on publishing of the revolution has not been good. Before the revolution, publishing was open and developing and growing steadily. After the revolution problems began, because they were trying to control all of the industries. There was great damage to the printing industry and they put restrictions on the import of materials and books. There was also severe censorship in the 60s. Finally, there was a lot of propaganda published in the media and books. This did a lot to drive people away from reading.

BOB: At what time did that start to loosen up, during Sadat's tenure as president?

IBRIHIM: .Yes, during the middle 70s, and it has continued to improve slowly with Mr. Mubarrak.

BOB: You said that the publishing industry is not quite flourishing at this time, is that due to Egypt's overall economic situation, or are ther other factors?

IBRIHIM: In part that is true, but also the loss of the children as readers, for the reasons I mentioned before. But there are other reasons. The political and cultural leaders all used to be officers and they are not cultured and intellectuals. Therefore the children have no models to copy, at least in this manner.

BOB: You have been described by your colleagues as being very outspoken regarding the publishing industry. What in particular would you like to see the industry doing that it is not doing now?

IBRIHIM: Oh a lot! We are suffering from several problems. The most important one is that reading is not a national habit, and that reading is not considered as a necessity. Illiteracy is not that big of a problem, it is that they just don't read, and they don't read for many reasons. First, they are not brought up reading. Second, it is very expensive for them to buy books. Third, there are very few public libraries. Fourth, there is not enough information in the press and media about publishing and books. Finally, all of the distribution channels for books are weak and inefficient. One other problem as far as importing books, is that this requires hard foreign currency, and this is in very short supply in Egypt.

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However, I think the industry will continue to improve slowly. There are efforts to increase reading, and the economic situation is improving slowly. We are hopeful.

PART II

Interview with Raymond Stock, English Acquisitions Editor and Samira Ammar, Assistant to the Director of American University in Cairo Press - July 16, 1990.

The American University in Cairo Press is the publishing arm of the American University in Cairo. It was established in 1961, and in that year published its first book on the the AUC library's Creswell collection on Islamic art and architecture. In the intervening 29 years, it has expanded greatly. During the 1989-90 publishing season, it published 19 books and and did over 1,000,000 L.E. in business. The house focusses mainly on materials about Egypt and by Egyptian authors. As part of its expansion, it is currently reexamining its mission.

BOB: I understand that AUC is the only non-Egyptian University in the country, is AUC Press the only foreign publisher?

AUC: Oh no. Ther are many, large and small foreign presses. to name a few, there is Palm Press, who just published THE GUIDE TO THE CITIDAL, Livre du France, and also William Harrison who publishes CAIRO TODAY magazine.

BOB: As foreign owned publishers do you have any special restrictions or guidelines that perhaps the local publishers don't have to deal with?

AUC: In terms of the overall press laws, we both deal with many of the same sorts of things. There are certain steps that one must follow in order to get a book published. What's interesting is that not many people that publish actually realize that these formal steps exist and are written down. However, when I first started researching this, it turned out that these steps were basically the same procedures that we had always been following. The basic press laws were first set up in 1956 and revised again in 1958 and later. These were during the Nasser years, and carefully spelled out what could be published. However, in 1974, during Sadat's rule, there was a no censorship law passed that said there was no censorship. The only problem is that earlier laws were not annulled, so there are sometimes conflicting regulations. You should know though that regular publications submit their materials, usually before distribution. For instance, at CAIRO TODAY, I understand they submit material after it is published, but before it is distributed. Rarely is anything stopped.

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BOB: Do you have to do the same thing with what you publish.

AUC: You have to understand that there are many different places that deal with censorship. It's not any one central place. Depending on what you have, you have to deal with the Post Office, Ministry of Information, Ministry of Culture, or the President's office. There is also Al-Azhar for religious and Islamic materials. I think that the subject of the President and religion are most carefully scrutinized.

Actually the practice of censorship in Egypt goes back to when the first printing press was introduced by Napoleon. He had two censors. One for French and one for Arabic. The practice continued with Muhammad Ali, the Khedive Ismail and on into the 20th century during the monarchy and the war periods. At each time the previous laws were lokked at and made better or worse.

BOB: From my discussions with other publishers, the period before the revolution was very open and free for publication.

AUC: At that time there were laws and they were applied, but there was more open discussion and publishers could challenge the censor and get there book published.

BOB: From what the other publishers said, the government does not get involved very often and when they do, they must go through the courts.

AUC: There have been cases where a book was censored by the courts. In this case, they said that it was pornography, but it wasn't. The book was written by the former lover of Nasser's head of security, and what they were trying to do was protect the names of people who are still alive and in government.

BOB: Do you have to submit everything you publish to some government authority for approval.

AUC: Yes.

BOB: Most of the books that I've seen at AUC Press tend not to be controversial, mostly histories, art and architecture and of course, Naguib Mahfouz.

AUC: Let me put it this way, most of the books that they let through tend not to be controversial. We publish (or try) what we think is good. We do not practice any form of self censorship.

BOB: Are you saying that the government has stopped you from publishing books?

AUC: Oh yes, they have forbidden publication of several

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books. For instance, MUBARRAK'S EGYPT by Robert Springhorne, RELIGIOUS STRIFE IN EGYPT, EGYPT FROM NASSER TO MUBARRAK and several others. These books have since been published outside Egypt, but the ban forbids their import as well. The censors don't always make sense either, There was another book that was banned for remarks critical of the government, when the same remarks had already been published in the opposition papers. It is hard to figure out.

ROB: What other types of problems do you run into with publishing, paper quotas, supplies, things like that?

AUC: Since we are not subsidized, we have no restrictions or quotas on paper, ink or the like. The most daunting problem is the censorship. And since the law says there is no censorship, we really have no recourse. In addition, we also have dificulty pursuing it because of the special nature of the university and its status as a non-political institution. This also brings into play the question of whether the publication of a book is a political act. Could the argument be made by the Egyptians that we are violating our charter by pushing this issue. Personally, I don't think that it would be, because to disseminate ideas is part of the education process. You can't divorce education from ideas. We do not advocate any political view. We do not censor any political ideas in the books. We do not take any political position. We are more concerned with it as an educational act. But those who wish to censor will always find a way to characterize the mere presentation of ideas as a hostile act. This is the definition of censorship. So we are somewhat restricted in our ability to fight back.

ROB: So if the University were pressed, would they not be able to, or not be inclined to try to take something like this to court?

AUC: It is something that makes us hesitant. As a publisher we want to publish but we have to go through AUC to contact anyone. Their initial reaction is not to do anything. Now if we went to them and demanded it, I don't know what they would say. The reaction so far is "lets keep it out of the courts" and "lets not put AUC on the line.

ROB: Do you or anyone else ever go personally to whoever is responsible for the censorship, and try to get decisions changed.

AUC: I t used to be during Nasser's era that any publisher had the right to know why a book was censored. Even a religious book that was submitted to Al-Azhar or the Coptic Church and was censored could be challenged. The publishers of any religious books or books on Islam must submit them to one or both of these authorities for approval. But during Nasser's rule if a book was censored, the publisher had a

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right to go to that authority and discuss it, and find the reason why.

ROB: Moving on to the business end of the press, are most of your sales inside of Egypt or outside.
AUC: Most of our sales are inside Egypt because we don't always have the rights to publish abroad. We have various arrangements with other publishers and distributors for distribution of our material abroad. For instance Columbia University Press distributes for us in North America.

ROB: I understand that you have the sole rights for publishing Naguib Mahfouz's works in English.

AUC: We have the underlying rights to his works, we are also his agents and have been for about 15 years. The first contract we had was 1978, but we had a relationship even before then. Two people at AUC, Dr Ahmed Assawi and Dr Rodenbeck both felt he was a great writer, and one of them even said at the time that he was a potential Nobel winner. This contract was for English rights only. He was already a respected writer in Egypt and had been for years. He had been writing since the late 30s and already had an Arabic publisher in Maktab al Misr. In addition, as his agent, we have sold the English translation rights for North America to Doubleday. We still publish our own English paperback translations here in Egypt. There are also other published who have the rights outside Egypt and North America.

ROB: I understand that Mr. Mahfouz has chosen not to publish CHILDREN OF GEBALAWI.

AUC: No, actually it was banned by Al-Azhar. After he won the Nobel prize, President Mubarrak said during a ceremony that there is no censorship in Egypt. Mr Mahfouz was then pressed to publish it. But he is quoted as saying that he will not, until Al Azhar approves it. He continued to say that even though he could fight and probably win, he felt that Egypt has enough problems and that he doesn't need to add one more.

ROB: I do understand that it has been published in Arabic in Beirut. If somebody were to bring it in, would it be possible to sell it.

AUC: Yes, in fact it is available in Egypt in a "plain brown wrapper".

ROB: In terms of upcoming English translations, what are your plans.

AUC: The second novel of the trilogy is due out at the end of 1990, I belive. The working title is PALACE OF DESIRE. Also, the translator has started on the third volume. There

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is also a collection of short stories due out in 1991.

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UNDERSTANDING EGYPTIAN CULTURE

by

Sherri Knight and Glenda Brogoitti

Fulbright/Hays Summer Seminar, 1990

Egypt

Understanding Egyptian Culture

Objectives

1. Students will have a better understanding of modern Egyptian culture with emphasis on teenagers.
2. Although differences will be evident, similarities will be stressed to promote insight into and acceptance of a third world culture.

Activities

Divide class into small groups and allow each group to focus on questions to stimulate discussion to determine concepts of teenagers in Egypt. (e.g. which aspect of this culture do you consider most positive? most similar to yours?) Allow time for discussion and write consensus on overhead. Then hand out copies of interviews to the groups and have them correct or confirm their previous opinions/ concepts.

Evaluation

Have each student write how the interviews and class discussion altered their concepts of modern Egyptian society.

TEACHER NOTES

The following information was gleaned from speeches, interviews, lectures and informal conversation while studying at the American University in Cairo on a Fulbright/Hays scholarship, 1990.

A good reference book for insight into the Arab World is The Arabs by David Lamb, Vintage Press, 1987. This book includes an excellent description of life in Cairo. The teenagers interviewed were urban middle or upper class. Without an interpreter it was impossible to interview lower socio/economic classes.

Education

Public schools are organized into three divisions - elementary, preparatory, and secondary. Attendance through eighth grade is compulsory, but many do not attend school at all. Part of the mandated curriculum includes English classes, usually beginning in preparatory school, and a third language added in high school. To receive academic secondary certification, graduating seniors must pass a final exam, called Thanawiya Amma. Currently, there is a push to encourage at least seventy per-cent of all students to attend technical high schools. Class sizes average fifty plus students with a beginning teacher's salary of the equivalent of $25.00 per month

Private schools are flourishing as Egyptian parents (who can afford it) see education as the key for success for their children. Classes are smaller, (twenty to twenty-five per class) and these schools can attract the better teachers by offering higher pay and better working conditions. The opportunity for tutoring (extra money) is also greater. Most of these schools are considered language schools with all subjects taught in that particular language (usually English, French, or German) except for social studies, which is taught in Arabic to promote cultural heritage.

A public university education is free to all students who pass the Thanawiya Amma. Large numbers attend causing overcrowding in classes. (Many have over one thousand students) Because of the lack of classroom space, many students take exams and graduate without ever attending class.

CAIRO

The population is fifteen million (almost 1/3 of Egypt) and growing at a rate of 400,000 per year. Housing, transportation and public services cannot meet the demands of this expanding population. Efforts have been made to move people to planned satellite cities using tax incentives but with few responding. Rents were frozen in the '50's in all then existing apartments which has resulted in owners allowing buildings to deteriorate, while owners of new apartments require large down payments ($15,000 - $40.00) from those wanting to rent. Many young people now delay marriage while saving the necessary money for housing.

Although there is much poverty, the crime rate is very low. Basic food (i.e. bread and sugar) is plentiful and cheap through government subsidies.

Over 95% of Cairo is Moslem and less than 5% is Coptic Christian. (In all of Egypt, 90% is Moslem and 10% Coptic Christian.)

Despite its problems, poverty and noise, Cairo and its people are unique and charming.

Name: Mona Mansour
Age: 17

Although I was born in Kuwait, my parents are Egyptian and we have lived in Cairo for the last ten years. My father is an engineer and was educated at Cairo University, but has spent much of his life working in Kuwait. Both my parents speak French and Arabic. My brother and I speak Arabic, French and English.

My family is Muslim. My mother covers her hair but allows me to choose, and I choose not to cover mine. My father goes to the mosque on Friday.

I attended private schools and graduated from secondary school at 16. I had to take an exam, which was both multiple choice and essay, over each subject to get my secondary certificate.

In my leisure time I go out with friends, male and female, to discos, movies or amusement parks. I have never dated - it is not allowed. When I go out at night, I wear make-up and dress up. At school, I frequently wear jeans. Sometimes when I have free time, I visit my grandmother in Nasr City.

I presently attend American University in Cairo as a business major. When I graduate, I would like to return to Kuwait and establish my own business.

My favorite food is foul and tai'mia (beans). I drink Pepsi and lemmonade (no alcohol). I don't have much time to watch television because of studying but I do enjoy "Knot's Landing." I do not watch news nor do I read a newspaper.

My future mate, whom I'll meet through family or friends, must have a strong personality, be handsome, and, of course, love me very much.

I have never been to the USA, but I would like to. I think American teenagers have more freedom than we do.

Name: Mohammed Seneh
Age: 16

I live in Cairo with my father, mother and sister. I am a muslem. I go to the mosque on Friday with my father. My mother and sister do not go.

I go to a private English school. We study all subjects in English except for social studies. Classes last for 45 minutes. We have three minutes in between classes. Our teachers change rooms, not the students. We have both men and women teachers. Last year I studied Arabic, math, social studies (world history), English and French.

Sometimes students are not always disciplined. Teachers take off on conduct grades or send them to the headmistress. Students do not want their parents called. It is very embarassing. If they ever called my mother she would not speak to me for days which would make me feel bad.

Although I would like to study in another country, I will probably go to a university in Cairo. To study engineering, I will have to score 75% on my secondary certificate exam. It covers all subjects.

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For fun, I watch T.V., play on my computer and read about lasers and scientific things. I go out with my friends to the sports club, restaurants and the movies. My favorite foods are Egyptian, such as molokia - a mint soup. I also like pizza, hamburgers and Pepsi.

When I marry, I would like my bride to be intelligent, funny and someone I can talk to with understanding.

I have traveled to Italy and Greece. I would also like to go to Germany, Turkey and America. I would like for Americans to come to Egypt. They will find Egyptians to be very warm and generous.

The one big problem we have is that too many people live in Cairo. They move here instead of living where they grew up. This needs to change.

It is important to keep our ancient monuments and protect them. This is my country and my heritage.

Name: Mustafa Sawy
Age: 16

I have always lived in Cairo near the Citadel. I have three brothers and one sister but all are married and have left home except my twenty-six year old brother. He cannot afford an apartment and he can't get married until he can provide housing so he may be living at home for a long time. My mother has never worked outside the home. My father makes metal door decorations and works in Saudi Arabia. He comes home for a few weeks each year. My family is muslim.

I attend a public school where last year I studied English, French, Arabic, history, geography, math and chemistry. I play basketball in my p.e. class. (I am a fan of the"Harlem Sixers.") My classes last forty-five minutes each. There are only boys in my school. All the teachers are male except for two women who teach German. The classrooms are crowded - about fifty in each class - and dirty. A few teachers seem interested in us but most seem to be just interested in soliciting students for tutoring. If students do not like a teacher, the students are loud, unruly and act like dogs. Only one student owns a car.

School starts in September and ends in May. We have Friday and Saturday off from school. We also have several national and religious holidays such as October 6th. During Ramadan we are supposed to go to school but because of the fast, few actually attend that month.

I want to go to a university and study politics. First, I have to pass an exam to get my secondary certificate. It is difficult to pass the exam without tutoring. If I don't go to university, I have to enter the army at age 20. The length of your service depends on your education. If you have university plans, you have to serve only one year and it can be deferred. A prep school education means two years in the army and if you have never attended school, you have to serve for three years.

In my leisure time, I go out with male friends. I have never dated - it is not acceptable. My friends and I go to the cinema (Sylvester Stallone is my favorite actor), listen to rap music at a disco or play basketball at a government club for the handicapped. (Even though I'm not hand-capped they let us use the facilities.) I also watch television and read the newspaper. I do not talk on the phone because my family does not have one.

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All my friends smoke so I do too sometimes. I have drunk part of a beer before, but never a whole one.

When I marry someday, I will look for someone who has good manners. It is not important that she is pretty.

I think American teenagers get to spend time with their girlfriends. They leave their families at age 16-18. They all have cars. Only one student in my school has a car. I would like to visit America someday.

LINDA KREFT

EGYPTIAN PAINTING AND RELIEF

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Ancient Egyptian Painting: Notes and Classroom Methods page 4
Multicultural Arts Guidelines page 6
Style and Conventions of Egyptian Art page 7
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Introduction and background notes

Much of what we know about the civilization of ancient Egypt comes to us through its art, particularly from its temples and tombs, which because of the favorable climate, has been preserved in large quantities. The Egyptians did not compose 'art for art sake'. What are now regarded as their works of art were produced to fulfill specific functions, either in religious or everyday contexts. (The Egyptian Museum Catalogue, Philipp von Zabern, p. 18) Thus the decoration of tombs and temples had a ritual purpose, whose aim was to depict the major figures of the tomb owner, the king and deities in the timeless, idealized worlds of the dead and the gods. Although the depiction was conceived in terms of this world, by making the scenes independent of time and space the artist was able to symbolize an eternal, abstract world; this gave a very formal and static character to religious art. By contrast, in the nobles tombs scenes that did not involve the major figure of the tomb owner and in domestic art the artist often depicted scenes and activities that were part of the transient world around him with all the vitality and immediacy of everyday life.

"Few artistic compositions can be assigned to a particular artist, and although some individual names have come down to us it is clear that the production of artistic work was usually undertaken by a team of men working together. Each team seems to have been led by a master draughtsman who probably conceived the original design and then oversaw each stage of production, correcting the work of his men where necessary and perhaps adding the final touches". (Egyptian Painting and Relief by Gay Robins; Shire Egyptology. p. 7).

The center of religious life in ancient Egypt were the temples. Many of these magnificent buildings still stand today. While the pyramids were built in a relatively short time, the temples grew up over hundreds of years, and were added to and altered.

Some temples were built to honor the dead, but most of them were built for the gods. They were not places of worship, like churches or mosques are today. They were places where the god actually lived. In each temple there was a shrine containing the god's statue.

Where was the god to be found? Not in the entrance halls, courtyards, storerooms and towers around the outside. To reach the shrine of the god you had to make your way through a series of doors to the very center of the building. Each room was smaller and darker than the one before. The last room was tiny and airless. It had no windows. Here was the life-giving statue of the god. The statue was rarely removed from the shrine. But sometimes a procession would be held, and the idol would be carried through the streets in a boat made of gold. No one of the peasantry saw the statue; only the priests and priestesses and the king would ever see the image of a god.

Every day the priests of the temple would wash, dress and even make up the statues of the gods. People would give the priests food such as bread, cakes and meat. They would eat this on behalf of the god. The ancient Egyptians probably had over 3,000 gods and goddesses. Each village had its own, but some were more important than others.

"Many of them were linked with particular animals. By the pharaonic times, most had been partly humanized into animal-headed gods. Khnum, for instance, was shown with the head of a ram. Thoth had the head of an ibis, and Anubis that of a jackal. Animals sacred to the gods were mummified when they died, just like humans. As in ancient Greece and Rome, there were gods and goddesses which represented the sun (Ra), the sky (Nut), the air (Shu), and the earth (Geb), Maat was the goddesses of truth and justice. Its freewheeling mastery of the sky and the fierce arrogance of its sharp beak and darting glance made the falcon one of the major embodiments of divinity for the ancient Egyptians. There were a number of falcon gods, including Sokar, Nemty, and the warlike Montu. Foremost among them, and one of the most important of all Egyptian gods, was Horus, in whom the majesty and lordliness of the bird were preeminent. Originally a sky god, Horus became the tutelary deity of Upper Egypt. From the beginning of Dynasty I, he was identified with kingship, both in a general sense and as embodying the divinity inherent in each reigning king, whose first title was always 'Horus.' Like all the major gods, Horus had many aspects and could be represented as a falcon-headed man, as a naked child, or as Harakhity (Horus of the Horizon, god of the sun in the daytime sky—a male figure, sometimes mummiform, with a bird's head crowned by a sun disk. When emphasis was on his role as the great national and royal god, however, he often appeared in his original, wholly animal form". (Egyptian Art. The Metropolitan Museum of Art. pgs 4, 53).

Why did the ancient Egyptians place so much importance on death? Why did they fill their tombs with treasure and bury such beautiful things underground? Over the ages, Egypt seems to have given its wealth to the dead rather than the living, Why?

A funeral procession was not in fact a sad occasion, for everyone believed a new life had begun when the person had died. Belief in life after death was so strong, that it seemed only natural to take one's possessions along on the final journey of all. Ancient Egyptians enjoyed life just as we do, but believed that if the funeral was arranged correctly, the dead person could live on in a sunny, happy land.

The Egyptians believed that every person had several souls. One of them was a personal spirit—the ka. When someone died, most of these souls left the body. In the afterlife they took on various forms, such as that of a bird with a human head. The ka, however, stayed attached to the body, which it looked after.

A dead body had to be preserved properly, or the ka would be destroyed along with the body. This was why the ancient Egyptians mummified dead bodies. Corpses were prepared with special ointments and bandages. Embalmed in this way, the mummies of humans—and animals too—have survived for thousands of years.

Tombs were filled with furniture, means of transportation such as chariots and boats, with clothes, food and vessels in which to store the food. There were weapons, and gaming boards to while away the time. "Representation of the tomb owner, along with his name and titles, were the most important feature of any decorated Egyptian tomb. They were not only numerous, but also larger and often more carefully worked than the images of anyone else". (Egyptian Art. The Metropolitan Museum of Art. p. 6).

Adequate provisioning for the afterlife was a paramount concern to Egyptians of every social and occupational class. While funerary offerings and activities of everyday life were most often portrayed in relief during the Old Kingdom, small painted models placed in the tomb became increasingly prevalent during the First Intermediate Period as a more effective way of perpetually ensuring the necessities and pleasures of life. In the underworld as in everyday life, the Nile was the highway for commerce and travel, and riverine craft were therefore necessary equipment for the deceased.

"Despite the variety of its content, all Egyptian funerary literature served the fundamental purpose of providing the deceased with a compendium of magical spells that would facilitate entry into the underworld. From the New Kingdom onward, these spells were written most frequently on papyrus and included original compositions as well as derivatives of the earlier Pyramid Texts and Coffin Texts. The spells and their accompanying vignettes are collectively known as the Book of the Dead; only a selection occurs on any one papyrus, with the texts apparently arranged in random order". (Egyptian Art. The Metropolitan Museum of Art. p. 45).

EGYPTIAN PAINTING AND RELIEF

GENERALIZATION

The art of a culture can communicate information about that culture.

CONCEPTS

ritual symbols temple art funerary art perspective

OBJECTIVES

1. To enable students to understand that the art of ancient Egypt can be appreciated by understanding that works of art were produced to fulfill specific functions, either in religious or everyday contaxts.

2.To introduce and develop the concept that few artistic compositions can be assigned to a particular artist, and that although some individual names have come down to us it is clear that the production of artistic work was usually undertaken by a team of artists and craftsmen working together.

RESOURCES

Resources for teachers
  Egyptian Painting and Relief (Introduction and background notes)
  The Style and Conventions of Egyptian Art
  Slides (narrative of slides included)
  Bibliography
Resources for Children
  Ancient Egyptian Painting
  Bibliography of Children's Books

PROCEDURE

Select images from the slide list which can be found in The Egyptian Museum Official Catalogue or other sources of artwork found in the teachers bibliography. Try to select art from the temples, tombs and objects used in everyday life.

Topics for discussion from the slides:

—Principles of representation
—Materials and techniques
—Formal scenes having a ritual purpose
—Art in domestic life and informal contexts

Introduce the Style and Conventions of Egyptian Art by having the students read:

—Ancient Egyptian Painting: Principles of Representation.

Show comparisons between the Plates and the Images or Slides from the Nobles Tombs. Point out various concepts used in Egyptian Painting:

—objects shown two-dimensionally
—use of the system of horizontal registers placed vertically above one another objects organized by a system of scale

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ANCIENT EGYPTIAN PAINTING

PRINCIPLES OF REPRESENTATION

Egyptian two-dimensional representational acquired a distinctive character around the beginning of the Dynastic Period and, despite the various changes and developments that occurred, it remains distinctly Egyptian. Essentially, a set of accepted symbols was used to encode information for the viewer to read, so that drawings of figures and objects can be regarded as diagrams of what they represent. The artist showed things in what were regarded as their real forms, and there was no place for what would have been seen as the distortion of perspective. In this sense, Egyptian art is considered conceptual rather than perceptual. Objects were usually shown in their characteristic or most visually satisfying aspect, two-dimensionally on the flat drawing surface, without depth. (see plate 1) The schematic nature of Egyptian representation is clearly shown in drawings of gardens laid out around a pool (see plate 2). The water appears as a rectangle, on the surface of which may be drawing plants, birds, fish or boats; in real terms, some of these are actually in the water, while others are floating on it. The whole is actually an efficient plan of a garden which is readily understood and convertible into real terms. Originally, figures had been scattered in disorder over decorated surfaces. From the Early Dynastic Period, artists began to divide the drawing surface into horizontal registers placed vertically above one another (see plate 3). The system of registers was a purely a method of ordering the material places upon it. It was never developed into spatial or time relationships between the different registers; nor to develop pictorial depth by placing the objects further or higher away from the viewer. In any one register, the lower register line was used as the baseline for the figures within it. Escape from the formal use of registers developed in battle scenes, where forces associated with chaos rather than the ordered world were depicted (see plate 4). In

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addition to the system of registers, material was organized according to the system of scale, which was used to encode the relative importance of the figures. The larger the figure, the greater the importance of the figures. The king (pharaoh) may overlook scenes in four or five registers and is also often shown larger than other members of his family (see plate 5).

VOCABULARY

symbol

perspective

two-dimensional

registers

scale

MATERIALS

paper

grid paper

opaque tempera

brushes

STUDENT APPLICATIONS

Begin a painting in the style of Egyptian two-dimensional art by gridding the paper. Draw figures using the system of registers and scale of the figures as the Egyptians in the Eighteenth Dynasty.
Paint plants and animals as used symbolically.

RESOURCES

A book of Ancient Egypt.
Bellerophon Books

Egyptian Painting and Relief.
Gay Robins, Shire Egyptology

EXPECTED LEARNER OUTCOMES

ART MAKING	HERITAGE	AESTHETICS	CRITICISM
Learn to see and create with lines, colors, texture, and shapes using the style and the	Perceive the narrative quality of art	Express ideas in a personal way	Be able to talk about a work of art based on its visual content

aesthetic of the Ancient Egyptians

TEACHER	STRATEGIES	MOTIVATIONS
Introduction to flora and fauna of Egyptian paintings. Talk about the content, use of grids, registers and scale in Egyptian two-dimensional art	Bring out in discussion how the paintings depict scenes of royal life, animals, plants in their environment, etc.	Lead discussions on visual content. How the paintings can depict a style of an artist or a group of people using the same style and/or addressing similar subjects

EVALUATIONS

Did the students successfully depict composition using gods or royalty in the style and aesthetic of ancient art, yet express their own individual content and image?	Can the student narrate the scene?	Can the student discuss their work in terms of content?

MULTICULTURAL GOALS

1. Knowledge: examination of a variety of cultures, both past and present, at home and abroad, and knowledge of the tools (i.e., concepts) needed to carry out such an examination; knowledge of history, the arts, and literature of our own and of other cultures; knowledge of the basic values expressed in our nation's political, economic, and social institutions and those of other cultures

2. Language: communication skills, including awareness of and appreciation for languages other than English; multiple language competencies within cultural contexts.

3. Geographic Literacy: knowledge of basic physical and cultural geography. We must teach the dynamic nature of cultures.

4. Global Literacy: introduction to basic concepts of social studies, such as interdependence, conflict, context, and multiple perspectives; practice in social interaction skills, including cooperative learning methods and listening and looking at things from another point of view, that lay the groundwork for participation in democratic decision-making.

5. Values: activities that increase awareness of beliefs and values, both the student's own and those of other peoples.

Kreft, L. (1988). Multicultural art: a learning process. Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

MULTICULTURAL ARTS GUIDELINES

1. Examine cultural particulars before moving to universals. Teachers should help students to recognize that the study of culture is inherently value laden. One usually

perceives the values of another culture from the perspective of one's own values; this inhibits the understanding of the other culture's art. Therefore, the more knowledge students can acquire, the less dominant will be that bias of perception and the more likely the students will recognize the validity of a particular art form. Moreover, the specific meaning attributed to an art object will be distorted and/or incorrect if features universal to all cultures are used to provide meaning to the work of art. Students must be made aware of cultural particulars before studying universals or they will miss the uniqueness of the art form.

2. Attempt to see the art forms of other cultures as creative expressions of individual artists. Teachers and students should place themselves as often as possible in the position of the artist making the expression in order to understand the cultural context in which the artist is communicating.

3. View culture as dynamic rather than static. Different factors (people, places, and events) effect the development of a culture in different ways. The dynamic nature of culture and the effect that it has on art forms should be taught. Every culture has a past, present, and future. The art of a culture should be studied within and across critical periods and influences in the development of the culture.

4. Examine specific elements of the art objects within the context of the culture. Specific art forms of a culture, whether in the past or present cannot be fully understood outside the context of the culture.

5. Recognize that the similarities and differences within a culture as diverse as the similarities and differences among cultures. Just as there are similarities and differences among cultures, there are similarities and differences within cultures. The students must be made aware of the danger of stereotyping a total culture based upon the examination of one art object from that culture. Any culture consists of numerous individuals each of whom views and values that culture from his or her own perspective.

6. Recognize the concept of cultural validity. An art object gains cultural validity when it is studied in relationship to geography, history, language and government. Each culture must be appreciated for its own values and expression.

7. Discover that initial rejection of an art object or an alternative cultural viewpoint can be overcome with persistence and new knowledge. Bias is not taught but acquired by the experience of being born into, growing, and living within a particular culture. Because of bias is developed over a long period of time, it is very difficult to transcend. New knowledge replaces ignorance; persistence as a teacher in helping students to acquire this new knowledge will give them a higher level of sensitivity toward other culture's art forms.

Kreft, L. (1988). Multicultural art: a learning process. Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

THE STYLE AND CONVENTIONS OF EGYPTIAN ART

Art in the works of man is the expression of an aesthetic ideal. All art, no matter what historical period it derives from, is distinguished by its own aesthetic, rules and manner of expression; in other words, its own style. In each artistic endeavor, the process of representation has a stimulating motive, and the object or theme reproduced has its own significance, for a representation aspires to fix an idea, a real or imaginary situation by means of pure figuration, of symbols or of abstraction.

Egyptian art, like all other art, was aware since its inception of its own aesthetic, its conventions and objectives. If we understand art in this sense, then such statements as: "Art for its own sake did not exist in Egypt;" "Egyptian art is exclusively funerary;" or even: It was intended only as a tool to serve the requirements of eternity," become unnecessary. For if a concern for aesthetics, as we define art today, had not existed from the beginning, then Art itself would never have existed at all in Egypt.

However, let us take care to avoid the pitfall of claiming that Egyptian art is merely an "instrument" for serving the requirements of eternity. Judging from what we can glimpse, furtive as it might be, of life on earth, we know, for example, that the officials' houses at Tell el-Armarna we as richly decorated as the Theban tombs, whose painted walls we admire so much. Furthermore, the workmen's village of craftsmen and artists at Deir el-Medina, far from being an agglomeration of huts, contains comfortable houses built of stone, decorated with paintings, and provided with altars for the worship of the gods. We know that the royal palaces gleamed every bit as brightly as the divine temples, whose archaeological remains permit us to reconstruct their original splendor.

In art, as elsewhere, form will ultimately depend upon function, and function upon aim and purpose, and, paradoxical as it may seem, the rigidly canonical character of Egyptian art was the logical consequence of the esoteric purpose imposed upon it as a result of its cultic functions.

A substantial part of Egyptian art was never intended to be seen by mortal eyes, the manifestation of decorative and aesthetic qualities can not have been its principal aim, which was undoubtedly of a metaphysical and magical nature.

It was, in fact, a belief in the magical reality of art, its presumed power to perpetuate on a fourth-dimensional plane beyond space and time, the life and existence of its models which gave impetus to the unparalleled artistic productivity of the Egyptians.

Since all phenomena, animate as well as inanimate, had a common existence in the reality of art they were all 'alive' in their artistic manifestations; and no essential difference existed between them. All categories of representation were therefore subjected to the same basic law, that no phenomenon should be represented in accordance with its momentary form of appearance in time and space but as it would appear sub specie aeterni to an observer beyond time and space.

Wherever possible, each individual object and each detail should be represented in its entirely, with all aspects accounted for, with no parts hidden or distorted by shifts of perspective, because parts omitted or not seen, were considered missing, and any deviation from the factual appearance of things was regarded as a natural deficiency, bound to mar the eternal image of the objects they represented.

Nowhere was the satisfaction of these demands considered more important than in the representation of the human body, throughout the history of Egyptian art always the principal objective of representation, and the ultimate aim of artistic activity.

Principal figures (kings) were consequently shown at an indeterminate age, neither old nor young, and in an impersonal form of appearance, obviously conforming to a conventional conception of bodily health and vigour. Almost all representations were distinguished by the insignia of their principal offices and the marks of their rank, obviously in order to secure their social status and position in the cosmic hierarchy.

Egyptian artists always remained anonymous craftsmen with the significant exception of the Armarna period, which, also from an artistic point of view, represents an explosive, and in the history of Egypt unparalleled, outburst of individualism.

When describing works of art, the Egyptians frequently referred to them as 'true' with the obvious meaning of correctly proportioned; but otherwise no contemporary source informs us about any personal attitude towards art.

Creative artists have everywhere and at all times been faced with the problem how to manifest and visualize their theories. Each theory presented its own Egyptian demand for standardized timeless reality, with complete proportional accordance of model and reproduction, led directly to the introduction of a canonical system of proportion.

As deduced from the monuments and the grids, ingeniously invented for the practical application of the system of proportion, the technical and unspeculative character of the Egyptian canon is evident and indisputable; and like most other systems of human proportions that of the Egyptians served but one basic purpose: that of making sculptural representations of the human figure conform to the natural proportions of the body. In its practical presentation the canon was, therefore, based on remarkably accurate standardizations of the natural relations of the various parts of human anatomy, such as the relation of thumb to fingers, of fingers to palm, of palm to fore-arm to height and breadth, expressed in simple numerical terms geometrically reflected in grids based on the fist. In practice, the entire system had the great advantage that it could be directly applied to sculptural representations by any craftsman who had been taught the correct placing of the various parts in the grids.

SLIDES

The Egyptian Museum Cairo: List of Slides
Numbers in parentheses correspond to the Official Catalogue for the
Egyptian Museum Cairo

Vase with painted decoration
Predynastic Period, Nagada II, 3500-3100 B.C.

A predynastic pottery having painted designs in red on a buff background. The motifs typically reflect a marshy river environment with birds and a mysterious plant, tentatively identified as the Abyssinian banana tree. Among the natural features, like the jump antelopes, are those which suggest religious ritual. This seems the most likely interpretation of the boat with many oars and the dancing women. (Egyptian Art. Eva Wilson. Diagrams 16 and 17)

Jar with painted decoration
New Kingdom, 19th Dynasty, reign of Ramses II, ca. 1290-1224

Pottery was not decorated in Egypt after the Predynastic Period, except during a brief period in the 19th Dynasty. Painted pottery enjoyed a wide popularity during the 19th Dynasty. The painting imitates, for funerary uses, the floral arrangements with which such vessels were ornamented during the festivals. The ornament of garlands and flowers is painted in light blue on a cream slip with minor details in black and red.

Oval Basket Coffin with rectangular lid
Archaic Period, 1-2 Dynasty
Tarkhan near Kafr Ammar

Most Egyptian baskets were made by the coiling method. Baskets were used as coffins in the Archaic period in Egypt.

Four Canopic Jars of Inpuhotep (97)
Sakkara, Middle Kingdom, 12th Dynasty, c. 1900 B.C.

Canopic jars are urns of ceramic or stone which the Egyptians used from the Old Kingdom onwards to store the liver, lungs, stomach and intestines of the deceased.taken from the process of mummification. The term comes from the village named Canopus by the Greeks, once rich in vessels with stoppers in the form of Osiris. At first the stoppers were used to seal the jars. Later jars were crowned with human heads; eventually taking the form of four separate heads of the four sons of Horus: Imsety, Hapi, Duamutef, and Qebsennuef.

Four Canopic Jars in limestone
Intermediate Period, 22nd Dynasty.

Four Canopic Jars
Four sons of Horus
Painted limestone, Middle Kingdom, 12th Dynasty.

Canopic Jars of Tutankhamon (176)
New Kingdom, 18th Dynasty

Faience tiles as a border design with papyrus motif

Tiles of faience with prisoners (226)
New Kingdom, 20th Dynasty

The inlaying of tiles for the decoration of the palace was a common practice under the rule of Ramses III. The tiles were used in both residential and ritual temples made of polychrome faience inlaid into the walls, doorframes and columns. The favorite subjects chosen were cartouches, floral friezes, birds and numerous bound prisoners.

The first captive to the right is a Hittite with pale skin, hands tied behind his back, and striped skull-cap with a dotted rim. He wears a colorful short kilt and a garment tied at the shoulder. The second figure is a Bedouin Shasu from Syria with wrists held fast in a handcuff. The central figure, with elbows bound up at shoulder height, is the traditional Asiatic. The fourth prisoner is a Nubian. He wears a decorated collar and a short kilt over a long plaited robe with dotted fringe and belt. The fifth captive is a tattooed Libyan with hands bound in front of his body. On the other side of the tiles are found the incised impressions of manufacturers marks; these tiles were produced in large numbers.

Head of a falcon (66)
Old Kingdom, 6th Dynasty

This falcon's head in beaten gold was found in the temple at Hierakonpolis. It belonged to a bronze statue of the falcon Horus, patron deity of this city, which was the predynastic capital of Upper Egypt.

Ostracon with painted sketches
New Kingdom, 20th Dynasty
Figured ostraca (chips of limestone) often display simple sketches or student's trial pieces; many times the first draft of an artist's design.

Ostracon of a praying scribe (231)
New Kingdom, 20th Dynasty
This limestone plaque is decorated with drawings and inscriptions in the name of the scribe Amenhotep. Amenhotep is represented kneeling, with shaven head, wearing a wide kilt with a scalloped front panel. The prayer to the god Thoth, the god of learning and patron of scribes is written all around the kneeling figure in a cursive hieroglyphic script.

Illustrations (232)
Papyrus
New Kingdom, 20th Dynasty
Two illustrations appear on this papyrus: lady mouse served by cats, and foxes acting as shepherds. Drawings in which animals replace humans are often found on papyrus and ostraca. They illustrate stories, fables or proverbs.

Amulets representing figures of gods
Made of Faience: Harpocrates, Thoth and Ptah Soker

Horus
During the sixth season Prof. Emery worked at Sakkara searching for the tomb of Imhotep. He came across many galleries used in later times for animal burials (ibis, baboon and oxen) This mummified form is of the hawk, Horus.

Funeral sledge of Khonsu
New Kingdom, 19th Dynasty
Among the mummies found in the tomb of Sennedjem were those of his son Khonsu. This coffin which preserved, one within the other, the body of Khonsu are now in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York. This sarcophagus is one of the best decorated of its kind; paintings of rare beauty accompany the texts of exquisitely multicolored hieroglyphs.

Stela of Djedamoniuankh
Third Intermediate Period, 22nd Dynasty
This monument is known for its beauty of its painting, the excellent preservation of its colors and the originality of the lower register. The scene in the necropolis represents neither a procession nor offering bearers. In the desolate desert, the slope of the cliff into which the tomb has been cut is painted pink with white specks. The structure of a chapel is visible, surmounted by a pyramid and a staircase. In front are three more structures, each with a door. A crouching woman mourns her dead by tearing her hair. Behind her a sycamore and two date-palms represent the garden in which the ba of the deceased hopes to find shade, fresh air and water. An offering table with bread and a basin of water has been set up between the trees; on one of them a crow has begun to peck at the dates. The principal design above depicts a traditional adoration scene. The stela's owner, dressed in a transparent pleated robe and adorned with a broad collar and wig raises her delicate hands before Re-Horakhty. The falcon-headed god is

crowned with a sun-disk surrounded by a uraeus. The whole scene takes place under the sky sign bent in the form of an arch and supported by two was-scepters.

Shabti figures and boxes

A special class of model, the shabti figure was originally intended to provide a substitute residence for the ka. The earliest of these mummiform figures were made of wax or wood and often had their own small coffins. By the New Kingdom times, the concept of a substitute body had been expanded to include the idea of a substitute laborer. The figures then became carved of wood or stone and in addition to the deceased's name, they had directions written on them. Over time, increasing numbers of shabtis accompanied burials, ultimately a figure for each day of the year. Called ushabtis during the Late Period, these mummified figures continued to be included in burials until the end of the dynastic period.

Sarcophus of Kawit (detail)
Middle Kingdom, 11th Dynasty

PLATES

Canon and Proportions in Egyptian Art (Erik Iverson, second edition fully revised in collaboration with Yoshiaki Shibata; Aris and Phillips Ltd. Teddington House, Warminster, Wiltshire, BA12, 8PO, England, 1975. Plates printed in Denmark.

The sculptural canon used for proportioning of the human body in Egyptian art was fully developed and regularly applied to all main representations from the time of the fourth dynasty.

Plate 1:
(1) A typical Old Kingdom grid.
(2) While working at Saqqara during his (Lepsius) stay in Egypt between 1842 and 45, he discovered on the walls of the tombs a number of figures inscribed in the original guide-lines used by the ancient craftsmen for their execution.

Plate 2 and 3: Their height was not measured from the feet to the crown of the head, but to the point at the hairline of the forehead, along a vertical center-line passing through the ear and the fork of the legs to a point dividing the hindmost foot at the ratio of 1 to 2, thus dividing the trunk of the body into identical halves at the armpits. At intervals, identical to all figures belonging to this category, this center-line was intersected by horizontal lines marking the knee, the wrist, and the seat, the elbows, the armpits, the nape of the neck, and the canonical measuring point at the hairline.

Plate 4: In the position of some secondary details there are minor variations: the lower curve of the buttocks, placed at line 9 on plate 3, is placed at 9 1/2 on plate 4, the skirts are of different shape and therefore differently registered,

as is the position of the belts; and in the proportioning of certain horizontal measures.

Plate 8: Originally, figures had been scattered in disorder over decorated surfaces. From the Early Dynastic Period, artists began to divide the drawing surface into horizontal registers placed vertically above one another. The system of registers was purely a method of ordering the material places upon it. It was never developed into a spacial or time relationships between the different registers; nor to develop pictorial depth by placing the objects further or higher away from the viewer.

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FRENCH IN EGYPT:
ON-SITE RESEARCH IN CAIRO SUGGESTIVE OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF FRENCH LANGUAGE INSTRUCTION IN EGYPT

by

(Dr.) Carleen S. Leggett
Morgan State University
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(Research carried out at the
American University in Cairo
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The history of Egypt in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has been definitively marked by the French influence which began in earnest with the occupation of the troops of Napoléon Bonaparte in 1798. Napoléon and his army never succeeded in achieving the absolute control over the whole of Egypt which was their original intention. Thus, Egypt never actually became a French colony as did other areas of the African continent. In fact, less than a year after his arrival in the country, Napoléon himself left Egypt to return to France in preparation for his decisive coup d'état.

The story has often been recounted of Napoléon's soldiers breaking off part of the nose of the great Sphinx at Giza while using it for target practice. However, the French influence was felt in more significant ways, even after General Kléber had been assassinated and General Menou and his troops had been run out of the country in 1801. The great Egyptian leader Muhammad Ali, as part of his program of reforms in the early part of the nineteenth century, hired French officers to help organize a modernization of the Egyptian army. Muhammad Ali's son, Said, has been condemned for his gullibility in allowing his friend, the French consul Ferdinand de Lesseps, to lead him into making arrangements favorable to France but detrimental to Egypt for the construction of the Suez Canal. In later financial disagreements, the imbalance and injustice were magnified, for Napoléon III was jointly chosen by the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian government as arbiter of the dispute. By the end of the nineteenth century, an unfortunate pattern had been established of financial control of Egypt by France, England, and other European countries. As Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot points out in his excellent historical summary, A Short History of Modern Egypt, the system which developed --specifically the so-called "Law of Liquidation"--"effected a stranglehold on Egypt, which from that moment on was unable to move without European permission."[1]

Even after the French semi-colonial presence was largely supplanted by that of the British, France continued to have often negative entanglements with Egypt, particularly motivated by the facts that the Suez Canal Company was French and that the canal itself had been designed and its construction directed by a French engineer. Furthermore, during the Algerian war for independence from France, the latter country became convinced that the material and moral support which Egypt was providing was so decisive that the Algerian rebels' resistance would collapse without it. After Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956, France joined Britain and Israel in a military assault against Egypt. French, along with British and other foreign residents, were deported from Egypt in large numbers after the resolution by the United Nations of the ill-conceived attack, and negative feelings toward the French (and even more toward the British) remained and can be felt to persist to some degree even now.

This is not to suggest, however, that the relationship between France and Egypt has been entirely negative. On the contrary, the unfortunate past quasi-colonial, military, and grossly unfair financial involvement of France in Egyptian affairs has been accompanied by an active cultural interchange which has had a marked influence on the political and educational system of France's African neighbor. When Napoléon Bonaparte first arrived in Egypt, he brought with him not only soldiers, but scholars. Thus began a French fascination with ancient Egyptian culture which perhaps reached its zenith with the work of the famous Egyptologist Champollion and the removal of an Egyptian obelisk to the Place de la Concorde, and which continues to this day.

The Egyptian legal system is based, as the reader may be aware, not on English common law, but on the French system. The same is true for Egypt's educational structure, particularly through the first half of this century. As current Egyptian Minister of Education Fathy Serour has pointed out,[2] before Egyptian independence in 1952, it was French culture, rather than that of the British occupying Egypt, which influenced the leaders of educational reform, many of whom earned degrees from France. This was the case with the well-known literary figure, Education Minister, and proponent of universal free education, Taha Hussayn, whose wife was French and who had obtained his advanced degree in France. The most recent curriculum reforms are being modeled on the American system of education, and (as indicated by Egyptian curriculum specialist Prof. Kaysar Kujuk[3]) USAID advisers are actively involved in current planning. However, before independence, the school system was definitively French-based. It was more common for the educated Egyptian to study French as a first foreign language, and French was widely considered the language of the elite upper class.

In recent times, of course, this situation has changed--to the extent that even such a well-educated, trilingual (Arabic, English, and French) Egyptian citizen as Ezzat Naguib,[4] Coordinator of Special Programs for the American University in Cairo, maintains that English is now the lingua franca of the elite native and foreign population of his country. Certainly, the visitor to Egypt is struck by the almost universal current use of English along with Arabic on street and subway signs, on forms and signs connected with business and the foreign tourist trade, etc. Although it is certainly not within the province of this study to draw conclusions about the phenomenon, it does strike any American visitor to Egypt that the use of English may very well have psychological and/or sociological, as well as practical, motivations, since the open friendliness toward and apparently sincere fondness for American (as opposed to British--or French) tourists is so very evident.

Despite the fact that the English language is currently more widely written and spoken by large numbers of Egyptians than French, the presence of the Francophone idiom is nevertheless still very strongly present in Egypt. It is, in fact, after English, the second most commonly used and studied foreign language among the Egyptian populace, placing well ahead of other foreign languages taught in some schools in the country, such as German and Italian. An interview with Monsieur Denis Kohler, who is Attaché Culturel Chargé des Problèmes de l'Enseignement at the French Embassy in Cairo,[5] revealed that approximately two million students in public, government-run schools are presently engaged in the study of French, one million five hundred thousand of these pursuing French for three years (as their second foreign language) and five hundred thousand taking French for six years (as their first foreign language). There is, however, a serious shortage of well-prepared foreign language teachers in the public schools, as attested to by Mrs. Fayza Fawzi el-Gawli, a former public school language instruction inspector.[6] This is due largely to the unfortunate combination of greatly overcrowded classes and low teacher salaries, which contribute to the flight of competent teachers from public to private school instruction.

Most parents, Mrs. el-Gawli stated, prefer, if they are financially able, to send their children, for primary and secondary education, to private schools, which offer smaller classes and higher quality instruction. This sentiment was confirmed by Mr.

Naguib[7]--who himself studied at a private French-language school, and who is now sending his children to a private English-language school--and by Mrs. Mary Kickham-Samy,[8] whose daughter is studying by choice at a private French-language school. The principal of one such private language school, Mrs. Ma'aly Kera,[9] pointed out that in addition to offering an excellent general education, such schools, by providing foreign language fluency, open doors to careers (such as in the tourist industry), which would otherwise be closed to the students.

The French Cultural Attaché[10] has pointed out that in addition to private French language schools and religious (Catholic) schools in which the instruction is in French (and in which a second foreign language--usually English--is also required and a third foreign language generally offered), there exist in Egypt five _lycées à lauréat_, in which approximately fifty thousand students study virtually all their subjects in French (as in the other French-language private and religious schools) and also study French language and literature in a particularly rigorous and intensive fashion. When these students complete their secondary training, they are, Monsieur Kohler declared, truly Francophone. The French government assures that the instructors in these _lycées_ are French as well as French-speaking and that they remain closely in touch with Francophone culture.

At the university level, the difficulties of achieving desirable oral and written fluency in foreign languages in the public schools has been increasingly felt as the school-age population has continued to grow. Dr. Angele Boutrous Samaan, Professor Emeritus of English Literature at Cairo University,[11] notes a drop in efficiency in foreign language learning, as well as a lack of interest on the part of a growing number of students. (Minister of Education Serour,[12] in fact, remarked that many students had in recent years complained about the difficulty of passing the French examination at the end of their secondary studies, and that the exam has, as a result, been made easier.) Dr. Samaan explained that at Egypt's most prestigious institution of higher learning--Cairo University--the overpopulation of classes and lack of sufficient numbers of professors has become a tremendous problem, as it has at lower levels of instruction. Some faculties within the university require continued foreign language study of only one or two years, while the humanities curricula require, in general, courses in foreign language during all four years. So far as the status of the university study in Egypt of French, specifically, is concerned, Attaché Kohler[13] estimates the number of students of French at Egyptian universities studying the language during their four years of advanced study to be five thousand. The French government offers, in addition, a varying number of scholarships to qualifying students for post-graduate study of one to four years in France.

One additional group should not be overlooked in this brief survey--that of adult, non-university students of the French language. The Directeur of the Centre Culturel Français in Cairo, Monsieur Claude Mazet,[14] maintains an annual enrollment at the center of almost ten thousand adult students. He also pointed out the fact that the language examinations administered under his supervision are the same ones used in France by the Alliance Française.

Even though in recent decades French has been supplanted by English as the dominant foreign language studied and used in various professions in Egypt, as in other countries throughout the world where French is not one of the official languages, there seems at present no reason to suppose that the French language will soon lose its very firm position as the second most popular foreign language among Egyptians. Lawyers, for example, are still required at the University of Cairo to study French (in addition to English) for at least one year beyond their six years of secondary study. Tour guides with university diplomas in the field must be fluent in two foreign languages, by far most frequently English and French.[15] One repeatedly finds that businessmen, hotel employees, and others involved directly or indirectly in the very important Egyptian tourist trade, are able to function in both English and French, as well as their native Arabic. Finally, the commitment of the French government to preserving and extending Francophone studies in Egypt is genuine, continuing, and enthusiastic, to the extent that France not only offers scholarships for study in France, but itself pays the salaries of more than two thousand French professors coming from France to Egypt to teach. This strong desire on the part of the French government to encourage and support "la présence réelle" of France in Egypt through direct and meaningful rapport between French professors and their students,[16] as well as the firm position of French study in the Egyptian educational system, strongly suggest that the French presence in Egypt will continue to be definitely and positively felt in the future.

NOTES

[1] (Cambridge, New York, Port Chester, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 70.

[2] Lecture and question-and-answer session for Senior Fulbright Scholars. Cairo, Egypt: July 8, 1990.

[3] Lecture and question-and-answer session for Senior Fulbright Scholars. Cairo, Egypt: July 8, 1990.

[4] Interview. Luxor, Egypt: July 3, 1990.

[5] July 11, 1990.

[6] Former Senior Inspector of English Language Instruction in Egyptian Public Schools, Giza Governorate. Panel discussion and question-and-answer session for Senior Fulbright Scholars. Cairo, Egypt: July 12, 1990.

[7] Interview. Cairo, Egypt: July 11, 1990. (See note number 4.)

[8] Assistant Director of the Office of Special Academic Programs, American University in Cairo. Interview. Cairo, Egypt: July 15, 1990.

[9] Principal of the Pyramids Language School, Cairo, Egypt. Panel discussion and question-and-answer session for Senior Fulbright Scholars. Cairo, Egypt: July 12, 1990.

[10] See note number 5.

[11] Panel discussion and question-and-answer session for Senior Fulbright Scholars. Cairo, Egypt: July 12, 1990.

[12] See note number 2.

[13] See note number 5.

[14] Directeur, Centre Culturel Français, Cairo, Egypt. Interview. Cairo, Egypt: July 11, 1990.

[15] The utility of fluency in both English and French was particularly noted in interviews with Mrs. Maha Ma'bed and Mrs. Ekram Morgan, both very successful trilingual (Arabic, English, and French) Egyptian tour guides. Interview with Mrs. Ma'bed: Cairo, Egypt: June 29, 1990. Interview with Mrs. Morgan: Luxor, Egypt: July 2, 1990.

[16] See note number 5.

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A LESSON PLAN FOR DISCUSSING THE PROBLEM OF HOUSING: AN EGYPTIAN EXAMPLE

LEARNING OUTCOMES MET–THIS PLAN FURTHERS:

(1) Understanding of other cultures
(2) Understanding of sub-cultures
(3) Understanding of a worldwide problem
(4) The use of critical thinking skills
(5) The connections between people
(6) Development of spatial and historical knowledge
(7) An understanding of the importance of geography
(8) An understanding of people-place relations

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

Major world cities, from Hong Kong to Rio de Janeiro, are experiencing problems in housing for an ever-growing urban population. In July of 1990 Mitch Snyder, a leader in the movement for housing the homeless in the United States, committed suicide in frustration over the lack of action in this area. Egypt has been experiencing this problem in Cairo for several decades. An examination of the housing situation in the Greater Cairo area can provide insight into the problem and its solution on a global basis. The purpose of this lesson is to stimulate discussion on the subject through an Egyptian example.

METHODOLOGY

Data for this lesson plan were gathered through library research and fieldwork. Library work at the American University in Cairo provided government reports, theses, and secondary materials on housing in the Cairo area. Fieldwork consisted of city tours led by Dr. John Swanson, Housing Office contacts facilitated by Dr. Salwa Gomaa, and interviews with U.S. AID officials. Both Dr. Swanson and Dr. Gomaa are faculty at the American University in Cairo.

BACKGROUND FOR THE LESSON

Most people are familiar with Egypt's grand and glorious past. The Pyramids at Giza, the temples at Luxor, and the monuments at Abu Simbel are called to mind by most people when they hear the name Egypt. Overlaying these antiquities is the Nile River—a river longer than the United States from coast to coast. There is, however, at least one other Egypt: a contemporary country with a capital city that exhibits many of the benefits and drawbacks found in all major cities today. This section provides a general background to Egypt as a context for discussing housing.

History

Rather than repeat the many written histories available on Egypt, a chronology of events will be provided. Of course, it must be kept in mind that dates provided for Ancient Egypt are not precise.

6000 B.C.: Pre-dynastic Period of Narmar, the Scorpion King. Between 6000-5000 B.C. Egyptians adopt agriculture in the Nile Valley.

3100 B.C.: Archaic Period—the time in which the basic patterns and forms of early Egyptian high culture took shape. The major surviving monuments are tombs at Saqqara and Abydos.

2550 B.C.: The Old Kingdom—Principal figures include Zozer, Snefru, and Khufu. The Step-Pyramid at Saqqara appears at this time. The Pyramids at Giza begin with the Fourth Dynasty.

2150 B.C.: First Intermediate Period—This is a time of several competing dynasties. No major works of architecture survive from this period.

2050 B.C.: The Middle Kingdom—Senusret III and Amenemhet III are the rulers of note. The center of gravity was at first in the Luxor area and later shifted north, back to the Memphis area. This is the time of the emergence of Amun as a great patron deity of the state.

1770 B.C.: Second Intermediate Period—This includes Dynasties XIII to XVII. This was once again a time of competing states. The XVIIth. Dynasty re-unified Egypt under its control.

1550 B.C.: New Kingdom—This was the most powerful and prosperous of the ancient Kingdoms of Egypt

1070 B.C.: Third Intermediate Period—An era of decentralization. Basically, the south was ruled apart from the north, although the rulers of the south—the high priests of the Cult of Amun—acknowledged the suzerainty of the northern kings.

750 B.C.: Nubian Period—The Nubian kings brought most of the Nile Valley under their rule by 700 B.C. and reigned as the XXVth. Dynasty until expelled by the Assyrians, who conquered Egypt after 670 B.C.

660 B.C.: Saite Period—If Egyptian art and architecture was influential in the development of Greek art and architecture, it was probably due to this dynasty, the XXVIth., which ruled Egypt from its capital at Sais in the Delta

341 B.C.: Last native dynasty falls; Egypt is occupied, in turn, by the Persians (who had earlier ruled Egypt from 525 to 400 B.C. before being forced out), the Greeks, the Romans, the Byzantines, and the Arabs

1250 A.D.: The Mamluk Empire rules Egypt and Syria, followed by the Ottoman Turks, who conquer Egypt in 1517

1798 A.D.: Napoleon leads the French invasion of Egypt; the British occupy Egypt in 1882

1940 A.D.: Britain fights Italy and Germany from Egyptian territory. Egypt, in the late 1940's, joined the first Arab war against Israel

1952 A.D.: On July 23 a revolution led by the "Free Officers" forces King Farouk to abdicate.General Muhammad Naguib becomes president. Later, he is forced out of power by Gamal Abdul-Nasir.

1960's A.D.: Eighty percent of Egyptian industry is nationalized. In 1967 Israel captures the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip.

1970's A.D.: Anwar as-Sadat becomes president of Egypt when Nasir dies. The Aswan High Dam is completed in this decade. It provides water to irrigate more than a million acres of land. It also provides hydro-electric power.

1980's A.D.: Sadat cracks down on fundamentalists and opposition forces. He is assassinated and Hosny Mubarak succeeds him as president.
1990's A.D.: Egypt merges as a broker in the Israeli-Palestinian issue.

(Thanks to Dr. John Swanson for his help in constructing this chronology)

GEOGRAPHY

The thread which ties these cultural occupations and events together is Egypt's geography. Approximately 386,650 square miles (1,001,758 sq. km.) in physical area—about the size of Oregon and Texas combined—only 4% of this total is habitable. Except in rare instances the only cultivable land is adjacent to the Nile, and so is the country' population. Add to this very little rainfall (1 inch per year) and the result is high urban densities. Thus, while cultures have come and gone, an environment which has remained basically the same for the last 10,000 years (since the end of the Pleistocene era) has been a formidable obstacle to easier growth and development. This is certainly evident with regard to the east-west expansion of Cairo—a subject pertinent with regard to the question of identifying areas of growth for the Cairo region.

CAIRO

Cairo is one of he world's super cities. In 1987 it was the seventeenth largest city in the world. It is the largest city in Africa and in the Middle East. One thousand people per day are added to the population of Cairo, so rapid is its growth. The average population density is 27,092 people per square mile, bur in and around the medieval quarter of the city the population density reaches almost 250,000 per square mile. As with other primary cities in the developing world, it is becoming increasingly large. Cairo, the capital, center of education, media, and money, is most attractive to the rural poor.

The city of Cairo itself dates to its foundation by the Fatimid Dynasty in 969 as "al-Qahira"—"the Victorious City". The Fatimid Dynasty ruled for so long hat Cairo came to engulf already existing communities in the area, including al-Fustat, the urban center of Egypt from 700 A.D. to 1000 A.D. Today, the medieval core lies approximately three kilometers east of the modern city. Overall Cairo has continued to grow in a north/south direction. (See Figure 1.)

There are eight basic sections in modern Cairo. (1) The Medieval core is home to lower-class and lower-middle-class people. (2) An initial expansion around the medieval core includes the neighborhoods of Abbasiya, Ataba, Azbekiyya, Abdin, Zoghli, and Sayyida Zaynab. These are areas of lower middle-class and middle-class people. (3) The present central business district developed in a sixty-year period between 1880 and 1950. This area houses the upper and upper-middle class. (4) Lower and lower-middle class districts were incorporated into Cairo as the city surrounded earlier agricultural villages. Modern well-to-do residential zones grew up between 1930 and 1950. (5) Upper class and middle class desert communities developed in Heliopolis and Nasr City. (6) Beginning in 1950 lower class communities grew in the west, north, and south. (7) After this time the cemeteries in the desert to the east of the medieval core also grew as residential areas. (8) Finally, Il-Haram ("the Pyramids") near Giza and Muqattam City to the east of the cemetery zones were developed as upper class and upper-middle class communities.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CAIRO AREA, 1800-1990


THE CAIRO AREA
CULTIVABLE LAND
DESERT
GEZIRA ISLAND
RODA ISLAND
DESERT PLATEAU
CULTIVABLE LAND
DESERT
0
10 km
BULAQ
MEDIEVAL CAIRO
OLD CAIRO
ABBASIYA
AZBAKIYA-ATABA
HELIOPOLIS
SHUBRA
AGOUZA
DOKKI
GIZA
PYRAMIDS
MAADI
HELWAN
IMBABA
MUHANDISEEN
NASR CITY
CEMETERY
DAR AS-SALAAM
SHUBRA AL-KHAYMA
BULAQ AT-TAKRUR
MUQATTAM CITY
HELIOPOLIS
NASR CITY
NEW MAADI
HELWAN

1200-1800:
Population: 500,000-750,000
Urban Area: 10 sq. km.

1880:
Population: 1,000,000
Urban Area: 20 sq. km

1920:
Population: 1,200,000
Urban Area: 40 sq. km.

1945:
Population: 1,900,000
Urban Area: 80 sq. km.

1968:
Population: 6,000,000
Urban Area: 169 sq. km.

1977:
Population: 8,200,000
Urban Area: 210 sq. km.

1982:
Population: 9,200,000
Urban Area: 330 sq. km.

1990:
Pop: 14,000,000
Area: 400 sq. km.

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In the year 1800 the population of Cairo was approximately 275,000. Presently approximately nine to fifteen million people live in Cairo, and the city's population is growing at a rate of 3.6% per year (or slightly less, depending upon one's source).Unfortunately, Cairo has an infrastructure capable of supporting approximately three million people. By the year 2000 there will be an unfilled demand for around three million housing units. Therein lies the crux of the problem. Cairo has been out-growing itself since the end of World War II. In order to meet the demand for housing it has allowed the development of what is called informal housing. This may take the form of people living on roof-tops, squatting on government land or maintaining a residence in the cemeteries. All of this housing is illegal since it meets none of the codes and has none of the services that housing should have. It is estimated that 50% of the housing in Cairo is informal.

What makes informal housing interesting is that Egypt has institutionalized the process and now is working to deliver services to the occupants or to move them into "legal" housing. A major reason for the lack of housing has to do with rent control codes put into effect soon after the revolution in 1952. Rent are frozen at the level of payment at the time of initial occupancy. Moreover, apartments can be passed on to children. The result is that there is little incentive for landlords to rent out or to maintain their buildings. Currently, rent control regulations aim at charging 20% of a family's monthly income or a minimum of LE 10 per month. However, the majority of Cairenes earn less than LE 20 per month.

The government is attempting to help correct this situation by the creation of a "ring road" around the city and the creation of a minimum of ten satellite cities which would absorb many of the people living in informal housing. It appears, however, that the very people in need will not be able to afford such housing. This housing is not attractive to the upper classes either. Sadat City, located about 100 kilometers northwest of Cairo along the main Cairo-to-Alexandroa desert highway, is ten years old and has room for one million people. But only 2,000 live there on what amounts to an artificial oasis in the desert. Cairo, as with third world primary cities, contains most of the opportunities and amenities available in he country. Moreover, there is a feeling on the part of some individuals who understand the situation that the upper class Egyptians in charge of housing are not able to relate to the needs of the poor. It should also be noted that empty living unit do exist. However, they are being held by the owners for their own families. Thus, homeless people can be seen sleeping on he ground across from the Nile Hilton Hotel in the heart of modern Cairo.

A second problem that exists in providing incentives for an entrepreneurial class of landlords is that of financing. Wealthy people pay cash. There is basically no Egyptian equivalent of the long-term mortgage except what occurs in the form of government subsidization. Agreement on land usually involves the full purchase price being paid over a twelve year period with an interest rate between 10% and 20%. In some cases final payment must be made when the housing unit, if new, is only 80% complete. One financing plan involves the "Cairo Company". This group sells equity in soon-to-be-started housing to people who will become the eventual purchasers. Another company, the "Arab Contractors", encourage foreign investors with tax breaks. They focus on upper, middle, and high income groups. However, the track record of low income families' abilities to pay is not good. In the mid-1980's, the cheapest, legal public housing cost LE 2,500 ($900) per year. This price was beyond the reach of 90% of the population. One interesting proposal has been that of the late Egyptian architect Hassan Fathy, who suggested a return to basic folk architecture. This would be possible because of an annual rainfall regime of no more than one inch. Hence unfinished mud-brick would hold up.

There are a variety of other recommendations to deal with informal housing. These include the following:

(1) Expand assistance to informal housing areas and people
(2) Provide utilities
(3) Enforce building codes
(4) Gradually raise rents
(5) Build new cities

This represents a sketch of the housing problem in Cairo. Teachers should consider using questions that follow as a jumping off point for classroom discussion.

DISCUSSIO QUESTIONS

1. How widespread is the problem of the homeless or those with inadequate shelter? How is it in your area?
2. How could the idea of rent control be improved?
3. It will take a considerable amount of resources to cure the housing problem in Cairo. Discuss the notion that "what is good for Cairo is good for the rest of the country".
4. What is the impact of letting Cairo grow to the north and the south?
5. Why are people attracted to Cairo?
6. What role could use of birth control methods play in lessening crowded conditions in Cairo?
7. Why are not people moving to the satellite cities?

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Fulbright-Hays Seminar

Egypt - Jordan

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Views on Egyptian Women in Arabic and Islamic Culture

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Views of Egyptian Women in Arabic and Islamic Culture

Introduction

The primary focus of this lesson plan unit is to examine the role of women in Egyptian life within the context of Arabic and Islamic culture. There is included an introduction to Arabic and Islamic culture, background and primary writings, and a bibliography. There are four sample biographies of Egyptian women from which a variety of classroom uses can be drawn. Ideas are given for their use as well as suggested follow-up activities.

We have chosen a cross section of women from the left wing, Nawal El-Saadawi, to a very right wing Muslim conservative leader, Zeinab al-Ghazali al-Gebali. We understand that our focus is limited in that it pertains to educated, middle to upper class Egyptian women. However , these women portray important ideas about what a woman's role should or should not be in this society. The biographical sketches were drawn from interviews, (Mrs. Mona Kamel and Ms Zeinab El-Ghazali), as well as books written either by and/or about these women, (Nawal Saadawi and Jihan Sadat). It is our hope that students will come to appreciate the richness of the cultural diversity found in Egypt as well as the political struggle of women to define their role within this cultural diversity.

Student Objectives:

1. Students will gain insights into Islamic and Arabic culture which will allow them to appreciate and understand this culture.
2. Students will examine the differing points of view of women in a changing Egyptian society as expressed by the women themselves.
3. Students will examine the political and social roles of women in Egyptian society.

Egyptian Women in Arabic Culture

In any discussion concerning the roles of Egyptian women, it is difficult to separate Arab culture from Islamic culture as they are inextricably interwoven in a manner which often overlaps in such a way that distinctions are not clearly defined. However there are some aspects concerning women's roles in Arab culture which, although attributed to Islam, have in fact arisen out of the historical background of the area. This discussion will focus on three of these misconceptions and will attempt to discuss some reasons many contemporary women have been able to successfully make their mark in present-day Egyptian economic and/or political affairs.

Long before the birth of Islam, the Pharoanic Era was one example of a patriarchial male-dominated society in which women were relegated to a lesser role. Westerners, in general, tend to perceive Egyptian women as submissive and attribute this to the effects of Islam. In reality, those who have studied this culture know that this attitude pre-dated Islam. Many Egyptian women, both fundamentalists and feminists, have pointed out to us that the Koran does indeed provide equality and fairness to women. They state that it is the manipulation of these principles for self-serving political and capitalistic ends that result in its misinterpretation on a socio-economic level.

It is interesting to note at this point that two of the women we have researched and/ or interviewed and who are at opposite ends of the political spectrum, Nawal El Saadawi and Zeinab al-Ghazali both grant that to varying degrees this is the case. For example, the wearing of the face veil was introduced by the Ottomans during their ascendancy in the Middle East. It was not an inherent part of Islam but was incorporated as a model for women through political expediency.

Islamic historian, Thomas Phillips, adds credence to this philosphy as pointed out in this quote from his article, "Feminism and Nationalist Policies in Egypt":

> "The debate over the emancipation of women originated among Muslim reformist. It was their contention that an Islam correctly interpretated and set free of traditional ballast was able to provide a viable system of beliefs and values even under the changed circumstances of modern times. Thus, they felt that the position of women had suffered, not through the commands of the original Islam, but by a mis-interpretation of the Quran and later un-Islamic additions."

The third mis-conception attributed to Islam but which has its roots in ancient Arab culture is that of the practice of female circumcision. This custom has been dealt with by women in the Arab world (and incidentally in many other areas) long before the advent of Islam. Many of todays leading Egyptian women have spoken out against this heinous practice, but even though many educated families seldom participate, it is far from being wiped out in especially in rural areas and/or strongly traditional homes.

What factors have precipitated the emergence of some women into the political and business scenes of the Arab culture? Our readings about and conversations with some of these women showed that several significant commonalities appear in the experiences of Arab women who have successfully participated on a very public level in the professions, businesses, and government of the present-day Arab world.

With few exceptions, they had families and /or fathers who encouraged them to excell just as a boy would. They were reminded to bring "honor to the family" by making their mark in the world of work-an attitude most unconventional considering the expections for women typical of their day.

Secondly, most of these women received very good education-both private and public. They tended to score very highly in competitive exams and be rated well by their teachers. The quality of their studies reflected intelligence, ambition, and industry.

A third factor which seems significant is that most successful women delayed marriage until their mid-twenties. By this time, they had generally completed the formal education including advanced degrees. Once married, they seldom had more than three children generally spaced more than two years apart.

Finally, and very significantly, these women tended to have unusually supported husbands who were very successful in their own right. Not feeling threatened, they encouraged and facilitated their wives involvement in business and political adventures. They were willing to share responsibilities at home and were proud of their wives' achievements.

This very brief discussion dealing with only a few situational roles and issues faced by some Egyptian women in their interaction with Arab culture and tradition is but the "tip of the iceberg". We would encourage you to read and study the books in this bibliography as well as the large number of books on this subject available in libraries. The emancipation of Egyptian women within the parameters of Arab and Islamic mores has made great strides, and progress is being noted on political, social, economic, educational, and psychological levels. It involves dealing with Arab customs as well as clarifying interpretations of Moslem traditions. The incredible, intelligent, well-educated and far-seeing women with whom we have spoken here in Egypt assure us that this process, which while challenging and wrought with obstacles, is in capable and excellent hands.

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Egyptian Women in Islamic Culture

In studying the role of women in Islam, it is important to understand that one cannot speak of a uniform group. Women's roles and lifestyles differ from one society to the next, and from one socioeconomic class to the other. Therefore the concentration of this study will focus on urban Egyptian women from low middle class to upper class.

It seems that Islam has provided an unifying force within the Egyptian Society. It has not only been an important element in defining the traditional roles of women, but Islam and Islamic symbols have helped to preserve their national identity and culture.

Islamic thinking has taken several directions. The two distinct directions referred to in this research are progressive and fundamentalist. The progressives look at the changes that have occurred in modern life and attempts to institute legal reforms that would reflect and support these changes. The fundamentalists see the Islamic Society deteriorating, and so the hope for a better future means returning to a more religious way of life which is interpreted by the teachings of "The Prophet". Both groups have taken a long hard look at the society, and both see separate solutions to the problem.

Legally, women have the same rights as men. In the most important public areas, women have the right to vote (although many still don't exercise this right) the right to own and administer property, and the right to equal pay. Therefore, the progressives have focused on reforms designed to give women a more secure place within the family. The Personal Status Laws were laws that regulated marriage, divorce, and child custody. Before the reforms were enacted, the minumum age for a girl to marry was 14, a man could marry more than one wife, the man's family took custody of the children in a divorce, and it was difficult for a woman to divorce her husband, although this was not the case when a man wanted to divorce his wife. In 1979, some revisions were made in this law. According to Amina Al-Said, one of Egypt's leading feminists and journalists, a woman now has the right to secure a divorce within one year of her husband taking a new wife, and a divorced woman now has the custody of her children. Once the male child reaches 15 years, he goes to court and decides which parent he'd prefer to live with.

Historically, fundamentalist groups were grass roots movements which appealed mainly to the lower middle classes. The members were mostly in their 20's who were usually the first generation in their families to obtain a college education. They became convinced that a better education would not necessarily provide a suitable job with a sufficient income. As women continued the struggle between traditional and modern values, Islam and it's code of behavior helped them put things in their proper perspective.

In the 1970's there was an increase of veiled or semi-veiled women in the streets and public places of the major cities in Egypt. It began as scattered acts by a few college women from the urban middle classes, but soon it turned into a movement that cut across classes and ages. Today the largest concentration of veiled women are still in the colleges and universities. Traditionally, the veil was elitist and destinguished the urban aristocracy from the lower class. Today Islamic dress is intended to erase any social or economic differences among its wearers. The Islamic features of women's dress require that they dress modestly with no elements designed to draw attention to her. There appears to be three basic types of dress:

Type 1: This type consists of a headscarf covering all of the hair and ordinary western clothes.

Type 2: This type consists of a long, wide opague dress with long sleeves and a headdress outlining the face and covering the dress at the front and back down to the waist.

Type 3: This type consists of a face veil usually made of the same color and cloth as the headdress.

Today there are several versions of Islamic dress which seem to be motivated less by culture or religion and more by fashion and/or. economics. There is no need for a whole wardrobe of matching clothes and accessories, and since the hair is hidden, women avoid the high cost of haircare as well as the time it takes to go to the hairdresser. More importantly, Egyptian Islamic women are enthusiastic about wearing these styles of dress. It is voluntary and not a response to male pressures. There seems to be no consistent pattern of Islamic dress in Egypt, so it is difficult to determine the level of a women's religious or political commitment from observing her dress. Zeinab al-Ghazali, a well respected advocate of greater religious conservatism, in a recent interview, stated that women who wearthe veil should do so out of religious committment and not political ideology.

A large majority of the young women involved in the fundamentalist and/ or progressive movements, have educational degrees and many are married and employed. They understand that modern conditions require that they be in a better position to take care of their families. All Muslims envision a better society and a more stable family with the woman having a protected role. Each group works towards this goal in its own way. The progressives work towards this goal through legal reforms in Personal Status Laws which give women a more secure place in their homes and with their children. The fundamentalists work towards these goals by re-emphasing the special role of women in a society based on Islamic Law.

Widespread education and employment of women is rapidly breaking down the strict segregation of gender roles. In 1985 a draft law was presented to the Egyptian Parliment calling for women to quit their jobs while retaining half of their salaries. It was felt that working women were neglecting the care of their children. This was said to cause juvenile deliquency and drug addiction among the young. It was felt by many that this was a stratagy used by the government to reduce the number of working women in the work force, especially during times of inflation. Generally, women who work have two jobs, one at home, and one outside. These kinds of demands cause some women to accept jobs that do not require much responsibility and are not very demanding. These jobs are not usually well paid, but because the reasons for taking a job vary, it is found that the amount of income earned is not always the major concern. Not only does an extra income support the family financially by allowing women to buy nicer clothing for their children and pay for their education and trips. More importantly, it gives them a positive feeling of accomplishment. Husbands have generallly supported their wives working as long as it does not interfere with their responsibilities as a wife and a mother. Both parents understand that the family has to be strong with educated men needing educated women to run the household and raise the children.

In 1979 thirty seats in Parliament were reserved for women in orderto help them to play a more visible role in the political arena. By 1982, forty two women were among the 600 members of Egypt's legislature. This attests to the fact that a growing number of Arab Egyptian women are becoming important in politics. The women who have served in parliament tend to have come from privileged families where education was stressed for both male and females. These women were almost always encouraged to seek a career outside of the home. "Seventy percent of them have earned at least one degree and one third of that group has received at least one advanced degree." The majority of the women in Parliament have had practical experience working in grass roots political organizations before becoming members. They generally agree with the objectives of the party on most issues although there are a few women who have criticized or questioned some actions taken by the government. They almost always unite on feminist issues such as the Personal Status Laws, although Zeinab al-Ghazali, mentioned earlier, (page 2) was one notable exception. She believed that the revisions were not justified because Islamic law does not restrict woman's rights. The majority of the women in Parliament are Muslim, and approximately twelve of them are veiled. The women who are veiled generally come from the rural parts of Egypt. Their attitudes and the attitudes of the other women are not much different. All the women are opposed to legislation that would discriminate against women. They have become very successful in their work because they have mastered the Arabic language and have made great contributions to the making of laws. They are extremely intelligent and loyal. They've also participated in several political coalitions.

Egyptian Islamic women are far from the passive and oppressed group that has been projected by mostly misinformation and hearsay. They are professional, non-elitist and Islamically veiled. These things are consistent with their heritage and Islamic traditions for which they are very loyal. More and more, both men and women believe in the equality of the sexes, and that there is no difference in the intellectual ability of men and women. The value of a person does not depend on gender, and more importantly, each person is capable of directing themselves. Islamic women are making these assertions and feel comfortable doing so.

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The following are brief descriptions of four Egyptian women who have made an impact on the role of women in an Egyptian society. Their goalisthe same. They all believe that the rights of women should remain secured. Their methods for achieving this goal differs.

Biographical Sketch of Nawal el-Saadawi

Nawal el-Saadawi was born in 1931 in Egypt. Her father was a university graduate, and her mother was educated in French schools where her father taught. Dr. Saadawi's parents encouraged her to continue her education. Although her parents stated that boys and girls were equal, Saadawi felt that that was not always the case in practice. When she questioned her parents on this, their answer was, "It is so". In 1955, Miss Saadawi graduated from Medical school. She pursued a career in Egypt as a doctor eventually becoming Egypt'sDirector of Public Health. As such, she continued her dogged pursuit as an advocate of Arab women's rights. Due to her outspoken political activism during the Sadat presidency, she was dismissed as Director of Public Health. Dr. Saadawi continued to criticize the policies of President Sadat which included issues not only regarding women's issues, but foreign policy as well, (The Camp David Accords). As a result of her political activities, she was imprisoned for a period of time by President Sadat. She is the author of numerous books and acticles dealing with the rights of Arab women.

Dr. Saadawi's political philosophy centers around her own experience as a female growing up in a very prominent patriarchal system which had done everything possible to subjugate women. Her involvement began with her own circumcision at the age of six which left her traumatized for many years. She does not believe that this patriarchal system is or was a strictly Arab world trait, but rather a world view where men have dominated women.

> "The oppression of women, the exploitation and social pressures to which they are exposed, are not characteristic of Arab or Middle Eastern societies... They constitute an integral part of the political, economic, and cultural system, preponderont in most of the world."
>
> Nawal El Saadawi
> "The Hidden Face of Eve"
> Page 1

She has moved away from a religious approach to solve women's problem, to a more secular approach. She is a Moslem. Before Islam appeared in the 7th century, the Arab world was already a male dominated, patriarchal world. She does not necessarily hold Islam itself responsible for the problems of Arab women, but rather its misinterpretation by this male-oriented society. She condemns the west for exploiting third world countries which has thus promulgated and exacerbated the problems of the third world. She often sounds angry and/ or bitter in her writing but one needs to read Dr. Saadawi for himself or herself, particularly her book, "The Hidden Face of Eve". We have included the preface to her English edition. In this, we can see that she blames two external factors for the plight of women; namely, the western powers, (including the United States), and the nature of the patriarchal system as evidenced on a world scale. She does remain a Moslem, but one who believes the Prophet's words have not been accurately and correctly interpreted. Islam was merely made to fit into the culture of an Arab, male-superior society. She continues har struggle as an advocate of women's rights.

Biographical Sketch of Jihan Sadat

Jihan Sadat was born in the south of Cairo in the village of Beni Suwaif in 1935. Her father, Safwat Rarof, was married to Gladys Cotren at Cambridge where the two met. They were married in 1923 and had five children.

Jihan was married to Anwar el-Sadat in 1949. At that time Sadat was a rebel officer in the army and Jihan was only sixteen years old. She took a leading part in organizing relief, aid and assistance whenever and wherever needed. Long before she married Sadat, she organized a feminist movement in her village with the aim of securing rights for women. In the beginning, the ladies who participated in Jihan's movement were those who did not enjoy much harmony at home. At Jihan's initiative, an aid center was established in the village to help those neglected women who were unwanted by their husbands and did not have any means of supporting themselves. She secured about twenty-five sewing machines for the aid center which taught women tailoring and other handicrafts. The center is flourishing today with the number of machines at three hundred. It now provides assistance to as many as three thoudand families. It also pays the educational expenses of over one thousand school and university students.

After her four children were married, she returned to school in order to prepare herself for a professional career. In 1980 she received her master's degree. She then began to teach at the University of Cairo while working on her doctoral dissertation. She wanted to set a good example for other women and in the process, helped other women see that they could get an education if they wanted to.

She was the wife of President Sadat from 1970-1981. During his presidency, she encouraged women to become educated, work outside of the home, and express their political opinions. She joined several women's associations and in many cases became their leader. She was very influential in the efforts to reform The Personal Status Laws, which regulated marriage, divorce, and child custody. In spite of the revisions which gave women more freedom in these areas, she still believes in the husband being the traditional head of the family with the wife as his strong supporter. She also believes in a mutual understanding of the respective functions of husband and wife. She convinced President Sadat of the need to reserve a specified number of seats for women in Parliament, and continued to secure women's rights through the passage of comprehensive laws. She believes that the freedoms that women continue to strive for should not be confrontational, and should be fought within the overall frame work of the country's traditions and customs. She also believes that one should create an atmosphere of mutual assistance with both men and women recognizing their special fields of work and responsibility.

After President Sadat's assassination in 1981, the revisions made to the Personal Status Laws were declared unconstitutional under the new Mubarak administration. In 1985, a newly revised law was submitted and accepted. Mrs. Sadat was not involved with the passage of these revised laws, but did support its passage. Her influence in the women's movement diminished under Mubarak's administration, although her active participation did not.

By promoting a general awareness among women concerning literacy, and laws affecting women and the family, as well as laws regarding the participation of women in politics, Jihan Sadat has helped change the life of the Egyptian women.

A Biographical Sketch of Mona Kamel

Mrs. Mona Kamel was born and raised in Cairo. Her parents were both well educated. Her father was a university graduate in electrical engineering, and at one time, he headed the Wauqf Ministry in Egypt. Her mother came from a well- to- do family and made sure Mona had a proper education. She attended private school up until twelve years of age and then received private tutoring at home in French, Arabic and piano. Mrs. Kamel was the eldest child followed by a brother and two sisters. She felt that her brother, because he was a male, received preferential treatment. She was especially close to her father who encouraged her independence and sent her to a private English school run by the Franciscan Sisters. After attending Cairo University for one year, her family decided that further education was unnecessary and she should return home, where she continued studying English Literature. Because she scored exceptionally well on the exams, the Dean recommended she be allowed to complete her university education on campus and her family agreed. She graduated with a degree in English Literature and a translation diploma.

Mrs. Kamel, once again, defied tradition and entered the work force. She worked for the Ministry of Culture during Nasser's Presidency after which she worked in the education department of Egyptian Public Television. She later married a well- educated Egyptian man, received an M.A. in Arabic, and began teaching at The American University at Cairo where she has been for twenty three years. Mrs. Kamel, a widow with two grown children, socializes both within the international and Islamic communities. This allows her greater freedom of movement and expression.

She is very concerned about the plight of women and believes that education for women should be a top priority. With education women could better protect their rights, understand the need for family planning, and hopefully escape the overwhelming poverty which exists. Politically, she feels that women have many equal rights, (e.g. equal pay for equal rights), and that Egyptian society is in transition. Women do have the franchise and they sit in the legislative body. She does not , however, think that Egypt is ready for a female head of state.

Insofar as Islamic influences are concerned, she does not think the influence of religion in Egypt is any different than the impact of religion in any country. She is a practicing Moslem, and as such believes that Islam in not a hinderance to the progress of women, but rather a protector of moral principles which serve as guidelines for a society. She thinks there has been some misinterpretation by "The West" of Islam and that much of what "The West" interpretes as Islamic culture is in fact a result of Arabic historical influences. Today, Mrs. Kamel continues to teach Arabic at The American University in Cairo in her own unique and vivacious style.

A Biographical Sketch of Zeinab al-Ghazali al Gebali

Before the impact of westernization, Islam permeated all aspects of life in Egypt and most Arabic countries. All customs and traditions were religious. Most people unquestioningly believed what their traditions told them to believe, and they obeyed the rules as well. Zeinab al-Ghazali was born in Egypt in the early 1900's into a very religious family. Because of their wealth, she was educated at home by tutors from Al-Azhor. She had serious objections to President Nasser's support of a secular society and spent much of her life rebelling against the political system. She started the Muslim Women's Association in 1937, which was officially recognized by the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1957. She believes that the rights of women are essential and are an outgrowth of the traditional values of Islam. She also believes that women's rights are well protected under The Sharia Laws, and sees the revision of those laws as "unislamic".

There were attempts to merge The Muslim Women's Association with The Muslim Brotherhood, but she wanted her organization to remain independent so as not to be harrassed by the government. When the Muslim Brotherhood was disbanded by law in 1953, she continued to support their efforts. Her secret work with this organization was discovered in 1965. This led to her arrest and the arrest of several others. She was sentenced to 25 years in jail on charges of attempting to overthrow the government. She spent 6 years in jail where she was severly tortured and raped, but she still refused to change her views. She remained steadfast until her release in 1971 by President Sadat. Her political activity declined after her release, although she still speaks on college campuses throughout Egypt. She publically opposed the 1979 and 1985 changes in The Personal Status Laws which she believed to be against The Sharia Laws. Zeinab al-Ghazali understands the importance in improving the status of women as long as it is compatable with Islam. She feels it is necessary for women to return to their traditional position under Islam and reassume the traditional Arab women's attire including the veil and the ankle length dress with long sleeves.

The freedom of women will continue to be a major issue in Egyptian society, and will continue to receive strong objections from the Muslim-Arab conservative sector as demonstrated by Ms. al-Ghazali.

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Methodology

There are a number of ways in which to utilize the information collected. It is hoped that teachers will take some or all of this information to adopt to their own needs and teaching styles. The suggested methods are as follows:

1. Give students a xeroxed copy of the background information on the general role of women as it pertains to "Arab Culture" and "Islamic Culture". You can give them classtime to read the information, or it can be assigned for homework. Once read, the teacher may then pursue a line of questioning which initially checks for comprehension. (Ex: List or give two facts about Islam. Describe the Arab attitude concerning women.) Then you should continue by asking questions that are more analogous in nature. (Ex: How is Islam similar or dissimilar to Christianity and Judaism? How would you account for this?) You can allocate two to three class periods depending on the depth of understanding you wish to achieve and/ or class ability. Once the initial introduction is complete, the next step would be to hand out the set of biographical sketches to the class. Ask students to initially identify where on the political/religious spectrum these women might be and ask each student to justify their answers. You may want to begin your questioning by first checking for comprehension.

2. A second method which might be useful would begin with dividing the class into four groups. Hand out a different biographical sketch to each group. Give the group classtime to digest the information. Encourage the students in each group to dialogue among themselves the important issues and ideology presented in in the sketch. As a facilitator, ask questions of each group to to keep the discussion flowing. During the following class period, have each group explain their understanding of each woman's position. This activity should generate much discussion. It is incumbent upon the teacher to keep the discussion focused on the points expressed in the biographies. Following this activity, hand out all the biographical sketches to each group. You can also hand out the copies of xeroxed information from the books on thelaws concerning divorce, opposition women, etc. Again, give the student ample time to read and digest the material. Allocate as much classtime as you need to discuss the information throughly. Again, begin by asking questions to insure the student has comprehended the information. Proceed by asking more analytical questions, possibly referring to Bloom's Taxonomy to analyze. Once this has been accomplished, ask each group to select the woman's position he or she feels most comfortable with. The student should be able to substantiate his or her position.

Evaluation and Follow-up Activities

1. Students may write an essay on which woman's position they most identify with and why.
2. Organize a class debate based on two (or all four) women's positions and require the remainder of the class to vote on who won. They should substantiate their position fully.
3. Have students read Naadawi's and or Jihan Sadat's work. They could do an oral or written evaluation.
4. Have students read the book "Guest of the Sheik" by Elizabeth Warnock Fernea. It is an anthropological look at the Islamic life of women living in a small Iraqui village in the 1950's. Most students should find this book interesting and enjoyable reading.
5. Have students compare and contrast the roles of women in the United States versus those in Egypt.
6. Students can elect to do research on other stereot,pes associated with Arab and Islamic cultures.

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Interviews

1. Zeinab al-Ghazali al-Gebali: An activist who advocates a society based on Islamic Law.

2. Dr. Selwa Gomaa: Professor of Political Science at The American University of Cairo.

3. Mona Kamel: Senior Lecturer in the Arabic Language Department at The American University of Cairo.

4. Amina al-Said: Publisher of several Egyptian magazines. The first woman Egyptian Publisher.

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Views on Egyptian Women in
Arabic and Islamic Culture

4

Opposition Women

THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN EGYPT

United only by its stance vis-à-vis the government, the political opposition in Egypt has been rich in talent and eccentricity, characterized by diversity, a penchant for hyperbole and self-righteousness, and restrained as often by the fear of force as by force itself. For most of Egypt's postrevolutionary history, being a member of the opposition has been dangerous but satisfying to the soul. Some opposition politicians may have been charlatans and opportunists, seeking mainly some short-term personal advantage, but most of the leaders have been honest in their opposition. All of the women mentioned in this chapter consider themselves to be sincere patriots, prepared to make considerable sacrifices for their version of political morality. In a country which places a high premium on consensus, some have been jailed and all have suffered in one way or another because of their opposition to or criticism of the government.

Before discussing the women selected to represent the female members of the postrevolutionary political opposition in Egypt, it is necessary to consider briefly two general questions. First, what are the major issues that have tended to arouse the ire of the opposition in Egypt? As a corollary to this question: what specific issues have concerned women? Second, what is the basic institutional structure or framework within which the political opposition has functioned?

What groups, parties, or forums have existed for the expression of rebellion, rejection, or criticism?

These two sets of questions, one dealing with motivation or ideology, the other with institutions and organizations, cannot be understood outside of the context of history. What follows is brief and is not intended to be a comprehensive study of the opposition in Egypt. It is included in order to provide readers with some sense of the ideological and institutional milieu within which the women in Egypt's political opposition have moved since 1952.

Why rebel? More specifically, why rebel in Egypt *after* the Free Officers' Revolution of 1952? Some rejected the legitimacy of the new system, while others denounced only specific policies, people or programs, but many people found a great deal to anger them. Some attempted to bring about change through organized movements, associations, or parties. Others worked as writers or stood as political candidates and challenged the system as independents rather than as members of a party until parties became legal in 1979.

Neither a chronological nor an ideological approach yields a satisfactory understanding of the opposition in Egypt. The post-1952 period could be thought of as divided into the Nasser period (1952–70), the Sadat period (1970–81) and the Mubarak period, which began in 1981. Another form of periodization, using an institutional rather than a personalist framework, would divide the 1952–84 era into two blocks of time. The first, 1952–76, was one in which the regime monopolized political activity and no opposition was brooked. The second, 1976–84, marked the beginning of political liberalization: opposition parties were formed, and opposition newspapers and magazines were published. Ideologically, it would be possible to think of Egyptian political forces in conventional terms of right, left and center, or, in a slightly more complicated version, conservative, liberal, socialist, communist, fascist, or anarchist. The problem is that all ideological and chronological frameworks oversimplify the Egyptian political landscape, even though each casts some light on Egyptian politics.

Presidents do dominate the system and much of political activity has been characterized by support for, or opposition to the president, but many opposition leaders have concentrated their ire on specific policies or laws and have not formulated their ideas as opposition to the president in power. For example, opposing the Personal Status Laws has not necessarily meant opposition to Nasser, Sadat, or Mubarak. Another inadequacy of the conventional framework is illustrated by considering the case of the Ikwan al-Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood). It has been part of the opposition to the Egyptian system of government since its formation by Hassan al-Banna in 1928.[1] To the Brotherhood, the issue has been more the system itself than the particular leader of the moment. Its members support the establishment of an Islamic state and government according to the principles of Islamic law. However, there have been significant variations to its tactical stance, according to who is in power. Some of its members or supporters were jailed or executed under Nasser. Under Sadat, others were jailed or, contradictorily, permitted to publish a magazine. President Mubarak has allowed them to participate in an electoral coalition with an essentially secular opposition political party, the New Wafd.

Ideological confusion also characterizes the opposition, as illustrated by the Socialist Labor Party, which has been thought of since 1978 as leftist, but whose prerevolutionary predecessor, Young Egypt, was once thought of as fascist. Its program has changed little since that time.[2]

A profitable way to think about the opposition in Egypt is to consider its diverse elements in the context of the major historical forces which have dominated Egyptian political life since 1952.[3] These are:

- The Free Officers' Revolution itself and its self-appointed heirs;
- Individuals and groups who believed they represented that revolution better than did the government;
- The Wafd Party, which was the major prerevolutionary, nationalist political party;
- The Muslim Brotherhood, a large religious-political movement which has advocated an Islamic state and opposed secularism;
- Other political forces which have existed, such as the Communists, but have not had as great an impact on the community at large.

The first group can be thought of as the government, regardless of the period of time in question. The other four, including the relatively minor groups, are the opposition discussed in this chapter. Some of these categories of people have been organized, but not all political figures of importance in Egypt have been members of organized movements or parties. Some have preferred to remain independent, including many of the women.

Over the course of the 1952–84 period, several major issues have been perennial highlights of Egyptian opposition politics. Some people objected to the direction of change, others to the pace, while a great many were upset about the methods the government has used to achieve goals. Thus, under Nasser, people objected to "too much" socialism; under Sadat, "too much" capitalism. With Mubarak, opposition figures complain that he has been too slow to make decisions, and that they are still "Waiting for Mubarak."[4] Before the early 1970s, objections were registered against the American presence in Egypt, and, especially after the Camp David Treaty, the opposition has focused on advocating more support for Palestinian rights and the restoration of Egypt's Arab links. There has been a growing sense, shared by leftists as well as Islamicists, that Egypt has lost its Arab personality and much of Egyptian politics since 1977, when Sadat went to Jerusalem, has been a struggle to reestablish Egypt's Arab identity. One issue which has been the most chronic of all, however, has been the demand for political freedom.[5]

The middle class is probably the most politically relevant stratum in Egypt, as its members are those who staff the military, bureaucracy, and schools, and run both public- and private-sector industries. For this class, freedom of speech, press, assembly, the right to organize groups and parties, has taken on growing significance and unites right, left, and center.[6] In the early days of the Free Officers' Revolution, the regime attempted to unite all political forces under a common umbrella, the most important of which was the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). Even though the ASU was designed in some respects after the Stalinist model, it never dominated Egyptian life to the degree the Communist Party dominated the Soviet Union, partly because it was the creature of the state rather than the other way around.[7] In spite of its formal power, the ASU was not always able to control all of its members, even those in the National Assembly or, after 1971, the People's Assembly. Furthermore, even with a formal monopoly on political legitimacy, the ASU could not prevent significant numbers of independent candidates from winning assembly seats in elections. Its increasing debility was evident especially in 1976 when three *manabir* (platforms) — left, right and center — were created out of the ASU and contested elections. These party-like groupings were to have provided a channel for all legitimate political activity; but over sixty independent candidates succeeded in winning seats in the People's Assembly. To the surprise of no one, the center, that is, the government party, won, while the right gained twelve seats and the left only two.[8]

In 1977, a new law permitted the formation of political parties, and in 1979 the ASU was formally abolished. Under the terms of the 1977 Egyptian law, revised in 1979 and 1983, political parties must be approved by a Committee for Political Party Affairs, a part of the government whose members are appointed by the president. All legal parties must state their support for such principles as national unity and social peace, and parties based on religion or class are proscribed.[9] By 1984, five opposition parties were legalized and four contested elections for parliament. Due to the restriction on the formation of parties, not all potentially important groups participated as organized forces in these elections. Most notable was the absence of a Nasserite party.[10] The Muslim Brothers, although unable to form a party of their own, did create an electoral coalition with the New Wafd, and this strange hybrid was the only opposition party to win seats in the People's Assembly in the 1984 elections.

In addition to the right to contest elections, since the late 1970s legal political parties have been able to publish a party newspaper. In the ensuing years, the opposition press has been lively and filled with controversy. These papers, as well as a few older publications such as *Rose al-Youssef* and *Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi*, form important outlets for nonconventional opinion. As the pages of the party papers are open to nonparty contributors, they are a more representative forum for political debate than parliament, in which the government party held roughly 82 percent of the seats following the 1976 elections, 90 percent after the 1979 elections, and 87 percent after the 1984 elections.

Part of the reason the National Democratic Party won such an overwhelming majority of seats in the 1984 elections was that the rules were stacked in its favor. Law 114 for the year 1983 created a system of proportional representation. By the terms of this law, unless a party wins at least 8 percent of the national vote, it will not get any seats in parliament, and the votes cast for a party which fails to get the 8 percent minimum will be counted as if they had been cast for the party which won the plurality of votes in that district. Also, the seats reserved for women would go to the party winning the plurality of votes in each district with a reserved seat. All thirty-one reserved seats went to the NDP in the May 1984 elections.

While the apportionment of seats in the People's Assembly does not reflect the real balance of forces in the country, the tally of votes for the 1984 election helps to shed light on the dynamics of opposition politics in Egypt. There was electoral violence, and one female candidate was killed. The NDP won a massive victory. But, lopsided results and violence aside, this may have been the most democratic and honestly reported election in Egypt since before the 1952 revolution. Still, the opposition charged that the NDP "forged" the results, and the true strength of the opposition is much greater than election results showed.[11] The published figures revealed that the opposition attracted 27 percent of the total votes cast. Equally important, but difficult to interpret with any certainty, is that only 43 percent of registered voters actually voted. The largest turnout was in rural Egypt, where 61 percent of those registered voted, while in Cairo, presumably the most literate, sophisticated, and politicized area of the country, voter turnout was only 20 percent. In Giza it was 28 percent and in Alexandria 24 percent. The low turnout may indicate considerable cynicism and widespread malaise, and was anticipated.[12] The national vote, by party, was as follows:

Party	*Valid Votes*	*Percent of Total*
National Democratic Party	3,756,359	72.99
New Wafd Party	778,131	15.12
Socialist Labor Party	364,040	7.07
Nationalist Unionist Progressive Party	214,587	4.17
Liberal Party	33,448	0.65
	5,146,565	100.00[13]

The NDP list contained many people who identified themselves as social democrats and some who would be inclined to join a Nasserite party if one were available. Nasserites and social democrats could also be found on the SLP and NUPP list. By contrast, some people who could be identified as "Sadatists" were dropped from the NDP list. Thus, Rawya Attia, a social democrat first elected to parliament

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in 1957, replaced Farkhounda Hassan, a close friend of Mrs. Sadat's, as the NDP women's representative for Giza. Party membership does not imply complete acceptance of a party's platform, and each of the legal parties contained representatives from various portions of the political spectrum. Even the NUPP list contained anomalies, as Marxists shared billing with sheikhs.

The oddest coalition was the basically secular New Wafd, composed largely of people the left refers to as secular right wing, prerevolutionary, neofeudalists; and the Muslim Brotherhood, which advocates an Islamic state and opposes the excesses of capitalism and hereditary privilege. Although the other parties were, to some degree, created by the regime, the New Wafd was a revival of the prerevolutionary Wafd. The "new" secretary-general of the party, Fuad Serag al-Din, held that post when the "old" Wafd was made illegal in 1954. In February, 1978, soon after the changes in the law in 1977, the Wafd resurrected itself. It lasted only four months before it ceased political activity, charging that harassment from the Sadat regime made it impossible for the New Wafd to continue.[14] At the time, it was thought the party had dissolved itself and was no longer a legal entity. Thus, when Serag al-Din tried to revive it again in 1983, anticipating the forthcoming elections for parliament, the government tried to block him, claiming the Wafd no longer existed. A complicated legal battle followed, the details of which need not be recounted here, and the Egyptian courts decided finally that in 1978 all the necessary legal steps to dissolve the New Wafd had not been taken.[15] Therefore, in the fall of 1983, the New Wafd resumed its political activities and, in February, 1984, two of its principal leaders, Fuad Serag al-Din and Ibrahim Farag, won a case in court against the government, which had sought to prohibit them from participating in politics because of their pre-1952 political activity.[16]

Shortly after this case was decided, a de facto electoral alliance between the New Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood was announced.[17] Thus, the National Democratic Party, which represented continuity and claimed credit for all the achievements of both Nasser and Sadat, was challenged in the 1984 elections by a coalition of organizations with genuine grassroots political support and considerable organizational skill. The NDP won a decisive victory, but the New Wafd gained roughly 15 percent of the popular vote and fifty-eight seats (13 percent) of the 448 chosen by the voters. Although the Wafd platform

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did not differ markedly from that of the NDP,[18] its list of candidates did, as the Wafd nominated a large number of people from Egypt's most prominent prerevolutionary families and people associated with or supported by the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Egyptian political spectrum is sui generis, and observers should not expect anything more than superficial resemblance to patterns found elsewhere. Nasserites, Sadatists, Marxists, Wafdists, and feminists are mixed with Muslims who seek to establish an Islamic state, Christians who wish to protect minority rights, and humanists who find new injustices to confront with alarming regularity. Women participate in the political process not only as leaders of women but as women leaders, and sixteen of them, representing a cross-section of women in the political opposition, will be discussed now that we have identified salient features of the milieu within which they operate.

WOMEN IN THE POLITICAL OPPOSITION[19]

Formative Years and Family Life

In the elections for parliament in 1984, over 140 women were candidates for office. Roughly 75 percent of these women competed on behalf of an opposition party, but only two were successful, both representing the New Wafd. Olfat Kamel, a veteran Cairo politician and incumbent parliamentarian, and Rizqah al-Balashi, a veiled social worker from Alexandria whose candidacy was supported strongly by the Muslim Brothers, joined the thirty-three NDP women elected to the Majlis al-Shaab. These two women have little in common although they are members of the same party, and they help to illustrate the diverse and sometimes paradoxical position of women in the opposition in Egypt. One attracted votes from one of Cairo's slums, the other from mainly male Islamic fundamentalists. Both added strength to a liberal party headed by a genuine pasha. However, they are not the only significant women in the political opposition, and running for office is not the only important activity for politically active people in Egypt, many of whom consider writing and organizing to be more meaningful than running for office.

Most of the leading women in the political opposition have the same types of family and educational background as the parliamentary women discussed in chapter 2. Some, in fact, served in parliament at some time between 1957 and 1982 and were included in that chapter. The discussion of the formative years of the opposition women will be brief, because the story is similar to that of the more politically orthodox group. The majority come from upper-class or upper-middle-class families, were encouraged by their families, particularly their fathers, and educated. However, some features of the early lives of these women are different from those who serve in parliament.

Most of the female opposition leaders discussed in this chapter come from urban areas. Only 37 percent have clear rural or provincial capital origins, compared with 44 percent of the parliamentary women. Like their parliamentary counterparts, the majority learned "proper," that is, classical, Arabic but are even more likely than parliamentary women to know a foreign language. Eleven of the sixteen are fluent in either English or French, and seven know both languages. In general, women opposition leaders are even better educated than their parliamentary counterparts, 43 percent of whom have university degrees compared to 63 percent of the opposition women. Advanced degrees are also more common among this group, as 38 percent have earned doctorates or masters degrees, whereas only 10 percent of the women who have served in parliament, but who are not included in this group of opposition women, have done so.

Additional significant differences appear when comparing the marital and professional life of these women with those of the establishment. Divorce is almost more common than is a single stable marriage. 38 percent of the opposition women have been divorced at least once. Also, although there is professional diversity among women in the political opposition, virtually all are, or have been, academics, writers, journalists, or leaders of unions or interest group associations. Both their professions and their politics have been central to the lives of these people, helping to account for the relatively high divorce rate and the smaller family size. Even though two members of the group have had four children, the average number of children is below two. Very few are likely to agree with a leading female parliamentarian who said "My house first, then political activity."[20] For most of these women, life has never been as uncomplicated as that. If it were, they would not have become rebels, a role which some were inclined to adopt even as children, but which others picked up much later in life.

Becoming Rebels

For a variety of reasons, the political left has more magnetism for opposition women than has the right. Nearly two-thirds of those discussed in this section are on the left, possibly because the left calls for extensive economic reforms, and women, who are clearly among the poorest of the poor, would benefit from those reforms.[21] Most opposition women also consider themselves to be feminists, and, as most feminists see tradition as part of the source of women's problems, they move leftward politically because the left represents, for them, a challenge to tradition and more hope for women. The right also attracts women, although in fewer numbers, because it offers opportunity for individuals based on ascription or achievement. Whether attracted to the right or the left, many politically active Egyptian women are more inclined to be drawn to the opposition than to the government, but this is not because the government has been against women or has done nothing for them. As indicated in earlier chapters, the reverse is true. Especially since 1952, the Egyptian government has done a great deal to improve the status of women in Egypt. Nevertheless, a number of other factors have impelled women to oppose the government.

Women move toward the opposition for the same kinds of reasons that attract men: ideological conviction or the pull of a particular leader. They are also moved to join the opposition as women, because no matter how much has been done to improve the lot of women in Egypt, it is easy to reach the conclusion that in many ways they are still second-class citizens. Not only is their right to vote or hold office still questioned by many influential people,[22] but aspects of the Personal Status Laws, even after recent reforms, permit men to have up to four wives at a time and make divorce easy for a man but quite difficult for a woman. They place women in such a disadvantageous position that those who do not withdraw from politics out of despair are likely to be drawn toward the forces of change.

This could be illustrated in many ways, but the following item from Egypt's leading newspaper will suffice. In February, 1984, it was reported that a man had gone to court to ask it to force his wife into *bayt al-taah* (house of obedience), that is, return to his house and submit to his authority. He had beaten her and mistreated her in other ways and then thrown her out of the hut in which they lived, which

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was adjacent to, and even had the same address as, a public toilet. Having expelled her, he then went to court to have the police force her to return and be obedient to him. The judge demurred, but only on the grounds that a public toilet was not a legal home.[23] The case could have gone the other way. If women, particularly poor women, must face even the remote chance of having to submit to such an indignity, it is easy to understand why so many politically active women are inclined toward opposition to the regime in power, regardless of how well-intentioned toward women that regime may be.

The story related above portrays the plight of women, and also highlights the special vulnerability of the poor, a traditional concern of the left. The combination of an ideological inclination to support a particular cause, plus some specific triggering event, helps to explain how and why these opposition women became rebels against rather than supporters of the regime in power.

One leftist woman, whose background is quite different from that of most of the women mentioned in this book, is Shahenda Mogled, a member of the general secretariat of the NUPP and the leader of the peasant's section of that party. In 1976, 1979, and again in 1984, she was an unsuccessful candidate for parliament from Tala, the place where Jihan Sadat started her first social welfare project. In 1984, she was placed second on the regular list of candidates rather than for a woman's seat. She is well known in her district because of her involvement in the notorious Kamshish affair. On May 1, 1966, her husband, Salah Hussein was murdered, as the party newspaper put it, "by the feudalist Fiqi family."[24] He had been a minor ASU official, active on behalf of the interests of the rural poor, and his murder did little more than stimulate a series of investigations.[25] The abuses remained and Shahenda Mogled, left with three children to support, continued her husband's work. Her life was not easy. In 1971, she was ordered by the Sadat government to leave Menoufia province, in which Tala is located. She was arrested because of her political activities in 1975 and again in 1981. In 1984, she stated her chief interest in running for parliament was to try to do more to protect the rights and enhance the prospects of tenant farmers and women.[26] As she is still well under fifty years of age, it is likely she will be active in Egyptian politics for the forseeable future. Before her husband's murder, Shahenda Mogled was interested in helping poor peasants. Radicalized by the murder, she was at loggerheads with the government

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soon after the event. Although more traumatic than others, her entry into opposition politics is typical in that she did not start out to oppose the system. She got involved in a particular political activity and in the course of that activity, something happened to cause her to decide to rebel rather than seek accommodation.

Trying to discover whether the regime was initially against these women, or whether they started to object and the regime responded, is another version of the familiar dispute concerning the chicken and the egg. Fortunately, there is no need to resolve the dispute. What is important is that all reached a point where they had to decide whether to stand against the government or for it, and all chose opposition rather than capitulation or accommodation. Furthermore, this stance was maintained for an appreciable period of their lives rather than being confined to the particular time associated with the triggering event.

For many members of this group, the pattern of rebellion against authority began when they were still children. Nawal al-Saadawi, for example, has been rebelling against what she calls the patriarchal class system since early childhood. Everywhere she looked, she saw injustice, particularly discrimination against females, and her parents permitted her to think and talk about what caused injustice and what could be done about it. This freedom led her to challenge the conventional values and institutions of the society in which she was raised, including male authority, religion, and capitalism. As a young girl, she was subjected to ritual clitoridectomy, and the lingering memory of that event, as well as of other childhood traumas, alienated her permanently. She doubted God's justice, and even God's existence, and in one of her nineteen books, reflects on the way God is typically thought of as a man. Why couldn't God be a woman?[27] She concluded, as an adult, that the problem of justice and male domination of society was not created by religion, particularly Islam, but by capitalism. As her opinion is shared by many leftist feminists in the Arab world, it is worth quoting at length and helps explain why many opposition women are attracted to the left.

> Economic factors and, concomitantly, political factors are the basis upon which such customs as female circumcision have grown up . . . Many . . . are not able to distinguish between political and religious factors, or . . . [they] conceal economic and political

> motives behind religious arguments in an attempt to hide the real forces that lie at the basis of what happens. . . . It has very often been proclaimed that Islam is at the root of female circumcision, and is also responsible for the underprivileged and backward situation of women in Egypt and the Arab countries. Such a contention is not true. If we study Christianity it is easy to see that this religion is much more rigid and orthodox where women are concerned than Islam. Nevertheless, many countries were able to progress rapidly despite the preponderance of Christianity as a religion. . . .
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> That is why I firmly believe that the reasons for the lower status of women in our societies, and the lack of opportunities for progress afforded to them, are not due to Islam, but rather to certain economic and political forces, namely those of foreign imperialism operating mainly from the outside, and of the reactionary classes operating from the inside. These two forces cooperate closely and are making a concentrated attempt to misinterpret religion and to utilize it as an instrument of fear, oppression and exploitation.[28]

Discrimination against women, the tyranny caused by what she and others regard as false interpretations of Islam, the domination of society by privileged and exploitative classes, and the evils of imperialism are part of a package. In 1981, Nawal al-Saadawi's political activity was of a high enough profile that she was among the roughly 1500 opposition figures arrested in September of that year. Released by President Mubarak after Sadat's assassination, she continued to be active in politics and, in 1983, tried unsuccessfully to form a new women's group which might later have been turned into a political party.[29] Her perspective is shared by many women and men in Egypt's political opposition, and her path to rebellion is not unique. Neither is hers the only view, as illustrated by the case of Zeinab al-Ghazali, a vehement opponent of secularism and an advocate of a society based on Islamic law.

Zeinab al-Ghazali al-Gebali established the Muslim Women's Association in 1937. She was barely twenty years old at the time. Raised in a wealthy and religious family and educated at home by tutors from al-Azhar, religion was the center of her life from early childhood. The association she established grew and, in the late 1930s Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, urged her to merge it with his organization. She refused, opting for continued independence. In 1948, the Brethren were under intense pressure from the government. Zeinab al-Ghazali again met with Hassan al-Banna and, still keeping the Muslim Women's Association independent, swore personal allegiance to him.[30] Her active political involvement did not become major until after the 1952 revolution, when she and the Muslim Women's Association, which by now had 119 branches, provided food, medical care, and other services to needy members of the Brotherhood. She kept her association with the Ikwan secret in order to protect the Muslim Women's Association from government harassment. Thus, even though the Brotherhood was disbanded by law in 1953, the Muslim Women's Association was recognized officially by the Ministry of Social Affairs in 1957.[31]

At an early age, this organizer for a holy cause had rebelled against secular society. This early rejection led her, as it did Nawal al-Saadawi, toward a life of dedication to a cause. In the late 1950s, she and Abdel Fattah Ismail, another member of the Ikhwan, gained permission from Hassan al-Hudeibi, the leader of the Brotherhood at that time, to organize an essentially underground revival of the Brotherhood.[32] The details of her involvement in this activity need not be related here,[33] but they led to her arrest in 1965 in what she regarded as, "the fake case of the Muslim Brotherhood."[34] Although the prosecutor asked for the death penalty, she was sentenced to only twenty-five years in jail. Some of her fellow activists, including Sayyid Qutb, who had become the leading religious leader of the covert group, and her colleague, Abdel Fattah Ismail, were executed on charges of attempting the violent overthrow of the government. Zeinab al-Ghazali denied the Islamic legitimacy of these charges then, and has continued to do so since. While in jail, she suffered considerably and at one point two of her jailers tried to rape her. In her autobiography she describes how she defended herself by biting one of the would-be rapists on the neck until he died.[35]

The case of Zeinab al-Ghazali illustrates that the way in which these women became rebels does little to predict the eventual consequences of involvement in opposition politics in Egypt. Like other women from wealthy families, she began by organizing a private voluntary social organization. Because of the Islamic character of that association, she made no distinction between the world of religion and the world of politics, and became involved with the Muslim Brotherhood.

It is easy to understand how she came eventually into serious conflict with the essentially secular Arab nationalism of Gamal Abdel Nasser, but she had been active in Egyptian political life for nearly thirty years before she was tried and convicted of attempting to subvert the government. Although sentenced to twenty-five years, she served less than six. In 1971, she and several others arrested at the same time were released by the new president, Anwar Sadat, who wished to come to terms with, rather than destroy, the leadership of the Islamic trend. Zeinab al-Ghazali's period of intense organizational activity was over, and except for her opposition to the 1979 and 1985 changes in the Personal Status Laws, which she regarded as un-Islamic, she has not been conspicuous in opposition politics since that time.

Some political violence is planned or organized, but at other times it is almost random, and the possibility that force might be used in politics is something of which most Egyptian politicians are aware. In the spring of 1984 an event took place which both male and female politicians are likely to remember. In May 1984, Niemat Hassan Muhammad Ali was the Labor Party candidate for the women's seat in the first district of Qena, in upper Egypt. Known simply as Niemat Hassan, she had been a member of the NDP in the 1970s and, before that, a member of the Socialist Youth Organization. She was a social worker in her district and, as a candidate for parliament, advocated the establishment of day care centers for the children of working mothers, feminist associations which would provide homes for elderly women, and special programs to combat illiteracy among rural women and teach them such practical skills as sewing and knitting.[38]

Programmatically, her ideas did not differ substantially from those expressed by the majority of the women in parliament or from those of the presidential wives discussed earlier in this book, but policies are not always the most important issues in politics. Active in the Socialist Labor Party since shortly after its formation, she had switched from the NDP to the SLP as a reaction against the corruption she saw in government, corruption for which she held the ruling party responsible. She was also impressed by the leadership of Ibrahim Shoukry, the head of SLP. In the 1984 election she was a vigorous campaigner and, a few days before the election, accused the NDP of trying to bribe her to switch parties. She declined the alleged bribe and accused the current and previous governor of Qena of corruption, contributing to the heated atmosphere of the campaign.

On the whole, the 1984 parliamentary election was orderly, especially by third world standards, but such a general statement was of little consolation to her family. On election day, in an incident which was not explained fully in the Egyptian press at the time, Niemat Hassan was shot in the head and killed by a cousin of a male NDP candidate for parliament from the same district. He was caught by the police and charged with first-degree murder.[37] Electoral violence such as this is rare in Egyptian politics,[38] but in upper Egypt many people are armed, and the 1984 election was one in which hopes, and tempers, ran high. Although there is no evidence that Niemat Hassan was shot because of her sex, it is also clear that male chivalry did not protect this mother of four from a politically inspired killer.

Not all entries into an opposition stance were as traumatic as that of Shahenda Mogled, as early as Nawal al-Saadawi's, or culminated as violently as that of Niemat Hassan's. Some opposition women evolved into an opposition posture gradually and some were, at one time, part of the regime rather than antagonistic to it. Afaf Mahfouz, a French-trained political scientist, was Egyptian cultural attaché in Washington, D.C., in the mid-1970s. Disenchanted by violations of basic human rights, she had not had much to do with Egyptian politics in the 1960s, most of which she spent in graduate study in France. Although she had rebelled against paternal authority as a teenager, and been offended by "excesses" of both Nasser and Sadat, she worked on behalf of the government from 1974 until 1978. Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal "let me be free in organizing my business at the Cultural Office."[39] It was only after she returned to Egypt in 1978 that she became involved in opposition politics, focusing on objecting to the terms of the Camp David Treaty, Egypt's growing dependence on America, and the lack of freedom, equality, and justice she found in Egypt. She did not join a political party, preferring to maintain maximum personal and political independence. Her most conspicuous role in the opposition has been helping other people and groups to organize, and encouraging opposition people to be aware of their own limitations while they are critical of others. The role of independent humanist is particularly lonely, and occasionally puts Afaf Mahfouz at odds with friends as well as political allies, but many of the members of the opposition in Egypt have chosen to remain independent rather than join a political party or association.

Like Afaf Mahfouz, Mona Makram Obeid is another opposi-

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tion woman who could easily have worked with the government rather than join the opposition, but her family background impelled her toward the New Wafd. Her father was a Wafdist parliamentarian before 1952, but the major influence on her early life was her uncle, Makram Obeid, one of the major Wafdist leaders of prerevolutionary Egypt. Rebellious as a child, she changed schools four times, but she remembers her uncle as always being supportive of her. Always interested in politics, she remained aloof from direct involvement until 1978, when she joined the New Wafd. A few years later, as a graduate student at Harvard, she enjoyed working as a student representative at the J.F.K. School. Upon returning to Egypt, she joined a new independent political organization modeled after the British Fabian Society. She probably would have continued to be independent of any party but when the New Wafd was revived in 1983, she reactivated her membership. As she put it in an interview, "The Wafd is my home."[44] In the 1984 parliamentary elections, Mona Makram Obeid ran for the woman's seat in Shubra, her father's former constituency. As an articulate Coptic woman from a distinguished political family, she attracted voters and attention in heavily Coptic Shubra, but the woman's seat for that district went to the NDP. She learned from the experience and plans to be active in the Wafd in the future, helping to prepare it and herself for the next electoral challenge to the government.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ROLES OF OPPOSITION WOMEN

The roles undertaken by women in the political opposition in Egypt can be thought of as falling into two fairly distinct categories. One could be called "consciousness raising" and the other, "organizational creation or innovation." The latter is the most concrete and, hence, the easiest to discuss.

Women have been active and conspicuous members and leaders of opposition political parties and movements, especially since 1977, when political parties were legalized. Not only have nearly all of the members of the group studied been active in such parties or movements, but several have served in leadership capacities. Laila Takla, who broke with President Sadat over Camp David, was deputy leader of the Socialist Labor Party for nearly five years, and Olfat Kamel had the same

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post in the Liberal Party until 1984, when she joined the New Wafd. Hekmat Abu Zeid, who began criticizing President Sadat in the mid-1970s, later became a leader of the Egyptian National Front. This organization, based outside Egypt, called for the overthrow of the Sadat government. As a consequence of its activities, the leaders, including Dr. Abu Zeid, were stripped of their right to participate in Egyptian politics.[41]

Another type of opposition activity which has attracted women has been working with unions or voluntary associations. Over the past several decades, the government of Egypt has tried to control these organizations,[42] and union leaders such as Amina Shafiq and Shahenda Mogled have been active in the process of resistance to government encroachment on union and associational autonomy. At least as far as these women are concerned, the government has not been successful in securing their compliance.

Chronic opposition to the government from within parliament has been unusual in Egypt, and few people have sustained this role for any appreciable period of time. One notable exception is Olfat Kamel, who bills herself as "Egypt's Thatcher."[43] Tough, independent, and forceful, she is one of Egypt's most respected politicians and was elected to parliament in 1984 on the Wafd ticket. It is likely that she will have some type of leadership role in that party in the future.

The role of women in the political opposition in Egypt can also be considered as an exercise in consciousness raising. That is, by what they do and how they do it, women who criticize or reject government or societal demands, or who offer alternative ideas or plans, help change conventional notions of behavior regarding a wide range of issues, particularly issues of special interest to women. Women interviewed for this study were aware of this role, but also conscious that it is hard to measure or evaluate the significance of this type of activity. By engaging in organizational work, half of the opposition women studied have tried to change what people in Egypt *do*, to influence behavior directly. Two-thirds, however, have worked to change how and what people *think*, to influence ideas, and through ideas to alter future behavior. In addition to writing, roughly 30% of them have taught at the university level and influenced students directly by modeling new roles and, more importantly, by providing students with encouragement to think on their own.

Additionally, opposition women may have contributed to changing political consciousness in Egypt as a consequence of themselves being victims of violence or oppression. One has been widowed, one murdered, and five have been sent to jail for political reasons. Several have been divorced by men who could not coexist with a wife active in opposition politics. There are few secrets in Egypt, and the circumstances surrounding these divorces are well known among politically conscious people. Research has not been done to determine what effect such events have on public opinion at large, or opinion among the most politically relevant strata in the country, but it is reasonable to assume that many of these women became at least minor heroines particularly because of their jail records and in general, because of the difficulties they have faced. Politicians in Egypt do not conceal these events from public scrutiny. President Sadat was proud of his jail experience, and many opposition women have reason to be proud of theirs and have written about the event to make sure it becomes part of the recorded history of Egypt.[44]

Perhaps the most specific achievement which can be claimed by women in the political opposition is the passage of new Personal Status Laws in July of 1985. Prior to their approval by parliament, a consensus on their terms was reached by a broad coalition of Egyptian political leaders. This coalition included a number of opposition women who were conspicuous in and essential to a process which created a climate of opinion in which new laws were perceived as both possible and necessary. Nawal al-Saadawi, for example, was especially prominent in this brief and effective movement, as were several other women mentioned in this chapter. Others, like Zeinab al-Ghazali, felt the new laws were against Sharia. Those favoring reform, however, carried the day and both governmental and opposition leaders may share credit for the reforms made in the Personal Status Laws in 1985, when "Jihan's Laws" were replaced by rules created and supported by a cross-section of Egyptian political leaders including the president, parliamentarians of both sexes, and opposition women.

CONCLUSION

In the years since the Free Officers' Revolution, the political opposition in Egypt has grown in complexity and size. By 1984, it included five legal political parties and a formally banned religious movement among its most prominent elements. One of the most conspicuous aspects of the opposition considered as a whole has been the presence in it of significant numbers of women. This chapter has presented salient information about and perspectives on a selective sample of leading women in that opposition. While their early background did not appear to differ markedly from the parliamentary women studied in chapter 2, their marriage and family circumstances did. Partly as a result of the political and professional careers they have led, opposition women have a high divorce rate relative to parliamentary women, as well as smaller families.

The women studied got involved in opposition politics in a variety of ways. Most had an early start as youthful rebels against parental, usually paternal, authority, but the actual entry into the opposition typically was triggered by some fairly dramatic event or a major change in government policy. They became interested and involved in politics and were committed to a fairly specific set of policies or programs. Steadfast attachment to those ideas led them toward an opposition stance.

As members of the opposition, women have been significant as leaders in virtually all of the various components the opposition has developed. With the possible exception of the underground groups involved in such activity as the assassination of President Sadat, women have been important role models, organizers, and consciousness raisers. Opposition women have demonstrated that not all women are compliant or reserved, and that women as well as men are ready to share the risks, and if successful, the rewards, of opposition politics in contemporary Egypt.

Future prospects for women dissidents and rebels depend on the overall prospects for freedom for interest groups and political parties to organize, and for individuals to exercise freedom of speech, press, and assembly. While individual rights are important, the history of the women's movement in Egypt illustrates the centrality of organization. The women studied showed a marked preference for legal as contrasted to underground political activity, and are likely to use the opportunities afforded them by the Mubarak regime, but the signals relative to democracy and freedom to organize emitted by that regime have been ambiguous. On the positive side, the opposition press has been able to publish and criticize policies and personnel associated with the regime. Also, the 1984 parliamentary elections resulted in significant electoral success by the Wafd and the Muslim Brothers. On a more negative note, not all who wished to form parties were free to do so. Interest groups remained under considerable pressure to conform to the government line, and the electoral rules were stacked against minority parties. Furthermore, the man selected in June, 1984, to be the new speaker of the People's Assembly, and a potential future prime minister, Dr. Rifaat Mahgoub, is a well-known Nasserite, former head of the ASU, and is on record as having opposed the original shift from a one-party to a multi-party system.[45] On balance, however, in mid-1985, the ability of the opposition to continue its role in Egyptian politics appeared relatively secure, guaranteed by law, presidential support, and its own enthusiasm for the game of democracy.

So far, this book has dealt with the roles of women in the political elite. From this consideration of political women, we move to examine the role of women in business. Once again the focus will be on an elite, this time a small group of entrepreneurs whose business operations are national in scope. As we shall see, political and economic women share many characteristics, but there are important differences as well. If anything, the entrepreneurs are even more accomplished and have overcome greater obstacles than have Egyptian women in politics.

Uncommon Egyptian Women
in Arabian Islamic Cultu

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Preface to the English Edition

The oppression of women, the exploitation and social pressures to which they are exposed, are not characteristic of Arab or Middle Eastern societies, or countries of the 'Third World' alone. They constitute an integral part of the political, economic and cultural system, preponderant in most of the world – whether that system is backward and feudal in nature, or a modern industrial society that has been submitted to the far reaching influence of a scientific and technological revolution.

The situation and problems of women in contemporary human society are born of developments in history that made one class rule over another, and men dominate over women. They are the product of class and sex.

But there are still many thinkers – men of science, writers, and social or political leaders – who close their eyes to this fact. They wish to separate the arduous struggles of women for self-emancipation from the revolt of people everywhere, men and women, against the present structure of society. Yet it is only this radical change that can end foreign and national class exploitation for all time *and* abolish the ascendancy of men over women not only in society, but also within the family unit which constitutes the core of patriarchal class relations. This core of relations remains the origin of the values and sanctified beliefs which throughout the ages have cemented, reinforced and perpetuated a system of class and patriarchal oppression, despite all the changes which society has known since the first human communities were constituted on earth.

Influential circles, particularly in the Western imperialist world, depict the problems of Arab women as stemming from the substance and values of Islam, and simultaneously depict the retarded development of Arab countries in many important areas as largely the result of religious and cultural factors, or even inherent characteristics in the mental and psychic constitution of the Arab peoples. For them underdevelopment is not related to economic and political factors, at the root of which lies foreign exploitation of resources, and the plunder to which national riches are exposed. For them there is no link between political and economic emancipation and the processes related to growth, development, and progress.

Development in such circles is visualized as a process of cultural change, of modernization along the lines of Western life, of technological advance which would permit better utilization of the resources, quicker and bigger profits, and more effective and efficient ways of pumping out oil from under the shifting desert sands or the depths of ocean beds. All this under one condition, and one condition only: such resources must continue to serve the interests of international capitalism and the multinational giants that still rule over a large part of the world. It must be submitted to the laws of unequal exchange and ruthless exploitation.

Some Arab and Islamic countries have been the theatre of such modernization processes at the hands of national governments and rulers largely controlled by Western interests. The result has been nothing more than a form of pseudo-development, a dual system composed of a small modern sector linked to the interests of multinationals and a large traditional agricultural sector producing for export, a population where a restricted minority shares in some of the gains while the vast majority sink from poverty to ever deeper destitution, a ruling class fed on opulence and wealth and the masses fed on deprivation and a loaf of bread or a bowl of rice. The income and profits generated from this form of development stream into the strongrooms of Western banks and the coffers of international corporations, while the gap between the 'developed' and the 'developing' grows ever wider and deeper. In the United States of America, the 360 billion dollar a year oil industry's 'official' profits for the five sister oil corporations increased in 1978 by as much as 343% over the previous year, while in the Arab countries a million children still die annually before reaching one year of age, as a result of poverty, sickness and malnutrition. Their intake of essential food items such as proteins and vitamins is only one-tenth of that fed to dogs and cats in the United States of America.

With the ever growing chasm which separates a minority of rich who own the wealth and control the power of nations, and the vast majority worn out by exhaustion, toil, sickness and hunger, problems are daily growing more acute, conflicts becoming more sharp and bitter, popular explosions more frequent, and everywhere the struggle of developing peoples for freedom, independence and social equality a widespread phenomenon which is shaking the foundations of an imperialist system built on social, racial and sexual discrimination. In almost every country of the 'Third World' the conflict between classes in its open and clandestine, legal and illegal manifestations is growing with each passing day.

The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79, which swept before it the Pahlavi dynasty, is an indication that people in the underdeveloped countries are no longer able to stand the growing pressures of an economic crisis that is affecting wider and wider sections of the urban and rural workers, the middle classes, the intellectuals and the national bourgeoisie, and burdening the life of millions, both men and women, whose existence is already one long trail of suffering from birth to death. Yet in Iran the Shah was the self-proclaimed leader of a modernization process which, it was said, had brought increasing prosperity to the country, but which in fact had only engendered incalculable riches for a handful of corrupt, degenerate and sanguinary despots, and a train

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of misery and death for those who worked the fields, operated the machines, ran the schools and colleges, and turned the wheels of everyday administration and business in a country where oil revenues had attained $9 billion a year.

The Revolution in Iran, therefore, is in its essence political and economic. It is a popular explosion which seeks to emancipate the people of Iran, both men and women, and not to send women back to the prison of the veil, the kitchen and the bedroom. The Iranian Revolution has lifted the banners of Islam overhead, as banners of freedom from imperialist oppression in the economic, social and cultural life of more than thirty-seven million people. For Islam in its essence, in its fundamental teachings, in its birth and development under the leadership of Mahomet, was a call to liberate the slave, a call to social equality and public ownership of wealth in its earliest form, that of a 'House' or 'Bank' in which all surplus wealth was to be deposited and used for feeding and clothing and housing the poor. Early Islam laid the first foundations of what might be called a Primitive Socialism, for the money deposited in the 'House of Wealth' belonged to all Muslims equally, irrespective of their tribe or class. But Primitive Socialism in Islam did not last long. It was soon buried under the growing prosperity of the new classes that arose and thrived after Mahomet's death, and that increased their influence when the Muslim warriors burst beyond the narrow frontiers of the Arab desert and flowed out from the burning sands into the green valleys of Syria, Iraq and Egypt. Primitive Socialism received its first blows at the hands of Osman Ibn Affan, the Fourth Caliph of the Muslims and head of the Ommayad dynasty in Damascus.

Thus arose in Islam the struggle that began, and was never to end, between those who hoped or believed or fought for social justice, freedom and equality, and those who stood for class privilege, feudal oppression and whose descendants were later to side with the Turkish domination, with French, British, Italian and German colonialism and later with international imperialism headed by the United States of America.

Thus it came about that, from the time of Osman Ibn Affan in the Eighth Century A.D., history was to plunge the Arab Islamic peoples into a long night of feudal oppression and foreign domination reaching its darkest depths under the Turkish Empire which, ever since it conquered and ruled, has symbolized what is most corrupt, degenerate, obscurantist, inhuman and reactionary in the annals of the Arab peoples.

Turks

Thus it was also that women were condemned to toil, to hide behind the veil, to quiver in the prison of a Harem fenced in by high walls, iron bars, windowless rooms, and the ever present eunuchs on guard with their swords.

In their quest for liberation from the injustices and oppression exercised against them by foreign invaders and internal feudal rulers, the Arab peoples could see no hope except in the application of those principles of social equality, freedom and justice which constituted the essence of Islamic teachings. This explains why the great majority of revolutionary Arab leaders who fought against feudal despotism in its various forms, internal or external,

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and later against colonialism, as well as the pioneers and thinkers who played a role in the cultural and intellectual development of the Arab peoples particularly during the reawakening of the 19th and early 20th century were also leaders and pioneers in Islam. We can cite as eminent examples Gamal El Dine El Afghani, Abdel Rahman El Kawakbi, Abdallah Nadeem, and Sheikh Mohammed Abdou. It is both interesting and significant to note that their thought and action not only aimed at the liberation of Arab peoples from the rapid expansion of colonialism in its economic, political and military forms, and from the oppression of feudal regimes, but also dealt with problems related to women's status and the need to draw them into the mainstream of life and of the struggle for emancipation.

The Iranian Revolution of today, therefore, is a natural heritage of the historical struggle for freedom and social equality among Arab peoples, who have continued to fight under the banner of Islam and to draw their inspiration from the teachings of the Koran and the Prophet Mahomet. Thus it is tha Islam, a religion characterized not only by its philosophical and theological content, but also by the fact that since the early days it penetrated into the arena of politics and also embraced the economic and social aspects of everyday life, has been and still is the banner and inspiration for conflicting forces – for feudalism, oppression and reaction on the one hand, and for the freedom fighters and martyrs in the cause of Arab liberation on the other.

The past years have witnessed a growing conflict which is being fought out on the basis of Islam, between the forces of progress, and those of imperialism and reaction. As the contradictions in the world of today grow deeper and more acute, the battle for people's minds and convictions is expanding in scope and complexity. This battle is being fought in all areas. Islam is one of the essential arenas because it spreads its influence over crucial regions of the world, rich in resources and human potential. The conflicts within Islam are directly related to the struggle for control of the oil fields.

Since Islam still exercises a profound influence over the eighty million people who constitute the Arab world, both the forces of reaction and those who stand for freedom and progress are waging a battle to win the support of the vast majority who still base their attitudes and behaviour towards many of the problems of society and of everyday life on the teachings of Islam.

As a result, the last two decades have seen a vigorous revival in the politica and social movements of Islamic inspiration. These movements consider that Islam can be an effective weapon in the hands of the Arab peoples against oppression and exploitation. Parallel to this development, and related to it, increasing efforts are being made to spread the effective utilization of Arabic as the national language. The Algerian Revolution, which fought French colonialism by mobilizing the Islamic potential, has also carried out a vigorou Arabization campaign. This is characteristic also of other countries in North Africa where French had replaced Arabic as the official language under the colonial regime.

The movements aiming at cultural emancipation, independence and

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identity run parallel to and intertwine with the political and economic struggles waged by the peoples of underdeveloped countries. They are growing in depth and maturity both in North Africa and in Sub-Saharan Africa. Peoples everywhere are not only breaking the bonds of political and economic dependence, but also the cultural chains that imprison the mind. They are probing into their past, rediscovering their origins, their roots, their history; they are searching for a cultural identity, learning anew about their own civilization, moulding a personality genuine enough and strong enough and resolute enough to resist the onslaught of Western interests and to take back what was plundered over the centuries: natural resources, labour producing value, goods and profits, and the creations of intellect and culture . . . and to restore the roots that take their sustenance in the past and their nourishment in cultural heritage. For without these roots the life of a people dries up, becomes weak and futile like a tree cut off from the depths of the soil, and loses both its physical and moral force.

This vast, deep and sweeping movement for liberation is, nevertheless, exposed to serious reverses as a result of the blows directed against it from both external and internal enemies. Imperialism continues to fight back viciously and often effectively in defence of its interests in the Islamic and Arab world. In this conflict any and all weapons can be used to contain the rising movement of peoples fighting for their rights.

Among these weapons is the use of religion, the 'sword and the words of Islam'. Any ambiguity in Islamic teachings, any mistake by an Islamic leader, any misinterpretation of Islamic principles, any reactionary measure or policy by Islamic rulers can be grist to the mill of imperialist conspiracy, can be inspired by CIA provocations, can be blown up and emphasized by Western propaganda, and can be manipulated or born of intent in order to be used in fighting back against the forces of progress. Only a short while ago, the Western press orchestrated a campaign against the Iranian Revolution accusing it of being reactionary, of imposing on women the veil and the *chador*, of attempting to deprive them of the civil rights they had enjoyed under the rule of the Shah. It tried to depict what was happening in Iran as a social change geared towards the past, traditionalist, and fanatic, rather than as a political and economic movement advancing under the pressure of a militant popular uprising surprising in its depth and resoluteness. Such counter-revolutionary machinations are characterized by their variety, subtlety, and the thought given to understanding the complexity of each situation and to ways of playing skilfully on the various contradictions. Even revolutionary and leftist movements can be utilized in this 'game of nations' and become unwitting instruments in the hands of reactionary forces posing under the guises of democracy, liberalism, humanism, modernism, and human rights. The Western press suddenly discovered that 'human rights' had to be defended in Iran. Progressive feminist movements intervened on behalf of Iranian women, not realizing that sometimes the form and even the content of their intervention was being used to discredit the Iranian people's struggle against American intervention. At the same time

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Western interests and agents are in fact encouraging the most conservative and orthodox forces of Islam so as to build up a rampart against the progressive wings of the Revolution by opposing Islam to the socialists and communists who are described as no more than atheistic tendencies in a society of believers.

Capitalist circles today are facing a dilemma. They are in need of Islam and utilize it as a buttress against progressive and socialist movements. But at the same time they realize that Islam has been an important force for people's liberation at various stages of its history, including contemporary Arab societie and that once again it can play an important role in the struggle against exploitation and oppression. This explains why the United States of America has adopted such an ambiguous stance with regard to the Islamic movements in the Arab world and the Middle East, a two-faced stand characterized by an attempt to preserve and reinforce them at times, while criticizing, attacking, and weakening them at others. The essence of American policy in this regard is to strengthen the reactionary, obscurantist and fanatical wings of Islam, and to divide, weaken and distort those movements that mobilize the masses in the Arab world to take an anti-imperialist, anti-feudalist or a socialist position. Let us not forget that, at the very time of writing (mid 1979), Islamic movements in the Arab countries have opposed the Israeli/Egyptian 'Peace Treaty' which has been conceived, engineered and almost negotiated by the U.S. – a Treaty which, instead of bringing peace, has divided the Arabs, strengthened Zionism, turned the Middle East into a theatre for American military bases and intervention, and led Egypt further down the path to capitulation and a deepening political and economic crisis.

In this double dealing game with Islam, the Western powers are supported by those Islamic regimes and those political and religious leaders following in the path previously paved by their predecessors for Turkish domination, and later French and British colonialism, those who utilized Islam as an instrument of oppression against the people, and who maintained that religion believed in and defended class privileges and was opposed to disobedience against the ruler, the father, and the male, those who depicted revolt, revolution and the struggle freedom as the greatest of all crimes, and who considered dissatisfaction of the ordinary person with poverty, destitution and disease as heresy. For was it not God Almighty who bestowed the good things of life on people in the way which he saw fit, depriving some of the bare necessities and bestowing upon others riches and pleasure without end ? He who is a believer, therefore, must perforce accept the will of God with peace, calm and a deep satisfaction!

Religious teachings and campaigns have played, and continue to play, an important role in maintaining and reinforcing reactionary regimes. Religious obscurantism, superstition and fanaticism have been and still are dangerous instruments in the hands of those rulers or classes that wish to disarm and divide the Arab peoples, instilling in their minds and hearts the conviction that destiny is all powerful and that fatalism and resignation are the highest of virtues.

Yet all through the centuries that followed Mahomet's first establishment of Islamic rule in the Arab Peninsula, there have been religious thinkers and

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leaders who have insisted that Islam cannot be understood properly if it is taken simply as a conglomeration of unrelated precepts and statements. These brave people have opposed the isolation of sayings like 'And we have made you to be of different levels' or 'One above the other' or 'Men are responsible for women' from their general context and from the essential principles of Islam in order that they might be used to support backward interpretations of Islam.

The broad character of the Iranian Revolution today means that it has drawn into its ranks a wide spectrum of Islamic leaders and religious thinkers. Some of them are enlightened and progressive. Others are not and tend to cling to traditionalist Islamic beliefs. These latter are the source of the pressures being exerted on women, of interpretations that require the body and head to be covered by a *chador*, or the emancipated working woman to be isolated once more within the precincts of the house. These slogans are either upheld out of ignorance of the real principles of Islam or are part of a connected plan aimed at holding back change, dividing the ranks of the Iranian people, and facilitating the success of the numerous conspiracies that are being hatched against the Revolution behind the scenes.

There are rulers in certain Arab countries who continue to use religion against the interests of their peoples. The present Sadat regime in Egypt did everything in its power to help in the revival and strengthening of conservative Islamic movements since 1970, in order that they might be used against progressive and socialist tendencies within the country. The government not only abstained from interfering in any way with their activities, but also helped them by opening up channels for financial and political support. Women were encouraged to wear the veil, and female students wearing modernized forms of Islamic dress were a familiar sight in the streets of Egyptian cities and on the university campus. Long articles extolling the virtues of motherhood and the dangers of female participation in paid employment appeared in the newspapers, and special radio programmes talked incessantly about woman's role in the home.

The Egyptian ruling class, however, retreated rapidly from this position and evinced serious alarm bordering on panic when the same Islamic movements started to attack the Peace Treaty with Israel and to defend the rights of Palestinians. This alarm was magnified a hundred fold by the sweeping march of the Iranian people battling to destroy the heritage of a tyrannical dynasty that had ruled the country over 57 years. Since large sectors of the revolutionary forces were drawing their inspiration from Islam, it now became necessary to attack what had been defended with such remarkable ardour before.

At the same time, the Western press once again started to attack the 'fanaticism' of Islamic movements. An enthusiastic campaign was launched in defence of Iranian women condemned to the dark walls of the *chador*. Iran overnight became peopled by hundreds of thousands of women, impressive yet chilling as they stood clothed in their long black robes, while the incessant click of Western cameras carried this medieval sight to millions of readers all

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over the world. Yet this enthusiasm for women's rights, or even human rights, was sadly lacking when thousands of Iranian men and women were being shot to death by army guns, or assassinated or tortured in the underground cells of the Savak, or when a whole people – men, women and children – was forced to flee its land to settle in the tents of refugee camps, or when peaceful populations were being burnt to death with napalm or torn to pieces by cluste bombs.

No doubt, any attempt to force women back into the *chador* or the home is a reactionary policy, unworthy of any revolution that wishes to emancipate people and abolish exploitation and misery. It is necessary that women unite everywhere to strengthen and broaden their movement towards liberation. Solidarity between women can be a powerful force of change, and can influence future development in ways favourable not only to women but also to men. But such solidarity must be exercised on the basis of a clear understanding of what is going on in the underdeveloped countries, lest it be used to serv other purposes diametrically opposed to the cause of equality and freedom fo all peoples. It is necessary at all times to see the close links between women's struggles for emancipation and the battles for national and social liberation waged by people in all parts of the 'Third World' against foreign domination and the exploitation exercised by international capitalism over human and natural resources. If this link is forgotten, feminist movements in the West may be used not to further the cause of women's liberation but instead to participate in holding back the forces of freedom and progress in the countrie of Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Of course, I oppose the desire of certain religious leaders in Iran to see women covered in the *chador* or deprived of the civil rights they have gained over the years. Such religious leaders either do not understand Islam correctly or have accepted to serve a dubious cause. A religious leader is not a God, he is human and therefore liable to go wrong and to make mistakes. It is necessary that his words and actions be submitted to democratic control and critical appraisal by the people whose life he wishes to influence and even direct. He should be questioned and appraised by the women and men he is trying to lead. Iranian women have shown that they are capable of standing steadfastly against attempts to throw them back into the past. Supported by enlightened religious leaders and progressive men, they have succeeded in throwing back retrograde attempts against the status of women and their rights in society.

The religious movement of Iran is a concrete example on a higher and mor advanced level of the age-long struggle that has continued in Islam between progressive political leaders and religious thinkers and those whose values and attitudes towards society are inspired by narrow class privileges and an orthodox traditionalist interpretation of Islam. An eminent leader may himself be the subject of inner contradictions so that his vision of certain aspects in the political and social struggle is enlightened, whereas his horizons in other areas remain limited and rigid. He may fight vigorously for the liberation of his country from foreign domination and yet look upon women as inferior

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creatures who should be subject to the will and fantasies of men. In this world of ours is it not true to say that very few are the men who not only intellectually believe in equality between men and women, but also are capable of practising it in everyday life? And is it not also correct to say that, even within the socialist movement itself, a backward position as far as women is concerned still remains characteristic and indicates that in many spheres socialist and Marxist thought and practice has still a long way to go?

Time and time again, life has proved that, whereas political and economic change can take place rapidly, social and cultural progress tends to lag behind because it is linked to the deep inner emotive and psychic processes of the human mind and heart. Men are very often the victims of such contradictions in their attitude towards women. The role of women's organizations, and of the political struggle of women, therefore continue to be crucial factors in any changes which will ultimately lead to the complete emancipation of women and to real equality between the sexes. Only through the influence exerted by political action and effective organization will this social and cultural change be possible. Such is the law of progress and the status of women is no exception. Men must come to realize, and even be compelled to make, the changes within themselves which are so necessary for human progress and which they seem so reluctant to make.

The feminist movements in the West which are devoting great efforts to the cause of women everywhere are beginning to understand the specific aspects of the situation in underdeveloped countries which have to be taken into account by women's liberation movements. For although there are certain characteristics common to these movements all over the world, fundamental differences are inevitable when we are dealing with different stages of economic, social and political development. In underdeveloped countries, liberation from foreign domination often still remains *the* crucial issue and influences the content and forms of struggle in other areas including that of women's status and role in society. Cultural differences between the Western capitalist societies and Arab Islamic countries are also of importance. If all this is not taken into account and studied with care, enthusiasm and the spirit of solidarity on its own may lead feminist movements to taking a stand that is against the interests of the liberation movements in the East, and therefore also harmful to the struggle for women's emancipation. This perhaps explains the fact that progressive circles among Iranian women adopted a somewhat neutral attitude to some American feminist figures who rushed to Iran in defence of their sisters against the reactionary male chauvinist regime 'that was threatening to imprison women behind the black folds of the *chador*.'

It is necessary to understand that the most important struggle that faces women in Arab Islamic countries is not that of 'free thought' versus 'belief in religion', nor 'feminist rights' (as understood sometimes in the West) in opposition to 'male chauvinism', nor does it aim at some of the superficial aspects of modernization characteristic of the developed world and the affluent society. In its essence, the struggle which is now being fought seeks

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to ensure that the Arab peoples take possession of their economic potential and resources, and of their scientific and cultural heritage so that they can develop whatever they have to the maximum and rid themselves once and for all of the control and domination exercised by foreign capitalist interests. They seek to build a free society with equal rights for all and to abolish the injustices and oppression of systems based on class and patriarchal privilege.

It is worth noting in this connection that it is precisely the current reactionary regime in Egypt, after having linked its fate to that of American and Zionist interests in the Middle East and abandoned the struggle of Arab peoples for a just and lasting peace, that started to attack the Iranian Revolution as opposed to the values of a modern civilization and the rights of women.

Our past experience has always shown that any strengthening of the links that bind the Arab peoples to Western interests inevitably leads to a retreat in all spheres of thought and action. Social progress is arrested and the most reactionary and traditionalist circles in society begin to clamour for a return to orthodoxy and dogma. The social and economic rights of the vast majority are subjected to attack, and women become the first victims of the general assault against freedom and progress. Radical social change is replaced by superficial modernization processes that affect the elitist and privileged groups in society, and the women belonging to these groups are transformed into a distorted version of the Western woman, while the vast majority of toiling women in industry, agriculture, government administration, commerce and trade, or in the teaching and liberal professions find themselves victims of increasing oppression and a sharp decline in their standards of living. Superficial processes of modernization, whether in the West or the East, will never lead to true equality between women and men in the economic, social, political and sexual aspects of life. Sexual rights as practised in many Western societies do not lead to the emancipation of women, but to an accentuated oppression where women are transformed into commercialized bodies and a source of increasing capitalist profits.

In addition, modernization processes in the West sometimes bestow 'equal rights' on that small minority of women belonging to the middle or upper classes. These find their way into business or the liberal professions and may even become Members of Parliament or Ministers. But usually such women are as conservative, if not more conservative, than the men to whose class they belong. The positions they enjoy do not serve to liberate women from the inferior position which is characteristic of such societies. On the contrary, they perpetuate inequality between men and women by masking the real situation and affording a pretence of change, whereas in fact no real change has taken place.

When Margaret Thatcher, leader of the Conservative Party, became the first woman Prime Minister of Britain during the month of May, 1979, the Western Press acclaimed this event as a significant development. And yet many people might feel that Margaret Thatcher's policies will probably lead to a deterioration in the situation of women, for it is not the

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being a woman which is important, but the class and policies she represents. A Conservative government will necessarily be antagonistic to the rights of working people, democratic liberties and socialism, and this inevitably leads to a similar position with regard to movements for women's emancipation. This will not only affect policies as regards women in England. Britain still exercises considerable influence in world affairs and particularly over a certain number of the countries in Africa and to a smaller extent in Asia.

The struggle of women in underdeveloped countries is not a narrow fanatic movement prejudiced in favour of the female sex and rising to its defence at any cost. We know that progress for women, and an improvement of their status, can never be attained unless the whole of society moves forward. We believe that fanaticism of any form should be opposed, whether religious, political or social. Victory in the long and difficult struggle for women's emancipation requires that women adopt a flexible attitude and be prepared to ally their efforts with all those who stand for progress. Women should be ready to co-operate with democratic and nationalist forces, progressive religious movements, as well as with socialist and Marxist oriented trends and organizations. It is the unified efforts of all these forces that permitted the Iranian people to carry through a successful revolution against the 57 year old rule of the Pahlavi dynasty, and it is this unified effort that remains the main guarantee for its future development. This explains why the enemies of the Iranian people are concentrating on attempts to divide these forces, to play one off against the other. In these divisive attempts, any slogan and any force can be utilized as long as it serves the main purpose – no matter whether that force be progressive or retrograde, capitalist or socialist, democratic or rigid and fanatical, chauvinistic and racialist or internationalist. The women's liberation movement is no exception.

Women have always been an integral part of the national liberation movement in the countries of Asia, Africa, the Middle East and Latin America. They fought side by side with the men in Algeria against French colonialism, and as part of the Palestine Liberation Organization's struggle against Zionist and imperialist aggressive policies aimed at depriving the Palestinian people of their national right to self-determination. And women fought too in Yemen against the British occupation and Arab reactionary intrigues, in Mozambique against Portuguese colonialism and Rhodesian punitive expeditions, in Vietnam against successive armed invasions of their country by the French, the Japanese, the Americans and now the Chinese.

Through their participation in the struggle for national liberation and for economic and social reconstruction they have gained many rights. Nevertheless, once the new systems of government are in place, whether national democratic or socialist, they very often cease to advance in a significant manner as far as women's status in society is concerned. This is noticeable in the socialist regimes of Eastern Europe, in Algeria after independence, and in other countries like North Korea, China and even Vietnam. This is due mainly to the fact that women have not succeeded in becoming a well organized political force capable of ensuring adequate representation for themselves at

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all levels of government and administration, as well as in the political institutions and structures built up after the national or social revolution in society. Despite the crucial role they play in all fields of economic and social endeavour in the factories, fields, social services, different professions and at home, and the fact that they represent half the population in each country, their representation within the political power structure is always limited to a minority, and sometimes even a very restricted minority.

The new ruling classes and governments are composed of men, and have a tendency quickly to forget the problems faced by women, or at least not to give them the attention and effort that are required. Instead of attempting to sweep away patriarchal class relations within the family, these are maintained in one form or another, and the values related to them continue to hold sway.

The changes that have taken place in the Arab countries are characterized by a shift from feudalistic structures to capitalism, and sometimes even to early stages of socialist orientation. These changes are usually accompanied by an accelerated industrialization which requires a rapid expansion of labour outside the home and which draws hundreds of thousands of both men and women into the production process and the numerous services and organizations that grow up. Families migrate in large numbers from the rural areas to the cities which tend to swell at a phenomenal rate (anything from a 4% to 13% annual increase in the population). Working women not only grow in numbers but they face a whole range of new problems resulting from the social changes to which they are exposed. They are deprived of the support, assistance and numerous functions that were previously afforded by the extended family system. Their children used to be cared for and looked after by members of the extended family whenever work called their mothers to the fields or elsewhere. Social, psychological and even financial support was forthcoming, and numerous tasks were undertaken in common so as to alleviate the burdens of every day life. The extended family carried out a wide variety of social functions. Migration to the city and social change in general are doing away with this unit, which is now being replaced by the nuclear family. But the nuclear family is incapable of performing the same role, and no other institution has grown up to substitute itself for the structures that once existed, and so be capable of undertaking what the extended family system once did for the family members and particularly the mother.

In this new situation, men have continued to wash their hands of any responsibility at home and to evade many of the responsibilities in society and public life, responsibilities related to the need for a new organization of social life capable of solving the problems faced by women both at work and in the home. Women continue to bear the double or even triple burden constituted by their new roles in society and at the work place, combined with their old roles at home, towards the husband, the children and sometimes relatives such as fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters and even cousins.

Whereas society has thrown overboard certain values that were an obstacle to the participation of women in the labour force, it has continued to uphold many old values with remarkable obstinacy, and in particular those values

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which ensure a continued exploitation of their efforts in caring for the home, husband and children, efforts which also continue to remain unpaid. It has extolled the work of women and their right to education, and torn down social walls and fences that prevented women from becoming a freely circulating part of the labour force. Nevertheless, it continues to reinforce those values that bind women to their children and husbands in servitude; it continues to sing the virtues of sweet motherhood, to maintain (as in some Islamic circles) that 'Paradise lies under the feet of mothers' and that obedience to the husband is the highest of qualities in a woman and a mark of obedience to Almighty Allah. To this very day, an Egyptian woman with work and a career, even if she be a Minister, is still governed by the law of obedience consecrated in the Egyptian Marriage Code. When a woman succumbs to the innumerable burdens in her job and in the home, or is unable to give her husband and children the care that is expected of her, she is not spared. Accusations are heaped on her head, not the least of which is that, by neglecting her children and not submitting herself to the husband's will and needs, she is contributing to the dissolution of 'sacred family bonds'.

Society pays great attention to preserving 'sacred family bonds' and yet cares little about what happens in matters without which the preservation of these 'sacred bonds' becomes no more than an illusion. The man's absolute right to divorce in Arab Islamic countries, to marriage with more than one wife and to a legalized sexual licentiousness all negate any real security and stability for children, and destroy the very essence of true family life. Society raises up 'motherhood' to the heavens and yet at the same time forgets to provide the facilities and means necessary for mothers to bring up their children appropriately. A woman is rarely given enough time to nurse her child, and the periods of leave afforded to her before and after giving birth to her baby are sadly inadequate.

The insistence that society has so far displayed in preserving the formal structure of the family, while depriving it of any genuine substantive content, is related to the desire of exploiting classes and the political powers that represent them to ensure that the economic functions of the family be maintained and that the family continues to bear the burden and costs of rearing children instead of these becoming the responsibility of the social system. The woman remains a source of free labour and of numerous services that would have to be compensated and paid for if other institutional arrangements were to take over her functions in the home. To prevent people from discovering the truths that lie at the basis of this touching attachment to the family system, society has all along reinforced the links between mother love or family love and the upkeep, nourishment and rearing of children. As though motherly or family affection must and can only express itself in assuming unaided responsibility for their economic needs. At the same time the inequality, injustice and poverty which characterize the lives of the vast majority of people in Arab countries deprive them of any real possibility of performing adequately the functions for which the family system was created and is still maintained. The vast majority of families cannot provide their

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children with the required economic means. Most mothers suffer hunger, deprivation and a state of exhaustion which renders them unfit to nourish their babies or even look after them. Without food their breasts dry up, without the basic needs of life their affection withers. Deprived of everything, they lose their capacity to give. Withered to the core by years of labour in the fields and in the home, their youth ebbs away in a matter of years, leaving a broken body and a drying soul – a useless forgotten human being whose lot it is to be cast aside for a younger and more attractive woman.

Women who are educated may find more rewarding occupations and a career. Nevertheless, in most cases, the husband will continue to dominate over her, to take possession of her earnings, and to threaten her with divorce whenever she tries to loosen his grip or refuses to respond to his fantasies. Patriarchal norms and values continue to reign in the home, the street, the school, the mosque and the place of work, and even in the concepts and attitudes propagated through radio programmes, T.V., films, the theatre, newspapers and magazines.

This is the situation of most women in the Arab countries. Yet I cannot agree with those women in America and Europe who draw sharp distinctions between their own situation and that of women in the region to which I belong, and who believe that there are fundamental differences. They tend to depict our life as a continual submission to medieval systems, and point vehemently to some of the rituals and traditional practices such as female circumcision. They raise a hue and cry in defence of the victims, write long articles and deliver speeches at congresses. Of course, it is good that female circumcision be denounced. But by concentrating on such manifestations there is a risk that the real issues of social and economic change be evaded or even forgotten, and that effective action be replaced by a feeling of superior humanity, a glow of satisfaction that may blind the mind and feelings to the concrete everyday struggle for women's emancipation.

I am against female circumcision and other similar retrograde and cruel practices. I was the first Arab woman to denounce it publicly and to write about it in my book, *Woman and Sex*. I linked it to the other aspects of female oppression. But I disagree with those women in America and Europe who concentrate on issues such as female circumcision and depict them as proof of the unusual and barbaric oppression to which women are exposed only in African or Arab countries. I oppose all attempts to deal with such problems in isolation, or to sever their links with the general economic and social pressures to which women everywhere are exposed, and with the oppression which is the daily bread fed to the female sex in developed and developing countries, in both of which a patriarchal class system still prevails.

Women in Europe and America may not be exposed to surgical removal of the clitoris. Nevertheless, they are victims of cultural and psychological clitoridectomy. 'Lift the chains off my body, put the chains on my mind.' Sigmund Freud was perhaps the most famous of all those men who taught psychological and physiological circumcision of women when he formulated his theory on the psychic nature of women, described the clitoris as a male

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organ, and sexual activity related to the clitoris as an infantile phase, and when he maintained that maturity and mental health in a woman required that sexual activity related to the clitoris cease and be transferred to the vagina.

No doubt, the physical ablation of the clitoris appears a much more savage and cruel procedure than its psychological removal. Nevertheless, the consequences can be exactly the same, since the end result is the abolition of its functions so that its presence or absence amount to the same thing. Psychological surgery might even be more malicious and harmful because it tends to produce the illusion of being complete, whereas in actual fact the body may have lost an essential organ, like a child born an idiot yet provided with brain substance. It can create the illusion of being free, whereas in actual fact freedom has been lost.

To live in an illusion, not to know the truth is the most dangerous of all things for a human being, woman or man, because it deprives people of their most important weapon in the struggle for freedom, emancipation and control of their lives and future. To be conscious that you are still a slave still living under oppression is the first step on the road to emancipation.

We the women in Arab countries realize that we are still slaves, still oppressed, not because we belong to the East, not because we are Arab, or members of Islamic societies, but as a result of the patriarchal class system that has dominated the world since thousands of years.

To rid ourselves of this system is the only way to become free. Freedom for women will never be achieved unless they unite into an organized political force powerful enough and conscious enough and dynamic enough to truly represent half of society. To my mind the real reason why women have been unable to complete their emancipation, even in the socialist countries, is that they have failed to constitute themselves into a political force powerful, conscious, and dynamic enough to impose their rights.

More and more women are being drawn into the struggle for social transformation in the Arab countries. Many of them, however, still believe that the cause of women's liberation is purely a woman's problem, or a particular social change related to the family, to the husband, or to children, a problem which is completely separate and distinct, unrelated to the major political issues in society, or to the struggle for socialism, freedom and democracy.

However, the experience and mistakes of the past have contributed towards a growing maturity among the women and men who are playing a leading role in progressive social movements and parties. Many of them are realizing more clearly the need to bridge the gap between political and civil life, between the general issues of society and the personal problems and needs related to each individual, between the broad functioning of government in society and the daily participation of people in the solution of their own problems and the running of their own affairs. They feel the need for a modern theory of social transformation that links thought to action, intellect to feeling and emotion, and that is able to build up a new and higher relationship between women and men in their struggle for a better world.

This new concept of society, and of the processes related to its

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transformation, must be able to concretize the relationships between the general oppression of both men and women, and the specific forms of oppression to which women alone are exposed for no other reason than that they are women. In other words, there is an urgent and vital need to visualize the links between the political, economic and social remoulding of society, and the cultural, moral, psychological, sexual and affective remoulding of the human being, and to blaze the trails along which this process must advance

The creation of a woman's movement in each Arab country, capable of mobilizing the women in every home, village, town or city, of drawing into its ranks the illiterate peasant woman, the female factory worker, the educated professional woman, will mean that the Arab movement for democracy, progress and socialism is capable of reaching every woman, and is attaining the stage where it is a real mass movement and not just the instrument of a specific class.

It is Arab women alone who can formulate the theory, the ideas and the modes of struggle needed to liberate themselves from all oppression. It is their efforts alone that can create a new Arab woman, alive with her own originality, capable of choosing what is most genuine and valuable in her cultural tradition, as well as assimilating the progress of science and modern thought. Conscious Arab women who no longer live under the illusion that freedom will come as a gift from the Heavens, or be bestowed upon them by the chivalry of men, but understand that the road to freedom is long and arduous, and that the price to pay is heavy. Such women alone are those that will lead others to total emancipation. Such Arab women will not hesitate because they know that, if the price to pay for freedom is heavy, the price of slavery is even heavier.

Nawal El Saadawi
Cairo
1979

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Views on Egyptian Women
in Arabic and Islamic Culture

Chapter III: DIVORCE EGYPTIAN STYLE AND RELATED MATTERS

> Divorce may be pronounced twice, and then a woman must be retained in honour or allowed to go with kindness ... Reasonable provision should be made for divorced women. That is incumbent on righteous men.
>
> The Koran

> Divorce is the most hated to God of all the permitted things.
>
> A Saying of the Prophet

> The family is the first cell of society and therefore, in the national interest, it must be afforded all means of protection.
>
> The (Egyptian) Charter (1962)

The small courtroom was full to overflowing. Men, women, and children were crowded together on the wooden benches. Many knew each other, for it was not the first time that they had come to that court. Some had met that morning and were exchanging information as to how long their cases were taking, and how many times they had been required to appear in court. A baby was being breast-fed. Several children were munching their breakfast of *^{c}aish baladi* and *gibna beida* (Egyptian bread and white cheese). A few better-dressed people sat on the front bench. These were the lawyers. The rest were *sha^{c}bi* - 'of the people' - a

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fact revealed principally by their clothing. Most of the men wore rumpled trousers and some kind of sweater or knitted shirt; most women were swathed in a black *milaya*, traditional garb of married women of the 'lower classes'. A girl here and there was dressed in skirt and sweater of 'popular' cut and quality; a man here and there wore a *gallabiya*. One of the lawyers was in the traditional clothing of a *shaikh*. He was undoubtedly one of the Shari^{c}a lawyers from the old Shari^{c}a courts.

The *hagib* entered with his court list and announced: '*Mahkama*!' The radio was turned off, the talking stopped, and the people stood up. The judges entered, three of them, with a *katib* and a representative of the *niyaba*, and took their seats behind the bench at the front. This was a personal status session of an *ibtida'i* court for the Northern District of Cairo in the courthouse in Shubra. First on the list for that morning were the *tatliq* (divorce by court action) cases. The *hagib* called the first case, by number and name of litigants. No reply. He called the second case. No reply.

The list of that morning's cases had more than forty cases on it, for *tatliq* alone, but at that rate it would soon be finished. The third announcement, however, produced a woman and her lawyer.

The judge sitting in the middle (*ra'is al-mahkama*) asked the woman her name. She answered. He referred to the file in front of him. 'What is your complaint against your husband?'

'He disappeared then years ago,' said the woman. 'I have not heard from him since.'

'Have you tried to locate him?'

'Yes.'

'Have you notified the *niyaba*?'

The woman looked confused. She turned to the lawyer. The lawyer told the judge that he had just been retained that morning and was unfamiliar with the case. The judge addressed the woman.

'You must notify the *niyaba*,' he said. 'Next case.'

The calling of the next cases produced no response. At about the tenth case, a lawyer with a briefcase, a tie and a shirt, arose. He opened his case, took out some papers, and stood before the judge. He gave the papers to the judge.

The background noise had been slowly increasing, but it noticeably subsided as this gentleman came forward. He was a known personality. Most of his cases had some kind of oddity about them. He specialized, it seemed, in the more unusual problems. He appeared alone, without

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his client. The defendant was not present.

He was known to the judges also. The *ra'is al-mahkama* looked up at him and spoke a word of greeting.

'My client, the husband-defendant,' began the lawyer, 'is entering a counterclaim to his wife's divorce petition. There can be no divorce because there is no valid certificate of marriage since the marriage occurred before the *ᶜidda* had been completed from her former marriage, a fact proven by the birth of a child three months after the marriage, which fact was not disclosed to my client at the time of the marriage.'

The judge looked at the papers. He spoke to the second judge.

'What does your client want?' asked the second judge, 'to remain married or to divorce?' Titters from the courtroom. The *hagib* motioned vigorously towards the offending group.

'My client wants justice!' The lawyer was beginning to speak eloquently. That was his stock in trade. 'The marriage should be declared nullified. My client should not be humiliated by this woman ... '

'Why do you not pronounce *tala'* [*talaq*] ?' asked the judge.

'My client wants justice,' repeated the lawyer. 'He is not the father of that woman's child. He takes no responsibility for *nafa'a* or *hadana*.'

'You must bring two witnesses, Hashem Bey,' said the *ra'is al-mahkama*. 'Next case.'

The next case also involved a husband's disappearance and failure to support his wife. And the next, and the next. One woman's lawyer indicated that they had brought witnesses. The judge said, 'Tell them to wait. We will hear them at the end of the session.' Other cases had incomplete files (that is, a necessary document was missing) and the hearings were postponed.

The next set of names were called and a husband and wife came forward.

The judge verified the names. He turned to the wife. 'Do you want to be reconciled?'

'No,' she said.

The judge asked the same question of the husband.

The husband said, 'Yes'.

The judge turned again to the wife. 'Your husband wants you back,' he said. 'Don't you want to go back to him?'

'No, no, no!' said the woman. 'Never, never. It's finished.'

The judge turned to the man: 'Why do you want to keep this woman anyway, humiliating you like this, bringing you to court? Why don't you act like a man and divorce her yourself?'

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The man hung his head and did not reply.

Someone in the audience was heard to say, 'Maybe she has money and that is why he does not want to let her go!' More gestures from the *hagib*.

The judge continued: 'Come on, now. Be a man! Pronounce *tala'*.'

The man mutely nodded assent.

'Good,' said the judge. 'Next case.'

Several more names were called, without response. Some people left, others came in. The courtroom was becoming noisy again. After the calling of another set of names, a woman came forward.

'What is your name?'

She answered.

'What is your complaint against your husband?'

'He disappeared a long time ago. I think he is in prison.'

There was a disturbance in the back of the courtroom. The representative of the *niyaba* said something to the second judge, who whispered to the *ra'is al-mahkama*, who looked at audience and said: 'I believe the husband is present. Would Mohammed Ahmed Mahmoud come forward?'

The judge spoke to the woman. 'Your husband is not absent,' he said. 'Do you want to change your plea to one of harm?'

She nodded.

'You must revise your petition,' he said. 'Next case.'

A woman and a man came forward after the next announcement of names by the *hagib*. The judge verified names, then turned to the man. 'Is it true, have you not been spending on your wife?'

'She left the marriage home six months ago without my consent,' he replied. 'I am ready to take her back.'

The wife became agitated and began to cry. 'He took another wife,' she said. 'That is why I left. That is why he does not spend.'

The judge asked, 'Do you feel harmed by your husband's taking a second wife?'

'Of course,' she replied.

'Have arbiters been appointed?' He addressed his question to the representative of the *niyaba*. The latter consulted his file. 'No,' replied the *wakil al-niyaba*.

'The court will notify you about the appointment of arbiters,' said the judge. 'Next case.'

The next set of names produced a lawyer. He was another eloquent one.

'My client is young,' he began. 'Her beauty is just budding. For

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two years she has been without the benefit of a marital home. She is unprotected and tied by marriage to a husband who is neither present nor sends money sufficient for her support. She is a young girl in full bloom. She should be released from this husband. She is fearful of her chastity. She is being harmed by this legal husband's absence. She should have an opportunity to marry another. She should have a husband who will stay with her and protect her ... '

The judge cut in. He was laughing. 'What do you want us to do? Find this girl's husband or find her another husband?'

The lawyer was smiling also. 'Her father finds many husbands,' he said. 'But she needs a divorce to marry one of them.'

And so it went. More absences. More husbands who had disappeared. More wives who claimed their husbands did not spend on them. Sometimes a wife would also say that she had been physically abused or insulted.

One case concerned a woman whose husband was abroad in the diplomatic corps. She did not appear; but was represented by her lawyer. Although he sent support money for her, she claimed she was being harmed by his physical absence. The judge told the *wakil al-niyaba* to notify him either to return, to send for his wife, or to pronounce *tala'*. If he did not do any of these things in a specified time, he, the judge, would pronounced *tala'* against the wife on her husband's behalf.

Another case involved a man in prison, or rather, under 'detention'. The wife said: 'Everytime he comes out, he is put back again.' The judge asked for an opinion from the *niyaba*, whether political detention constituted a prison sentence for purposes of divorce. The *wakil al-niyaba* said, 'No. Political detention is not a regular prison sentence. It is of indefinite duration and does not come within the law which specifies the prison term as being for at least three years.'

'Petition denied,' said the *ra'is al-mahkama*.

At the end of the session were the witness sessions. They were heard in the anteroom off the courtroom. It went like this:

Judge:	What is your name? ... What is your address? ... Do you swear to tell the truth? ... How do you know the plaintiff?
Witness:	I sell vegetables across the street.
Judge:	Has her husband really disappeared?
Witness:	Yes.
Judge:	When did you last see him?
Witness:	About three years ago.

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Judge: Does he support her?

Witness: No.

Judge: Does he have any accessible property we might give to the wife?

Witness: No.

Judge (to *katib*): Note that the wife's witnesses have been heard, and notify the husband to bring his.[1]

This is not how all divorces occur in Egypt, or indeed, one is told, the majority of them. Divorce by court action (*tatliq*) *is exceptional*, I was told with great emphasis. The typical way divorce occurs is by means of repudiation by the husband (*talaq*); that is the traditional method of divorce in Islam, the way it is supposed to be done.

Islamic law considers divorce to be the man's prerogative. It is rationalized that, whereas marriages are contracted with the idea that they are permanent (the 'temporary marriage' is not today supposed to be countenanced by orthodox Sunni Islam) it must be foreseen that sometimes a married couple will develop an aversion to each other and desire their marriage to be ended. Since the responsibility must be placed somewhere for ending the marriage, the Islamic legislator vested this power in the man.[2] He must do this today in Egypt before the *ma'zun* (*ma'dhun*), a state-appointed official with religious qualifications, found occupying a small office in every neighbourhood. The *ma'zun* officiates over and records the pronouncements of *talaq* and the signing of marriage contracts. Thus is the pronouncement of *talaq* officially recorded, and there must be witnesses.

Talaq is not quite (but almost) as unfettered a right for the husband, nor as restrictive on the wife, as may at first appear. There are certain 'safeguards' built in, various complications, and some variant possibilities.

A man may pronounce *talaq* twice, and still take his wife back within her ^{c}*idda* (waiting period after divorce or death, before remarriage) which for this purpose is considered to be three months:

> The ^{c}*idda* for divorce is the length of time covering three menses, or if the wife is pregnant, with the birth of the child. Since it is the period of time after the divorce that a man is required to support a wife fully, wives in the past, it is said, would claim their ^{c}*iddas* had not been completed for maybe years. The law today in Egypt sets the ^{c}*idda* at 'no longer than a year'.[3]

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During this time she is allowed to live in the marital home and must be fully supported by the husband. After the expiration of the ^{c}idda, he may still take her back but it must be by remarriage with the payment of a new dowry, etc. After the third time talaq is pronounced, that's it! He may not take her back through remarriage except after she has been married to another, and of course divorced or widowed. Thus is a man allowed to reconsider a hasty action, or change his mind, but only twice. The ^{c}idda also serves to safeguard a marriage if the woman unbeknownst, is pregnant at the time of the talaq.

Any safeguards which exist for a woman exist because marriage is a contractual arrangement. A portion of the dowry which the husband pays at the time of marriage is withheld and is to be paid upon divorce. This is written in marriage contracts and the amount stipulated. The woman is allowed to keep whatever she has put into the marriage. In Egypt today, this typically means the furniture. The man supplies the living quarters, the lighting fixtures and the kitchen equipment; the woman buys the furniture from the dowry which is her right from her father. The man also gives his intended bride a gift of jewelry. This occurs, of course, among those who can afford such things. By law today in Egypt also the 'triple divorce' is forbidden, that is, a man may not take all three of his divorces at the same time. He is, as it were, required by the law, to take time to reconsider his action.

A divorce under the traditional system may be initiated by a woman in two ways. She may have an ^{c}isma in her marriage contract which means the husband has delegated to her his power to divorce when she wishes. Presumably this can be open, or it can stipulate a condition which must occur, such as the husband taking a second wife. My impression is, however, in Egypt today, that whereas the ^{c}isma is known and can be a legal stipulation in a marriage contract, it is usually not included.

Another way open to the woman under the traditional system to end a marriage is to pay off the husband. This is rationalized by saying that if it is the woman's desire alone to divorce, she should reimburse the man for what he has spent on her.[4] In actuality it is simply the offering to a husband of an inducement to pronounce talaq. It may or may not have a direct relationship to the amount he has spent on the setting up of the marital home. He is also quite free to say no, legally. Indeed, much about the traditional system rests upon the man's good character. There is nothing to prevent a man from divorcing his wife for no reason or a frivolous one, except his conscience, and for his con-

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science, he is answerable to God, not the positive law. An honourable man would not hold a woman against her will, or mistreat her, but then, not all men are honourable . . .

There are obviously two major difficulties inherent in the traditional system of divorce. A woman is required to stay married unless or until the man pronounces talaq. If the man refuses to accede to an unhappy wife's desire to be divorced, or if the man disappears, there is nothing she can do. Nor does the traditional law provide any but a very minimal protection financially for a cast-off wife. Furthermore, if very little has been spent on the marriage, because the couple are poor, very little obviously under this system can be taken as 'compensation'. Legally required support otherwise after divorce is of extremely limited duration: one year for the wife (unless she remarries) and for minor children, until they reach the age to be taken by their father. It is understood that a woman when divorced goes back from whence she came, namely to her father's household, until or unless she marries another. The woman whose father is dead or without means to support her, or without another male relative to take over the father's guardianship role, literally has nowhere to go. A grown son is required to support a divorced mother. Whatever way you look at it, however, a divorced woman becomes a burden on somebody. Thus, whereas the traditional system of divorce may work well in some instances, in other cases it does not work at all.

It was obviously to obviate the first difficulty mentioned above that reform legislation passed in the 1920s in Egypt was designed to supply a remedy. A woman can now (as we saw) seek a divorce on her own initiative from a court of law, and whereas it is time-consuming, full of formalities and bureaucratic procedures, if she persists, a divorce can eventually be obtained. The reform legislation, however, although it ameliorated the problem slightly, did not begin to deal with the maintenance of the wife after divorce in any adequate way.

The 'modernist' legislation, it should be emphasized, is also Shari^{c}a, at least as regards the grounds for divorce. The Islamic Shari^{c}a comes in various variations. There are four orthodox schools of Sunni Islam: Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi^{c}i and Hanbali, not to mention the Shi^{c}i rules and various unorthodox versions of Islamic law. The Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence is the official doctrine followed in Egypt as it was the official school of the Ottoman Empire, reinforced by positive legislation in Egypt in the nineteenth century. Hanafi rules as pertains to a woman seeking a divorce, however, are restrictive. These rules allow

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a woman to seek a dissolution of her marriage from a qadi only under three conditions: if a woman were married at a young age by a guardian other than her father or grandfather, upon reaching majority, she can ask the qadi to dissolve the marriage; or, if insane, upon regaining her sanity; or, if the husband is sexually impotent.[5] The Maliki school which predominates in North Africa, the Sudan, and at one time, the southern parts of Egypt, provides a greater variety of reasons. The reformers of the 1920s drew from Maliki doctrine to specify further grounds whereby a wife might, on her own initiative, seek to be divorced by a court of law. The legality of these provisions rests upon the right, accepted in Islamic law, of the ruler-legislator (1) to make administrative regulations, as long as they are not contrary to the Islamic Shari^{c}a, and (2) to specify which rules of Islamic law shall govern for particular purposes.[6]

The grounds which were being presented in our courtroom scene were primarily those which are contained in two laws enacted in 1920 (Law No. 25), the other in 1929 (Law No. 25). Together they constitute the grounds operative today by which a woman can bring a divorce suit to the court.

First in the 1920 law came provisions for a divorce suit to be brought on the grounds of 'not-spending', that is, non-support (Art. 4), absence (Art. 5), or of the husband being afflicted with a dangerous and incurable disease (eg leprosy), or only curable after a long period, and which therefore made the marriage relationship dangerous (Art. 9). When the former grounds are demonstrated the judge is directed 'to divorce her on her husband's behalf' (talaqa alaihi al-qadi) (Arts. 4 and 5). The grounds of non-support and absence produce a revocable divorce, if the husband can prove during his wife's ^{c}idda that he is able and willing to support her (Art. 6). Divorce for a dangerous disease produces a 'legal separation' (tafriq) which is synonymous to a divorce, and is specified further as constituting a final (that is, unrevocable) divorce (talaq ba'in) (Art. 10). Divorce for non-support is to be granted if a husband fails to support his wife and has no known property out of which a maintenance order may be executed, unless he proves, or she acknowledges, that he is destitute. In the latter instance, the husband is to be given a grace period of not more than a month to produce some means of supporting his wife (Art. 4). Absence is also made specifically applicable to imprisonment (Art. 5).

The 1929 law provides a further ground: ill-treatment or 'harm' (darar), and further elaborates on the grounds of absence and imprisonment. Whereas the 1920 law spoke of a husband not spending on his wife as constituting harm, and the dangerous diseases as things which make married life harmful, with the 1929 law 'harm' becomes a separate category. It is defined in general language, leaving much to the judges interpretation and discretion. It states that 'harm' is a situation which a wife claims to be impossible 'for the likes of her' (bain amthaliha) connoting 'for a person of her social standards' (Art. 6). This is apparently intended to be, and is, used as a variable standard, leaving a judge to determine what kinds of behaviour are acceptable for what kinds of people. There is a provision attached to this ground that if the wife is unable to prove her contentions of ill-treatment two arbiters are to be appointed, one from each family of the couple, who are to try to find out the reasons for discord between them, and if possible, to reconcile them. If no reconciliation is effected but the fault is determined to lie with the husband, or both of them, or is unknown, a final divorce shall be given. If the two arbiters do not agree, the judge is to send them back to try again. If a second try does not bring agreement, two other arbiters will be chosen. If there is still no agreement, the findings are to be presented to the judge and he will decide (Arts. 7-11).

Absence is specified as to have been for one year or more without an acceptable excuse (Art. 12) and absence due to imprisonment must have been for one year and be expected for two more. That is, the prison sentence must be for three years and the wife can ask for a divorce after one year (Art. 14). The grounds due to imprisonment sound straightforward except, as we saw, there is a prison sentence called 'detention' which does not count as grounds for divorce.

The 'acceptable excuse' for absence is another area in which the notion of 'harm' (as a flexible rule) enters into judicial interpretation. The law states that a wife whose husband is absent, even though he sends support money, can ask for a final divorce, if she feels harmed by his absence. Such 'harm' is often phrased in court as fear of falling into temptation or unchastity, which seems to be something judges accept as valid. The judge is directed to notify the absent husband that the court will divorce the wife 'on her husband's behalf' if he does not come to live with her or send for her or repudiate her, by talaq, himself (Art. 13).

The language used in these laws reflects both traditional law and predispositions of the society. Tatliq is used once in the 1920 law, in a context where the 'judicial divorce' (tatliq al-qadi) for absence or non-support is to be a revocable divorce, that is, the husband can return to his wife if he proves that he can and will spend. Otherwise the action involved is referred to as the judge 'divorcing her on her husband's behalf,' or a 'separation' specified as constituting a final divorce. In the 1929 law, the respective sections are headed: '*tatliq* for harm' and '*tatliq* for the husband's absence or imprisonment,' (Sections 2 and 3, respectively) which indicates that it is here carrying the meaning of 'judicial divorce,' by itself.[7] But how should a judicial divorce be viewed? Is it the *qadi* simply substituting himself for the husband and divorcing a wife 'on her husband's behalf' or does it constitute a 'right' which modern legislation has conferred upon the wife? I venture to suggest that both in the judicial mind and the popular mind the God-given, exclusive right to the man of *talaq* is very much intact. There was ample evidence in the court sessions that the judge exercised his legislatively conferred power of agency only when a husband had completely disappeared, or it was demonstrated otherwise that he was both unable and unwilling to support his wife. Otherwise, all possible means seemed to be used to get the man to pronounce *talaq* himself. To what extent 'harm' is a viable ground when it is unconnected with either absence or non-support is questionable. It is hedged with a relativity to the social status of the couple, that is, the judge is to determine what forms of physical or mental cruelty are harmful to which kinds of people, and the actions claimed as 'harm' must, of course, be substantiated by witnesses. It is not easy for a woman to find witnesses who are willing to testify against a husband. (A case mentioned in Chapter V indicates it to be a problem.) Moreover a man has a right to 'punish' a disobedient wife. Whereas this right is supposed to have some limitations in Islamic law, it can be used as a 'defence' by a husband. That the law foresees difficulty with this ground is indicated by the provision for the appointment of arbiters from the families involved which forces, as it were, the decision concerning fault as well as the negotiation of reconciliation back into the traditional framework of the family.

The major hazard for a woman who has been divorced by a reluctant husband (without an *^{c}isma* and without 'a consideration,' for these are final divorces) was that the husband will demand her back within the three months allowable. Until recently the institution of *bait al-ta^{c}a* (lit. 'the house of obedience,' ie, the husband's house) existed, that is, the husband could call upon the police authorities to compel his wife to return. This operated not only to restore a wife after a *talaq* of the first and second time, but also if the wife herself on her own volition left the marriage home without her husband's consent. It does not seem unlikely that it could also have been used when the judicial divorce

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was not a final divorce. There would seem to be nothing legally to prevent it. The implementation of the use of the police to compel a wife to return to her husband was presumably cancelled by a ministerial order issued on February 13, 1967.[8] However, opinion generally dates its actual disuse only two or three years ago.

Whereas the same laws, be they Shari^{c}a or modern legislation, apply to rich and poor alike, it is obvious that the divorce by court action is particularly relevant to the problems of the poor. From the material gathered from the court sessions it is obvious that lack of financial support is the chief cause of divorce by court action in Egypt - that is, poverty. Poverty also brings these same women to the *guz'i* courts to collect the *nafaqa* to which they are entitled, and for support money for their children.

The better off do not go to court for their divorces, not only because that is what the 'common people' do (and the general prohibition against court-going operates here as well) but also for other reasons. The stigma attached to a woman usurping this particular male prerogative also carries over to having a lawyer represent her, it would seem. Primarily, however, it is because they have alternatives. Various alternatives are preferred for reasons we shall discuss in a moment. The inducement of 'a consideration' to a husband to pronounce *talaq* seems to imply a 'no fault' divorce and everybody's honour is intact.

It is obviously only those who have something of value to give that an inducement of 'a consideration' is a possibility for getting a divorce. Since the poor bring little but themselves to a marriage, there is little scope in the form of protection, such as payment of the remaining part of the dowry upon divorce, or the possibility of an inducement by the release of the dowry obligation or repayment of dowry paid or simply a cash settlement.

It is, however, still curious that the 'modernizing classes' are so adamantly opposed to the 'modern' practice of divorcing in a modern court of law. I am told, furthermore, that such practices absolutely do not exist outside of the main metropolitan areas, that in the 'traditional' countryside divorce by court action does not occur. But I am not so sure.

A courtroom dealing with *tatliq* cases was visited in Giza. Whereas Giza is part of metropolitan Cairo, it includes under its jurisdiction areas which come under the (statistical and common-opinion) classification of 'rural'. Moreover, the people observed in this courtroom had a 'rural' demeanour. This court, it is said, is known as 'the court for fellahin'.

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The cases in the Giza Court were heard in an anteroom, the judges chambers, and only those immediately involved in each case were allowed to be present. The litigants were brought in as their cases were considered and stood before the judge. There were fewer cases and the judges spent more time on each. They were allowed to speak more freely, even to the point of irrelevancies.

The persons found in this court were clearly of peasant origin. Again, this is known by their clothing, general demeanour, and mannerisms. Petitioners appeared in person. One young woman came barefoot. Another wife who claimed 'harm' was accompanied by her father, an 'old fellah', and a lawyer. There was a tendency here to present cases with more drama. Stories went beyond the facts necessary to substantiate the allegations. A Koran was produced by the brother of one girl who demanded that he be allowed to swear upon it. In another case, the father spoke at length of the sexual peculiarities of the husband, which was not the ground upon which the case was based. The judges here exhibited more compassion towards the female complainants.

One wife claimed her husband had not spent anything on her for ten months, forcing her to eat at her parents' home while he ate with his parents. Her parents had several younger children and could not afford to feed her as well. Meanwhile her husband, she said, gambled away all his money at cards, and had taken all her belongings and sold them. The husband denied these allegations, saying he earned thirty piastres a day making bricks, and had been sent away from her parents' house six months ago.

The judge told the husband to pay his wife then and there. The husband produced four pounds, which would represent about half the month's wages that he claimed to earn. The judge then asked the wife if she did not wish to return to him. She said, 'No, I still do not trust him.'

The judge said, for the benefit of all present, 'Such a man may behave well in court and then mistreat his wife again later. Is such a man entitled to torture his wife, then pay a few piastres before a court and be allowed to take her away?' Since decisions are never made immediately in these three-judge courts, the outcome of this case is not known. Whether the judge could give her a divorce for non-support when the husband had come up with some money is doubtful. With 'harm', however, he has more discretion.

Another study of Cairo divorce litigation has indicated that the closeness of rural affiliation among litigants does seem to make a difference in their attitudes to the divorce courts, namely that they articulate de-

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gradation and humiliation in stronger language than do those without close rural affiliations. The fact remains, however, that these particular individuals did come to court seeking a divorce 'as other alternatives were absent.'[9] One hindrance in the rural areas themselves is of course the fact that the *ibtida'i* courts (where divorce actions must be brought) are located only in the 'centres' and not in the outlying areas. That divorce actions are brought in these courts in the rural 'centres', however, we have some evidence for in Chapter V. That the rural populace is not specially reluctant to bring complaints to the authorities was indicated in Chapter I.

For a woman to petition a *qadi* for the dissolution of her marriage was known in Egypt prior to this century and its 'modernist' innovations. The law allows it in certain specified circumstances, and we know of practices from European travellers reports, eg Edward Lane:

> A woman cannot separate herself from her husband against his will, unless it be for some considerable fault on his part, as cruel treatment, or neglect; and even then, application to the Kadee's [*qadi*] court is generally necessary to compel the man to divorce her; and she forfeits the ... remnant of her dowry.[10]

While it is contended that such an incident could not possibly have happened in Cairo under Hanafi law, but must have occurred in the south where Malaki rules operated,[11] it should be noted that what the woman is asking the *qadi* to do in not divorce her but to intercede to get her husband to divorce her 'for a consideration', ie the forfeit of the rest of her dowry, which is not inconsistent with Hanafi rules.

Another incident of a woman seeking divorce by a *qadi* is reported by Michaud and Poujoulat about the same time as the above:

> A woman came asking for a divorce. She advanced towards the judge and placed her slipper before him upside down, which meant that her husband did not fulfil his conjugal duty from Thursday night to Friday morning and that he was incapable of fathering descendants. The judge agreed to the divorce.[12]

This could indeed be a Hanafi *qadi*, for a husband's impotence was an allowable cause for a woman to ask a *qadi* to dissolve her marriage. If indeed it is as easy as the above quotation makes it appear, the aspersions,cast upon a husband's manliness by a wife 'going to court' is obvious. Against such a background the terrible thing that a woman does in bringing her husband to court to divorce him is more understandable.

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The reason articulated today, however, is that asking for a divorce from a court of law constitutes the making public of what is, and should be kept, a private matter.

The divorce rate in Egypt today is high. The average number of marriages to divorces is about one divorce in every 4.5 marriages.[13] This high figure reflects the relative ease with which divorce can take place on the man's initiative. It also includes divorces by *tatliq*, as no distinction in the statistics is made as to the relative incidence of the two kinds of divorce. Divorces by *talaq* are undoubtedly higher. However, the crowded courtrooms indicate that not a few cases are brought by women; the court records indicate that divorces are indeed issued by the courts with some frequency. Since the court processes are time-consuming, and for those with very little, they represent a considerable financial drain over the months. As the lawyers must be paid and witnesses compensated in some way, many *tatliq* actions are not carried to their conclusion, or, alternatively, actually serve as a catalyst for a husband to pronounce the divorcing himself.

Al-Ahram, a few years ago, indicated that divorce was a major problem in Egypt.[14] The recent population statistics are used to indicate that it is decreasing. However, these statistics lump together divorced persons with widows and widowers and it is impossible to tell whether indeed the divorced proportion of the population has declined. Moreover, these figures represent only those persons who were at the time of the census, divorced or widowed, not whether they had been at some time in their lives. With these obvious limitations on this data, we report below what the census-takers found:

> The percentage of divorced and widowed population in the 1976 census decreases, as regards the total population of marriageable age, to 9.4% against 12.5% in the 1960 census.
> The percentage of divorced and widowed males in 1976 is 2.6% against 3.5% in 1960, while the percentage among females amounts to 15.6% in 1976 against 20.4% in 1960.[15]

The Central Agency interprets the decrease as being due to the decrease in divorce and death rates, and to the increased chances of divorced and widowed persons to remarry.[16] Be that as it may, a study reported in *Al-Ahram* in 1977 indicates that 'in the past year there had been 236,000 marriage contracts signed and 169,000 divorces.'[17]

The condition of being divorced for women does not in itself carry the same kind of stigma which it does some other places in the world, nor is it, nor has it ever been, a bar to re-marriage. Indeed, by far the largest proportion of divorces occur in the under twenty-five age bracket,[18] and it is probably correct to assume that a large proportion of these remarry. The problem for the upper classes is not being divorced as such, but being unmarried. Being unmarried means that some male relative has to bear all kinds of responsibilities from supporting them to chaperoning them on many occasions, to overseeing their moral conduct. Unmarried women find themselves severely restricted in their social movements. Things they could do as married women they cannot do, or certainly not as easily, as divorcees (and, it should be noted, as widows). They are a threat to their female married friends, especially if they are young and pretty. Husbands and fathers may consider them inappropriate friends for their wives or daughters. These are very pronounced patterns in the social relationships in Egypt. A society addicted to gossip by both male and female members, watches obsessively for signs of 'deviance' in its single female members. A single female finds it exceedingly difficult to live by herself. It does happen, but it inevitably occasions great problems. The poor seem to manage it better if only by force of circumstance. Especially if they have young children a single woman is not readily absorbed back into their father's household. A recent study indicates that 67% of all divorced women live from their families, 10% were living on nafaqa supplied for their children, and 20% from some kind of employment.[19] There are immediate pressures to get a daughter who has been returned to her family by one husband, married off again to another. Because the most readily available man is often the former husband, not a few divorced women remarry their former husbands.[20] Many undoubtedly discover that whatever unpleasantnesses occurred by being married to a particular man, the inconveniences of being unmarried are vastly greater. The man also, be it noted, notwithstanding his almost unfettered 'right', is also subject to family pressures to remarry.

A poor woman who is divorced may move in temporarily with a friend rather than her family, and may ultimately, if she has a job or other means of some support, rent a room for herself and her children to live in. Living alone is only a relative term here, as these rented rooms in the poor quarters offer neither privacy nor seclusion from the neighbourhood with whom the occupants must interact whether they want to or not.[21]

Nor has divorce on a woman's initiative in court been the only area in which the family law in Egypt has been altered or regularized by modernist legislation during the past half-century. Laws in 1923 and 1931 tackled the problem of child marriages. This was done by means of administrative regulations which made marriage below the ages of 16 for girls and 18 for boys not registerable and therefore they are not eligible for judicial relief before a court of law. The legality of the marriage itself, allowed under the Islamic Shari^{c}a, was thus not contested. The state simply declined responsibility for taking any part in solving controversies which arose as a result.

The Egyptian laws of the 1920s also include raising the age of custody of children by the mother from seven to nine for boys and from nine to eleven for girls, and the ^{c}idda, if it is in dispute, shall normally be considered to last for one calendar year. The law of 1929 specifies that a missing person shall be declared dead, in the eyes of the law, four years after his disappearance if the circumstances make his death probable, or at the discretion of the court, after all possible inquiries have been made. Also prohibited has been the triple talaq whereby a man could pronounce all three of his allowable divorces at the same time, and divorce pronounced under intoxication, or contingent upon an event occurring, or as a threat.[32]

This legislation covering personal status reforms of the 1920s and 1930s is collected together, along with the legislation of 1955 which abolished the Shari^{c}a Courts and provided for the integration of personal status matters and the judges and lawyers of these courts into the National Courts, as Qawanin al-ahwal al-shakhsiya (Laws of Personal Status), periodically reprinted. It does not, however, constitute a 'code' of personal status law. A unified code of personal status law has been talked about for many years, at least since the 1930s, and at least one complete draft was prepared during the 1940s, but the obstacles to such a unified code being made law would appear to be insurmountable. Opposition to tampering with traditional Shari^{c}a rules governing family law has, if anything, increased in recent decades.

Nor have the piecemeal reforms of personal status law, attempted three times in the last six years, met with any greater success. The two most sensitive areas are the restricting of the virtually unfettered right of the man to pronounce divorce by talaq, and the male's right to take up to four wives at the same time.

In 1972 a Committee for the Reform of Personal Status Law headed by Aisha Rateb, then the lady Minister of Social Affairs, proposed to give the courts discretionary power to permit or deny polygamy in specific cases, and to require men to obtain permission of a judge to divorce. Egyptian reformers as early as Mohammed Abdou had advocated restrictions on polygamy. In 1974 Dr Rateb again presented proposals for similar changes. The first proposal was couched in terms of needing to 'reopen the door of ijtihad' (independent reasoning) and of using 'creative thinking' to solve modern problems. The second proposal emphasized that the proposed amendments to the personal status law were completely in harmony with the Islamic Shariᶜa. Nevertheless, the opposition to both was vigorous. The 1974 proposal even elicited a protest march from the Al-Azhar community of ᶜulama' and students upon the People's Assembly and President Sadat promised in a public speech that no action on the proposal was presently contemplated by the Assembly. May 1977 saw another proposal containing considerably fewer 'innovations.' There is no mention here of either restrictions of polygamy or of requiring a court appearance for a man wishing to divorce. Indeed, as far as it appears from the newspaper account of the proposal, there is nothing new, except for a proposal to eliminate the bait al-taᶜa (pr. bait it-taᶜa), which, as mentioned, had already been discontinued. It would seem that even this has met a similar fate of the others – that is, of 'being studied.'[23]

Polygamy, the reader may be surprised to learn, has a rationale in terms of a woman's welfare. The lady-director of the Family Counselling Bureau of Cairo, states that when a wife is sick or childless, polygamy is less of an injury or disadvantage than divorce. A man can thus take another wife while still taking care of the first one.[24]

Polygamy may well be more prevalent in Egypt than some persons would like to believe, and it occurs on all levels of the society, but for different reasons. It is perfectly true that, given the present lack of requirements to support a divorced wife beyond a very limited period, a man does indeed do a first wife less damage by not divorcing her when he marries another if he continues to support her provided, of course, that she does not herself want a divorce. The marriage of a husband to a second wife is, however, a 'harm' that a wife can plead in court, particularly when it is linked with either inadequate or unequal support.

One pressure for marrying a second wife comes from the desire to have male children. We know of a case where enormous pressures were exerted upon a man, determined to take a second wife for this reason, not to divorce the first wife who had borne him three female children, but to continue to support her and live with her, intermittently with the second. Hope sprang eternal that she would next time give birth to a male child and thereby restore herself to his favour. The desire for male children is not difficult to explain. Not only is 'maleness' highly

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valued in itself, but society has created great social and financial hazards and responsibilities attached to female children, while those in various relationships to a male have a right to be supported by him.

Another reason for polygamy seems to be for an upwardly mobile man to take a second wife of a higher social standing than the first wife (and perhaps his own status in life previously) and usually younger. Such a man will probably cease living with the first wife but will continue to support her and his children by her. Given the institution of polygamy, divorce for the man becomes primarily a way of divesting oneself of financial responsibility.

The most generally acceptable reason for taking a second wife is when the first wife is ailing or otherwise incapable of fulfilling the wifely functions, in which case it is considered not proper that he abandon her, ie divorce her, although if both are elderly and the first wife has been a faithful wife to him for many years the 'acceptance' is muted.

Taking a second wife is hedged by religious law with some restrictions. Just as certain categories of blood and suckling relationship are forbidden for marriage absolutely, the list increases to include a first wife's mother, sister, aunt, niece and daughter (by another husband).

The efforts to reform the institution of polygamy have not attempted to abolish it but rather to require that the man have an acceptable reason, and have sought to vest discretionary authority as to what constitutes a proper reason with the courts. The *harim* of days gone by, it should be noted, does not exist anymore. Very rarely is a second wife moved into the same house. Indeed, some wives are not even aware that a second wife exists, but this is usually not a secret which can be kept indefinitely.

The crux of the problem is, of course, the support money for a divorced wife. She may claim support payments for herself for not more than a year. Although the man is required by law to continue to provide support for the children under the mother's care up to the ages of 9 for the boys and 11 for the girls, after that time he can take them, and then all support payments cease. Moreover, the wife must move out of the marital home provided by the husband after her *ᶜidda* is finished. When the man himself leaves, that is, of course, a different story. She has a right to remain.

Even taking account of the fact that some divorces are obtained without a woman appearing in court, by representation of a lawyer, the fact remains that the court process is used predominantly by the poor. The all-compelling necessity among the poor is to obtain the wherewithal to support themselves from somewhere and to protect themselves, if possi-

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ble, from having what money they are able to find from being taken away. Thus suing for a divorce in court is a way to gain the assistance of the State authorities to force an absent, indigent or irresponsible husband to come up with some money or to prevent the little money a wife may herself be able to earn or her few possessions from being taken by a non-working or profligate husband. Some women initiate tatliq actions, it is claimed by some of the court authorities, to forstall consequences of a talaq divorce which has already been done. However, whereas this could conceivably prevent the husband from taking her back during the ᶜidda period, it would also mean that she would give up certain compensations.

The major cause, however, of divorce would appear to be the disappearance of the husband, or claimed disappearance, coupled with non-support. With a divorce she can then marry again, someone this time, it is always hoped, who will be able and willing to provide a living. Very few of the cases in the divorce courts did not have a factor of economic deprivation.

Whereas throughout society a woman who enters a court to divorce an unwanted husband has done a very degrading thing - to her husband as well as herself - poverty itself brings degradation, but if there is a prospect of a little money for the next days or weeks existence, or the opportunity of a life with a modicum more financial security, then the degradation, it appears, is bearable.

That divorce actions must be brought to the three-judge ibtida'i courts is in itself indicative that the state does not consider divorce by court action lightly. Most other personal status matters, when they involve as little financially as do most of these divorce suits, are brought into the one-judge guz'i courts. Thus divorce is considered not in terms of the money involved, but in terms of the nature of the action itself - the dissolution of the marriage relationship.

Child custody and support are not part of divorce actions. Children, legally speaking, are irrelevant to divorce, as is also the support after divorce to which a woman is entitled. Nor is mistreatment of children a ground for divorce. Custody is fixed by law and although it may be contested, this is done as a separate legal action. Suits to collect child support payments are separate legal actions and are usually brought in the guz'i courts. There was one case, however, in the Shubra ibtida'i court where a young girl's educational expenses were being requested. It was unclear whether this was an appeal from a guz'i court or had been brought becuase the amounts of money involved allowed it.

Although the National Courts are the courts of the land and thus of

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supposedly universal application, the personal status law operated therein is demonstrably Muslim law. The state abolished the separate milla jurisdictions in 1955 but it still takes account of the fact that the Christian sects in Egypt, some 6.3%[25] of the population, have more restrictive laws governing divorce. Included in the collected legislation of personal status above referred to is a section entitled 'Personal Status Laws for Non-Muslims.' This does not appear to be a regularly enacted law but rather a promulgation of the Ministry of Justice at the time of the disuse of the milla courts in 1956. The grounds for divorce in this 'law' are more stringent than those for Muslims but at the same time it leaves the determination as to whether a divorce should be issued to the magalis of the respective church organizations. If a recommendation from a church maglis is issued for a divorce, it is then the procedure to report it to the National Courts where it is recorded. When Christians are of different sects, that is, when there is no Church maglis to take jurisdiction, then the case can be brought to the National Courts applying the law of the land (Muslim law), just as the old Shari^{c}a Courts governed in cases of conflicting confessional jurisdictions.

The poor have taken advantage of modern legislation intended for the whole society while their 'betters' have held fast to traditional forms. That the possessing classes do one thing and the dispossessed do another cannot help but suggest that there are economic factors operating here.

Among the upper classes property and money are inevitably involved in both marriages and divorces, and this is not something an Egyptian family is going to leave to the vagaries of an outside arbiter, that is, a judge of the National Courts, if they can help it, and they usually can. Curiously, divorce is not an area where attempts to be 'modern' and 'western', so pronounced in Egypt's upper classes otherwise, has been operative. Usually it is the lower classes whom popular wisdom considers to be 'traditional.' Yet it is precisely these 'traditional' parts of society who have used, and are virtually the only ones who do use, the 'modern' institution of 'divorce by court action.'

The whole pattern of the developmental process in Egypt and the changed and changing social relationships which it comprehends are reflected in this dichotomy of divorce. The transformation to modernity has meant not less but more complex property relationships among those sections of the population who possess something of value. It has brought at least as many pressures towards family cohesion in this group as towards its atomization, but not necessarily in the same ways or for the same reasons as occurred in the 'traditional Islamic family.' The new relationships are complex and they derive from the transformations of the social structure which have occurred during the past century. They owe as much to the structural conditions which define the social relationships of the privileged strata today as they do to the traditional past.

A wife is not (nor has she ever been under Islamic law) 'property.' The dowry, or 'bride-price' paid by the husband is a gift to his future wife and the marriage contract is an agreement among equals or their agents, not a sale. A wife from the upper and middle classes, however, will in all likelihood be a property-owner. This fact derives principally from the inheritance laws. A woman under Islamic law takes in inheritance one-half of what a male in a similar relationship to the deceased takes (with some exceptions, such as when there are only female descendants). She owns her property, however, in her own right. Upon marriage her property does not merge with that of her husband (nor her husband's with hers). Upon divorce she takes her property with her, including that which she brought into the marriage home. At the same time she is precluded by custom (not law) from managing her property herself, and this same custom makes her dependent upon a male relative - husband, if married, if not, her father or brother - as both her 'protector' and agent in virtually all matters concerned with the world of men and business, including the management of her property. The secluded creature of the harim of historical literature no longer exists in Egypt. The present situation of dependance is quite modern and goes along with a male-dominated, or perhaps more accurately a family-dominated, modern commercial society.

The high divorce rates should not be taken as an indication that the family is not centrally important for either social life generally or 'the national interest,' in the upper strata of society. As these families carefully select marriage partners so also do they usually vigorously apply pressures to prevent divorce. Although there is no hard data which we can cite, we suspect that divorce is less frequent among the upper classes today than formerly; that factors requiring family cohesion are, if anything, more pervasive. Although the women in these families have attained a 'modern' or emancipated position produced by the influences of liberalism and education, at the same time their 'modern' behaviour is carefully monitored.

These family units are an economic fact in a much more comprehensive sense than might be implied by the husband or father having responsibilities for the support of his wife or offspring, or the husband/father being the manager of their property. It is within the family that a comprehensive social security and life-support system rests. It provides an institutionalized system of cooperation in virtually all aspects of life. It is counsellor and matchmaker, employment agent and arbiter of conflict. It is the basic unit of business and politics. Thus marriage can be viewed from two angles: it may serve a solidifying function for business or professional relationships either existing or hoped for, or it may serve to establish the security of one's child, if a female, and her future offspring. The establishing of economic security through marriage of a girl at the same time both protects the family's status and insures that the family's resources otherwise will not be needed for her support in the future. A daughter's or sister's 'security' may also mean that property inherited or to be inherited jointly will not be needed for her support. Thus she can 'renounce' her inheritance share and the property can be the undivided support of the male inheritors. This latter practice seems to be of ancient origin, and when it occurs usually concerns land inheritances. Such renunciations of inheritance rights are, of course, considered to have been voluntary, and purport to have Koranic justification.[26]

The institution of arranged marriages is still very active among this group of the population. By the same token, if there must be a divorce, it also is 'arranged.' The family is too important for too many aspects of life to leave either its formation or its dissolution of a marriage to the whim and emotions of one of its members. Furthermore the dissolution of a marriage will rarely affect only two people and simply mean their living apart. Nor is it the children who are the central concern. While children are very important for various reasons otherwise, as noted, they do not figure prominently in rationales for resisting the dissolution of marriages. The dissolution of a marriage by divorce (or death) rarely leaves children without someone to care for them.

Because the family is so basic to economic and social life its women must not be allowed to endanger it. Their moral character must be protected as a condition of maintaining family unity. Nor must the family's moral reputation be called into question, for a moral reputation is very important for many aspects of life outside the family.

The same pressures that create a marriage and keep it together can also cause its dissolution. If the liabilities of union become greater than the benefits, and the parties directly involved have also developed an aversion for each other, than there is no reason to keep it together.

Those on the fringes of the upper strata, or in the middle between the rich and the poor, emulate those above in various areas of conduct, even if the same structural basis of existance is not necessarily, or usually, present. It becomes even more important for them not to do those things, like take a divorce to court, that would suggest they were really lower on the socio-economic scale than they presume to be. This part of society, however, tends towards atomization. The nuclear family by itself is much more in evidence here, but it is, as we have noted in the Introduction, a grouping with very diverse elements. It is also from this part of society that extreme religious traditionalism comes. Religious traditionalism, of course, does not allow the taking of divorces to the courts.

Divorce is not the only area where this 'middle' part of society can be seen to follow 'traditional' norms of behaviour.[37] They do so in marriage as well. However, the same dynamics do not operate because the same economic relationships do not prevail. This strata includes (among others) the educated wage-earners and those with small inheritances of landed property. The existence of educated wage earners in modern society, perhaps more than anything else, produces atomization in these societies, that is, the emergence of the nuclear family, 'individuation' of the personality, an ideological independence in certain social relationships - particularly those concerning the family - and alienation. The 'arranged marriage' in an atomized society is an anachronism. Nothing illustrates this so well as the existence of marriage brokers, that is, women who, for a fee, 'introduce' persons to others who wish to marry.

The traditional laws and customs which operate successfully for the privileged strata of society demonstrably do not work where the family has a tendency to atomize, for the proper operation of the traditional modes requires a high degree of social (ie family) control over behaviour and/or the existence of men with good characters. Religiosity is traditionally one guarantor of the latter, and perhaps not a small part of the propensity to religious traditionalism in this strata is an unconscious recognition that the structural conditions for social enforcement of traditional behaviour are not present. Operating the 'traditional' laws and customs in an atomized society carries with it distinct hazards, as is illustrated by a recent Egyptian television 'soap opera.'[38] As this little drama depicts, the abuse of the husband's prerogative to have a wife both dependent upon him and 'obedient' cannot be checked by law alone as it presently exists. The main features of this story are as follows:

The widow of a prison official, with grown, married children finds herself totally alone. The children have their own lives and more or less ignore her except when they need money. When a marriage broker seeks her out with a prospective husband she succumbs to persuasion. No check is made of the new *ᶜaris* (bridegroom) as there is no one who really cares enough. The children oppose the marriage at first because remarried their mother will not be as accessible for the handouts of money the daughters constantly require to supplement the small salaries of their husbands. The son is a profligate who is unable to earn or hold onto any money which he is given by his mother. The children are, however, bought off. She gives each a cash 'settlement' and the marriage takes place.

The new husband presents himself as being absolutely proper and concerned that he relieve his wife of all activities connected with the overseeing of her property. She owns a few feddans in the countryside from her father, a small building, and has a bank account. She is, of course, happy with her husband's masculine assertiveness, particularly as her former husband was also a strong, protective male. The new husband also presents himself as being particularly jealous, and forbids her to do anything which would bring her in contact with 'strange men.' He is a little more extreme in this than most Egyptian men but nonetheless the pattern very clearly rings true. He insists that she move out of her old apartment as it is associated with her former husband, and he finds a new one, which she furnishes (as is customary). Because he plays the strong male who oversees everything, he takes care of the acquisition of the furniture (although she pays) and the receipts are written in his name. He persuades her to invest the money from her bank account in a commercial enterprise run by a man he introduces as known to him, as it will bring her a higher interest. Since he claims it is against his honour to allow her to go travelling by herself to the countryside to collect her land rents she duly gives him a *tawkil* to do it on her behalf. He then advises her that her land is not bringing the kind of return that could be had for investment elsewhere, and persuades her to sell the land. Because all property available for purchase, he claims, costs more than the money she realized from the land sale, he persuades her to sell her building as well. Whenever she has doubts or questions him, or if she is not an 'obedient' wife, he acts offended and either walks out of the house in anger or sulks or belittles her for not understanding 'business.' He has, in various ways, which are not germane here, gained her affection and played on her sympathy. He is supposedly an employee in a ministry and tells her that he keeps the money locked up at the ministry because it is safer there than at home, and he needs it to be

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readily available whenever he finds her a property to reinvest it in for her. She discovers, too late, that he is a crook and has done the same thing to several wives before her. He divorces her, by talaq, and is very correct about paying her nafaqa so that she can have no claim against him by law but makes her leave the apartment with nothing but her clothes. When she threatens him that there are laws and courts to call upon, he reminds her that she freely gave him the tawkil, freely signed her name on the contracts of sale of land and building, and the receipts for the furniture purchases are in his name. Thus she has no case under the law.

The thing which prevents this sort of thing from happening more frequently, if less extremely, is that families are there to monitor. In the situation of the story there is no male relative except a son, who is young and most of the time estranged from his mother because he failed in school, ran away from home, and is generally irresponsible. The son does, however, in the end, accost the husband with a gun as he is about to trap another unsuspecting woman, and threatens that he will be watching to see that he is never able to duplicate his actions. The son fails, of course, to retrieve his mother's money.

Had there been a brother or father or family members otherwise concerned, it is unlikely that the swindler would have been able to operate as he did. Fathers and brothers and families in general are there to see that their daughters or sisters are properly treated by their husbands.

The story also underscores the popularity and persistence of 'arranged' marriages, in this section of society, even when there is no structural rationale for them. In the upper classes a marriage would not be arranged with someone whom the family did not previously know or had not thoroughly checked out. Because a husband has such legally unfettered authority over a wife, it is very important that his selection not be left to accident. The laws offer no protection to such a woman, as the widow in this story, when the structural features which make them work are absent.

The poorer strata - and the vast majority of Egypt's population is poor - are far more atomized than are the groups above. Contrary to popular belief that the poor are the 'traditional' part of society, modernization has had much more of an impact here on social (particularly family) structures. Whereas there may be found strong attachments between parents and children, or between brothers and sisters, these are affective sentiments rather than structurally defined, and one is just as likely to find a lack of such attachments.

It is perhaps wrong to say that there are today proportionately more

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poor or that these people are poorer. One can say, however, that they are a *different* poor, different, that is, from the poor of pre-modern times. Certain manners and customs, the most visible part of any society's life, are 'pre-modern,' just as the 'traditional' ethic of mutual help appears very visibly in the upper strata families. However, the social and economic relationships are different in both cases.

For the poor, the helping hand of neighbours is at least as significant as that of blood relations. Since no one's living quarters are very spacious, the *hara*, or small neighbourhood, is the centre of life. These people earn their livings as they find work. A large proportion are not regularly employed. Occupations mentioned in the courtroom and witness sessions were: unskilled factory work of various kinds, pedlar, waiter in an *'ahwa*, taxi driver, and so on. Women usually work as domestic servants or do some kind of factory work. There are few pressures that can be brought upon men in this stratum who do not want to divorce their wives. By the same token, there is little to keep a husband with his family if he is unable to support it, except affection. There is little leverage women can exert upon such husbands either to stay with them and their children or be better providers. When affection is absent or disappears, physical disappearance, or *talaq*, is the 'solution' available for the man. The one leverage available to such women, it would appear, is the instituting of divorce proceedings in court. If instituting a *tatliq* action does not produce a divorce by *talaq* it then becomes the only available possibility of freeing oneself from such husbands.

The Egyptian reformers of the 1920s, whether they realized it or not, were providing 'modernist' legislation which was, fifty years later, to apply to the life-situations of the poor rather than to Egyptian society as a whole. However, it is only a partial solution. The matter of money for support is the prime need of the poor whether divorced through *tatliq* or *talaq*, as it is their major problem throughout their lives. Court divorce is, for all practical purposes, irrelevant to the life-situation of the privileged as they have a preferred alternative. Those in the middle condition are perhaps most hurt by the lack of reform in family law generally, as ideologically they are unable to avail themselves of some legal solutions which exist, and unable structurally to find viable alternatives. Yet, ironically, it is precisely from these groups that some of the most vocal opposition to the reform of family law emanates.

FOOTNOTES

1 I am indebted to Malak Zaalouk and Adel Azer from whose observations in the Shubra courtrooms the foregoing scene was reconstructed, as well as that of the Giza court, infra. The material was collected over a period of several weeks during Spring of 1972 in several sessions of these courts. The excerpts herein represent composites.

2 Mohammed Abu Zahra, 'Family Law,' in Majid Khadduri and Herbert J Liebesny, *Law in the Middle East* (Washington: The Middle East Institute, 1955), pp 146–148; and id., *Al-ahwal al-shakhsiya* (Personal Status) (Cairo, 1950), pp 278–281.

3 For a discussion of the issues concerning the *ᶜidda*, see J N D Anderson, 'Recent Developments in Shariᶜa Law IV,' *The Muslim World* 41 (1951), 193 ff; and id., *Law Reform in the Muslim World* (London: The Athlone Press, 1975), p 133 ff.

4 Abu Zahra, 'Family Law,' p 147

5 Anderson, 'Recent Developments V,' p 271

6 For a discussion of these methods of reform, see Anderson, *Law Reform*, p 43 ff

7 In the 1920 law tatliq is still specifically indicated as a divorce of a *qadi* – *tatliq al-qadi*. It would appear that it is through usage *in some places* whereby a connotation of 'divorce by judicial action' is conferred upon the second form verbal noun (*tatliq*). Otherwise, the second and first forms of the verb seem to be used interchangeably. The Maliki school uses *tatliq* to indicate a 'judicial divorce' although other schools use either the words for annulment (*faskh*) or separation (*tafriq*) when referring to a marriage dissolved by a judge. See Anderson, 'Recent Developments V,' pp 273–274.

8 Mohamed al-Nowaihi, 'Changing the Law on Personal Status within a Liberal Interpretation of the Shariᶜa,' (paper presented to the Open University Seminar on Law and Social Change, April 20, 1969, The American University in Cairo), mimeo., p 3

9 Malak el-Husseiny Zaalouk, 'The Social Structure of Divorce Adjudication in Egypt,' (M. A. Thesis: The American University in Cairo, 1975), p 106 ff.

10 Edward Lane, *The Manners and Customs of the Modern Egyptians* (New York: Everyman's Library, 1966) from the edition of 1860, pp 101–102.

11 By Sir Norman Anderson, in private correspondence. It is known that at certain times, in certain places, *qudah* from the various schools of Islamic jurisprudence 'held court' contemporaneously,

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U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST: SOME POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR EGYPT

(Author's Note: I wish to express here my gratitude to the members of the DOE/Fulbright seminar for the often stimulating discussion that helped to clarify my thinking on these matters. Few, if any, of the members would share my conclusions. Obviously the views expressed herein are the sole responsibility of the author and should not be ascribed to any organization. Extensive footnotes are available from the author upon request. Nothing may be quoted without permission.)

In his recent book The United States and Egypt (1990), William Quandt argues that "In a post-cold war Middle East, neither Egypt nor Israel can expect to present themselves credibly as important 'strategic assets' in confronting a waning Soviet threat " (p. 32). However, Quandt goes on to state that "For the United States, the strategic value of Egypt resides in the fact that it is, on the whole, a force for stability in a volatile region, not that it is an ally in an anti-Soviet Crusade" (p. 54; see also pp. 63, 66, and 73).

In this book, Quandt comes closer than most establishment types in stating the ultimate rationale for Egypt's importance to the United States. Nevertheless, he begs the essential questions by failing to spell out the meaning of terms such as "stability", "security", and "strategic value".

My purpose here is two-fold: first, I will attempt to briefly sketch out the overall context of U.S. policy in the region; and second, I will try to raise some questions, the answers to which may bear on the nature of U.S.-Egyptian relations in the 1990's.

First, them, any discussion of U.S. policy in the Middle East must begin by taking into account the long-term and ;large-scale economic interests that determine U.S. policy. They give shape to military and strategic thinking and without a firm grasp of their dynamics, one's chances of understanding policy are rather slim.

The initial one is a belief that the U.S., European, and Japanese economies require access to Middle Eastern oil. Second, there are U.S. petroleum, banking, and defense industries all of which define their interests as matters of U.S. national security. Third, there is of course the linkage between the U.S. and Israel and the role of a powerful domestic pressure group—the Israeli lobby. Here I would agree with those who analyze Israel's relevance to military-strategic planners as a sort of political contraceptive against revolutionary (nationalist) upheavals in the region. This role even outweighs the importance of the lobby itself.

To return to my earlier points, it has been projected that in 1990, Gulf oil suppliers will be providing up to 28% of U.S. imports (up from 6% in 1985). In 1988, Saudi Arabia became the single biggest oil supplier, providing five times what it did in 1985. Further, some 65% of the world's known reserves are in the Gulf. (Note: Egypt is expected to become an oil-importing country within a decade.) And we know that the U.S. competitive position in the Middle East, relative to Japan and the EC, has declined. U.S. policy-makers seek the leverage over these competitors that accompanies control of the Gulf. The objective here is to maintain intra-imperial control over industrial rivals, otherwise known as "allies".

Second, and related, are the more specific economic interests: weapons sales in the regions, as a percentage of total U.S. arms sales, has increased each year. Further,

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oil companies fear losing control of pricing and extraction rates while the flow of petrodollars into U.S. banks is extremely lucrative. This power block of oil companies, banks, and military interests projects its interest into the U.S. executive branch. They have a vital stake in the existing Middle East social and political order.

What constitutes the major threat to these interests? Without question, revolutionary movements (including Islamic) in the region which might nationalize oil profits, decrease military purchases, reinvest oil earnings at home, assist other revolutionary movements, and generally politicize oil resources.

Again, Israel is important largely because of her role as a bulwark against Arab nationalism. best epitomized by the Palestinians. (Note: This also applies outside the region. During the Iran/contra Affair, one U.S. government analyst put it this way: "Israel is just another federal agency, one that's convenient to use when you want something done quietly.")

As Noam Chomsky has put it, "If the U.S. wants a peaceful settlement in accord with the international consensus, Israel would gradually be forced to accommodate itself to living in the region—a sort of Luxembourg—but the U.S. would lose the services of a valuable mercenary state, technologically advanced and militarily competent. A pariah state, utterly dependent upon the U.S. for its economic and military survival and hence dependable, available for service where needed—in the Middle East, South Africa, or Central America."

Again, and paraphrasing Chomsky, if for some reason Israel were to refuse or be unable to perform its specified role, is there any doubt that U.S. aid and weapons would flow to the most reactionary Arab regime? The marriage of Zionism and U.S. policy is one of fortuitous convenience driven by economic imperatives—a client regime in the mold of so many other—the only difference being the existence of AIPAC, which has made a high art of political extortion and electoral blackmail.

In any event, U.S. policy has passed through various stages in recent years. First, until 1979, policy involved using alliances within client regimes and/or ruling groups with shared interests. These included Iran under the Shah, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Sadat's Egypt. What was their function? The Shah provided a stable oil source, supplied oil to Israel (and South Africa), and SAVAK co-operated with Israel. The Israelis provided the other "book-end" and with Iran, held the region within the U.S. sphere-of-influence. Sadat further extended the axis. His accommodation with Israel at Camp David was rewarded with major U.S. military assistance, ultimately contributing to his own demise. (Note: It strains plausibility to accept the argument that Sadat did not perceive Camp David to be at the expense of the Palestinians.) This continued during the 1980's, when the U.S. Congress appropriated more than $23 billion in aid to Egypt, the second largest recipient after Israel. Today Egypt receives $2.3 billion per year in economic and military assistance from the United States. Finally, Saudi Arabia made petroleum available, kept OPEC de-politicized, subsidized reactionary regimes, and financed right-wing (e.g. the contras) movements.

The all began to disintegrate with the fall of the Shah in 1979, especially in the sense that an Islamic regime broke the bond that had held Iran and Israel together. Subsequently, the Saudis felt vulnerable to Muslim forces, given that Iran-like privileges and inequality existed there, And who would prop up the Gulf rulers in the absence of the Shah?

The U.S. was forced to beef up its military presence, now cloaked in the jargon of "defending the area from Soviet expansionism." Again, it is terribly important to stress that U.S. policy was never remotely about Soviet expansion, communism, or even the Cold War. Rather, the states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the

United Arab Emirates represent the backbone of U.S. "security interests" in the region. In this the U.S. has had the co-operation of local elites. Despite all of the rhetoric about Arab unity and Islamic piety, the maintenance of political power over subjected classes has been their dominant concern. (This includes the subordination of women, a condition maintained by a combination of law, custom, and ideology. On this, see the writings of Fred Halliday.)

In short, the overriding preoccupation of U.S. national security managers in that the Gulf monarchies be protected from their most feared enemy: their own populations. The native populations might get the heretical idea that oil resources should be used for something other than enriching the royal family. Some elements may even demand democratic accountability. Obviously any government would sell oil on the world market, but the decisions about the revenues would be made by the people themselves. Oil profits might even be shared with other Third World peoples. The Gulf ruling groups, tiny elites having more in common with the Salamon Brothers than with their Arab brothers, would be swept aside in favor of popular control. Oil would be considered a resource that all might co-operate in exploiting. This popular control cannot be allowed to emerge and the prospect causes restless nights in Washington.

For example, U.S. elites apparently believed that an Iranian victory in the war with Iraq would have accelerated the process of radical nationalism throughout the region—hence the U.S. government's tilt toward Iraq. At the same time, Washington (since 1979) has repeatedly sought to reconstruct the afore-mentioned alliance by appealing to Iranian "moderates"—those willing to stage a coup in which thousands would perish. Saudi financing and Israeli intermediaries played key parts in these futile attempts. Washington has continued to cultivate Iran and there is some reason to believe that these efforts are finally bearing fruit.

One obstacle to overall U.S. policy in the region has been the lukewarm response of EC members and Japan. From Washington's point-of-view these "allies" have not assumed their proper share of the cost—often only offering "token" support. Why are they reluctant? Quite simply, consolidating Arab political regimes under exclusive U.S. control, linked to the U.S. political/military/economic apparatus, does nothing to strengthen European and Japanese positions in the Middle East. They know that the U.S. presence brings in its wake political linkages which turn on the spigot for U.S. economic interests. And as the U.S. global empire continues to decline, one would expect a higher Middle East profile;e for these nations.

One nation that has been enthusiastic, of course, is Israel. As a colonial settler state lacking any real political options, she has been eager to convince Washington of the necessity for projecting military power in the Middle East. However, Israel's status and mentality also make it a major liability in the region. As an "unsinkable aircraft carrier" Israel might be useful in a crisis. However, Israel is not really an acceptable collaborator force (visible) for Gulf regimes that must maintain an "anti-Israel" public posture. And reliance on U.S. forces is almost as daunting a prospect. It has been estimated that to seize and hold 700 Saudi wells; 7,000 miles of vulnerable pipelines; and 150 processing plants would require 200,000 on a permanent basis. Given "Vietnam Syndrome" there would be scant domestic support for this option.

Currently, U.S, policy lacks any appealing core ideology for the Arab masses. It can prevail only through force or by shaping Arab domestic formations to lend themselves to protecting U.S. interests. This may involve approaches to the Islamic right but also selective cultivation of surrogate (client) regimes. In the latter respect, U.S. policy would be consistent with that followed elsewhere in the Third World.

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We are now in a position to offer some questions for the purpose of discussion and further research, especially in the light of Quandt's observations:

1. Is it beyond the realm of possibility that in Washington's geopolitical view, Egypt is to assume the role once played by Iran?The United States has used Egypt in at least the following ways: ammunition storage, rescue effort of hostages in Iran, fuel facilities for planes and ships, military operations such as "Brightstar" and "Operation Cobra", sharing of military doctrine of desert fighting, exchange of intelligence, American arms for Afghan *mujahideen* given logistical help by Egypt, and the training of some 200 Egyptian military officers each year in the United States. To what extent is U.S. aid a guarantee or "ransom" for U.S. access to Egyptian military facilities? What is the actual prospect for joint U.S.-Egyptian operations in the Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East? What minimum conditions would be required? What would be the likely outcomes?

2. What would be the domestic (Egyptian) implications of a phased reduction in U.S. aid to Egypt? At what levels could "stability" be maintained?
   a) U.S. aid functions as a wedge to further open Egypt to American investment, which precludes a drastic curtailment.
   b) Since the aid is "tied" to purchases in the United States, there is a significant lobby for continuing large subsidies to American business.
   c) The "instability" within Egypt following any cutback (especially of food) would need to be calculated with a view to the afore-mentioned overall objectives.
   d) The dependence on U.S. aid ensures a reasonably high level of compliance with U.S. objectives and lessens the likelihood of a military takeover.

3. In the absence of any progress on the Palestinian/Israeli conflict, will Egypt's close co-operation with the United States serve to discredit the regime in the eyes of other Arab governments? Is there a grace period after which new ruptures can be expected? Will the massive concessions made by the PLO and Egypt devalue "moderation" and jeopardize U.S.-Egyptian relations? Egypt's peace with Israel has survived the Israeli raid on Iraq (1981), the raid on PLO head-quarters in Tunis (1985), the annexation of the Golan Heights (1981), the invasion of Lebanon (1982), and the continuing carnage in the Occupied Territories since December 1987. Egypt has been re-admitted to the Arab League, is a member of the Arab Co-operation Council, and now has diplomatic relations with Syria. However, and recalling the foregoing discussion, it may be the case that the initial (public) Arab hostility toward Egypt was more calculated for domestic consumption than a reflection of actual policy. That is, one may be witnessing an elaborate charade mandated by the popularity of the Palestinian cause among the Arab masses and the highly functional (indispensable?) use of Israel in domestic Arab politics. If this is the case, one might expect some highly-charged rhetoric directed at Egypt without any serious consequences. The mainstream PLO has few other options while the "rejectionist" faction will not be a significant factor. Thus Khalidi may be exaggerating the case when he states that inaction ". . . plays

into the hands of those who maintain the inherent bankruptcy of peaceful negotiations" (Journal of Palestine Studies, Spring 1990, p. 15).

4. What are the implications for U.S.-Egyptian relations if Israel moves to expel ("transfer" is the Israeli euphemism) the Palestinians on the West Bank? The idea of transfer has persisted within mainstream Zionism since 1937, and today a significant minority of Israeli Jews support this option. For them, the only question is under what conditions could expulsion proceed without risking U.S, financial support. Here one thinks of "preventive attacks" or provoked incidents requiring drastic alternatives. (See Israel Shahak in Z Magazine, March 1990, p. 103 and May, 1990, p. 62.) This issue, combined with the unpredictable future of the *intifada*, is the wild card in this analysis in that it would force Arab 'moderates" like Egypt (and Jordan) to choose between two unacceptable paths.

KAREN PENICK

A TEACHING UNIT ON ISLAM: A TEACHER'S QUESTION-AND-ANSWER GUIDE

Background

Islam is one of the major religions of the world. For a fifth of the world's population, Islam is both a religion and a complete way of life. Originating in Arabia in the seventh century A.D., it spread rapidly across a broad geographical area of the globe from the Atlantic coast of Africa in the west to the fringes of the Pacific Ocean in the east; and from the steppes of central Asia in the north to equatorial Africa in the south. Today, the world-wide community of Muslims numbers nearly one billion and includes the peoples of many races and diverse culture. About 18% of all Muslims live in the Arab world; the world's largest Muslim community is in Indonesia; substantial parts of Asia and most of Saharan and Eastern Africa are Muslim; while significant minorities are to be found in the Soviet Union, China, North and South America, and Europe. (See the chart on "The Peoples of Islam".)

Why is it important to learn about Islam?

The sheer numbers of Muslims and their distribution make their ideas and attitudes important to the rest of the world. Muslims form nearly the total population in approximately 25 countries and a majority in another ten.

The largest concentrations of Muslims are in the Third World among the emerging nations. The economic potential of some Muslim states is indicated by their possession of large petroleum revenues.

The inherent power of Islam to affect the world we live in makes it important for us to know something about the origin, beliefs, and practices of Islam. Islam may seem exotic or even extreme in the modern world. Perhaps this is because religion does not dominate our everyday life in the Western societies today, whereas Islam is not only a religion, it remains a way of life for millions.

What is Islam?

Islam is one of the world's great monotheistic religions. It is practiced throughout the world by peoples of many countries and diverse cultures.

What does "Islam" mean?

The Arabic word "Islam" simply means "submission", and derives from a word meaning "peace". In a religious context, it means complete submission to the will of God.

Who are the Muslims? (. . . also spelled "Moslems")

Muslims are the followers of Islam. Of many different races, nationalities, and cultures, "Muslims" are those who have accepted "Islam"—that is, who have "submitted to God's will."

What do Muslims believe?

Muslims believe in one God; in the Angels whom He created; in the Day of Judgment, and in the individual accountability for one's own acts; in life after death; and in God's complete authority over human destiny. They also believe in the prophets through whom God has made His revelations to mankind. The prophets are Adam,

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The Peoples of Islam

Muslim communities and individuals can be found in almost every country. A few countries may not appear on this chart owing to the small size of their Muslim communities. In some cases, also, the census data is highly uncertain.

Country	Total Population (000's)	% Muslim	Muslim Population (000's)
Afghanistan[1]	15,500	99%	15,345
Albania	3,000	70%	2,100
Algeria	22,200	99%	21,798
Bahrain	400	99%	396
Bangladesh	101,500	89%	90,335
Benin	4,000	16%	640
Bhutan	1,400	5%	70
Brunei	200	64%	128
Bulgaria	8,900	11%	1,014
Burkina Faso (Upper Volta)	7,000	44%	3,080
Burma	37,000	4%	1,480
Cameroon	9,600	22%	2,112
Central African Republic	2,622	8%	210
Chad	5,000	51%	2,550
China (PRC)[2]	1,042,000	1.44%	15,000
Comoros	424	99%	420
Cyprus	700	18.5%	130
Djibouti	300	90%	270
Egypt	48,000	91%	43,680
Ethiopia	36,000	35%	12,600
Fiji	700	8%	56
Gambia	650	87%	565
Ghana	14,500	15%	2,175
Greece	9,900	2.5%	250
Guinea	5,700	69%	3,933
Guinea-Bissau	850	38%	323
Guyana	800	9%	72
India	750,000	12%	90,000
Indonesia	165,000	85%	140,250
Iran	43,000	98%	42,140
Iraq	15,000	95%	14,250
Israel[3]	4,200	12.5%	525
Ivory Coast	9,500	25%	2,375
Jordan	2,900	93%	2,700
Kampuchea	6,200	2.4%	149
Kenya	20,000	6%	1,200
Kuwait	1,475	95%	1,416
Lebanon	3,000	57%	1,710
Liberia	2,200	21%	462
Libya	3,600	98%	3,528
Madagascar	10,000	2%	200
Malawi	7,100	16%	1,136
Malaysia	15,700	49%	7,693
Maldive Islands	200	100%	200
Mali	7,700	80%	6,160
Mauritania	1,900	100%	1,900

Country	Total Population (000's)	% Muslim	Muslim Population (000's)
Mauritius	1,000	17%	170
Mongolia	1,900	9.5%	180
Morocco	23,000	99%	22,770
Mozambique	13,800	13%	1,794
Nepal	17,000	5%	850
Niger	6,400	87.4%	5,593
Nigeria	89,000	45%	40,050
Oman	1,000	100%	1,000
Pakistan[4]	95,000	97%	92,150
Panama	2,000	4.5%	95
Philippines	56,000	5.6%	3,136
Qatar	280	96%	270
Reunion	500	2.4%	12
Rwanda	6,000	8.6%	516
Saudi Arabia	9,000	99%	8,910
Senegal	6,500	91%	5,915
Sierra Leone	3,600	40%	1,440
Singapore	2,600	18%	468
Somalia	5,000	99%	4,950
Soviet Union	277,000	18%	49,860
Sri Lanka	16,000	8%	1,280
Sudan	21,700	72%	15,624
Surinam	400	14%	57
Syria	10,200	88%	8,976
Tanzania	21,500	30%	6,450
Thailand	52,000	4%	2,080
Togo	2,900	16%	464
Trinidad & Tobago	1,200	6.5%	78
Tunisia	7,100	99%	7,029
Turkey	50,000	99%	49,500
Uganda	14,700	6.6%	970
United Arab Emirates	1,000	90%	900
U.S.A.[2]	238,900	0.6-1.2%	1,500-3,000
Yemen (North)	6,066	100%	6,066
Yemen (South)	2,200	100%	2,200
Yugoslavia	23,000	16%	3,700

Footnotes:

[1] Estimated 2.5 million Afghan refugees are included in Pakistan, not Afghanistan.

[2] Countries with less than 2% Muslim population have not been listed except for China and the U.S.A., which were included because their total populations are large enough so that their Muslim populations are numerically significant.

[3] Does not include Muslim populations of West Bank and Gaza, estimated at total of 1,100,000.

[4] Estimated 2 million expatriate Pakistan workers are included elsewhere, esp. in the Gulf countries, not in Pakistan figure.

Other Notes:

(1) The data listed above are for mid-1985.

(2) Figures for the Gulf states include workers as well as citizens.

(3) Sources include the Population Reference Bureau, the IBRD, the State Dept., other published and unpublished materials, and previous studies by AIIA. The principal source for Muslim populations was the second edition of *Muslim Peoples, A World Ethnographic Survey*, by Richard V. Weekes. (Greenwood Press, Westport, Conn., 1984).



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Important Terms

Arabic is the universal language of Islam even though Muslims speak many different languages. Islamic terms, therefore, are generally Arabic or Arabic derived.

Allah	The Arabic name for God used by all Muslims and by Arabic speaking Christians
Muhammad	(570-632 A.D.) the Prophet of God who received the revelations of God contained in the Qur'an
Islam	submission to the will of God; used in reference to the "nation" of believers and their faith
Muslim	A person who submits to the will of God; an adherent of Islam (also, sometimes, Moslem)
umma	the Muslim community
Qur'an	(Koran) the book of "recitations" of the Word of God as revealed to the Prophet Muhammad; the holy book of Islam
sura	a chapter or division of the Qur'an; there are 114
shahada	the profession of faith: "There is no God but God and Muhammad is his Messenger"
hadith	sayings of the Prophet; traditional stories which aid in governing Islamic life and in interpreting the Qur'an
sunnah	the "beaten path" or body of traditions recounting the deeds, sayings and silent approval of the Prophet covering the details of community life
shari'a	the whole body of rules governing the life of a Muslim: legal doctrine derived from the Qur'an and the sunnah
Sunni	(Sunnite) a follower of the tradition, "orthodox;" the branch of Islam whose adherents believed that Muhammad's successor should be elected; now comprises about 85% of all Muslims
Shi'a	(Shi'ite) "partisans of Ali;" the branch of Islam whose adherents hold that Ali, Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law, was Muhammad's successor; now found principally in Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Afghanistan and Pakistan

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'ulama	men learned in the law and religious studies; the class responsible for determining Muslim othodoxy
imam	leader of worship or leader of the Muslim community
mu'azzin	(muezzin) the person who calls the faithful to prayers
mullah	a religious teacher and preacher
ayatollah	literally "reflection of God," used especially in Iran to refer to Shi'a religious leaders, elevated to this status by community consensus
masjid	mosque; any place where worship is perfomed in groups
jami'	a major mosque where official Friday services are held
hajj	the annual pilgrimage to Mecca, always in the last month of the Muslim calendar; required, if possible, for every Muslim once in lifetime
jihad	struggle, a term sometimes used generally, but also specifically, to designate either a war waged in accordance with the Shari'a in defense of the faith or the personal struggle to overcome one's imperfections and baser impulses in order to become a better Muslim
zakat	a tithe or tax; almsgiving for the poor
Ka'ba	the Ka'ba is the structure in the central courtyard of the Grand Mosque in Mecca which encases the "black stone"; recognized as a shrine, it is the point toward which Muslims pray and the focal point of the hajj
ijtihad	the attempt, when faced by a new situation, to establish a ruling a through creative scholarly effort based on the recognized fundamental principles of Islam
ijma'	consensus; an agreed upon opinion of the Muslim community
hijra	(hegira) emigration, or the original exodus of the Prophet, and his followers, from Mecca to Medina; the year it occured, 622, was fixed as the beginning of the Muslim calendar; A.H. denotes years in the Muslim calendar
Sufi	one who practices Sufism, a general term alluding to the various schools or orders within both Sunni and Shi'a Islam which espouse mystical approaches to the understanding of God
tarika	a particular Sufi order or "brotherhood"

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The Islamic Calendar

The Moslem Months

1st - Moharrem
2nd - Safar
3rd - Rabei el Awal
4th - Rebei al Thani
5th - Jumada el Awal
6th - Jumada el Thani
7th - Rajab
8th - Sha'ban
9th - Ramadan
10th - Shawal
11th - Dhu al Qada
12th - Dhu al Hijja

The Islamic calendar contains 12 lunar months. Each Islamic year the first day moves forward 10 days according to the western calendar and every holiday, though fixed on the Islamic calendar, rotates on the Western calendar. The month Dhu al Hijja has 30 days in a leap year which occurs 11 times in every cycle of 30 years.

Days of the Week

Sunday - Yowm al-aHad
Monday - Yowm al-ithnayn
Tuesday - Yowm al-talut
Wednesday - Yowm al-arba'a
Thursday - Yowm al-Khaniys
Friday - Yowm al-juma'a
Saturday - Yowm as-sabt

MUSLIM HOLIDAYS and Special Observances

The Islamic year is marked by many religious and traditional holidays. Some involve prayer and fasting; others take on additional festive aspects. Some are more cultural than religious in origin. Some are obligatory for the believer while others are not.

Not all "Muslim holidays" are celebrated everywhere. A few -- Ramadan, 'Id al-Fitr, and 'Id al-Adha -- are celebrated widely in the Muslim world, while others are important in a specific area or are significant only to particular groups of Muslims. Similarly, the forms of celebration of the same holiday may differ from country to country. In addition, many Islamic countries have their own national celebrations.

Lunar Calendar

Islamic holidays occur in the Muslim lunar calendar of 354 days, or twelve twenty-eight day months. These months -Muharram, Safar, Rabi' I, Rabi' II Jumadi I, Jumadi II, Rajab, Sha'ban, Ramadan, Shawwal, Dhu al-Qidah, and Dhu al-Hijjah -- each begin with the new moon. Because the Gregorian calendar, in use in the West, is based on the 365-day rotation of the earth around the sun, the Gregorian and Muslim calendars do not conform. Therefore an annual check is necessary to determine the Gregorian date which corresponds to a particular Islamic festival. A general rule is that the date will advance 11 days from one year to the next (e.g., Ramadan dates: , July 13, 1980; July 3, 1981).

The chart shows the major Muslim festivals. [redacted] A particular date in both calendars will coincide once in 32 years (i.e. January 1--1 Muharram). Because the Gregorian calendar is accepted internationally, people in most Muslim countries operate in both calendar systems, and the international calendar is used in non-Muslim matters.

Muslim holidays are dated in relation to phases of the moon. Throughout the Muslim world, there are astronomers and mathematicians who calculate precisely when these can be anticipated. Nonetheless, in many areas, the date is not confirmed until the actual sighting. Islam is a world-wide religion, and therefore because of differences in geography and sighting, holidays may begin on different days in various countries. However, the variation is seldom more than one day. Consequently, it is not always possible to anticipate exactly when business and government offices in a particular country will close for a holiday. Throughout the Islamic world, the day goes from sundown to sundown, rather than midnight to midnight as in Western custom.

Unlike Christmas, Passover, or Chinese New Year, which fall in the same season each year, Muslim holidays rotate through the seasons. During a lifetime, therefore, a Muslim will observe the Ramadan fast for example, during hot and cold seasons and longer and shorter days.

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Each Muslim observance has its own significance. They are listed here in the same order that they occur in the Muslim lunar calendar, and their standard Arabic name is used. However, the Arabic spelling for the name of the holiday may vary or a local name may be used.

Specific Holidays

Muharram 1

Ras al-Sana, the new year, is the first day of the first month, Muharram. Particular religious observances are not called for, but rather it is celebrated much as the new year is celebrated in the west, although without alcohol. The work week is interrupted in some countries for this holiday.

Muharram 10

'Ashura (the tenth), is a religious holy day during which pious Muslims may fast from dawn to sunset. Although it is not an obligatory day of fast for Muslims, fasting is a recommended ritual and often practiced by individuals. For Shi'a Muslims*, it is a day of special sorrow, commemorating the assassination of the Prophet's grandson, Husain. In some places there will be passion plays and parades which often include self-flagellation in sorrow and sympathy for Husain. Among Shi'i, the celebration of 'Ashura traditionally begins on the first of Muharram and culminates on the 10th day. It is a time of mourning in Shi'i areas, where daily work will often be interrupted.

Rabi' I 12

Maulid al-Nabi, the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, is celebrated the 12th day of Rabi' I. In some regions this holiday goes on for many days. It is a time of festivities and the exchange of gifts, with children, especially, receiving candy and toys. Sufis may have torch-light processions at night. Often panegyrics (passages) eulogizing the Prophet are read aloud. In some places businesses may be closed for the celebrations. Islamic teaching does not encourage the veneration of saints, the Prophet, or other pious persons, so that in some Muslim lands, Saudi Arabia for example, the popular celebration of his birthday is discouraged.

Rajab 27

Lailat al-Isra wa al-Mi'raj, literally "the night of journey and ascent", commemorates Muhammad's night journey from Mecca to the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem and his ascent to heaven and return the same night. This night is traditionally celebrated by prayers and the reading of panegyrics. In Mecca, parades may take place. Its observance does not disrupt daily life.

*See What is Islam for a simple explanation of some of the different groups in Islam.

Sha'ban 14

The 14th night of the eighth month, Sha'ban, is widely celebrated by pious Muslims. Sometimes it is called "Lailat al-Bara'a" or "night of repentance". In some areas of the Muslim world it is treated like a new year's celebration. According to Muslim hadith or tradition, it is the night God approaches earth to call to man and to grant forgiveness for his sins. In some countries, India and Malaysia for example, it is a night when prayers are said for the dead, food is given to the poor and sweets are eaten.

Ramadan

Ramadan, the ninth month of the Muslim year, is entirely devoted to meditation and spiritual purification through self-discipline. It is a period of abstinence from food, drink, and physical pleasure. The fast is an obligation practiced by Muslims throughout the world, unless they are old, infirm, traveling, or pregnant. Those who cannot complete the fast during the prescribed time will frequently make it up the following month. Throughout the month, which begins with the sighting of the new moon, the strictures apply between dawn and dusk. Observing the fast, however, does not preclude performing normal daily tasks. However, in some Islamic countries, business slows down for this month and government offices, if they are open, keep short hours. After dusk, the faithful say the evening prayers and gather for a meal. Guests are frequently invited to share in these often sumptuous meals. There is also a small meal shortly before the sun rises. In many countries, for example Jordan and Saudi Arabia, it is difficult for non-Muslims to obtain food and drink during the hours of fasting; frequently they can best care for their needs in the larger hotels in major cities. It is considered inappropriate for people to openly eat or drink during Ramadan.

Ramadan 27

The next to the last night of the fasting month, "Lailat al-Qadr", or "night of power and greatness", is by custom an especially holy time. It is said to commemorate the time at which revelation was first given to Muhammad. It is felt that prayers said during a particular but unspecified hour of this night will be answered, hence many pious Muslims spend the entire evening at prayer.

Shawwal 1

"'Id al-Fitr", called the lesser feast, begins immediately after the month-long Ramadan fast. It is perhaps Islam's most joyous festival, marking as it does, the end of the month of abstinence and the cleansing of the believer. Although the 1st of Shawwal is the primary holiday, celebrations often continue for two or three more days. Like the beginning of Ramadan, the exact date is not fixed -- although most people know when it should be -- and in many countries 'Id al-Fitr is not declared until the actual sighting of the new moon. The first morning begins with communal prayer followed by feasting. Families and friends visit each other's homes. It is a time for new clothes and for presents, with sweet pastries a particular favorite. In Indonesia, where friends must be greeted and asked forgiveness for the commissions and omissions of the past year, festivities may continue intermittently for several weeks. Businesses and government offices are frequently closed for the holiday time.

Dhu al-Hijjah 1-10

Muslims, if they are able, are obliged to undertake a pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in their lifetime. This duty, called the hajj, should be performed in the last month of the Muslim calendar, Dhu al-Hijja. According to tradition, it commemorates Abraham's offer to sacrifice his son, Ishmael. (In Islamic tradition, Ishmael, son of Hagar, was the intended sacrifice, not Isaac, son of Sarah, as held by Jews and Christians.) Pilgrims from all over the world converge on Mecca for these ten days, performing a number of rituals and participating in communal prayer.

Dhu al-Hijjah 10

All Muslims, whether on the pilgrimage or at home, participate in the feast of sacrifice, "'Id al-Adha", which marks the end of the hajj on the 10th of Dhu al-Hijja. The feast of sacrifice, called the "greater feast", is observed by the slaughtering of animals and the distribution of the meat. In some places this is done individually, and the meat is shared equally among the family and the poor; sometimes the slaughtering may take place in a public area and the meat is then distributed. As with the lesser feast to mark the end of Ramadan, people put on new or good clothes, offer a special prayer in the morning, visit each other, give presents, especially to children, and visit cemeteries. The festivities usually last two or three days, during which time businesses and government offices are usually closed.

Prayer

One of the daily and weekly rituals in Islam is prayer. Prayers are said five times daily, before sunrise, before noon, afternoon, after sunset, and in the evening. A call to prayer is delivered from the minaret of the mosque. This is customarily begun by the Arabic phrase--Allahu akbar--or "God is great". The prayers at noon on Friday are the most important of the week. The community -- particularly the men and boys -- gathers at the mosque. A sermon in which the community is told of important events usually precedes the prayers. While Friday is a special day, it is not one of relaxation, but one of joining together. Muslim businesses and government offices are usually closed. In some countries, Friday may be a half-day or the lunch hour may be extended to facilitate communal prayers.

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Noah, Abraham, Ishmael, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, Job, Moses, Aaron, Elias, Jonah. John the Baptist, and Jesus. God's final message to man was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad through the Archangel Gabriel.

Who is Allah?

Allah is the Supreme Being, the one and only God. According to Islam, Allah is the same God as Him worshipped by the Jews and the Christians. Arabic-speaking Christians and Jews also use this name when referring to God.

Muslims believe in the absolute oneness of God, as proclaimed in the Qur'an: "Say He is God the One and Only/ God the Eternal, the Absolute:/ He begetteth not nor is begotten,/ And there is none like unto Him" (Sura CXII).

Who is Muhammad?

The Prophet Muhammad was not only a conveyor of the word of God to man but also a brilliant military and political leader whose actions and decisions changed the course of history.

Muhammad probably was born in 570 A.D. in the town of Mecca, which is located in the mountains along the western coast of Arabia. Although related to the Quraysh, one of the ruling tribes of the city, Muhammad's immediate family was poor and he was orphaned early in life. He was brought up by an uncle named Abu Talib, who followed the common practice of city Arabs by sending Muhammad to live for two years with a bedouin family in the desert to learn frugal ways and self-reliance. As a young man, Muhammad travelled widely with his uncle's trading caravans and eventually went to work for Khadija, a wealthy widow. At about age 25 Muhammad married Khadija. They had several children. Their sons died at an early age but four daughters lived and married men would were Muhammad's future supporters,

Muhammad, though considered the greatest of the prophets by the Muslims, was merely a man. He was neither God nor son of God: he was not to be worshipped or called upon to intercede between man and God.

How did Muhammad become a prophet?

On a night in the year 610 A.D., at the age of 40, while spending the night in meditation and prayer in the mountains, the Angel Gabriel appeared to Muhammad and began to reveal to him God's word. At first he told only Khadija, his wife. But the Angel Gabriel commanded him to proclaim publicly what had been revealed to him.

What is the *Qur'an*?

The *Qur'an*, the holy book of Islam, is the body of revelation which God delivered to Muhammad through the Angel Gabriel. The word "*Qur'an*" means "Recital", for it was in fact recited to the Prophet, who in turn recited what he had heard and memorized to other men; indeed, according to tradition the Prophet himself was illiterate, and eventually others in the early Muslim community began to write down the his prophetic utterances. The *Qur'an* was recited by Gabriel—in and has always been written in—Arabic and provides the Muslim believer with all he or she needs to know to lead a good life according to Islam. Its basic theme is the relationship between God and humankind, and it provides guidelines for a just society, proper human conduct, and an equitable economic system.

The text of the *Qur'an* was transmitted to Muhammad over a period of twenty-two years. According to Muslim tradition, it was finally compiled into its present written form in 651 A.D., nineteen years after the Prophet's death. Although the *Qur'an* is available in

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languages other than Arabic, these are considered to be mere interpretations; the full, true meaning of the *Qur'an* is only apparent when read in Arabic. Therefore, Muslims everywhere, no matter what language they speak, recite the *Qur'an* only in its Arabic original; and for this reason most Muslims strive to learn at least some Arabic if they are not native-speakers of the language.

The *Qur'an* must be treated with great respect; no other book is allowed to be placed upon it; it should be carried above the waist; one must not smoke or drink while reading it or listening to it. Many believe that is a talisman against disease or disaster.

How is the *Qur'an* organized?

The *Qur'an* is divided into 114 chapters called "suras". Not one word of the "suras" has been changed over the centuries, so that every detail therein is exactly the text as it was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad. The "Suras" are numbered and titled in reference to their content. Some examples of the "Suras" are "Women", "The Pilgrimage", "Divorce", "The Dawn", "Rivalry in Worldly Increase", and "Small Kindnesses".

The "Suras", or chapters, are divided into verses, which are called "ayyas". Altogether there are 6,236 "ayyas". The chapter vary in length from three to 282 "ayyas".

What is the Sunnah?

The "sunnah", or "Way" is the body of traditions recounting the Prophet's behavior, which is a standard of conduct to be emulated by all Muslims. The sayings of the Prophet, which are part of the Sunnah, are called the "hadith".

Thus the Sunnah, especially in the form of the Hadith, is complementary to the *Qur'an*. It helps to explain and clarify the Holy Book itself and to present practical applications of its teachings. (See the Index of Godly Commandments and Forbiddances of the Sunnah or Hadith.)

What is the Shari'a?

The "Shari'a", the "path to the watering place", is the holy law of Islam as expounded in the *Qur'an* and the Hadith. In Islam, this law is of divine origin, transmitted from God through the Prophet to mankind. It recognizes no difference between the religious and the secular and governs every aspect of the Muslim's life,

Its provisions cover criminal law, oaths, contracts, evidence, judicial procedure, marriage, slavery, education, personal hygeine, the killing of animals, and even manners and deportment.

What are the religious duties of the Muslim?

There are five major duties of Muslims. These are expressed in "the Five Pillars of Islam". (See detailed explanation in the chart "Five Pillars of Islam".) These duties involve not only profession of faith but also the recognition of God in all aspects of human conduct:

1. To believe in and profess the oneness of God and the truth that Muhammad is His foremost messenger.
2. To pray five times daily: at first light of dawn, noon, mid-afternoon, sunset, and evening.
3. To give alms—a certain percentage of one's income must be given to the poor or to the government for distribution to the poor.
4. To fast from food and drink, especially during the month of Ramadan.

Commands index

1. Unify Allah
2. Believe in five.
3. Utter the two witnesses.
4. Bath if you were polluted.
5. Clean before prayer.
6. Rub with clean ground if you don't find water.
7. It's better to pray with a group.
8. Haste to the prayer of the day of congregation.
9. Adorn at the mosque.
10. Pray the prayers in its time.
11. Be guardian of your prayer.
12. Enjoin upon thy people worship.
13. Pray the traveller's prayer (Short & Combination).
14. Pray the Sonnah prayer. (largess)
15. Follow the Prophet's Sonnah.
16. Ask blessing and salute the Prophet Muhammad.
17. Pay the poor-due for yourself and the others.
18. Pay the alms for the following eight cases.
19. Fast the month of Ramadan.
20. Pilgrimage to the oldest House.
21. Adore Allah only.
22. Turn your prayer toward the Kaabah.
23. Prostrate the reading's prostration in the Glorious Quran.
24. Carry out the Lord's commands.
25. Be Moslem.
26. Read.
27. Be pure before reading the Quran.
28. Seek refuge in Allah when you recite the Quran.
29. Listen to the Glorious Quran if it is read.
30. Looking at the verses of Quran.
31. Think in creation of heavens and the earth.

32. Read the Quran.
33. Worship Allah.
34. Fear Allah.
35. Remember Allah.
36. Obey Allah.
37. Ask Allah for help.
38. Repent to Allah.
39. Discourse with the bounty of Allah.
40. Thank Allah.
41. Ask Allah Who answers you.
42. Be clean and pure..
43. Be generous with your parents.
44. Emigrate to Allah's land for better life.
45. Follow the commands of Allah not parents.
46. Withdraw from who left the worship of Allah
47. Believe in the allegorical verses.
48. Race for forgiveness.
49. Seek protection of Allah from the satan.
50. Make room in knowledge or religious meeting.
51. Do good for your future.
52. Ask the followers of knowledge.
53. Increase your knowledge.
54. Restrain your soul.
55. Strive in the way of Allah.
56. Fulfil the convenant of Allah.
57. Glorify your Lord and thank Him.
58. Make Allah's will before you will do anything.
59. Adjust your own morality.
60. Eat of that over which the name of Allah has been mentioned.
61. Eat what beasts and birds you have trained.
62. Eat with those..
63. Enjoin right conduct and forbid indecency.
64. Be good-hearted.
65. Refer to Quran and Sonnah whenever you have a dispute concerning any matter.
66. Verify before you attack your brother.
67. Judge justly.
68. Make peace among opponents.
69. Join among the folk.
70. Join your relatives.
71. Make for your eternity.
72. Keep the government's furniture.

73. Defend your home.
74. Be careful at mankind's peace.
75. Say the good word.
76. Begin with the good word.
77. Forgive when you have the ability.
78. Keep your tongue.
79. Say the good words if you don't give alms.
80. Begin with yourself, then the others.
81. Intervene in a good cause.
82. Lower your gaze and be modest. (the man)
83. Lower your gaze and be modest. (the woman)
84. Greet the greeting.
85. Awake at night for prayers.
86. Be kind to your neighbour
87. Enter the uninhabited house.
88. Give the slave his wealth if he wants.
89. Give the best you have.
90. Give almsgiving in hide.
91. Witness the right.
92. Be sport.
93. Be generous with your guest.
94. Protect the weak, old and child.
95. Be kind with everything.
96. Avoid lying speech.
97. Consult with them upon the conduct of affairs.
98. Bring up your children very well.
99. Be content.
100. Be good intention.
101. Shun the suspicion.
102. Perfect your work.
103. Spend from Allah's provision.
104. Be modest at your expenditure
105. Preach people with wisdom and argue them in politeness.
106. Restore deposits to their owners.
107. Like your brother as yourself.
108. Be modest in your bearing.
109. Lower your voice.
110. Keep hide your secret.
111. Cooperate unto righteousness and good deeds.
112. Be pious duty to your children.
113. Refrain in the clothing if you become old. (The Woman)
114. Refrain if you have no hope of marriage.

115. Marry your slaves and maid-servants.
116. It is better to marry one.
117. Keep birth control.
118. Give the woman her dowry
119. Go in unto your wife.
120. Consort with your wife in kindness.
121. Ask help of both folk to make one mind.
122. Pay to divorced virgin half you have appointed.
123. Let woman alone during her period.
124. Keep away of your wife during the menses.
125. Understand with your wife before the divorce.
126. Release the divorced in Kindness.
127. Lodge your divorced and spend for her till she brings forth her burden.
128. Invoke Allah by His names.
129. Proclaim the unknown children for their real parentage or your brothers in the faith.
130. Spend on your child and suckle it two years.
131. Separate between male and female in sleeping-bed.
132. Let your adult children ask leave of you.
133. Let your slaves ask leave of you.
134. Equalise among your children in treatment.
135. Beware of your wife and children.
136. Forbid usury.
137. Give up what remaines from usury.
138. Record in writing when you contract a debt.
139. Record in writing a debt whatever its value.
140. Give a pledge in hand if you are on a journey.
141. Fill the measure and weigh with a non-biased balance.
142. Test the orphan and deliver over unto him his fortune.
143. Divide the inheritance (if it was) after the death of the husband or wife and in the following cases:
144. Divide the bequest (if it was) after the death of father or mother and in the following cases.
145. Leave a bequeath unto parents when you are about to die.
146. Distribute the dead's bequest (if it was) who did not marry and in the follwoing cases:
147. Fight in the way of Allah.
148. Punish with the like of what you have been punished.
149. Beware your enemy during the war.
150. Speak the straight word to the point.
151. Love peace.
152. Be tolerant.

153. Call to witness two men or one man and two women to write the debt.
154. Give the debtor the time to pay back his debt.
155. Spend firstly for parents then the others.
156. Give the poor their shares from Allah's wealth.
157. Forbid marrying by sucking.
158. Admonish the rebellious wife.
159. Pick up the foundling and bring it up.
160. Make ready for your enemy.
161. Be patient whatever you may befall.
162. Wash your dead and haste to bury him.
163. Pray upon your dead.
164. Ask Allah to forgive your dead.
165. Pay the dead's debt.
166. Visit the graves.
167. Condole to the dead's family.

Forbiddance's Index

1. No partner to Allah.
2. Do not pray unto anyone along with Allah in mosque.
3. Do not worship angels, prophets nor messengers.
4. Do not worship Allah upon a narrow marge.
5. Do not forbid the approach to the sanctuaries of Allah.
6. Do not fight at the Inviolable Place of Worship.
7. Do not eat the onion and garlic before you are going to mosque.
8. Do not pray if you are drunken.
9. Do not loud your voice in the worship.
10. Do not hide Allah's revelation to the mankind.
11. Do not sit with whom derided with the revelation of Allah.
12. Do not argue concerning Allah without knowledge:
13. Do not argue with the people of the scripture unless it is better.
14. Do not despair of Allah.
15. Do not swear with Allah to hurt anyone.
16. Do not follow what you do not know.
17. Do not distract with your wealth and children from remembrance of Allah.
18. Do not be sad for what you have lost and don't exult which you have been given.
19. Do not fear mankind and fear Allah.
20. Do not gain a small price of Allah's covenant.
21. There is no compulsion in religion.
22. Do not exaggerate in your religion.
23. Do not become a renegade from your religion.
24. Do not speak about lawful and forbidden without the Glorious Quran.
25. Do not confound the truth with falsehood.
26. Do not take Popes for Lords beside Allah.
27. Do not insult your parents.
28. Do not call every dead a dead.
29. Do not believe in other religion save Islam.

30. Do not forget Allah.
31. Do not be heedless of Allah's remembrance.
32. Do not coin the examples for Allah.
33. Do not follow the devil's whisper.
34. Do not choose the Satan for a patron.
35. Do not forbid the food which Allah has made lawful for you.
36. Do not forbid the adornment of Allah.
37 Do not eat the kinds of the following meat:
38. Do not be prodigal in eating the food.
39. Do not swear with someone other than Allah.
40. Do not swear much with Allah.
41. Do not swear lying with Allah. (or with others).
42. Do not forget the sin-offering of a lie oath.
43. Do not hoard up and not be prodigal your wealth.
44. Do not hoard up yourself.
45. Do not enjoin avarice on mankind.
46. Do not give the foolish your wealth.
47. Do not squander the others' wealth to the ruler.
48. Do not squander your wealth among yourselves in vanity.
49. Do not devour the usury.
50. Do not be rancorous.
51. Do not envy.
52. Do not render your almsgiving by injury.
53. Do not drink strong drink.
54. Do not play any game for money.
55. Do not wrong mankind in their goods.
56. Do not lose the measure and weigh.
57. Do not commit sin and throw it upon the innocent.
58. Do not deride and insult by nickname.
59. Do not curse the time.
60. Do not curse the wind.
61. Do not curse the disbeliever.
62. Do not curse mankind.
63. Do not utter bad speech in loud-voice.
64. Do not follow the vain desires of your predecessors.
65. Do not curse the dead.
66. Do not incline to oppressive.
67. Do not laden yourself others' sins.
68. Do not walk on the earth exultantly.
69. Do not be proud of yourself.
70. Do not scorn the mankind.
71. Do not hide testimony.

72. Do not escape from the fight.
73. Do not dispute for doing the good.
74. Do not forget to have a work.
75. Do not poke your nose in others' affairs.
76. Do not speak in the falsehood.
77. Do not eat up the worker's wage.
78. Do not discriminate between white and coloured in treatment.
79. Do not enter a house without his folk's permission.
80. Do not make a scandal for the believer.
81. Do not oppress the orphan.
82. Do not drive away the beggar or questioner.
83. Do not cheat.
84. Do not malign Allah and His messenger.
85. Do not malign the believer for nothing.
86. Do not hurt the animal.
87. Do not be angry.
88. Do not take and give a bribe.
89. Do not hoard up the wealth.
90. Do not monopolize the moslem's food.
91. Do not joke with anybody.
92. Do not laugh much.
93. Do not lie in your dream.
94. Do not contradict Allah's revelation.
95. Do not steal.
96. Do not have a dog at home.
97. Do not eat up the orphan's wealth.
98. Do not work confusion in the earth.
99. Do not beguile the world's life.
100. Do not exult with yourself.
101. Do not delay the promise.
102. Do not be hypocrite.
103. Do not suspect badly.
104. Do not spy.
105. Do not backbite.
106. Do not obey any rejecter, oath-monger and slander.
107. Do not ask a fortuneteller.
108. Do not ask a magician.
109. Do not conspire for crime.
110. Do not make a friendship with a bad friend.
111. Do not attack in calling upon Allah.
112. Do not plight your torth with women secretly.
113. Do not sign the marriage's contract till the period has finished.

114. **Do not marry the idolatress until she believes in Allah and the idolator until he believes in Allah, also.**
115. Do not marry your father's wife.
116. Do not marry your mother, daughter and sister..
117. Do not bare your body's organs when you go out.
118. Do not imitate a woman nor a man to each other.
119. Do not display your adornment.
120. Do not stamp your feet.
121. Do not traduce women wrongly..
122. Do not traduce your wife with adultery.
123. Do not swear on your wife with your mother.
124. Do not expel women from their homes unless they commit open immorality.
125. Do not place difficulties of divorced woman in the way of her marrying her husband.
126. Do not take anything from your wife's dowry.
127. Do not take the divorced woman's wealth.
128. Do not inherit the women in constraint.
129. Do not conceal the divorced what in her womb.
130. Do not touch woman at your devotions in the mosque.
131. Do not strain toward the one's wife.
132. Do not force the slave-girls to whoredom.
133. Do not come near unto adultery.
134. Do not come with lust unto men instead of women.
135. Do not take the Jew and Christian for a friend.
136. Do not take the idolator for a friend.
137. Do not commit suicide.
138. Do not wish the death.
139. Do not forgive for an idolator.
140. Do not slay your child from the poverty.
141. Do not kill without right.
142. Do not slay a believer of set purpose.
143. Do not forget the sin-offering by killing a believer by mistake.
144. Do not cause sedition.
145. Do not avail you anyone upon the Last Day.
146. Do not ascribe purity unto yourself.
147. Do not be seen of mankind.
148. Do not change which Allah created
149. Do not hurt anybody.
150. Do not travel a woman alone.
151. Do not be alone with a woman.
152. Do not disobey your husband in his bed.

153. Do not ask your husband the divorce.
154. Do not beg pardon in Allah's instruction.
155. Do not hasten in reading the Quran.
156. Do not mock at Allah's revelation.
157. Do not worship the Christ (Jesus).
158. Do not inherit the adoptive child.
159. Do not marry a divorced for the sake of her first husband.
160. Do not hurt the divorced.
161. Do not take tombs as mosques.
162. Do not throw yourself into ruin.
163. No mourning for a widow except her husband.
164. Do not cry on your dead.

Contemplation in Some
Commands and Forbiddances
in Quran and Sonnah,
Abdel Ghany AR Muhammed.

5. To make the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in one's life, if physically fit and financially able.

Muslims have many other religious duties as well, although none take precedence over the Five Pillars. Among these other duties are prohibitions against drinking, gambling, and eating pork.

What is a mosque?

The Muslim house of worship is called the masjid, the "place of prostration". The word "masjid" has passed into English, with a slight change, as "mosque".

Mosques consist of a prayer hall. The floor of the prayer hall is covered with carpets or mats. There are no benches or chairs for those gathered to pray. Shoes are not worn within a mosque.

In one wall, the "qibla" wall, is the "mihrab", an apse or niche or alcove indicating the direction of Mecca—the direction in which one's prayers must be addressed. Nearby is the "minbar", a flight of stairs to a small platform on which the "imam" (the "one in front", or, in a mosque, the prayer leader) stands to deliver addresses or sermons which are usually religious in character; the "minbar" is essentially a pulpit.

Most mosques also have washing facilities outside the prayer hall where worshippers may perform the ablutions which the *Qur'an* demands before one prays.

What does the term "muezzin" mean?

A "muezzin" is the person who chants the Muslim call to prayer. In the past the call was often issued from the top of a "minaret", a tower attached to a mosque, although nowadays the call is usually broadcast from a microphone.

What is said in the call to prayer?

A translation from Arabic of the call to prayer is as follows: "God is most great. God is most great. God is most great. God is most great. / I testify that there is no god except God. I testify that there is no god except God. / I testify that Muhammad is the messenger of God. I testify that Muhammad is the messenger of God. / Come to Prayer! Come to Prayer! / Come to success (in this life and the hereafter)! Come to success! / God is most great. God is most great. There is no god except God." (From Understanding Islam and the Muslims, the Embassy of Saudi Arabia, Washington, D.C., 1989)

Are there different sects within Islam?

Yes, as with Christianity and other major religions, the original unity of Islam was broken. The division, which lasts to this day, occurred during the generations following the death of Muhammad. Shortly after the Prophet's death, a debate developed within the Islamic community over who should succeed him as leader of the faithful. Thus the origin of the split within Islam was political rather than religious, following from the death of Muhammad without an heir. It left the Muslim word divided into two major groups, the "Sunni" group and the "Shi'ite" group. The question of succession to the Prophet as political leader of the Muslim community and to the title of "Khalifa" ("successor", the source of the English term "Caliph") revealed a deep philosophical difference within the body of Muslims.

Who are the Sunnis?

The Sunnis comprise 85%-90% of the Muslim world and adhere to the traditional, basic beliefs and practices of Islam. They also believe in "ijma'", the consensus of the

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Five Pillars of Islam

(1) Profession of Faith, or *shahada* in Arabic, requires the believer to profess *the unity of God and the mission of Muhammad;* this involves the repetition of the formula: "There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah." This assertion forms part of every prayer and in a critical situation, one may repeat the first part in order to establish one's identity as a Muslim.

(2) Prayer, *sala*, is required five times a day: at dawn, noon, midafternoon, sunset and dusk. It must be performed in a state of ritual purity and every word must be in Arabic. The worshipper has the choice of praying privately, in the open air or in a house; or with a group, outdoors, or in a mosque. Islam opposes the practice of withdrawing into ascetic life. For this reason, there is no priesthood, as is known in the West, only *'ulema*, learned men, who are well-versed in Islamic law and tradition. Throughout the Muslim world, services are held at noon on Fridays in mosques. Muhammad did not explicitly designate Friday as a day of rest, only a part of which is devoted to a special religious service. Merchants are free to open their shops before and after the service.

(3) The third Pillar of Islam, Almsgiving, *zaka* or *zakat*, embodies the principle of social responsibility. This precept teaches that what belongs to the believer also belongs to the community in the ultimate sense, and that only by donating a proportion of his wealth for public use does a person legitimize what he or she retains. The *zaka*, in addition to the other tenets of Islam, is a religious obligation and believers are expected to treat it seriously.

(4) The ancient Semitic institution of Fasting is the fourth Pillar of Islam, known as *saum*. To a Muslim, it means observing Ramadan, the month during which, it is written, God sent the *Qur'an* to the lowest heaven where Gabriel received it and revealed it in time to Muhammad. Fasting demands complete abstinence from food and drink from dawn to sunset every day during Ramadan.

(5) The last cherished Pillar of Islam is the Pilgrimage to Mecca, *al-hajj*, where God's revelation was first disclosed to Muhammad. Believers worship publicly at the Holy Mosque, expressing the full equality among Muslims with a common objective—all performing the same actions, all seeking to gain the favor of God. *All* pilgrims, from various cultures and classes, wear identical white robes as they assemble around a single center, the *Ka'aba*, which inspires them with a strong sense of unity. Every Muslim is expected to make the pilgrimage at least once during his or her lifetime. Attached to the experience of the pilgrimage is added status: after the individual returns home, he or she is addressed as "*al-Hajj*" or "*al-Hajjah*" (the pilgrim), a title which carries great prestige.

National Council on
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Washington, D.C.

Islamic community through which God reveals his will. The community is therefore empowered to elect the Caliph.

Who are the Shi'ites?

The Shi'ites comprise 10-15% of the Muslims in the world. There are divided into many different sects.

Shi'ites form a majority in Iran and Yemen and have important minorities in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, eastern Arabia, and parts of India. The Shi'ites restricted eligibility for the Caliphate to descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fatima and his cousin and son-in-law 'Ali. Shi'ites are, in a manner of speaking, royalists, believing in the divine right to rule over all Muslims which is vested in the family of Muhammad and 'Ali.

Today, a majority of the Shi'ites in the world (and most of those in Iran) believe that the last descendant of 'Ali and Fatima to possess a divine right to be the Imam—the divinely-appointed political and religious leader of the Muslim world—disappeared more than one thousand years ago. Someday, they believe, he will return to restore justice to the world, but in his absence there are in each generation a few exceptionally pious and learned scholars of the Qur'an and Hadith who may act as Imams, or guides for the faithful, on behalf of the true but absent Imam. Therefore these figures have great authority in Shi'ite Islam—much more so than do Sunni "Ulema" ("scholars of Islamic law").

How do Christianity and Islam relate to each other?

The relationship of Christianity and Islam resembles the relationship of Christianity and Judaism. All three are monotheistic faiths. Neither Jesus nor Muhammad intended to create new religions, but each thought of himself as developing and completing the old. Present-day Muslims are aware of the ties between their faith and Christianity and are surprised by the lack of information among modern Christians about these ties.

How does Islam regard Jesus?

Jesus is named as one of the prophets in the *Qur'an*. Muslims respect and revere Jesus and await his Second Coming and consider him one of the greatest of God's messengers to mankind—indeed, the greatest to appear before the appearance of Muhammad. The *Qur'an* confirms his virgin birth, and Mary is considered the purest woman in all creation. He could and did perform miracles, a gift denied even to Muhammad: raising the dead, healing the sick, breathing life in clay birds. Although Jesus had no earthly father, he is not considered by Muslims the son of God and has no claim to divinity.

According to the *Qur'an*, Jesus was not crucified. Although condemned to death, his likeness was put on another man who was crucified in his place. Jesus then ascended into Heaven in bodily form.

How does Islam view women?

Woman, in Islam, was created by God to be man's partner. Islam sees a woman, whether single or married, as an individual in her own right. She has the right to own and dispose of her property and earnings. Although the *Qur'an* grants women the same rights as men, it allows that "the men have a degree above the women".

A marriage dowry is given by the groom to the bride for her own personal use, and she keeps her own family name rather than taking her husband's. Her consent must be obtained for any transaction involving her or her property—above all, her marriage.

Married women retain control of their property during marriage and after divorce. Widows and divorced women have status and are protected.

In contrast to Christian beliefs, woman in Islam is not considered the source of evil. In Islamic belief, she did not tempt Adam; nor did the devil or death, whether physical or moral, come into the world through her.

Woman, therefore, is innocent. She is a positive good, a source of happiness and fulfillment to man, as man is to her.

Can a Muslim have more than one wife?

The Qur'an allows that a man may have up to four legal wives with the injunction that the husband treat all of them fairly and equally. The *Qur'an* then advises :You will not be able to deal equally between your wives however much you may wish to do so." The message is clearly that while polygamy is permitted, monogamy is preferable. Today, polygamy is outlawed in some countries and is dying out naturally in others,

Are Christian and Muslim marriages the same?

Marriage in Islam is not a sacrament; it is a contract between the two parties containing terms mutually agreed upon, and either partner is free to include conditions. Although many marriages are arranged, according to Islam no Muslim girl can be forced to marry against her will.

The man pays a bride-price or dowry according to his circumstances. The first part consists of gifts of jewelry and clothing which becomes the woman's personal property. The second part specifies the amount of alimony to be paid ion the event of divorce.

How do Muslims feel about divorce?

Islam permits divorce, although divorce is not nearly as common as it is in the West today. It is generally considered as a last resort. Classical Islam gave the man a great advantage over the woman in divorce by allowing him the old Arab tradition of simply pronouncing "tallaq" (the formula for divorce) three times.

The wife also has the right to initiate divorce. This process is called "fuskh" and is more limited than "tallaq". The wife must have valid reasons for dissolving the marriage, such as insanity, undue cruelty, impotence, or non-support.

Many Islamic states have abolished "tallaq" and have made divorce laws more equitable.

How do Muslims dress?

Both men and women are expected to dress in a way which is modest and dignified. The traditions of female dress found in some Muslim countries are often the expression of local customs.

The veiling of women is not required by the *Qur'an*. Even in traditional Arab societies today, veiling is largely an urban and middle class practice. Peasant and bedouin women do not cover their faces, though they may do so at the approach of a stranger. In many Islamic countries, the custom of veiling has been dying out. However, encouraged by a fundamentalist Islamic movement, in some Muslim countries women are reverting to extreme modesty of dress as a reaction to secularization and westernization.

Are there Muslims in the United States?

Today there are about five million Muslims in America. It is almost impossible to generalize about them. They are immigrants, converts, factory workers, teachers, and doctors. In addition, today many Afro-American Muslims play an important role in the Islamic community.

Throughout many communities across the United States, one will find a network of mosques.

Resources

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A LESSON PLAN ON ARAB SOCIETY AND CULTURE

Introduction

This teaching unit encompasses a number and variety of readings on Arab culture, Many of these readings are dealing with aspects of Arab society that emphasize the uniqueness and special nature of a rich and diverse society.

The readings that are contained in the lesson plan come from the books listed in the bibliography. Most of these books are available in bookstores in the United States. Contained here are a number of readings dealing with poetry, music, politics, quotations, city life, and social life in Arab society. The following list includes in detail the title of the article and the number of pages in each item.

I The City of Cairo	12 pages
II Arab Quotations and Proverbs	8 pages
III Arab Poetry	
---Five Songs to Pain	2 pages
---The Village Market	1 page
---The Sorrows of Violets	1 page
---The Lost Footsteps	2 pages
---Barrenness	1 page
---Love and Petroleum	2 pages
---Sudden Death	2 pages
IV Who is an Arab	7 pages
---The Bedouin Ideal	3 pages
---Group Cohesion	3 pages
---Religion East and West	3 pages
---Music	3 pages
---Literature	2 pages
---Toward Western Forms	2 pages
V Places / Geography	2 pages
---People of Egypt	6 pages
---Endangered Monuments in Egypt	3 pages

Many of these readings can be used for both World Geography and the regular and honors World History courses. It is up to the individual instructor to determine the appropriateness and value of each reading for use in the classroom.

The instructor can duplicate any of the handouts as part of a class set or create enough copies for each class to use. The teacher can have these read in small groups or for the class as a whole. Individual students too can give an oral summary or report on the content of the readings.

Each school library is sent each year many video catalogues. Some of these video catalogues contain appropriate films for use in the classroom on Arab culture on a teaching unit such as this one.

What is missing from this unit is a handout on Islam giving in detail the description of a religion that permeates every level of the culture. In the book Religions of Man, there is a wonderful chapter on Islam, and parts of the chapter can be duplicated for classroom use.

The classroom instructor should also emphasize the geography of the Arab world as well as the major cities and physical features of the Middle East. As the Greek historian Polybius once said, "Geography is Destiny" and this is particularly true of the Middle East. A unit on geography would complement the teaching unit on Arab culture and society.

David Lamb is the author of The Arabs: Journey Beyond the Mirage. In this wonderful book is a chapter that deals with life and survival in the city of Cairo. This chapter is titled "Cairo Gridlock", and it is one man's incisive account of a disfunctional environment and how people cope and adjust in such a place.

Here is an excellent chapter from Lamb's book for classsroom discussion. If you should decide to duplicate copies for your students it contains a great deal of insights into urban life in the world's most important Arab city. This chapter will enlighten your students on contemporary urban problems of a city that contains fifteen million people. Located below are four quotations from the chapter:

(1) "Yet never have I seen a place where the past seemed so distant and irrelevant, the present so unmanageable, the future so unimaginable."
(2) "The Semitic mind does not lean toward a system of organization"—T.E. Lawrence
(3) "Indeed, in Egypt, we seem to have a developed talent for destroying beautiful things"—the Egyptian Gazette
(4) "We have complete democracy here—you can do whatever you want"—a Cairo cab-driver

I believe that the Lamb book and this particular chapter is a wonderful way to stimulate discussion on urban problems. This chapter should enlighten many of our students for it contains enough "meat" and content to make comparisons with cities in other countries that have similar problems.

Another section that I have include is a number of superb quotations on Arab culture.These quotes should give the reader some insight into the mood of these fascinating people. I think that this is a unique way to study a culture and its wisdom through quotations and proverbs. There are many good proverbs for student / teacher discussion as well as learning about cultural uniqueness. Many comparisons and insights can be made and drawn if one has studied western proverbs. I am sure that the instructor will find many of these proverbs revealing of the mind and character of the Arabs.

The poems in the teaching unit come from the book Arab Poetry. Some samples of modern poetry are included to acquaint students with some contemporary views of Arab life through poetry. These are the best poems in the book and allow another approach to studying the literature of this culture.

These ten short readings will give students a more complete and broader picture of Arab society. From these readings the student will get a better picture of personality traits, character formation, and the importance of Bedouin culture. The first three readings deal with the above subjects.

One of the readings deals with Arab music. The instructor may be able to acquire some Arabic music to play to his students which would complement the reading. Here again the teacher can duplicate the articles and pass them out to his class for discussions.

The last article deals with the endangered monuments in Egypt due to the rise of tourism, overpopulation, and pollution. Our students should be made aware that the world's cultural heritage is threatened by these problems and what Egypt is doing to address these critical problems.

This is, in short, a teaching unit on Arab culture that can enhance one's lesson plan on Middle East studies. I believe that a multi-disciplinary method is best when attempting to expose students to a vast and rich culture. This teaching unit on Arab culture attempts to use a number of different readings, videos, slides, and music to enhance a unit on Arab culture. It is felt that Arab culture is often neglected or limited in the teaching area. I hope that this unit will make both the teacher and students aware of a rich cultural heritage.

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

"Intelligent and incisive...Mr. Lamb has the first-rate reporter's tools, and he uses them to relate, with compelling detail, who the Arabs are."
—*The New York Times Book Review*

THE ARABS

Journeys Beyond the Mirage

DAVID LAMB

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TWO

Cairo Gridlock

In the blissful still of early morning, when Cairo is bathed in the soft blue of desert dawn and the Nile's waters are smooth as silk, I could see from my balcony the vestiges of beauty in a city that was once among the grandest and most important on earth. Unlike the new, sterile Arab cities built by oil money, Cairo has soul and substance. Its streets throb with life, its open-air cafés are crowded until the wee hours with men who discuss the cost of bread and the price of peace over countless cups of sweet, thick coffee. In many ways, Cairo is to the Middle East what London is to the English-speaking world; it is an emotional magnet, a place where an Arab has only to step off the plane to know immediately that he is *home*. He may hate Cairo's filth and congestion and nerve-racking noise, but for him there is no more wondrous city anywhere.

The name for this thousand-year-old city in Arabic is Al Qahira, which means victorious. On the southwestern edge of the metropolis are the three Great Pyramids of Giza. On the northeast is an obelisk that marks where—according to legend, at least—Plato once studied. The French that Cairo's elite still speak is a legacy of Napoleon Bonaparte's scientific and military expedition here two centuries ago. And the architecture—the Romanesque stone doorways, the sand-colored mosques, the wrought-iron balconies reminiscent of Paris, the mullioned windows and the domes of the Mamluks, all darkened with age—is a reminder that Cairo remains a juxtaposition of new and old, of East and West.

"Cairo, like Rome and Florence, lives upon tourists who, if they are not beloved, are welcome," wrote Winwood Reade, a British author, in 1873. "The city is lighted by gas; it has bucolic gardens in which a native military band performs every afternoon; an excellent theater for which Verdi composed Aida; new houses in the Parisian style are springing up in the streets and are let out at high rents as soon as they are finished."

Our apartment was on the top floor, the fifth, of a dusty building overlooking the Nile. On our side of the river, where wealthy Egyptians gave catered cocktail parties, wore tailor-made suits and spent their holidays in Europe, rents for expatriates averaged two thousand dollars a month. On the other bank, perhaps a hundred yards away, people wore the flowing robes of peasants and paid fifty cents for one-room flats without water or electricity. Their brick buildings were crumbling, as though hit by wartime bombardments, and they stretched in endless layers toward the horizon, finally disappearing from view in a haze of sand and polluted fumes. The river divided two worlds that were mutually exclusive and strangely independent of each other.

From our balcony I could count the minarets of twenty mosques—tall, graceful spindles that towered above palms and dwarfed everything in sight. Each morning before sunrise a sudden explosion of amplified cacophony would thunder from the mosques, shaking the neighborhood awake and summoning the faithful to prayer. "God is great. I testify that there is no god but God. . . ." Cairenes would pour out of their dark doorways and move through the empty streets to fill their chambers of worship. The muezzin's call would drift off and fall silent. Cairo was magic in those moments, hushed and peaceful, a grand old lady who still looked beautiful in the half-light of dawn. I used to sit on my balcony with my first cup of coffee of the day, waiting for the tempo of the streets to pick up. Soon the heat and the noise would become overwhelming and drive me inside. Loving Cairo was difficult; hating it was impossible.

It was never easy to know whether Cairo—and Egypt as a whole—belonged to the First or Third World. After all, how can you speak of civilization's birthplace as being a "developing" nation? Yet never have I seen a place where the past seemed so distant and irrelevant, the present so unmanageable, the future so unimaginable. "A fascinating city but oh, my God . . ." Western visitors would say, shaking their heads in disbelief. Indeed, time has not been kind to Cairo, and yesterday's grandeur has become today's urban nightmare. The capital is sinking under the weight of people, people and more people, and Egypt itself seems in danger of becoming a Bangladesh on the shores of the Mediterranean, an impoverished land gripped by lethargy and decay, its illiterate population growing by more than a million a year, its daily bill for imported food already at $10 million, its infrastructure held together by freelance fix-it men with glue and tape and bits of string and wire.

I had been given the name of a fix-it man my first day in Cairo, and when my toilet started gurgling, then overflowing, I called him immediately, reaching Mr. Darwish on the eighth or ninth try. "Hello! Hello!" he shouted into his phone. The connection was poor, and there was a lot of static. "Speak up!" he yelled. "I cannot hear you."

After a few minutes I managed to convey that I had a plumbing problem and needed help. Mr. Darwish said he did not like such work, preferring to repair air conditioners or typewriters or eggbeaters. But he had known my predecessor and after a moment's hesitation he replied, "All right, I will be there within ten days."

On the twelfth day, he mounted his bicycle in Heliopolis, a tattered suburb once favored by princes and magnates. He wore a faded blue necktie and a ragged jacket and carried a briefcase full of string, wire, bottles of glue, nuts, screws, a pair of pliers, two hammers, and some cooking oil. It took him an hour and thirty minutes to weave through the hazardous traffic and reach my apartment on the other side of town.

Mr. Darwish rolled up his sleeves and was at work at once, stopping only briefly to join my cook for noontime prayers on the kitchen floor. He fashioned a loop of string, attached a piece of wire, wrapped a loose joint with tape, tossed two ounces of cooking oil into the reservoir bowl and jiggled the handle. The toilet flushed perfectly and no water leaked from its base.

"There you are," he said, stepping back, an artist admiring his work. "Just like new."

I asked what I owed, and Mr. Darwish said, "As you like." A tough bargaining session followed, and we finally agreed on eight pounds, then about ten dollars. Mr. Darwish gathered up his paraphernalia and was off, biking down Abu El Feda Street to the next job, a broken radio.

The toilet worked fine for two weeks. Then the string broke, the wire became slack, the tape around the joint gave way and all hell broke loose in my bathroom. But no matter. Mr. Darwish was only an hour or so away by bicycle and for eight more pounds I knew he could give my toilet another two weeks of life.

There are thousands of fix-it men in Cairo like Mr. Darwish, and all are the benefactors of a system that has never rewarded competence and has seen its skilled craftsmen head off for better-paying jobs in the oil-rich countries. In their absence, janitors become clerks, farmers become builders, cooks become mechanics. When the results are predictably disastrous, the ever-tolerant and patient Egyptians merely shrug and say, *"Malesh"*—Never mind.

Cairo today is a city of fourteen million people, five hundred thousand cars, eighty thousand animal carts and one motorized street sweeper. It is the largest city in Africa—four times more populous than its closest rival (Lagos, Nigeria)—and it dominates its region as no other capital does on any continent. It is the intellectual, religious and educational center of the Arab world, the seat of filmmaking, journalism and book publishing, virtually the only place where political debate is lively and foreign policy is bold and far-reaching. If you drew four circles, one each around the nonaligned, Arab, Islamic and African nations of the world, the lines would converge very close to Cairo.

Like many Arab cities, Cairo is bone-dry, receiving only an inch of rain in a wet year. The furnace-heat of summer bounces off the streets in shimmering waves that make everything look slightly out of focus, and the breathless days taste of sand. The sand is powder-fine and so pervasive that it sneaks through the tiniest cracks and clings to everything. Cairenes draw their louvered shutters tight, trying to seal themselves in a hermetic world, and live in darkness even in the dazzling sunlit days of July and August. They slip plastic covers around their radios and television sets, wrap their valuables in paper bags and flail away desperately with feathered dusters. But there is no escape. Open a book and there on page 105 is a fine coating of dust.

These hot, dusty summer months bring Arab visitors from the Persian Gulf states by the planeload to Cairo. Compared with, say, San Francisco's North Beach or London's Soho, Cairo is a fairly tame place, but by the puritanical standards of the Middle East it is Sin City, Arabia, offering belly dancers and nightclubs, young male and female prostitutes, whiskey and beer. This freedom from the restraints of home is a more powerful attraction than what Egypt has to offer historically or intellectually, and it was rare for an Arab visitor (or an Egyptian, for that matter) to explore the ancient monuments in the Valley of the Kings or gaze in wonder at the great Pyramids or be mesmerized by the King Tutankhamun exhibit at the National Museum. Instead the Arab tourists seemed more content to sit, absorbing but not exerting. They shopped or watched movies on video recorders by day and spent the nights in outdoor tea gardens or in nightclubs dense with cigarette smoke, where the children and wives would nod off by midnight and their fathers and husbands would share two-hundred-dollar bottles of whiskey and cheer the plump, gyrating belly dancers until dawn.

Most Cairenes did not look favorably on these nouveaux riches from the Gulf, whom they called "gulfies." "They're crude. The Arabs don't know anything," a cabdriver with an engineering degree said to me. When I asked him if he didn't consider himself an Arab, too, he replied, "Not really. I'm *Egyptian*." His comment underscored an important change that has taken place in the Arab world since the 1960s: nationalism has replaced Pan-Arabism as the most powerful political force. The Egyptians and others have been told by their leaders for years that they had to sacrifice for Arab goals—the liberation of Palestine, the destruction of Zionism, rapid development that would lead to economic strength, Arab unity. But none of these objectives has been achieved, and the people, growing weary of political acrobatics, having had to surrender what little democracy they had to authoritarian governments, are now, more than ever before, looking inward, toward their own nations, for their identity.

Wandering the streets of Cairo, poking through the dark alleyways that smell of urine and are strewn with trash, you can stumble on dilapidated villas where orchestras were heard in their gardens on summer evenings long ago. Handsome Victorian-era apartment buildings stand mirage-like amid rows of tenements, their wrought-iron balconies draped with laundry, their shutters drawn tight against the assault of noise and dirt. Broad boulevards lead into expansive squares that hint of Paris; narrow alleyways that are scented with spices and crowded with goats and black-veiled women wind through mysterious, ocher-colored worlds, almost biblical in tone and texture.

Sometimes on the dusty shelves of unlit bookshops, you can find old guidebooks to a city that is no more. They speak of Cairo's fine opera house, of banyan trees and patches of green that stretched along the verdant promenade of the corniche clear out to the suburb of Maadi, of the splendidly pampered Japanese garden in Helwan and the excellent restaurant in Groppi's downtown pastry shop, of days when Cairenes could live and breathe and move easily in what was, until the 1950s, among the last of the twentieth-century Westernized enclaves in the Arab world. Cairo, in fact, was really two cities throughout most of the 1800s and 1900s: there was the Cairo for Europeans and the Egyptian aristocracy with manicured gardens, elegant hotels and palaces, fine carriages and well-dressed people, and farther back from the Nile, past the parks and villas, there was the crowded, dirty Cairo for everyone else.

One British writer, William Morton Fullerton, aptly described in 1891 how great the psychological gap was between the two Cairos: "With the polo, balls, the races and the riding, Cairo begins to impress itself upon you as an English town in which any quantity of novel oriental sights are kept for the aesthetic satisfaction of the inhabitants, much as the proprietor of a country place keeps a game preserve or deer park for amusement."

Napoleon had brought Western technology and culture to Egypt in 1798, and the Suez Canal—built by the Frenchman Ferdinand de Lesseps—established Cairo's reputation in the West as the sophisticated capital of a new and important power. The *New York Herald*, commenting on the canal's opening in 1869, noted that it brought Africa and the Nile "within a convenient distance for English colonization." Cotton was king then, and Egypt's viceroyalty embraced the Westernization of their country as surely as today's rulers reject it. Life was a lavish extravagance for the elite—much as it would be a century later for the Saudi Arabian oil sheiks—and from Europe came communities of British, French, Swiss, Italian and Greek settlers. Cairo had become truly cosmopolitan. It was a city of Christians, Jews and Muslims, of Europeans and Middle Easterners, of old monuments and new ideas. "Since God has given us the viceroyalty, let us enjoy it," said Ismail the Magnificent, the ruler from 1863 to 1879.

. . .

31

Cairo Gridlock

On the day that I was to discuss the decay of Cairo with Hassan Fathi, Egypt's internationally acclaimed architect, the local papers carried three items that caught my attention: two apartment buildings had collapsed, killing seventy people; a pedestrian had fallen into an uncovered manhole and drowned in raw sewage; and a student had jumped to his death from a bridge after being tormented for months by his neighbor's blaring radio—he had left a note that said, "Suicide is better than life without dignity."

Fathi's creative urban designs had been used in projects in Europe and the United States; his ideas for low-cost housing had been put into practice in India. But in Cairo, where he advocated the construction of satellite cities in the desert, no one had paid much attention. It was his great sadness that the people, *his* people who needed him most, had utilized his genius the least.

Thin and hard of hearing, Fathi was an old man when I visited him. He lived in one of the oldest parts of Cairo, in a rambling apartment full of maps and drawings and books written in English, French and Arabic. Every afternoon he observed the ritual of tea, making sure that each of his twenty cats shared his biscuits. He was, like almost every other educated Egyptian I met, gracious and kind and forthright with both his opinions and his hospitality. From the street below his open windows the din of blaring horns and raised voices swelled up, making it necessary for us to carry on our conversation in shouts.

"What is happening to Cairo is a tragedy, really," he said, cupping his hands to his mouth. "For forty years I have been fighting to save my city, and I have had no results. No one listens. Does anyone care? I'm not sure. Just look at those TV ads the government is running, then tell me I shouldn't grieve for Cairo."

The government's television campaign he mentioned was intended to bring a little order to Cairo, an undisciplined city whose population generally ignores all traffic regulations, most standards of sanitation and many rules of good neighborliness. The campaign consisted of several one-minute spots interspersed throughout soap-opera dramas. In one, a popular actor walks under a building and is suddenly splattered with garbage dropped from an upper apartment. Wiping the goo from his face, he asks: "Is that what our country has come to? Egyptians, say it isn't so!"

Alas, though, it is. An apathetic public, economic mismanagement and a wildly out-of-control birthrate have become the cancers of Cairo, sapping its strength and leaving its dazed inhabitants the victims of what is known in Egypt as the IBM syndrome: *inshallah* (if God is willing), *bokra* (tomorrow) and *malesh* (never mind). It doesn't matter what gets done or how it's done. If not today, then tomorrow. God decides anyway, so why worry? This sense of fatalism takes all responsibility out of human hands and puts everything—from the outcome of wars to the keeping of appointments—under the control of a Greater Power. That Cairo is being transformed into a vast slum of rural peasants, attracted to the city by the illusions of a better life, does not greatly concern the individual Cairene because, the reasoning goes, man does not really control his destiny or his surroundings.

But here's a curious thing: while Egyptians are content to live in filthy, battered buildings, the insides of their homes are always immaculate. Time and time again I trudged up darkened stairwells to apartments on the third or fourth floor, and when my host opened the door, I would step into an isolated world of elegance and cleanliness. The door would shut behind us and it was as though the blighted Cairo no longer existed. When I asked friends if anyone had ever considered a neighborhood block association or an owners' association to clean up common areas, they would chuckle and say, "Oh, *that* would never work here." No doubt it wouldn't. My friends did not feel that their responsibility extended beyond their own boundaries. That attitude, I thought, represented a troubling omen for the undisciplined Egyptian society as a whole and brought to mind the words that T. E. Lawrence spoke more than seventy years ago: "The Semitic mind does not lean toward system of organization. It is practically impossible to fuse the diverse elements among the Semites into a modern, closely knit state."

The opera house mentioned in the old guidebooks no longer exists, having been set afire by a smoldering cigarette in 1971. Shepheard's Hotel, where John Speke and Captain James Grant were feted with public concerts and elegant dinners more than a century ago after their expedition to the source of the Nile, was burned down in the riots of 1952. The banyan trees lining the boulevards have been cut down to provide wider roads, and the patches of green along the riverfront have given way to high-rise apartment buildings that spill untreated sewage into the Nile. The streets of suburban Maadi are often knee-deep with trash and pocked by wide, deep potholes. The restaurant in Groppi's lost much of its business after a Kuwaiti bought it and banned the sale of beer. In Tahrir (Liberation) Square, out the back door of the Nile Hilton Hotel, the cluster of small gardens and the strips of grass have been paved over to make way for an outdoor terminal serviced by fifty-four bus companies.

Of the once splendid Japanese garden in nearby Helwan, a one-time health resort whose cement and steel factories now spew poisons over Cairo, the *Egyptian Gazette* commented: "Its ponds are broken and filled with dust, its flowers neglected and rusty tangles of barbed wire are strewn everywhere. Indeed, in Egypt today, we seem to have developed a talent for destroying beautiful things."

A generation ago, when Egypt produced a hundred or more feature films a year, Cairo's thirteen first-run movie theaters were as grand as any in London. There was not a filmmaker in the Arab world who had not studied in Cairo, not a successful actor or a songstress whose fame was not dependent on the acceptance of the Cairo audiences. Today no first-class theaters are left. And in the flea-ridden theaters still operating, the seats are broken, the air conditioners don't work, the aisles are littered with trash, [illegible] audiences are made up almost exclusively of sexually repressed young men who hoot and holler in excitement when an actor and actress seem ready to touch.

"Our films used to change every week back when Cairo was the Hollywood of the Middle East," said Salah Abou Seif, a prominent director. "Opening night was really a gala occasion then. It was Monday at the Royale, Tuesday at the Metropole. Everyone wore tuxedos and gowns and the papers reported the next morning who had sat in what box and who had worn what. A fine era it was."

"The audience that used to support the first-class theaters just doesn't exist anymore," said one of Egypt's widely known character actors, Salah Zoufoukai. "Now it's a peasant society. My wife said the other night that she wanted to see a particular film that was playing in Cairo. I said, 'OK, I'll bring it home on video cassette, as long as you don't make me go into that theater.' Besides, who's going to go out into that traffic if you don't have to?"

At every major intersection fifteen or twenty illiterate policemen in soiled white, ill-fitting uniforms stand frantically blowing whistles and waving their arms, trying to unsnarl traffic jams they themselves have created. But the drivers pay them no heed, for Cairo's roads are an anarchist's delight. "We have complete democracy here—you can do whatever you want," a cabdriver chuckled as he bounced over a median divider and headed up a one-way street, the wrong way. Not to worry. Speed limits and safety restrictions are not enforced—a twenty-five-cent bribe will pacify most uncooperative policemen—and the only rule of the road is that he who honks loudest with the largest vehicle has the right of way.

Undeniably, though, lives were saved when Cairo's unruly drivers were immobilized by traffic jams of classic proportions, because the city's accident rate—eighty fatalities and six hundred injuries per ten thousand vehicles—is the highest in the world, according to a World Bank study. At that rate the United States' traffic toll would be 1.3 million dead and nearly 10 million injured every year.[1] The American ambassador, Nicholas Veliotes, used to peer out at the long lines of motionless cars blocking every intersection in sight and spring from his bulletproof limousine with the words "The hell with it. Let's walk." And off he would head for his next appointment, jacket slung over his shoulder, followed by his Egyptian bodyguards.

Cairo's deterioration is of more than passing interest because the conditions that have allowed it to happen were largely avoidable. Yet throughout the Third World, dozens of cities are becoming the Cairos of tomorrow, buffeted by the same forces and awaiting the same fate. At some point even creative urban planning becomes irrelevant, and new overpasses to move the traffic and new apartments to house the poor represent not much more than a finger in the dike.

The first force of destruction was government centralization. Everything is centered in Cairo. If an Egyptian needs a new passport or has a question about his war pension, he must come to Cairo. Industry, government, education and commerce are all centered there. One in four Egyptians lives there. Cairo *is* Egypt and nothing of significance happens outside the capital. In Arabic the same word is used for both Egypt and Cairo: *Misr*.

Then there was the constant state of hot and cold war between Egypt and Israel from 1948 to the mid-1970s. Millions of peasants poured into the capital to seek safety during the '67 and '73 wars, and in the era of confrontation the nation's financial resources and its energies were channeled to the military, leaving nothing with which to build a nation. Every pothole in Cairo's streets is a legacy of the conflict with Israel, every eyesore represents a decision to buy a tank instead of repairing a building, a sewer or a telephone system. Besides which, Egypt's leaders never gave much thought to maintenance in the first place. They much prefered to spend money on grandiose projects that were flashy and new.

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[1] Traffic accidents in the United States average forty-five thousand dead and 1.7 million injured annually.

Compounding these problems were the policies of Gamal Abdel Nasser, Egypt's president from 1953 to 1970. In a burst of socialistic enthusiasm, he destroyed the power of the upper class, instituted mass education—in the process reducing school standards to the lowest common denominator—and pushed through a series of rent-control laws that destroyed landlord profits. Suddenly it was no longer economically reasonable for an owner to repair an elevator, hire a janitor or paint a building. Some large offices in Cairo still rent for the equivalent of twenty-five dollars a month. Not a piaster has been spent on the buildings for a generation, and more often than not the elevators are dead, cobwebs cling to the ceilings, and the trash that has accumulated in the hallways needs to be shoveled out, not swept.

And finally there is the birthrate—the number of births per year per one thousand people. In Egypt, where a baby is born every nineteen seconds, the rate is forty, compared with just over fifteen in the United States and thirteen in Britain. Already the Arab world's most populous nation, Egypt will have a population of seventy-five million by the turn of the century and, if the present trend continues, will need by that time nearly four million new housing units and will have to import one seventh of all the surplus wheat in the world to feed its people. Cairo's population is growing at the rate of a thousand a day—seven hundred new babies and three hundred arrivals from the countryside.

"I am not a believer in calling on people to exercise birth control by decree or persuasion," Nasser once said. "Instead of teaching people how to exercise birth control, we would do better to teach them how to increase their land production and raise their standard. . . . If we direct our efforts to expanding the area in which we live instead of concentrating on how to reduce the population, we will soon find the solution."

He was wrong. In Cairo's most crowded districts the population density has reached two hundred forty thousand per square mile, which is tantamount to packing the entire city of Corpus Christi, Texas, into a single square mile. The United States has spent $67 million trying to help Egypt develop a family-planning program and has shipped in condoms by the carload, but to little avail; barely 25 percent of married Egyptians use any form of contraception (compared with more than 50 percent in Mexico, Taiwan and Colombia, three underdeveloped nations where family planning is working). Half the population is under age fifteen, and despite mass education, illiteracy is increasing, opportunities are decreasing. Every year four hundred thousand Egyptians enter the job market to compete for jobs that do not exist, and every year forty thousand students are graduated from the nation's thirteen universities. Most find little meaningful employment and are forced to take jobs in government or to drive taxis or wait on tables. In the Ministry of Agriculture alone, there are two thousand Ph.D.'s, the majority of whom sit at empty desks without telephones or typewriters or notepads. (Until 1986 every university graduate was promised a government job—a policy started by Nasser; the bureaucracy as a result has grown from 370,000 to two million in three decades' time.)

Although educated, financially secure Egyptians often have only two or three children, the peasant majority still believes—with good reason—that large families are necessary to provide a financial safety net for old age. Some parents also believe it is their duty to promote the growth of Islam, a position that religious leaders do not discourage even though Islam's official policy on birth control is ambivalent. Even educated Egyptians see the empty desert all around them and, figuring that one day it will be conquered by Western technology and made habitable, ask, "What population problem?"

For Egypt, though, the population explosion means that serious economic planning is impossible. "By the prophet Mohammed," President Hosni Mubarak said after getting a report on the nation's economy, "if they brought in a government of angels, it wouldn't make any difference." For Cairo, the explosion means that life will continue to be a burden of endurance for all but the very rich, and that as the impoverished class becomes larger and more dissatisfied, the call of religious zealots for fundamental reforms in the system will have growing appeal.

Cairo's once-cosmopolitan population also is being transformed into a homogeneous one. The French and British communities either packed up or were expelled in the wake of Nasser's pro-Arab, antiforeign revolution. The Jews left in 1948, 1956 and 1967 because the Arab-Israeli wars had made their position insecure. The Greeks and Italians departed by the boatload as economic opportunities diminished under Nasser, with only a few remaining as restaurateurs and mechanics. The Egyptian royalty melted unobtrusively into society or moved abroad. The intellectual class became more isolated and less influential, its voice drowned in the sea of look-alike, think-alike peasants who have taken over Cairo and to whom politicians, educators, filmmakers and newspaper editors seem to believe they must cater.

One of the few people I met in Cairo who had found a quiet, uncrowded place to live was a woman named Marhaba (meaning "hello" in Arabic) Hafez. Her home, in one room of an underground tomb, was cool and cheery. She and her three sons had painted the walls blue and hung an outdated calendar for decoration. They cooked their meals of beans on a cement slab beneath which were buried several members of a family, and they drew their water from another cemetery, a five-minute walk away. There was, Mrs. Hafez said, nothing spooky at all about living among the dead. Indeed, she was thankful for her accommodations and resented only the fact that she had had to make a one-time payment of $1,500 "key money" to the tomb owners for the privilege of renting her home.

Egyptians started living in cemeteries more than eight hundred years ago, and today the living population of the graveyards exceeds one million. Many of the residents think they are decidedly better off than those who live in Cairo itself. Their neighborhood is cleaner, quieter and less crowded than those in Cairo; the air is better; there's no traffic; their children have more space to play. The so-called City of the Dead even has its own post office, and here and there makeshift cafés and food stores have sprung up between the tombs. Many of the inhabitants tap onto electrical outlets in nearby shops and equip their mausoleums with secondhand television sets and squeaky old General Electric fans. Few have any visible means of employment, but Egyptians are remarkably generous in taking care of both their own families and anyone less fortunate than themselves, and none of the graveyard dwellers lacks for food or even spare change to buy a cigarette or two or a leg of lamb for religious feasts.

"I'd rather be here than on a rooftop downtown, with a piece of bedding strung up for a ceiling," said Mrs. Hafez, who earned a dollar a day as caretaker for a score of tombs, sweeping and scrubbing and keeping them tidy for the owners. They came once or twice a year, on Islamic holidays and on the first day of spring, to visit the dead, an occasion that would be celebrated with a family picnic on the rocky ground just outside the tomb.

"We came to Cairo ten years ago, from Luxor," she said. "We gave up the farm because there was no money in it and Cairo had jobs. There was a lot of money here. But things didn't work out the way we thought, and my husband went off to Saudi Arabia to work in construction. It's a three-year contract. When he comes home we will have money to buy a house and raise a bigger family. *Inshallah.*"

The house she may need, but not the bigger family, for Egypt already has an uncommon problem: the country is larger than California, Nevada and Arizona combined, but 99 percent of the people are clustered in the narrow ribbon of green along the Nile that represents only 4 percent of the land. This cultivated strip, an area no larger than West Virginia, is the only habitable land in what is otherwise a desert wasteland. Each year urbanization is claiming forty thousand acres of the farmland, and while food production in Egypt is increasing 2 percent a year, food consumption is increasing 5 percent.

Government officials know they are treading on a minefield of potential social unrest, and to keep the lid on the masses, they spend $3 billion a year subsidizing essential commodites, from food to fuel. The subsidies encourage consumerism and discourage conservation. Egyptians pay only 28 percent of the average world market price for gasoline and regularly feed their farm animals loaves of bread that cost only a penny and were made from wheat shipped by the U.S. government. The pricing structure has gotten so out of whack that a gallon of gas in Cairo costs forty-eight cents, a gallon of milk sixty-eight cents and a gallon of purified drinking water $1.28. Teachers and middle-level bureaucrats earn forty dollars a month, about half what an illiterate maid can make working part time. A senior diplomat just below the rank of ambassador earns $138 a month and soldiers are so poorly paid (five dollars a month for a private) that most devote more attention to their moonlight civilian jobs than they do to their military duties. At that rate of pay, it is not surprising that only 15 percent of the government's two million workers show up on time for work and that the average workday for bureaucrats ranges from twenty minutes to two hours, according to one official report.

After my first six months in Cairo, I made an inventory of all my personal property because I fully expected the city to erupt one hot summer day in a frenzy of violent protest over horrible living conditions, intolerable housing, poverty-level salaries and the immense gap between rich and poor. But this never happened. In fact, Cairo didn't even have any crime to speak of. Muggings, house burglaries and car thefts were uncommon, even in the poorest sections of the city. Murder and rape and violence were rare. In a city of fourteen million, you could walk any street without fear. After a couple of years I tore up my inventory list.

What I had not understood at first was that the Egyptians, unlike many Arabs, had an escape valve for their frustrations and anger—a sense of humor. They joked constantly, about themselves, their leaders, their lives, about everything except religion, and it was only when you didn't hear jokes that you knew the nation's mood was glum. No matter how bad things got, they seemed able to make every day a tolerable, if not pleasant, experience. Their crowded existence reinforced their sense of community, and they laughed and argued and shouted with great gusto. Even in the worst of times, their optimism was unquenchable.

At the intersection below my balcony, I saw a collision at least once a day (there are no stop signs or right-of-way rules in Cairo), and the scenario was always the same: The two drivers would jump from their cars, cursing the other's stupidity, and square off as if to fight. A huge crowd of men would gather instantaneously to separate the drivers and to decide who was at fault. They would shout excitedly and try to direct the traffic that had come to a standstill with horns blasting. Soon reason would prevail. The shouting would subside, the traffic inch by, and the two drivers would embrace and head their separate ways, their fenders bruised but their dignity intact.

Cairo is a fan-shaped city wedged between the desert escarpments, narrow in the south, then widening in the north, where the Nile sweeps into a broad, fertile delta. Except for the river and a barren plateau known as the Mokattam hills that rises above the capital's eastern perimeter, the city is flat and featureless. Atop that plateau is a nameless village. The dirt track to it climbs steeply, and Fathi Zaki's donkeys must strain and heave to haul their precious cargo the final yards back into the nightmarish world of the *zabbaleen*.

Zaki was forty years old, going on sixty. His face was creased and leathery from the sun and his eyes were heavy from lack of sleep. He reined in his donkey team outside a shanty at the end of the track and opened the tin door to his home. His two barefoot children scampered off the cart, and Zaki shoveled his cargo—ripe, wet garbage that he had carried the three miles from Cairo—onto the dirt floor of his living room, disappointed that the load contained no little treasures except food for his pigs.

"Look," he said to me, kicking at the pile. "Not even any good paper. People just don't throw away anything any good the way they used to."

Like the other villagers on the Mokattam range, Zaki was one of the rubbish barons of Cairo, the zabbaleen (a term that translates as rubbish collectors). They are Coptic Christians—Egypt's six million Copts represent the largest minority in the Arab world—who migrated from southern Egypt to the capital in the 1930s. They ended up in a medieval world of garbage, and there they have remained, finding no escape. The garbage sustains them and holds them in economic and social bondage.

Long ago Cairenes burned the garbage to heat water for Turkish baths or merely threw it into the street. Over the centuries so much garbage built up that entire communities grew atop layers of compacted trash, and today, as in Rome, one often has to walk down five or six steps to enter some old buildings that were once at street level. Early in this century a group of Muslims who had wandered to Cairo from the Western Desert developed a profitable business collecting garbage. When the zabbaleen arrived in the thirties, the *wahiya* (or bosses) put together a slick scheme: they contracted with tenants and landlords to dispose of the trash, then sold the zabbaleen the rights to pick it up and keep it.

The system still works that way, and routes are passed down among the zabbaleen from father to son. The wahiya charge both the zabbaleen and the tenants about fifty cents a month for an apartment. If one of the zabbaleen tries to collect the money himself from the tenants or if he does not make his monthly payments to the strong-armed wahiya, he is usually roughed up on one of his morning runs; his cart is smashed and his precious garbage is strewn over the street.

"It's very unfair, but it's an inherited kind of thing," said Father Saman Ibrahim Moussa, the young, bearded priest in the village. "The zabbaleen are forced into the system because without education there is no other way to break the cycle. They just accept that this is how it works, how it has always worked."

Each morning, well before sunrise, the zabbaleen take their children in tow, leaving the women behind to poke through yesterday's garbage, and head into Cairo in their rickety carts to collect the trash that no one else wants. Theirs is the only household collection service in the city, and for their labor—ten hours a day, seven days a week—the zabbaleen get no pay. They get only to keep the garbage, seven hundred tons of it a day.

Their little carts squirm through Cairo's bumper-to-bumper traffic, and their children crawl up the perilous spiral staircases that cling to the sides of ten-story apartment buildings where, at each narrow landing, tenants have placed the garbage. (If the tenants have servants, anything of value has already been removed.) The zabbaleen are scavengers as well as recyclers, and their municipal service is the most efficient one in Cairo, costing the city government not a piaster.

Back home, in their roofless brick houses that have neither water nor electricity and are shared with many barnyard animals, the rubbish is sorted by hand into various piles—garbage for the pigs, scrap paper that brings five dollars a ton, odds and ends like discarded toilet seats and broken pottery that may fetch a few piasters. What the zabbaleen can't use or repair they burn. Heavy clouds of smoke from the smoldering dump hang over their village night and day like storm clouds.

Except for the Coptic Church, there is almost nothing in the village but the cluster of living compounds that sprawls nearly to the doorstep of Cairo's magnificent, eight-hundred-year-old citadel. There are no schools, health clinics or shops, and although a doctor visits the church two evenings a week, 40 percent of the children die in their first year, according to a World Bank study.

Virtually none of the twenty-five thousand zabbaleen have ever left their world of garbage, and few seem inclined to do so. I asked one teenage boy if he would leave if he suddenly found ten thousand dollars. He laughed at the foolishness of the question and said, "Of course not. Where else would I go? What would I do?" So he, like his ancestors, will presumably live forever atop a smoldering dump, and Egyptian Muslims, who place great emphasis on bodily cleanliness and wash themselves before each prayer session, will continue to scorn the zabbaleen as lazy, dirty people who supposedly grow rich on treasures mistakenly discarded by the rich.

"People who say the zabbaleen are wealthy have weak brains," Father Moussa said. "Just look around you. Does this look the way rich people live?"

Outside his pint-sized church, the stale air was abuzz with flies. Mounds of trash flowed up the hillside and spilled out of the doorways. Pigs and scrawny dogs wandered in and out of the cement-block homes and runny-nosed children played in heaps of garbage, as happy as any Western child turned loose on a sandbox. My shoes were caked with mud and slime, and as I turned to leave Mokattam, feeling disoriented and empty, I heard behind me the sound of laughing children.

Though the zabbaleen may be trapped, more than three million Egyptians—or one of every eight adults—have left their country to work abroad, many as common laborers in the oil-producing countries, others as professionals in cities ranging from Los Angeles to Jeddah. The remittances they send home each year now represent Egypt's largest source of foreign exchange. Egyptian teachers are the backbone of Saudi Arabia's educational system; Egyptian doctors keep the hospitals in Kuwait and Qatar functioning; Egyptian academics, economists and businessmen have become prominent in dozens of American and European cities. Most give two reasons for leaving: the limited opportunities at home, where the per capita income is only five hundred sixty dollars and promotions are based on loyalty, not ability, and the stultifying pressures of Cairo that assault the senses like jackhammers, leaving even the most energetic souls drained and numb.

"I step off the plane in London or New York and my whole mentality changes," an Egyptian executive with Citibank said. "In Cairo, I know my work gets sloppy and I try to cut corners because no one really cares how you perform.

But get me out of Egypt and I am a different person. It's amazing. Suddenly, I get excited about doing a good job."

The banker and I were picking our way across Tahrir Square, crossing one lane at a time as buses bore down on us, each packed so tightly that the upright passengers seemed in danger of suffocating. "Now," he yelled, and finding a small break in the traffic, we dashed across another lane. There was no room on the sidewalks—that's where cars park—and the streets were a swirling mass of pedestrians, colliding and bouncing off one another like windup toys. "Aaaagh!" My friend cried as a soldier's heel accidentally came down hard on his foot in the crush of people jostling for the next safety zone.

He hobbled along behind me to the Diplomatic Club, one of the last physical remnants of Cairo's old aristocracy, where we were to meet an acquaintance for lunch. The club had high ceilings, long faded drapes that covered the sooty windows, and the feel of lost elegance. The bar had been closed for a year and turned into a prayer room. We sat down in the dining room and ordered grapefruit juice.

"I haven't slept in days, or, at least, it feels that way," my friend said. He explained that a "maverick sheik" had taken over his neighborhood, and for hours on end, crouching in reeds along the Nile night after night, would shout out his own thanks to God over a megaphone. With each sleepless moment the chant would seem to grow louder, until my friend imagined that the sheik had actually entered his bedroom.

"There's nothing I can do," he said matter-of-factly. I asked if he couldn't call the police and have the man arrested for disturbing the peace. My friend, a Muslim who took an occasional glass of whiskey and believed religion was being carried to the extreme by too many people, looked aghast.

"Are you kidding?" he said. "You couldn't do that these days. Why, I'm the one who would be arrested, for being un-Islamic."

A dictionary of
ARABIC AND ISLAMIC PROVERBS

Paul Lunde
and
Justin Wintle

Ability : Ability has no school. Turkish.

Abstinence : Practice abstinence, for riches will not last. South Lebanese.

Actions : The planting of one tree is worth the prayers of a whole year. Turkish.

Good deeds cut off tongues. Arabic.

Adaptability : That which bends does not break. South Lebanese.

Advice : Good advice is worth a camel. Lebanese.

Ageing : When you reach forty a new ailment is suffered every year. Arabic.

Alcohol : When a drunkard smells a pomegranate he wants it to sin. Medieval Arabic.

Ambition : If you fall in love, fall in love with a prince; if you steal, steal silk; and if you knock at a door, knock at the door of a great man, so that when they revile you it will be for something big. Lebanese.

Anxiety : If you have anxieties, go to sleep. Moorish.

Arabs : An Arab's intelligence is in his eyes. Arabic.

Armenians : Anyone who can cope with an Armenian can cope with the devil. Persian.

Arrogance : If anyone shits in your hand fling it in his face. Maltese.

When a chicken gives the call to prayer, slaughter it. Moorish.

Authority : A hundred years of tyranny is preferable to one night of anarchy. Arabic.

Shit falls downward. Lebanese.

An ass is an ass, even when it carries the Sultan's treasure. Lebanese.

Bad Language : Spit cannot return to the mouth. Moroccan.

Beggars : Let one beggar marry another and all you will get is more beggars. Lebanese.

Chance : One tiny insect may be enough to destroy a country. Medieval Arabic.

Change : O God, spare us from change. Tunisian.

Character Types : The beard is full, the brain is lean. Tunisian.

A man with a big nose is a man of standing. Lebanese.

Charity : Do good and be rewarded with evil. Lebanese.

Children : He who has children has torments. Tunisian.

Christians : Be nice to Christians when you need them, but otherwise bring a wall down on their heads. Lebanese.

Circumstances : A thoroughbred horse is not dishonoured by its saddle. Syrian.

Commerce : Big fish eat little fish. Lebanese.

Compassion : Even the hand of compassion is stung when it strokes a scorpion. Persian.

Conformity : To avoid being eaten by wolves be a wolf! Tunisian.

Consequences : After the fire, ashes; after the rain, roses. Moroccan.

He who plays with cats must bear the scratches. Algerian.

When the snow melts, the shit appears. Lebanese.

Consolation : When things get rough, visit the graveyard. Tunisian.

Contentment : The sweetness of rest comes from the bitterness of labour. Algerian.

Everyone is pleased with his brains; no one is pleased with his wealth. Omani.

Praise be to Him who made men content with their intelligence! Lebanese.

Conversation : The words of the night are butter which will melt in the morning. Tunisian.

If speech were silver, silence would be golden. Tunisian.

Corruption : To destroy the cobweb, destroy the spider. Maltese.

When cat and rat join forces the country is destroyed. Omani.

It is from the head that the fish first stinks. Turkish.

Courtesy : It is from the discourteous that the courteous learn courtesy. Turkish.

Cunning : Cleverness wins over strength. Omani.

A man without cunning is like an empty matchbox. Omani.

Death : The cemetery never rejects a corpse. Lebanese.

Dependence : The greatest curse is to need help from others. Maltese.

Desires : The thing dearest to the heart of man is that which is forbidden him. Arabic.

Desperation : What drowning man would not cling to the tail of a serpent? Turkish.

Destiny : No water can wash away the destiny written on a man's forehead. Moroccan.

Destiny caresses the few and molests the many. Turkish.

Wherever it grows, wheat always arrives at the millstone. Arabic.

Discipline : Where the teacher strikes roses will grow. Turkish.

Education : Repetition teaches the donkey. Saudi Arabian.

Don't bother about educating your son: life will teach him. Lebanese.

Egotism : His mother was an onion, his father garlic, and yet he is a rose! Turkish.

Big head, big headache. Turkish.

Enemies : A thousand friends are few, one enemy is many. Algerian.

Envy : Every eunuch scoffs at his master's prick. Medieval Arabic.

Envy is a burden that no man knows how to put down. Medieval Arabic.

Equality : If I were a prince, and you were a prince, who would drive the asses? Maltese.

Evidence : There are feathers in your hair, O chicken thief. Tunisian.

Expectations : Hope without work is a tree without fruit. Arabic.

The content of the pot is revealed by the spoon. Arabic.

Experience : What is learned in youth is carved in stone. Arabic.

Faculties : The mind is for seeing, the heart is for hearing. Turkish.

Believe what you see and lay aside what you hear. Arabic.

Faith : Trust in God, but tie your camel. Turkish.

Fate : He who slaps his own face should not cry out. Lebanese.

Fear : When the lions are absent the jackals dance. Arabic.

Food : Roses are scented, but bread keeps us alive. Maltese.

A man's bread is a debt he owes to others. Lebanese.

Freedom : Better a stray dog than a caged lion. Syrian.

Every monkey has its chain. Syrian.

Friends and Friendship : No path is steep that leads to a friend. Arabic.

Bring your hearts together, but keep your tents separate. Arabic.

How many friends I had when my vines produced honey, how few now that they are withered. Arabic.

To die among friends is a feast. Arabic.

You know a man when you need him. Maltese.

Grief : Grieve for the living, not for the dead. Turkish.

Guests : Guests and fish stink after three days. Bedouin.

Health : For the healthy man every day is a wedding. Turkish.

Health is the best feast. Yemeni.

Heredity : The man descended from dogs will bark. Arabic.

Home : Every man is a child in his own home. Arabic.

A house without an elderly person is like an orchard without a well. Arabic.

Ignorance : Ignorance is an incurable disease. Saudi Arabian.

The ignorant man is a soldier without weapons. Arabic.

Man is the enemy of what he doesn't know. Arabic.

Individuality : Every man is the master of his own beard. Arabic.

Knowledge : It is better to know things than not to know things. Moroccan.

No man has enough knowledge. Arabic.

He who knows nothing is well off. Maltese.

Leadership : If you wish to destroy a country, pray that it has many chiefs. Lebanese.

Learning : A scholar who does not produce is like a cloud that doesn't rain. Arabic.

If all your learning comes form books, you are more often wrong than right. Lebanese.

Luck : No stone worthy of a wall will be found on a road. Persian.

Male and Female : The beauty of a man is in his intelligence: the intelligence of a woman is in her beauty. Arabic.

Means and Ends : Why burn the blanket to destroy the flea? Turkish.

One stone is sufficient to frighten a thousand crows. Turkish.

Men : A gentleman is gentle. Arabic.

Money : The value of money is having it. Lebanese.

Motherhood : Every pig is beautiful in the eyes of its mother. Moroccan.

Opportunism : If a good thing comes your way, seize it. Arabic.

When the lions depart, the jackals gather. Arabic.

Politics : It is better to herd cattle than rule men. Arabic.

Possessions : The best of your possessions is that which has profited you. Arabic.

Power : To every Pharaoh a Moses. Turkish.

Precautions : Before going in think about getting out. Arabic.

Priests : However large the mosque the mullah only preaches what he knows. Turkish.

Three things I shall never see: the eye of an ant, the foot of a snake, or the kindness of a mullah. Persian.

Purity : Every scholar makes mistakes, and every thoroughbred stumbles. Arabic.

Rank : If I am a prince and you are a prince, who will lead the donkey? Arabic.

Relatives

General : Relations are scorpions. Tunisian.

Ancestors : Always walk proudly in the land of your fathers. Arabic.

Sons : Your husband is what you make of him; your son is how you raise him. Arabic.

Resolution : When the hands are strong the eyes are dry. Arabic.

Respect : A man is respected in proportion to how well he dresses. Arabic.

Revenge : Blood washes away blood. Arabic.

Vengeance erases shame. Arabic.

Mercy is rare, vengeance is common. Arabic.

Self-control : If you see two people in harmony, one of them is bearing the burden. Tunisian.

Self-criticism : What camel ever saw its own hump? Arabic.

Self-improvement : Learn tact from those who lack it. Lebanese.

Self-interest : Everyone pulls the blanket to his side of the bed. Lebanese.

Self-reliance : Use your own brains, for no one else will lend you his. Arabic.

Separation : Separation from the living is harder than separation from the dead. Arabic.

Simplicity : The greatest luxury is simplicity. Kurdish.

Smiles : Not every smile is a smile of welcome. Arabic.

Speech : A man's tongue is his sword. Arabic.

When the mind is overwhelmed, all words fail. Arabic.

Strangers : When you shake hands with a stranger count your fingers. Persian.

Stupidity : A third of the world is desert locked up in the human brain. Moroccan.

Time : Time passes by without a word, greeting no one. Arabic.

When the times you complain of are gone you will weep for them. Arabic.

A sponge for the past, a rose for the present, a kiss for the future. Arabic.

Place no faith in time. Moroccan.

When the flood recedes the mud remains. Turkish.

Transience : There is no security in three things: the sea, the Sultan and time. Arabic.

In the end, everything is consumed by moths. Arabic.

Travel : Travel is a blessing. Arabic.

Only with travel can a man ripen. Persian.

Choose your companions, then choose your road. Arabic.

Every journey is a little piece of Hell. Tunisian.

To know a people's language is to be safe from their malice. Lebanese.

Camels are ships of the land. Arabic.

Treachery : Always stroke the head you wish to cut off. Arabic.

Truth : Truth is the salt of mankind. Arabic.

Uncountable : There are four things a man cannot count: his sins, his years, his debts, and his enemies. Persian.

Vice : To contemplate vice is a vice. Arabic.

Wealth : Too much wealth makes a man blind. Arabic.

He who seeks wealth without capital is like the man who carries water in a sieve. Arabic.

West, the : Nothing coming from the West rejoices the heart. Egyptian.

Wisdom : The words of the ancients are wisdom. Arabic.

Women : A single woman destroyed Paradise. Arabic.

I hear the echo
Resounding in the Gulf,
"Rain . . .
Rain . . .
Rain . . .
In every drop of rain
There is a red or yellow bud of a flower.
And every tear of the hungry and the naked,
And every drop shed from the blood of slaves
Is a smile waiting for new lips
Or a roseate nipple in the mouth of a babe
In the young world of tomorrow, giver of life."

And rain pours.

(*Unshudat al-Matar*, Beirut 1960.)

نازك الملائكة

Nazik al-Mala'ika

Five Songs to Pain

I

The giver of sorrow and burns to our nights,
Of drink from cups of insomnia to our eyes:
We found him on our way
One rainy morning
And we gave him out of our love
A tap of pity and a little corner
Throbbing in our hearts.
Ever since, he has not left us once
Or absented himself from our way.
He follows us all over the great wide world
We wish we had not given him a single drop to drink
On that melancholy morning—
The giver of sorrow and burns to our nights,
Of drink from cups of insomnia to our eyes.

II

How can we forget Pain,
How can we forget him?
We shall drink him, eat him,
Follow his erratic steps.
As we sleep, his grim
Body is the last thing we see;
His facial traits are the first thing
We set sight upon in the morning
We shall carry him with us
Wherever our wishes and wounds carry us.
We shall permit him to build dams
Between our longings and the moon,
Between our burning agony and the cool brook,
Between our eyes and sight.
We shall permit him to spread sadness
And sorrow in our eyes.
We shall shelter him in an ecstatic nook
Of our songs' ribs.

Finally, the torrents of the valleys will carry him away
And give him cactus thorns for a pillow.
Oblivion will then descend on our valley.
Good evening, sorrow!
We shall forget Pain, we shall forget him.

III

From where does Pain come to us,
From where does he come?
He has been the brother of our visions from time immemorial
And the guide of our rhymes.
Yesterday, we took him to the deep waters
And smashed him there, scattered him on the lake's waves.
We did not leave a sigh of him or a tear
And we thought we returned free from his harm:
He would no longer cast sorrow on our smiles
Or hide bitter sobs behind our songs.
Then we received a red rose of warm fragrance
From our beloved ones overseas.
What did we expect in it? Joy and satisfaction.
But it trembled and ran in warm thirsty tears
Watering the sad tunes of our fingers.
We love you, O Pain,
From where does Pain come to us,
From where does he come?
He has been the brother of our vision from time immemorial
And the guide of our rhymes.
To him, we are mouth and thirst
He revives us and gives us to drink.

IV

Can we not defeat Pain?
Postpone him till next morning or evening?
Occupy him? Divert him with a toy or a song?
Or an old story of a forgotten tune?
Who could that Pain be?
A little tender child with questioning eyes,
Silenced by a lullaby and a loving pat.
He will sleep if we smile and sing to him.

O finger that has given us tears and regret!
Who else but him closes his heart in the face of our sorrow
And comes to us crying, asking that we love him?
Who else but him distributes wounds, and smiles?
This little one . . . He is the most innocent of oppressors.
Is he our loving enemy or our bitter friend?
A dagger blow that wants us to give it our cheeks
Without reproach, without pain?
O little child, pardon our hand and our mouth.
You dig canals for tears in our eyes
And arouse our wounds all over.
We have forgiven your guilt and your harm from time immemorial.

V

We crowned you as a god at dawn
And prostrated our brows at your silver altar
O our love, O Pain
We burnt you incense of linseed and sesame
Then offered sacrifices and sang verses
Of Babylonian tune.
We built you a temple of fragrant walls
Sprinkled its floor with oil and pure wine
And burning tears.
We kindled for you fires of palm branches,
Of our sorrow and of wheat bran in the long night,
Our lips closed.
Then we sang and called and offered our vows:
Dates from drunken Babylon, bread and wines
And joyful roses.
Then we prayed to your eyes and offered a sacrifice
And collected the drops of generous warm tears
And made a rosary.
You whose hand gave melodies and songs
O tears that grant wisdom, O fountain of thoughts
O wealth, O fertility
O harsh tenderness, O grudge full of mercy
We have hidden you in our dreams, in every tone
Of our melancholy songs.

(*Al-Adab*, Beirut, September 1957.)

عبد الوهاب البياتي

'Abd al-Wahhab al-Bay

The Village Market

The sun, the lean donkeys, the flies
A soldier's old shoes passing
From hand to hand, a peasant staring blankly:
"In the new year
My hands will certainly be full of money
And I shall buy those shoes"
The cry of a cock escaping from a cage, a little saint:
"Nothing can scratch your skin as well as your own nails" and "The road to H
Is closer than that to Paradise," the flies
The tired harvesters:
"They planted and we did not eat
We plant in humiliation and they eat"
Those returning from the city: "What a blind beast it is!
Its victims are our dead, women's bodies
And good dreamers"
The lowing of cows, the woman selling bracelets and perfume
Trudging like a beetle: "My dear lark, O Sodom,
The perfume seller cannot repair what Time has impaired"
Black rifles, a plough, a dying fire
A blacksmith fighting sleep off his blood-shot eyes:
"Birds of a feather flock, always, together.
The sea cannot cleanse sins, nor can tears"
The sun in the middle of the sky
The women selling grapes gathering their baskets:
"The eyes of my beloved are two stars
His chest is Spring roses"
The market is deserted and the little shops
The children catching flies and the far horizon
The huts in the palm grove yawning

(Abariq Muhashshama, Beirut 195

'Abd al-Wahhab al-Bayati

The Sorrows of Violets

The millions who work hard do not dream of the death of a butterfly
And the sorrows of violets
Or of a sail glowing
Under the green moonlight on a summer night
Or the love affairs of one madly in love with a phantom
The millions who work hard
Are naked
Torn
The millions who make a boat for the dreamer
The millions who make a handkerchief for an enamoured one
The millions who cry
Sing
Suffer
In the corners of the earth, in a steel factory or a mine:
They chew the sun disc to escape an inevitable death
They laugh from the bottom of their hearts
They laugh
They are enamoured
Not like one madly in love with a phantom
Under the green moonlight on a summer night
The millions who cry
Sing
Suffer
Under the night sun dream of a morsel

(*Ash'ar fi'l-Manfa*, Beirut 1964.)

From here
Oh death
The announcer's voice
Is wooden
They willed that it should not feel what it announced
"London"
And Big Ben strikes
"Twenty thousand" .
—No, enough. Old news like the announcer.
"They were killed that others may live"
I mutter: they are lying
You say:
Of barefooted people
"They were killed that years may flower"
I mutter: they are lying
You say:
Of the flock.
On other lips
A voice whispers as if in prayer
My mother murmurs in prayer
"Lord, keep my life
I want nothing but my life"

Mother, O my mother
Here without my love and my smile
I sink in the mud
You will forget me
In spite of the light put out in my room
In spite of the empty morrow, my mother
You will forget me

I am alone
My hand pressing my hand
A terrible pain
I almost hear from there
From here
The announcer's wooden voice,
They willed that he should not feel what he announced.

(*Khutuwat fi l-Ghurba*, Beirut 196

Baland al-Haydari

The Lost Footstep

The winter rain made traces on the platforms of the station
While a storm was mewing like a cat
And on the road
An old lantern was quivering
And shaking our frugal village
What will I do in the city?
And you asked me:
                    What will you do in the city!
Your stupid step will be lost in its great streets
The blind alleys
Will crush you
Night will grow in your deaf depths
As sad hopes
What will you do in the . . . and without a friend
No . . . there are no friends in that city
You laughed at me
And I remained waiting for the train to the city
You went away from me
And I went away from you
Through the glass window of the train
Villages passed
Floating and sinking in the sand while I waited
For day in the city
And to whom shall I return?
To my village
Or to the winter rain making traces on the platforms of the station
Or to the light shaking our frugal village
Or to the women dying of modesty?
No . . . I shall not return
To whom shall I return since my village has become a city
With lights at every corner
Glaring from new lamps
Which will shout at me
—What do you want?
—What do I want!

Nothing knows me or is known to me here
Nothing remembers me or is remembered by me here
I will drag my little footstep in its great streets
I will be crushed by its blind alleys
But . . . I will never return
To whom shall I return, for my village has become a city.

(*Aghani al-Madina al-Mayta*, Baghdad 195

Baland al-Haydari

Barrenness

The same road
The same houses tied together by a great effort
The same silence.
We used to say
Tomorrow it will die
And in every house will wake
Voices of little children
Rolling with day on the road
They will mock our yesterday
Our grumbling women
Our frozen looks with no brilliance
They will not know what memories are
They will not understand the old way
They will laugh because they will not ask
Why they laugh

We used to say
Tomorrow we will understand what we say
And the seasons will gather us together
Here a friend
There a bashful person
Yesterday it was a deep love
Perhaps
We did not mean what we used to say
For the seasons have gathered us together today
That friend
Is without a friend
That love
Is a callous face
And on the road
The same road
Are the same houses tied together by a great effort
The same silence
And there
Behind the closed windows

Nizar Qabban

Love and Petroleum

When will you understand?
When will you understand, Sir?
That I am not one
Like the others of your girl-friends
Nor a female conquest
To be added to your conquests
Nor another number
To be entered in your records
When will you understand?

When will you understand?
O unbridled camel of the desert
Whose face and wrist
Are eaten by smallpox
That I will not be here
Ashes in your cigarettes
A head
Among thousands on your pillows
A statue
To compete for in a feverish auction
A breast on the marble of which
You leave the form of your fingerprints
When will you understand?

When will you understand?
That you will never numb me
By your wealth and your princedoms
That you will never possess the world
With your oil
With your concessions,
With petroleum
Exhaled from your flowing mantles
With cars you throw
At your princesses' feet

In countless numbers . . .

Where are the backs of your camels?
Where is the tattoo on your hands?
Where are the holes in your tents?
O you with cracked callused feet
O slave of emotions
Whose wives have become
Only some of your hobbies
Accumulated
In tens on the bed of your lusts
Mummified
Like insects on the walls of your halls
When will you understand?

When
O glutton
Will you understand?
That I am not one to be interested
In your hell or your paradise
That my dignity is more valuable
Than the gold heaped in your palms
And that the climate of my thoughts
Is different from your climates
O you in the atoms of whose cells
Feudalism hatches and nestles,
Of whom the very desert is ashamed
Even to call,
When will you understand?

Wallow
O oil prince
In your pleasures
Like a mop
Wallow in your sins
Yours is the petroleum
Squeeze it then
At the feet of your mistresses
The night-clubs of Paris

Have killed your magnanimity
So you sold Jerusalem
Sold God
Sold the ashes of your dead.
As if the lances of Israel
Did not abort your sisters
And destroy our houses
And burn our Qur'ans
As if her flags were not hoisted
Over the shreds of your flags
As if all who were crucified
On trees in Jaffa
In Haifa
And Beersheba
Were not of your kin.

Jerusalem sinks in its blood
While you are
A victim of your passions
You sleep
As if the tragedy
Is not part of your tragedy

When will you understand?
When will the human being wake up in your soul?

(*Habibati*, Beirut 1964

كمال أبو ديب

Kamal Abu Dib

Opposites
An Elegy to the Babel of Voices
(Fragment)

To Adonis, the multi-
dimensional, the embodier.

Babel. This is your name. This is your identity in the winds.

Babel, whatever I name you. I name you a flower on the body of the desert, but you go forth and rise surrounded by seven towers.

A tigress I name you, a body with which the mystics are infatuated, a lotus tree under which the world seeks shade. But you revert to Babel of the towers and the tongues.

A river of the dead I name you. I draw you on the walls of trains as wheat granaries, boots of millions of soldiers traveling the continents, a pyramid of books, bare thighs, virginities, and beards. But you go forth and rise in the wind surrounded by seven towers.

Babel is your name and identity.

You lie stretched out: deserts and thirsty sheep, valleys overflowing with Spring and song. You wash your extremities in the foam of the oceans, in turbid rivers. Mountains crouch at your navel, oxeye bushes creep on your thighs—your thousand thighs, sharks enter your pelvis, and oil wells come out of your eyes.

And I see you not surrounded by a rampart, not brushed by a wind.

I name you a woman, and a thousand vulvas grow to you, breasts spring in your body as stars and sand, and a thousand husbands and conquerors claim you. I call you a book, and you roar with a thousand noises, languages, and letters; and voices open on your pages:

Ahmad 'Abd al-Mu'ti Hijazi

Sudden Death

I carry my telephone number
My name and my address
So that if I fall dead suddenly you will identify me
And my friends will come.

Fancy what will happen
If you don't come.
I will remain in the morgue two long nights
Cold telephone wires will shake in the night. The ring will start.
No reply . . . once . . . twice.

Somebody will go to my mother and tell her I am dead
My mother, that sad country woman—
How she will walk alone in the city
Carrying my address!
How she will spend the night beside me
In the utterly quiet hall
Subdued by her loneliness
Comforted by her seclusion in sorrow
As she ponders alone
Over her hidden sorrows
Weaving my shroud from her black tears!

I wish my mother had tatooed my boy's arm
So that I would not be lost
So that I would not betray my father
So that my first face would not be lost under my second face.
When I see men and women going out silently
After spending two hours in front of me during which
We did not exchange looks or see different scenes,
When I see that life has no madness

And the bird of quietness flutters over everybody
I feel as if I am really dead and lying silently
Watching this dying world

(*Lam Yabqa illa al-Firat.* Beirut 1965.)

square miles; in 1970 it was inhabited by a population of about 121 million (see Appendix I, page 314).

2. WHO IS AN ARAB?

Of the three successively larger concentric circles—Arabs, Middle East, Islam—only the first and the third figure prominently in Arab consciousness. The Arabs are, of course, well acquainted with the middle one as well; in fact, in modern Arab political writings one encounters frequently the expression *al-sharq al-awsaṭ*, "the Middle East." But this term has been adopted and translated from the European languages, primarily English and French, in which it had come into vogue only during the World War II years. Having had no indigenous term for it, one suspects that the concept of the area as the locale of a specific cultural configuration did not exist in the Arab mind.

The term "Arab" referred in pre-Islamic times to the people who inhabited the Arabian Peninsula and the Syrian Desert. It appears in Assyrian records: in 854 B.C. Gindibu the Arab with one thousand camel troops from Aribi territory joined Bir-'idri of Damascus (who is none other than the biblical Benhadad II) against Shalmanassar III in the Battle of Qarqar. In this first historical appearance of the Arabs they are associated with camels—evidently they were camel-herding desert Bedouins—and throughout the ensuing twenty-eight centuries, the association between Arabs and the desert has never ceased. "Like an Arab in the desert" is a simile used by Jeremiah (3:2) about 600 B.C. in the tone in which one refers to a well-known fact, and more than a century earlier Isaiah (13:20) refers to the Arab pitching his tent, which presupposes a nomadic, desert-dwelling existence. The conceptual association between Arab and Bedouin was and remained so close that frequently when an Arab author uses "Arab" what he actually means is "Bedouin." This is how Ibn Khaldūn, the famous fourteenth-century historian, uses the term "Arab," and this is how the Bedouins refer to themselves to this day.

The foundation of Islam by the Prophet Muhammad (570–632) and the Islamization of Arabia during his lifetime marked the beginning of the large-scale Arab expansion outside the Arabian Peninsula and the Syrian Desert. From this time on, the term "Arab" assumed a second meaning: it came to denote all the peoples who, after having been converted to Islam, gave up their ancestral languages and adopted Arabic instead. Simultaneously, the Arab conquerors of the new lands lost their originally tribal character, settled down, and became town dwellers. The fate of the Arabic language in these new countries differed from place to place, but in general it can be stated that in several countries the initial distinction between the Arab conquerors and the local populations gradually diminished and disappeared. Within a relatively short period the "Arabs" had become the only, or the predominant, population element in a huge area in North Africa and in Southwest Asia.[6]

Numerous scholars, both Arab and Western, have struggled to answer the question, Who is an Arab? The answers usually include one or more of the following criteria: Arabs are those who speak Arabic, are brought up in Arab culture, live in an Arab country, believe in Muḥammad's teachings, cherish the memory of the Arab Empire, are members of any of the Arab nations.[7] A moment's reflection will suffice to show that of all these criteria, only the linguistic one holds good for all Arabs and for almost nobody else but Arabs. Persons whose mother tongue is Arabic may be brought up in a non-Arab culture (e.g., in French culture in North Africa), and still consider themselves Arabs and be so considered by others. They may live in a non-Arab country—witness the many Arabs who live in France, the United States, Latin America, and elsewhere—and still be Arabs. They may not believe in Muḥammad—the hundreds of thousands of Christian Arabs do not—and yet are as intensely Arab in their feelings and national orientation as any Muslim Arab. Many Arabs do not "cherish" in particular the memory of the Arab Empire because they are Communists, or for any of several other reasons. And, finally, there are numerous Arabs who emigrated to other countries, acquired citizenship there, and have become members of other nations, without thereby losing their Arab identity. In a similar manner, one could point out that there are individuals and groups who meet all or most of the conditions enumerated and yet are not Arabs, for example, the Christian Copts of Egypt, or the Jews of any Arab country.

For this reason, and for want of a better definition, we go along with the one suggested recently by Jabra I. Jabra, a Baghdadi critic, novelist, and poet, to the effect that an Arab is "anyone who speaks Arabic as his own language and consequently feels as an Arab."[8]

However, and this is significant for their self-image, the Arabs do not consider themselves as several separate nations or peoples who inhabit separate political entities. In the Arab view, fostered for at least one generation by almost all Arab leaders, the Arabs constitute one nation, the Arab nation, and the division of the one Arab fatherland into numerous separate countries is but a temporary condition that sooner or later must be, will be, overcome. In this theoretical or ideal view, all Arabs are brothers, children of one single *qawm* or nation.

As to Islam, all educated or even semi-educated Arabs know that it embraces, in addition to the Arabs, numerous non-Arab nations. The Arabs, of course, consider themselves the core of the Muslim nations, since they were the originators of Islam and those who spread it in the world. The world, in the traditional Arab view, is divided into two parts: an inner part, constituting the *Dār al-Islām*, or "House of Islam," and an outer one, constituting the *Dār al-Ḥarb*, or "House of War." In Arabic the antithesis between the two Houses is much more apparent and impressive than in the English translation of their names, because in Arabic the term "Islam" always carries the connotation of the word from which it is derived: *salām*, "peace." Therefore, for the Arabs, the meaning of the two Houses connotes the contrast between inner peace and outer war, just as the ancient Romans had their *pax Romana* imposed upon the "pacified" lands, separated by the *limes* from the lands beyond which were the domains of the lawless Barbarians.

Under the impact of Western domination and the irresistible penetration of Western influences, the concept of the "House of War" has in the twentieth century become obsolete even in the eyes of the traditional Arabs, let alone in those of their Westernized fellow countrymen. But if the "House of War" as such does not exist any longer, the distinction between Muslim and infidel remains and it is a sharp one. In fact, as the Arabist Clifford Geertz observed, as a result of the involvement with the West, "into what had been a fine medieval contempt for infidels crept a tense modern note of anxious envy and defensive pride."[9]

In fine, in the Arab view the world appears like a fruit that consists of three parts. At its core is the kernel, the most valuable part: this is the Arab world. Surrounding it is the flesh of the fruit, the Muslim world, enveloping the Arab core area like a protective covering. Outside is the skin, the non-Muslim world, whose very existence testifies to the inscrutability of the ways of Allah.

One last point. Despite the historical difference between the Arab world and the Muslim world, Arabs often tend to identify Arabism with Islam and Islam with Arabism. This tendency can be observed not only among uneducated Arabs who cannot be expected to know too much about the existence of non-Arab Muslims,"[10] but also among Arab literati. The writings of one of the most outstanding contemporary Arab thinkers, Muḥammad Kurd 'Ali (1876–1953), can be mentioned as an example of such an absence of distinction. This prominent Syrian scholar, who was for many years the president of the Arab Academy of Damascus, wrote, among other works, a book entitled *Al-Islâm wa'l-Ḥaḍâra al-'Arabiyya (Islam and Arab Civilization),* published in two volumes in Cairo in 1934 and 1936. One would expect a book with this title to differentiate carefully between Arabs and Muslims, between the narrower and the wider of the two circles, between the part and the whole. This, however, is not the case. While Kurd 'Ali is at pains to distinguish between "Arab" and "Bedouin," he is guilty of an indiscriminate usage of "Arab" and "Muslim" throughout the book.[11] This is a significant characteristic of the ethnocentricity of Arab students of Arab history. Islam, originally the religion of the Arabs, remains for them identified with the Arabs to the extent of making it practically impossible for them to distinguish between the two, despite the fact that they know very well, of course, that Islam underwent important extra-Arab developments.

II

THE GROUP ASPECTS OF THE MIND

HAVING TACKLED THE TERM "ARAB" WE MUST NEXT CLARIFY what we mean by the second word in the title of this book: mind. In fact, it might be asked in general, What is meant by the "mind" of any large population aggregate, such as a nation? Is it at all legitimate to talk about the "mind" of a human group? Is not the "mind" a most personal part of the individual and, as such, unique and uniquely his?

To begin with, it must be admitted that any statement about the mind of a population is, of necessity, an abstraction. Concretely, there are only individual minds (or psyches, or characters, or personalities). Still, by the same token there are only individual human bodies, and yet we are all used to talking about "the human body" and to being told about new discoveries made of formerly unknown properties of "the human body."[1]

The abstractions that we do venture (about either body or mind) are reached by processes of generalization. When we say that the cephalic index (i.e., the width of the head divided by its length and multiplied by 100) of the Arabian Bedouins ranges from 72 to 75, we are resorting to verbal shorthand, the full explication of which would run something like this: On the basis of measurements taken of the breadth and length of the heads of, say, a thousand Arabian Bedouins, one seems to be justified in generalizing and asserting that the cephalic index of the Arabian Bedouins in general ranges from 72 to 75. On the basis of this generalization, in turn, one can make the statement that "the Arabian Bedouin" (which term itself is, of course, an abstraction) is dolichocephalic or long-headed. Likewise, when one ventures a statement about a certain mental characteristic of any given human group, one inevitably generalizes as well as abstracts.

In the writings of social psychologists and psychologically oriented anthropologists, one seldom encounters expressions such as "group mind," "national mind," "racial mind," and the like. They prefer, instead, to use the terms "personality" or "character," and in their studies they discuss the common elements discernible in the personalities (or characters) of individuals who are part of a given sociocultural milieu.

One of the earliest attempts to tackle the problem of the individual and his sociocultural background was made by the anthropologist Ralph Linton and the psychologist Abram Kardiner. The concept of "basic personality types," as developed by these two scholars, rests upon the following postulates:

> 1. That the individual's early experiences exert a lasting effect upon his personality, especially upon the development of his projective systems.
> 2. That similar experiences will tend to produce similar personality configurations in the individuals who are subjected to them.
> 3. That the techniques which the members of any society employ in the care and rearing of children are culturally patterned and will tend to be similar, although never identical, for various families within the society.
> 4. That the culturally patterned techniques for the care and rearing of children differ from one society to another.
>
> If these postulates are correct, and they seem to be supported by a wealth of evidence, it follows:
>
> 1. That the members of any given society will have many elements of early experience in common.
> 2. That as a result of this they will have many elements of personality in common.
> 3. That since the early experience of individuals differs from one society to another, the personality norms for various societies will also differ.
>
> The *basic personality type* for any society is that personality configuration which is shared by the bulk of the society's members as a result of the early experiences which they have in common. It does not correspond to the total personality of the individual but rather to the projective systems or, in different phraseology, the value-attitude systems which are basic to the individual's personality configuration. Thus the same basic personality type may be reflected in many different total personality configurations.[1]

Despite the circumspection with which the above statement was formulated, a few years after its publication another anthropologist-psychologist team, Kluckhohn and Murray, found it necessary to warn that "a group can no more have a 'common character' than they can have a common pair of legs."[4] What can be common to a group is a specific feature, or a set of specific features, that social psychologists and anthropologists have reference to when they talk about national character or modal personality. Incidentally, the very term "modal," borrowed as it is from statistics (where it refers to the value or number that occurs most frequently in a given series), shows that the personality thus described is only the statistically most significant one in the group studied, and not necessarily that of the majority.

The basis of modal personality or national character studies is the observation that human beings who grow up in a common environment exhibit, beyond their individual differences, a strong common factor in their personality. It is inevitable that this should be the case. Any sociocultural environment impresses the individuals who grow up within it with its own stamp: its values, its behavior patterns, its accepted and approved varieties of actions and reactions, as well as its culturally channeled needs and goals. During childhood, the young member of the society gradually internalizes the moral imperatives of his social environment, implanted in him by parents, nurses, teachers, priests, and other individuals in position of authority. At an early age, the channels through which this implantation takes place utilize the lure of rewards for "good," that is, conforming, behavior, and punishment or the threat of punishment for "bad," or nonconforming, behavior. After a number of years, the system of rewards and punishments becomes sufficiently internalized to develop the Freudian "superego," which takes over and continues the task begun by external agents. In this way, the successfully enculturated and socialized individual will become a true representative of his cultural and societal environment, a member of that numerically preponderant group which constitutes the modal personality.[5] I would, therefore, venture to define national character as *the sum total of the motives, traits, beliefs, and values shared by the plurality in a national population.* Since the personality of the plurality in a given population can also be designated as the modal personality, it appears that national character can be equated with modal personality.

At the same time, one can agree with those who insist on a distinction between national character and modal personality and propose that the former term should be used for the more general concept, while the latter should be applied to more narrowly delimited groups. In any population, and especially in contemporary large-scale industrial societies with their great diversity of constituent sectors, there may be several modal personality structures. This means that the national character consists of the sum total of the modal personality structures found in the national population.[6]

The issue, then, comes down to the question of cultural homogeneity. In a national population made up of several distinct culture groups (or ethnic groups), each of these groups can be made the object of a study with a view to ascertaining its modal personality. To take an example from the peripheries of the Arab world, one will undoubtedly find two rather different modal personalities in the Arab north and the Negro south of the Republic of Sudan. In fact, the difference between the two modal personalities will be so pronounced that the researcher would be hard put if he were to try to subsume the two under the general heading of the Sudanese national character.

On the other hand, if the national population studied is fairly homogeneous as far as its ethnic composition is concerned, one will find that the modal personalities of any two or more sample groups will be sufficiently similar to warrant extrapolation from them to the character of the national population at large. As a preliminary tentative estimate in this respect one can state that the Muslim Arabs, who form the overwhelming majority of the population in the Arab world, are definitely closer to this homogeneous type of cultural and personality configuration than to the disparate variety referred to in the preceding paragraph.

The value of the national character concept—with the limitations and qualifications indicated—as a tool of scholarly inquiry and an approach to portraying a large sociocultural aggregate is enhanced by the fact that the idea of a national character is present, albeit in a vague form, in the consciousness of national groups themselves. With the spread of nationalism into all parts of the world, people everywhere acquired the habit of thinking of themselves as members of a nation and as sharing certain national traits.[7] Even minority groups have, in recent years, evinced a growing tendency to view themselves as national groups, constituting a separate nation within the larger political entity in which they live.

As to the Arabs, the best minds as well as some of the simpler people among them have been and still are astute observers of their overall national character. If one reads the *Muqaddima (Introduction to History)* of Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406)—who was undoubtedly the greatest historical genius of his times as well as the greatest ever produced by the Arabs—one is struck again and again by his observations on the Arab character, which add up to a veritable portrait of the Arab national character seen from the vantage point of a historian who could look back upon seven centuries of Arab history. A few brief quotes will suffice to show the Khaldūnian view of some features of the Arab national character. But first one must keep in mind that when Ibn Khaldūn used the name "Arabs" he was referring primarily to the Bedouin or nomadic Arabs: and that he was not entirely free of the universal tendency of intellectuals to fault rather than praise their countrymen.

Under the heading "Arabs can gain control only over flat territory," Ibn Khaldūn explains, "This is because, on account of their savage nature [the Arabs] are people who plunder and cause damage. . . . Eventually their civilization [i.e., of those whom the Arabs conquer] is wiped out. . . ." In the next section, which he entitled "Places that succumb to the Arabs are quickly ruined," Ibn Khaldūn explains, "The reason for this is that [the Arabs] are a savage nation, fully accustomed to savagery and the things that cause it. Savagery has become their character and nature. They enjoy it because it means freedom from authority and no subservience to leadership. Such a natural disposition is the negation and antithesis of civilization."

Perhaps even more remarkable is Ibn Khaldūn's insight into the psychology of the vanquished, which he based on his observations of the peoples conquered by the Arabs, but which holds equally good for the Arabs themselves after they succumbed to European colonial domination. The heading of the section in which he treats this subject reads: "The vanquished always want to imitate the victor in his distinctive mark(s), his dress, his occupation, and his other conditions and customs."[8] Thereafter, Ibn Khaldūn adds several more features to his portrait of the Arab national character. "The Arab," he says,

> can obtain authority only by making use of some religious coloring, such as prophecy or sainthood, or some great religious event in general. The reason for this is that, because of their savagery, the Arabs are least willing of nations to subordinate themselves to each other, as they are rude, proud, ambitious, and eager to be the leader.[9]

While Ibn Khaldūn's observations refer primarily to the Bedouin Arabs, his disciple Taqī al-Dīn Aḥmad al-Maqrīzī (1364–1442), the most eminent of Mamluk historians and himself an Egyptian, discusses in some detail the character of his countrymen. The Egyptians' character, he says, is dominated by

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> inconstancy, indecision, indolence, cowardice, despondency, avarice, impatience, disdain of study, fearfulness, jealousy, slander, falsehood, readiness to denounce others to the king and to accuse them; in brief, the foundation of their character is composed of the vilest faults produced by the meanness of the soul. All of them are not like this, but these faults are encountered among most of them.

A few pages later, Maqrīzī returns to the subject and adds several more traits to his unflattering portrayal of the Egyptian character:

> That which dominates in the character of the Egyptians is the love of pleasure, the propensity for enjoyments, the love of trifles, the belief in impossible things, the weakness in resolution and decision. They are extremely inclined to cunning and deceit; from their birth they excel in it and are very skilful in using it, because there is in their character a basis of flattery and adulation which makes them masters in it more than all the peoples who have lived before them or will live after them.

In a third passage Maqrīzī repeats some of the points he made in foregoing quotes, adds that the Egyptians are characterized by the "absence of reflection," and records that "our shaykh, the master Abū Zayd 'Abdul-Raḥmān Ibn Khaldūn, told me: 'The Egyptians act as if they would never have to render account.' " As against this long list of negative traits, Maqrīzī finds only two positive features in the Egyptian character: they are not jealous of their wives, and those of them who live in seaside towns are of a gentle nature, which he attributes to the effect of the humidity.[10]

Medieval Arab generalizations about the personality of a people, such as those offered by Ibn Khaldūn and Maqrīzī, are based on personal observation and/or statements made by respected authorities. In any case, they represent attempts to describe group character by enumerating one feature discerned after another. As against them, Arab folk wisdom, as expressed in innumerable proverbs and sayings, usually picks out one particular feature which it considers characteristic of Arabs in general, or of one specific subdivision of the Arab people, and presents it in an emphatic statement. A very few examples of this kind of folk characterization will have to suffice.

One of the most frequently quoted proverbs, current in several variants in many Arab countries, is: "I and my brothers against my cousin; I and my cousins against the stranger" (or "against the world"). This is an acute comment on the Arab traits of family cohesion and hierarchical loyalties. A proverb current in Syria and Lebanon comments on Arab pride: "Even if I have to see the worm of hunger emerge from my mouth, I shall not debase myself" (i.e., by asking help). Another reflects the Arab dislike of

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authority: "Nothing humiliates a man like being subject to somebody else's authority." The importance of self-respect and of face-saving, as well as of independence, is emphasized again and again in Arabic proverbs: "Pass in front of your enemy when you are hungry, but not when you are naked." "Work on Sunday and holidays, and be not in need of your fortunate brother." "Better to die with honor than to live in humiliation." "Be content with a piece of wild celery, but don't humiliate yourself, O my soul!" "Shave with a hatchet, but don't be obliged to someone else."[11] There are thousands of proverbs current in the Arab world which either comment upon the Arab character as it is actually found to be, or hold out, in the form of advice, the character traits which the ideal Arab should strive to possess. A study of these proverbs would yield a fascinating folk view of the Arab character and would set forth the Arab value system as applied to personal conduct.

That there is such a thing as the "mind" of a national entity was discovered by at least one Arab intellectual about the same time as (or perhaps even earlier than) the concept came in vogue in the West. Ṭāha Ḥusain (1889–), who has been called "probably the leading scholar-littérateur of the Arab world,"[12] operates with the concept in his book entitled *The Future of Culture in Egypt,*[13] published in Cairo in 1938. In this book, Ṭāhā Ḥusain asks the question, Is the Egyptian mind (he uses the Arabic term "*'aql*") Eastern or Western in terms of its concept formation, perception, understanding, and judgment? And his answer is, It is Western because in the past it was part of the Mediterranean mind, and thus related to the European mind. All appearances notwithstanding, even in the modern age, Egypt has taken Europe for her model in all aspects of material life, and her spiritual life, too, is purely European. All the signs point to Egypt developing toward complete coalescence with Europe.

Another term Ṭāhā Ḥusain is fond of using closely corresponds to the English concept of national character. He talks about the *shakhṣiyya*, or "personality," of Egypt, which, he asserts, she was able to preserve intact despite the dominion exercised over her by numerous powerful nations. Egypt's own personality was formed by her unchangeable geographical situation, as well as by other factors which have remained constant. This being the case, Egypt does not have to fear that Westernization will endanger her personality or her national identity and individuality.[14]

One would expect a people so sensitive to national character traits to be aware of differences that exist between one Arab country and another, as well as between various population elements in one and the same country. And this, indeed, is the case. Well known is the Bedouin stereotype of the fellah, or Arab peasant, whom he considers to be a slave of the soil. The urbanite, too, has his own stereotype of the fellah: a dumb, subservient, docile beast of burden. He is lazy, cowardly, cringing, stupid, and evil; or, according to a more charitable view, quiet, gentle, satisfied with his lot, happy, grateful, and a hard and loyal worker. The fellah himself, knowing that patience is one of the character traits that makes his life bearable, extols it in many proverbs: "Patience demolishes mountains." "Nothing is lost with patience." "Patience is beautiful." "A patient man sees freedom." "God is with the patient." His opinion of the Bedouin and the townspeople is rarely expressed, because he fears the former and often is dependent on the latter (his landlord). One proverb nevertheless ridicules the Bedouin: "Everything is soap for the Bedouin."[7]

Nor is the observation of differences in national character between one Arab country and another a new development in the Arab world. In fact, astute Arab observers had remarked on these differences many centuries before the concept of national character was formulated in the West. A classical example is attributed by Maqrīzī to Ka'b al-Aḥbār, one of the companions of the Prophet Muḥammad. The observation is couched in an anecdotal form but its import is unmistakable: When Allah created all things, Ka'b is reported to have said, He gave them each a companion. "I am going to Syria," said Reason, "I will go with you," said Rebellion. Abundance said: "I am going to Egypt"; "I shall accompany you," said Resignation." "I am going to the Desert," said Poverty; "I shall go with you," said Health.

Carrying this a stage further, Maqrīzī goes on:

> When God created the world, He also created, it is said, ten character types: faith, honor, courage, rebellion, pride, hypocrisy, riches, poverty, humility, and misery. Faith said: "I shall go to Yemen"; "I shall accompany you," said Honor. Courage said, "I shall go to Syria"; "I shall go with you," said Rebellion. "I shall go to Iraq," said Pride, "I shall accompany you," said Humility. Poverty said, "I shall go into the Desert"; "I shall go with you," said Misery."[8]

As can be seen from these quotes from Maqrīzī, educated Arabs in the fourteenth and fifteenth century were well aware, not only of the existence of an Arab national character, but also of character differences between the Arab peoples inhabiting various countries. To this day this latter factor causes one of the main difficulties for anybody who attempts to portray the Arab mind. There seems to be no such thing as an Arab in the abstract. He is always, and has been at least since the days of Maqrizi, an Iraqi Arab, a Syrian Arab, and so forth. These differences in character have, in turn, led to the creation in many parts of the Arab world of local tendencies, which frequently clash with the overall, larger ideal of all-Arab unity.

One of the main problems, then, in dealing with the Arab mind, or the Arab national character, is that the Arabs have for over a thousand years inhabited a larger geographical area than any comparable ethnic group and that this historico-geographic factor tends to express itself in two contrapuntal themes in the Arab mentality: the theme of all-Arab unity, which is a matter of aspiration; and that of the particularistic local Arab nationalism, which is a matter of realistic self-interest. As far as the modal Arab personality is concerned, one can, as a working hypothesis, posit the same interplay between general all-Arab and particular local Arab character traits as occurs in the cultural realm.''

III

ARAB CHILD-REARING PRACTICES

1. THE ISSUE OF SEVERITY

IS THERE SUCH A THING AS A GENERAL PATTERN OF CHILD-rearing practices in the Arab world? The question is of basic importance because, as several leading social psychologists have conclusively shown, child-rearing practices are among the most important factors contributing to the formation of the modal personality.[1] As so often with basic questions, this too is rather difficult to answer. In fact, for lack of sufficient data, no definitive answer at all can be given. A number of considerations nevertheless allow us to arrive at least at a tentative conclusion.

First of all, one finds that even two such widely separated cultures as those of Morocco and Iraq appear quite similar when compared with, say, the Greek, or Italian, or Sub-Saharan Negro culture. And this basic cultural similarity, which underlies the surface manifestations of local differences, is very likely to have a correlate in the basic similarity of child-rearing practices in all parts of the Arab world.

Secondly, in quite a large number of studies dealing with many different parts of the Arab world one can find at least a few observations on child-rearing practices which point to the same kind of basic similarity. One century Muslim religious scholar, the object of historiography was "remarkable happenings which are of interest.'" Even when Arab historians use the term "time" they use it, not in the sense of a period of duration within whose course a historical process is played out, or, as Spengler put it, "the limitless flight of times," but in the sense of a brief time section centered on a great or remarkable event. As al-Kāfiyajī says, "linguistically, (the words) time-section *(zamān)* and time *(waqt)* are identical.'" This being the case, Arabic historiography has nothing comparable to the critical method in the study and the writing of history which was introduced into Western historiography (primarily by Leopold von Ranke) nor to the interaction of history with other social sciences which has characterized it for the last hundred years.

Let me conclude this section by casting one more glance at Hebrew, one of the few other Semitic languages in addition to Arabic alive today. In its ancient form, Hebrew duplicated the indeterminacy of verb tenses we found in Arabic. In biblical Hebrew usage, as shown by the example from the Book of Job quoted above, the imperfect can refer to the past tense; similarly, the perfect can refer to the future, much as in Arabic. However, after the biblical period, the Hebrew language began a process of development whose end result today is a complete elimination of these ancient ambiguities. In fact, it can be said that one of the main differences between modern and biblical Hebrew is that in modern Hebrew the verb has past and future tenses as in Western languages, while in biblical Hebrew it had perfect and imperfect forms as Arabic still has to this day.

Before Arabic can become a medium adequate for the requirements of modern life, including those of scholarly and scientific discourse, it will have to undergo a similar development. It will have to become more factual, rid itself of its traditional rhetoricism, its exaggeration and overassertion, and transform its perfect and imperfect verb forms into semantic equivalents of the past and future tenses respectively of Standard Average European.

V

THE BEDOUIN SUBSTRATUM OF THE ARAB PERSONALITY[1]

1. THE BEDOUIN IDEAL

ALTHOUGH TODAY THE BEDOUINS CONSTITUTE PROBABLY NOT more than 10 per cent of the population of the Arab world, many Arabs, in both the villages and the cities, claim Bedouin origin. What is more important than mere numbers is that a very large sector of the settled population still considers the Bedouin ethos as an ideal to which, in theory at least, it would like to measure up. As Jacques Berque, one of the few Westerners who have written about the Arab world with true sensitivity and empathy, put it: ". . . the emotional intensity of the desert dweller has imposed its ideal on the opulent cities."[2] The fact is that the Bedouins are looked upon, not only by the Arab cities, but by the entire Arab world with the exception of its Westernized elements, as images and figures from the past, as living ancestors, as latterday heirs and witnesses to the ancient glory of the heroic age. Hence the importance of the Bedouin ethos, and of the Bedouins' aristocratic moral code, for the Arab world in general.

The heroic age, the period in which the ancestral group performed great deeds with lasting effects, indelibly impresses itself upon the mentality of every people. Looking back upon heroic ancestors, the progeny tends to endow them with almost superhuman traits, transforming them into veritable giants of courage, statesmanship, intellect, or whatever features are most valued in the culture of their descendants. In upholding them as ideal images, the progeny creates for itself prototypes whose words and actions must, and indeed do, serve as exemplars, as powerful influences on value systems and behavior patterns alike.

Among the Arabs, with their typical ahistoricity, the heroic age is actually timeless. It has, of course, existed in the past but, because of the unchanging environment that was its stage, it continues in the present. To put it differently, for the Arab mind there is not so much a heroic age, which left its indelible mark on all subsequent generations, as a heroic environment and a special social form that grew up in response to its challenge. The environment is that of the Arabian Desert, and the society that of the desert people, the nomads. Desert is *badw* or *bādiya* in Arabic, from which is derived the name *badwī* or *badawī*, or "Bedouin" in the customary English form, meaning inhabitant of deserts. Incidentally, another meaning of the noun *badw* is "beginning," which permits the inference that to the old Arabs the desert was the beginning of the world as water was to the Hebrews and to Thales. While the desert and its Bedouins are very far removed from the great majority of the Arabs, who are either town dwellers or villagers and have been for many generations, in ideology and scale of values both still loom large; in fact, they still hold the undisputed first place.

As one of the many indications of this pre-eminence of the desert and the values and mores of the desert people, let me mention that until quite recently it was customary among the best families of Damascus (and of other Arab cities), who had been town dwellers for countless generations, to send their sons for a year or two to one of the *aṣīl* ("noble") camel-breeding tribes of the Syrian Desert in order to expose them to the experience, mentality, manners, and values of the Bedouins, much as the British gentry would send their sons to Eton and Oxford, or aristocratic Japanese families would place theirs in a Zen monastery for a few weeks every year. In each case, the purpose was the same: to enable the youths to absorb as much as possible of what is considered the best and noblest in the national tradition. The young city Arab was supposed, in particular, to learn from his Bedouin hosts their "pure" Arabic and their highly valued manners and customs (the Arabic terms are "*adab*," literally, good manners or politeness, and "*'ādāt*," customs).

This tendency to look up to the Bedouin as the "ideal" Arab was reinforced by the practice of many generations of Muslim jurists who in their legal decisions relied heavily on Bedouin precedents,[3] and by the reliance of Arabic philologists on Bedouin usage in deciding on fine points of grammar.[4]

If time has cast a veil of oblivion over the Bedouin origins of a village population, social or political circumstances occasionally bring back the awareness of Bedouin ancestry forcefully, compellingly. Such was the case, for instance, in Egypt, where under the influence of the Egyptian nationalist movement led by Aḥmed 'Urābī ('Arabi) Pasha (1839?–1911), the Bedouin ideal was brought back into the villages. It is still dominant especially in the Ṣa'īd (Upper Egypt), where "patriarchal hierarchies and vendettas and the proud attitudes" of the nomadic Bedouins have "oddly and dangerously influenced" the mentality of the fellahin.[5] More recently, a psychologically oriented Arab analyst of the contemporary scene has criticized the Arab countries for adhering to Bedouin values and glorifying them. The Shī'ite Iraqi author 'Alī Ḥasan al-Wardī takes exception to the entire trend of thought and emotion which looks up to the Bedouin virtues as something to be emulated. He criticizes even Arab nationalism because, while it combats imperialists with the sword, it breeds imperialism within itself in glorifying the Bedouin ethos. Closely related to Wardī's criticism of the Bedouin ethos is his attack on the traditional values of Arabic literature, including those of the greatest classical writers, whose works, he says, abound in panegyrics of authority, Bacchic exaltation, amorous sensuality, and verbal decoration. All these features—which incidentally stem from the Bedouin ethos—are uniformly denounced; Wardī does not hesitate to declare that the very idea that classical Arabic literature was "noble" is nothing but a fable, a legend, without any foundation in reality.[6]

The preservation in many families of a tradition of or claim to tribal ancestry is another common form of nostalgia for the Bedouin virtues. Such traditions and claims are found quite frequently among the inhabitants of small towns and large cities alike, even in families who have been town dwellers for many generations. People of humble circumstances, such as artisans and workers, preserve the tradition of their Bedouin descent carefully and jealously, for it supplies them with the one and only claim they have to a semblance of status and social importance. A case in point is the descent claimed by the parents of 'Abd al-Karīm Qāsim, the revolutionary leader of Iraq from 1958 to 1963. His father, Jāsim Muḥammad Bakr, was a poor carpenter who lived in the Mahdiyya quarter on the left bank of the Tigris, inhabited by poor and hard-working Sunni Muslim families. He claimed descent through his father from the Zubayd (or Zubed) tribe, and through his mother from the Bani Tamim, both well-known tribes of Arabian origin.[7]

In general, even in the poorest suburbs of Baghdad, where swarms of uprooted people live in frightful congestion in primitive huts, people take great pride in keeping up their tribal traditions and divisions, their old loyalties, their own customary law, in a word, their Bedouin heritage.[8] In Damascus, each constituent group of the population used to uphold "its own interests and virtues according to a partriarchal code of honour which owed much to the Bedouin model; the latter, both through its poetic tradition and its geographical importance, forced itself on the city."[9]

What kind of person is this Bedouin to whom relationship is claimed by high and low alike in settled Arab society? We may begin by stating that he is son and master of the desert, whose way of life has changed very little from the time he domesticated the camel in the eleventh or twelfth century B.C. until the penetration of his ancestral habitat by modern technology in search for oil. For three thousand years, the desert was his impregnable stronghold: here the Bedouin could preserve undisturbed the way of life he had developed in close symbiosis with his camel, the "ship of the desert." In the desert he was able to guard his sacred traditions, the purity of his language and his blood, and develop a unique social and cultural adaptation to one of the harshest environments known to man on earth. In the process he himself became, like his hunting falcon, tense, keen, quick-tempered, a bundle of nerves, sinews, and bones. His life alternates between periods of lethargic inactivity and outbursts of frenzied activity and almost frenetic effort. Except for a few festive occasions when he gorges himself on the meat of a slaughtered sheep or young camel, the Bedouin subsists on dates, sour camel's milk, and a mixture of flour or roasted corn. His long belted shirt *(thawb)* is covered by an equally long cloak *('abā)*, which gives him an uncommonly dignified and aristocratic appearance. His head is covered by a shawl *(kūfiyya)* held in place by a crown of thick cord *('iqāl)*. Trousers are not worn and footwear is rare. The trying, often cruel, conditions of his life endow him with a mentality to which passive endurance seems preferable to all effort to change his lot. At the same time, he is a rugged individualist who refuses to bend to authority and whose loyalty is limited to family and tribe. The desert itself is such a hard taskmaster and demands so much discipline that the Bedouin has no patience left for any imposed by outside authority.

THE BEDOUIN SUBSTRATUM

A discussion of those Arab values which go back to Bedouin origins, or belong to the Bedouin substratum, must begin with a brief indication of the nature of Bedouin society itself. This society, where it still exists today, has remained essentially unchanged since pre-Islamic times in many basic aspects: it is still organized along the same structural lines, exhibits the same internal dynamics, upholds the same values, and has preserved even in its religious life many pre-Islamic features.

The Bedouins were, and are, a patrilineal and patriarchal society, kin-based and strongly kin-oriented. The functional social unit in Bedouin society is the wandering group—a number of extended families, all of whom usually trace their descent to one common patrilineal ancestor. Such a unit camps together, wanders together in search of pasture for its animals, practices endogamy (ingroup marriage), and has a strongly developed feeling of cohesion. In the world of the Bedouin, subsisting in the forbidding physical environment of the Syrian, Arabian, and North African deserts and steppes, social development until recent times has never grown beyond the stage of tribal organization. In practice, this meant that several related wandering units formed a subtribe, several of these a tribe, and some of the tribes occasionally constituted a tribal confederation. The larger the social aggregate thus produced, the smaller the cohesion among its constituent groups, and the rarer the cases in which it was able to join forces for common action. This also meant that beyond the extended family and the next larger kin group to which it belonged and which made up the wandering unit, there was no power structure, no authority, and no protection on which the individual could count. In the desert it was literally each man and his kin group against the rest of the world.

The effect of this situation was to develop a number of interlocking social measures, each backed by similarly interlocking values. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that nomadic life in the desert was made possible by the development of certain values and by the measures in which they were embodied and expressed. In any case, the challenge of the desert was met, and met by a very specific set of values, structures, and dynamics. The interlocking nature of these can easily be demonstrated while analyzing them from the point of view of their responsiveness to desert conditions.

First of all one must recognize that the desert, at least until the discovery of oil and the digging of artesian wells for water, was capable of supporting barely more than a subsistence economy. Hence only the tribe and no larger, more complex political structure could be erected, because the latter would have required the production of surplus food to be used to support administrators, soldiers, and other economically non-productive sectors. Given this limitation, the first order was to protect the individual from attack by others stronger than he. This was achieved primarily by the emphasis on the kin group and kin cohesion, and by instilling into each member a commitment to group solidarity and mutual responsibility as supreme values. Such values can develop and function as mandatory guidelines only in a small society, in which interpersonal relations are based on personal contact and social life takes place in a milieu where people are all personally known to one another and most are related by blood or, at least, by a fiction of common descent. In such a small society there are considerable pressures to conform, to uphold the group values, and to live by the unwritten but inevitably well-known moral code of the group. To put it in the simplest form, without the effective support and protection of the kin group, the individual would be lost. The price he has to pay for this support is conformity to the group's code and values and their internalization to the extent of emotionally identifying his own interests with those of the group, a conformity, that is not felt to do violence to individuality.

2. GROUP COHESION

In most general terms it can be stated that those personality traits which tend to strengthen group cohesion are considered positive values, are encouraged and rewarded in childhood, and approved and upheld as ideals in adulthood. Conversely, those personality traits which can in any way be detrimental to group cohesion are considered faults; their manifestations are discouraged and punished in childhood, and met with strong disapproval and censure throughout the individual's life. In childhood, those who exercise this control over the individual are father, mother, aunts, uncles, siblings, cousins, and other members of the extended family. Later, the control group becomes co-extensive with the functioning social unit, that is, the group which camps and wanders together.

Here there is no anonymity. Everybody is personally known to everybody else, and this in itself makes for very effective social control, which is reinforced by the age hierarchy. In other words, the younger one is, the smaller is the number of those who, being even younger, do not wield the double-edged sword of approbation and reprobation. The older a person gets, the smaller the number of those to whose judgment he must defer, and the larger the number of those who must defer to his. On the other hand, the older a person gets, the more he feels a different kind of pressure: that of serving as an exemplar, a status that can only be achieved by scrupulous conformity to the moral code and value orientation of the group.

What are the personality traits most approved or censured in Bedouin society? They come in pairs, directly juxtaposed. At the positive end is the trait or value which aids and abets group cohesion, and hence group survival; at the negative end is its opposite. Bravery *(ḥamāsa)* and cowardice are one set of such pairs, and an elemental one at that: it needs no special explanation to understand that in a society in which each group is fair prey to the others, only that group can survive whose members are brave and willing to defend the group no matter what the personal risk.

Related to bravery and cowardice are the traits of aggressiveness–peacefulness, or manliness *(muruwwa)*[10]–meekness. Yet there is an important difference between the two sets of pairs. Bravery is an absolute value; brave behavior is expected of a man in every context. Its opposite, cowardice, is absolutely contemptible: in no context must a man show himself a coward. Aggressiveness, on the other hand, is expected of a man only outside the social group to which he belongs. Within it, it would be met with reprobation, and the man guilty of ingroup aggression would be judged a troublemaker, a man not fulfilling his supreme duty as a group member, which is to support and strengthen the social aggregate. Again, peacefulness is judged a negative trait only if because of it a man refrains from defending the rights of his group against another. Otherwise, the peaceful and peace-seeking man is valued, and is often called upon to mediate in intergroup disputes. Within the group, where aggressiveness is condemned, peacefulness is always considered desirable and laudable; the peaceful man tends to maintain peace in his group and thereby strengthen it *vis-à-vis* other groups.

An oft-recurring situation in Bedouin society in which both the aggressive and the peaceful members of the group are expected to play out the roles to which their natures predispose them is the blood feud. If a member of a group is killed by a member of another group, the relatives of the victim have suffered because their group strength has been diminished. The overt emotional reaction of the injured group is that its honor has been blemished. Revenge is called for, which becomes the duty of all the male members of the victim's kin group, all the men within his *khamsa*. (The *khamsa* is a man's kin group, composed of all those male relatives who are removed from him by no more than five male links. The exact composition of the *khamsa* varies from tribe to tribe, but its function is largely identical everywhere: it serves as the group on whose support a man can always count in any feud with an outsider in which he gets involved.") If the avengers cannot find the murderer, any member of the murderer's *khamsa* is a legitimate target for blood revenge. In this effort it is, of course, the aggressive members of the victim's *khamsa* who play an active role. They will go after the murderer and make plans to revenge the murder in a manner prescribed in detail by the tribal law. In the meantime, or after a certain period, the peaceful members of the victim's family (usually the older men) will begin a parallel effort to find one or more respected leaders, equally distant in kinship from both feuding groups, and persuade them to undertake the difficult but highly honorable task of mediation.

The duties of blood revenge and mediation are features of the Bedouin ethos which have been passed on almost unchanged into village life and which survive in Arab urban society as well. The persistence of blood revenge makes the work of the police and the judiciary difficult in capital cases or other offenses for which tribal law demands blood revenge: even if a murderer is sentenced to death and executed, the duty of the victim's *khamsa* to avenge their kinsman's death will not be fulfilled; it will be fulfilled only if they actually kill either the murderer or one of his relatives. *Dam buṭlub dam,* "Blood demands blood," says the oft-quoted Arabic proverb. The honor of the victim's family is restored only if its members themselves retaliate, or a reconciliation *(ṣulḥa)* is arranged and appropriate damages paid.

Because of the inexorability of the law of blood revenge, raiding—which until recently was a favorite pastime as well as an economic necessity among the Bedouins—used to be carried out with circumspection and caution so that no member of either side was killed. The spilling of blood would transform the raid (in Arabic *ghazw,* whence *razzia*) into a blood feud in which both sides would inevitably suffer. The purpose of the raid was to rob another group of as many of its animals as possible, without actually clashing with the men who tended them. A successful *ghazw* achieved two aims at once: it strengthened one's own group by augmenting the numbers of its herds and flocks, and it weakened the enemy by reducing its herds and flocks, which are the basis of livelihood, even survival, in the desert. As Hitti put it,

> Since the days of Ishmael, the Arabian's hand has been against every man and every man's hand against him. . . . In desert land, where the fighting mood is a chronic mental condition, raiding is one of the few manly occupations. . . . The poet al-Quṭâmî of the early Umayyad period has given expression to the guiding principle of such life in two verses: "Our business is to make raids on the enemy, on our neighbor and on our own brother, in case we find none to raid but a brother."' . . . According to the rules of the game—and *ghazw* is a sort of national sport—no blood should be shed except in cases of extreme necessity . . . . These ideas of *ghazw* and its terminology were carried over by the Arabians into the Islamic conquests."

However, the game of the *ghazw* must be played according to rules as strict and as confining as those of chess. If it were simply a matter of robbery, the weaker tribes, deprived of their animals by the raids of the stronger ones, would have long disappeared. Obeying the rules, which carry with them the sanction of loss of honor, raiding can take place only between tribes, or tribal sections, which are each other's equals or near-equals in both status and strength. For a noble tribe to raid an inferior tribe (everybody in the desert knows the distinctions between the two) would be so shameful that the noble tribe would rather starve than do such a thing. Similarly, a strong tribe would only heap shame on its head if it raided a tribe patently weaker than itself.

If happens, of course, that these rules of the raiding game are not obeyed and that a group of young men from a noble camel-breeding tribe sometimes undertakes a predatory foray against an inferior tribe or a settled community. While these excursions are not considered to be up to standard according to the ethos of a noble tribe, not much opprobrium attaches to them because the booty they bring home improves the economic situation of the tribe, and because they provide something like training exercises for the tribal youth. In order to preclude such incursions, the non-noble tribes and the settled communities which lived within raiding distance from a powerful noble tribe used to enter into a client relationship with it, paying it an annual *khuwwa* ("brotherhood"), that is, protection money."

Since these norms and arrangements leave only a relatively small number of tribes as potential targets for a tribe intent on raiding—tribes equal to it in status, and near it in strength—the outcome of the *ghazw* game depends not on sheer numerical superiority or the physical strength of the two sides as measured in manpower, but on their relative daring, skill, and endurance. It is in this light that a raid assumes the character of a supreme test of all the manly virtues subsumed under the concept of *muruwwa*.

Enough has been said of the Bedouin ethos to make us understand one additional juxtaposition which it impresses upon the Bedouin mind, and which found its way from there into the Arab mind in general. This juxtaposition is that of activity–passivity. The typical Bedouin's life alternates between relatively long periods of passivity, of spending all day in what the Italian mind, with a similar appreciation and inclination, considers the "dolce far niente" "the sweet doing nothing," and brief spurts of frantic activity best exemplified by the *ghazw*. The Bedouin temper is characterized by sudden flare-ups, which can easily lead to violence and even murder, followed by remorse and long periods of tranquility, inactivity, almost apathy. This alternation between two poles has been observed and commented upon by numerous students of the Arabs, for it is characteristic not only of the nomads but also, although to a lesser degree, of the settled people, villagers and city dwellers alike.[13] Even in semi-Westernized Arab society, in a generally friendly gathering, such sudden, violent outbursts of temper occur not infrequently, but they cause only a momentary flurry, since everybody knows they mean nothing serious, and that the even flow of give-and-take will return after what normally proves to be but a short interruption.

In the Arab method of introducing changes into the social order, economic structure, and political life, one notices the same phenomenon: sudden, sporadic advances followed by periods of quiescence in which what was achieved in the brief stage of activity either gradually erodes or becomes set into a new pattern of tradition. This new tradition, in turn, becomes an impediment to further gradual advance, and can be overcome only by a new outburst of changes.

George Antonius remarks in his well-known book *The Arab Awakening* that the Arabs approach any undertaking in successive and isolated spasms, rather than in a continuous and sustained effort and endeavor. It is to this trait that (following Antonius) Fāris and Husayn attribute the "intermittent and violent explosions interspersed with periods of repose and inactivity" which, they find, characterize the history of the Arab national movement.[14]

The same point is repeated almost verbatim, although based on quite a different set of observations, by Leila S. Kadi in her study of the Arab summit conferences. In commenting on the failure of the individual Arab governments to implement the resolutions of the conferences, Miss Kadi remarks: "It is much easier, it would seem, to plunge into *immediate* action, envisaged as a 'one-shot' action, than it is to embark upon a protracted action which, it is recognized in advance, would necessitate continuous implementation and patient sacrifice over a long time."[11]

It is, of course, a far cry from the juxtaposed Bedouin activity–passivity to the alternating pattern one can observe in the conduct of affairs in Arab government circles and other echelons of leadership. But there are connecting links between the two phenomena. One must not forget that the leaders of the Arab world today, or at any rate their parents, were brought up in an environment where Bedouin values were upheld and Bedouin influences strongly felt.

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perhaps the most vicious, because most insidious, attempt of the West to impose itself upon the Arab East. However, just as all the protests against Western cultural imperialism are of no avail, as will be shown later, one can expect that ultimately the Arab mind will have no choice but to accept Western sex mores; and its innate ingenuity will find a way to modify and mold them until it will create, after the example of "Arab socialism," a special Arab subvariety of the new sexuality.

IX

THE ISLAMIC COMPONENT OF ARAB PERSONALITY

1. RELIGION EAST AND WEST

THE ISLAMIC COMPONENT OF THE ARAB PERSONALITY IS best approached by comparing the role of religion among the Arabs and among Westerners.

The normative function of religion is manifested in the extent to which it regulates everyday behavior through positive and negative commandments, all of which, ideally, must be observed. In the West, at least since the onset of the Industrial Revolution, this function of religion has shrunk considerably. Religious doctrine and ritual, even for those who follow religious precepts meticulously, cover but one area of life, separate from most of the everyday pursuits. Religion has thus become divorced from the essentially secular goals and values which constitute the bulk of modern Western culture. Moreover, most people, especially in the large metropolitan centers, do not feel religious or, at the utmost, are quite lukewarm in their attitude to religion. Religion does not regulate their lives. Indeed, in the West religion has largely lost its normative function.

In the Arab world, on the other hand, before the impact of Westernization, Islam permeated life, all of which came under its aegis. Religion was not one aspect of life, but the hub from which all else radiated. All custom and tradition was religious, and religious do's and don'ts extended throughout all activity, thought, and feeling. Most importantly, all the people in the Arab world were religious in the double sense of unquestioningly believing what tradition commanded them to believe, and obeying the ritual rules with which religion circumscribed their lives. Religion was—and for the traditional majority in all Arab countries has remained—the central normative force in life.

In the West, religion has largely lost its function as an inner sustaining force. The most obvious expression of this loss of power is that most people no longer believe that man is protected by God. Despite the unceasing efforts of valiant evangelists to persuade Western man that "Jesus saves," most Westerners do not feel the need to be saved, although they certainly feel insecure. Toynbee speaks of "the spiritual vacuum which has been hollowed in our Western hearts by the progressive decay of religious belief that has been going on for some two-and-a-half centuries."[1] What Islam can impart, in contrast to this, has been observed by Rebecca West. Speaking of a Christian youth who acted as her guide in Yugoslavia, she remarks: "The lad was worse off for being a Christian; he had not that air of being sustained in his poverty by secret spiritual funds that is so noticeable in the poverty-stricken Moslem."[2] In the Arab world, and in the entire Middle East, all religions have such spiritual sustaining power. All share with Islam the "characteristic of being able to generate a psychological certainty of possessing the Truth, of following the Right Path, and of wielding the Perfect Key to the gate of the Great Beyond." They all impart

> the feeling that one does what is right because one observes the commandments of one's religion, and that one is inwardly protected from serious harm because God, in whom one trusts, keeps an eye on each individual and ultimately metes out just retribution. These convictions give the true believers of every faith, creed, and sect an extraordinary sense of security, an ability to preserve their calm and dignity and detachment, without depriving them of the ability to seek and enjoy whatever pleasures can be wrung from this world.[3]

As far as the supernatural component of religion is concerned, both official Christianity and official Islam paint a similar portrait of the deity. Both agree that God can be described in the same way: He is eternal, the creator of the universe and of man, omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient, benevolent, and merciful. They differ in that Islam insists, like Judaism, that God is invisible and that therefore it is sinful, and hence forbidden, to represent Him in a painting or a statue. Christianity, especially Catholicism, while also maintaining that the deity is invisible, permits, and in fact encourages, artistic representations of God. Another significant difference is that, at least according to the Muslim view, Christianity is not strictly monotheistic since it believes in three persons of the deity, while Islam insists on the strictest oneness of Allah. To the Muslim, the Christian concept of a God who became man and, while man, suffered and died, smacks of outright idolatry, as does the Catholic veneration of statues of Christ, Mary, and the saints.

Beneath the thin veneer of official doctrine are old popular beliefs, held by the masses who know little of the theological tenets of their religion. In the West, little of this popular religiosity has survived. A belief in the existence of the Devil, which, incidentally, is also part of the official doctrines of both Islam and Christianity, does survive on the popular level; but in order to find a living belief in demons, spirits, the evil eye, and other supernatural forces, and an actual worship of local saints, one has to go to the Mediterranean, a region transitional between the West and the Arab world. In the Arab world itself, popular religion places even more emphasis on demons. There is belief in innumerable demons and spirits, jinn, ghouls, 'ifrīts, the evil eye, and the like, as well as belief in, and ritual worship of, numerous saints who, especially at their tomb-sanctuaries, wield great supernatural power. With the inconsistency characteristic of religious thinking and feeling on this level, the believers are unaware of any incompatibility between their belief in Allah the only God, and these numerous superhumans who people their world of the unseen.

There is a marked similarity between Christianity and Islam in their exclusivity. Both are characterized by religious jealousy, intolerance, the conviction that only the doctrines of the faith, or rather the sect, to which one belongs are true and valid and that all other faiths are in error. While Christianity has recently begun to modify its position on these issues, in the past it was considered the duty of the Church to impose, by force if necessary, its faith on unbelievers. This had a Muslim counterpart in the doctrine of *Dīn Muḥammad bi'l-sayf* (literally, "The religion of Muḥammad with the sword"), which required all Muslims to spread Islam by the force of arms. When two such doctrines met, as they did many times in the Middle

Ages, clashes were bound to ensue, and the number of those massacred in the name of "gentle Jesus" and "Allah the compassionate" was legion.

The days of religious wars between Christians and Muslims (although not between Muslims and Hindus) are gone. Christianity is struggling to work out a compromise between its old religiocentrism and the new ideal of ecumenism. Islam has not yet come face to face with this problem. The issues it is grappling with are rather similar to those Western religions tackled a century to a century and a half ago: primarily the problems of adjusting an antiquated religious law (the *sharī'a)* to the changing conditions of modern life.

Both Christianity and Islam (as well as Judaism, their fountainhead) present man with a balanced teleology. The ultimate aim of human life, they maintain, is twofold: to achieve moral stature and live a good life in This World, and to obtain salvation in the Other. This dual purpose is given classical expression in the popular Arab saying: "*I'a'mal li-dunyatika ka'annaka ta'īshu abadā; wa-ta'mal li-ākhiratika ka'annaka tamūtu ghadā*"—"Labor for This World of yours as if you were to live forever; and labor for the Other World of yours as if you were to die tomorrow." The recurrent theme in the prayers offered up to God by the faithful of both religions (as well as of Judaism) is the request that God provide the "daily bread," that is, the material wherewithal man needs to continue living in This World. Curiously, the blessings one strives for in the afterlife, in the World to Come, are also conceived in material terms, in both Christianity and Islam. In Christianity, somewhat vaguely, the spiritual existence of the just in the heavenly paradise is described as a perpetual pleasure derived from God's radiance in a glorious realm; while in Islam, it is described more robustly as the enjoyment of a well-watered, shady garden, in which the pious will have everything, including the services of houris, those eternally young, beautiful, and virginal black-eyed maidens.

To sum up, the main differences between Islam and Christianity lie in their normative and psychological functions; in their view of the supernatural, their exclusiveness, and their teleological orientation, the two are more similar than different. This means that the crucial difference is not doctrinal but functional; what Muslims fear from Westernization is not that it will cause their co-religionists to abandon Islam in favor of Christianity, but that it will bring about a reduction of the function of Islam to the modest level on which Christianity plays its role in the Western world.

THE ISLAMIC COMPONENT

2. PREDESTINATION AND PERSONALITY

In the modern West, the "spiritual vacuum" left behind by the "progressive decay of religious belief" which Toynbee bemoaned has, at least partly, been filled by an attitude of self-reliance and a drive to know and understand the world. It is no coincidence that the great urge to explore the universe methodically, which is a unique characteristic of the modern West, arose as religion began to wane. Whatever the shortcomings of the scientific approach, it implies a firm belief in man's ability to understand and improve things around and within him, and expresses the conviction that it is his moral duty to make every effort to do so. This, ultimately, is the intellectual, moral, and, if you will, spiritual foundation of modern Western culture.

It is interesting in this connection to note how a Muslim Arab author views the changing interrelationship between religion and science in the modern Western world. The Abū 'l-Ḥasan 'Alī al-Ḥasanī al-Nadwī (1913-   ) devotes several pages to this subject in his book *What Has the World Lost Through the Decline of the Muslims?* Nadwī admits that Europe is unsurpassed in its inventions and discoveries and that there is nothing wrong with technical progress as such. What is wrong with Europe is that, because of her irreligiosity, she has nothing to guide her, and so confuses means with ends. This being the case, power and science are ever growing in Europe, while ethics and religion are ever declining. "This is why all progress leads Europe nowhere but to suicide. As European civilization is corrupt in its roots, no wholesome fruit can come of it. Its dominant role is merely the consequence of the decline of Islam."[4] There is no need to comment on the shortsightedness of a view which sees Western technological advance as nothing but an increase in mechanical aptitude and which is totally unaware of its ideational and ideological bases.[5]

In contrast to the West, the Arab world still sees the universe running its predestined course, determined by the will of Allah, who not only guides the world at large, but also predestines the fate of each and every man individually. The very name of *Islām* indicates that the one overriding duty it imposes upon man is to obey God; it is derived from the verb *aslama*, which means "to submit, to surrender oneself wholly, to give oneself in total commitment."[6] Hence, *Islām* means primarily "submission [to the will of God]."

The Muslim belief in predestination is at least as old as Islam itself. It recurrences at fixed intervals but presents the few basic characters of the Arabic script in a constantly varying pattern of repetition. The pattern nevertheless has its inner rhythm, in contrast to the outer rhythm of the geometric pattern, and is not altogether unexpected to those who contemplate it and who are familiar with the Koranic verse it presents. The seemingly endless horizontal chain constituted by most characters of the Arabic alphabet is interrupted, again rhythmically but at indefinite intervals, by the letters ا, ط, ظ, ك, ل whose vertical strokes are emphatically elongated, and by the ر, ز, and و whose dip beneath the line is also given special stress.

In all this, the Arab artist achieved a triumph of thought, idea, and imagination over the mundane reality of form observable in nature. He created a great artistic tradition which was, and remained completely divorced from nature and which was purely the product of the mind, of the artistic fiat. And since the Arab artist worked and lived within a religious context, and the prime purpose of his endeavor was to provide an esthetic embellishment and enrichment for the channels through which the Muslim sought to approach God, no wonder that the artistic creativity was considered not only a service to man and God, but an *imitatio dei* on a small and modest scale, a work like that of God's not copying nature which God created, but using the God-given thought, the idea, to create something out of nothing.

2. MUSIC

Arab decorative art shares a number of its characteristics with other Arab artistic endeavors. The repetition of the same small-sized element in an unchanged form or with minor variations which is a part of the Arabs' decorative art is also found in their music. A typical Arab musical piece will begin with one or more instruments playing a brief melodic line, then repeating it several times with or without variation; then the vocalist takes over and does the same; after him, it is again the instruments' turn; then again the vocalist; and so on several times until the conclusion. This is the heritage of the Arab folk song, which consists of one solitary phrase that is repeated with each verse or even each hemistich. This structure is, of course, reminiscent of the structure of an ornamental frieze; it comprises a long sequence of one, two, or perhaps three, motifs, alternating, but

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without change in either the rhythm or the amount of emphasis, without reaching a point of culmination or a dramatic turn, and without the coda which so typically brings the Western musical piece to a formal close at a point well signaled in advance. Just as the decorative frieze has no beginning and no end, but simply starts and ends according to the space to which it is applied, so the Arab musical frieze fills the available stretch of time and is characterized throughout by the same level of emotion sustained unchanged from beginning to end.

The Arab's disregard of time, his refusal to let his life be structured and cut up by the tyranny of the clock, finds creative expression in the traditional world of Arab music. Jacques Berque has remarked that the Arab musician, while playing at a concert, may feel himself possessed,

> step aside from the orchestra, and improvise for an hour or even two. It was thus, they say, that the future star 'Abd al-Wahhāb first shone in an orchestra at Tanta, some twenty or twenty-five years ago; he began to improvise, to modulate in that manner which disconcerts the Western listener but which brought the singer his fame.[9]

Music is, of course, as far removed from the world of physical reality in which we live as an art form conceivably can be. Except where he uses folk tunes and bases his composition upon them, or relies on some other source, the melody is the pure creation of the composer's mind. It is, as some philosophers of art have pointed out, the most mysterious process of artistic creativity because it has absolutely no point of departure in observable nature.

The creative process of the Arab composer is not as different from the creative activity of the visual artist as it is in the West. Arab decorative artists, especially if they utilized geometric patterns, could nowhere in nature observe anything that would give them a basis for the development of, say, a new design of interlacing bands and polygonal star configurations; they had neither kaleidoscopes nor microscopes to observe the forms of snowflakes. All they had were the works of artists who preceded them, whom they studied, and upon whom they tried to improve. The Arab composer worked within a very similar frame of reference. Probably, even if it had been possible to reproduce natural sounds musically, he would have refused, like his colleague in the decorative arts, to "copy" nature, which was ephemeral, imperfect. The new melody he wanted to compose had to be the creation of his own imagination. Where he did go for both inspiration and raw material was—in analogy to the work of earlier decorative artists

—to the musical heritage of his culture. This musical heritage was as highly formalized as the tradition of geometric patterns, and much more minutely organized, classified, and categorized. To understand its nature, a few words must be said about the characteristics of Arab music in comparison with the music of the West.

To begin with, the tonal raw materials used in the two musical traditions are utterly different. The tonal material of Western music is the tempered system of equal semitones, twelve of which make up an octave. Arab music is not tempered, and is based on quarter-tones, twenty-four of which constitute an octave. This means that Arab music has a richer and finer raw material at its disposal than Western music. Because Arab music is built on quarter-tones, it impresses the Western listener as being plaintive and sensuous, while Western music creates the impression on the Arab listener of being crude and rough (since it inevitably jumps in its melodic line notes that would be utilized by an Arab composer), as well as loud and confusing (because what Western music considers as harmony is regarded in Arab musical tradition as dissonance). In the course of the centuries the Arab tonal scale has undergone gradual changes, but since the eighteenth century the most generally accepted Arab scale divides the octave into twenty-four equal parts of fifty "cents" each.[4] This means that each octave in Arab music contains twice as many notes as the European octave, and that the difference in pitch or interval between any two neighboring notes in the Arab scale is a quarter-tone.

Secondly, while in Western music there are only two modes—major and minor—Arab music in its entirety is modal and possesses dozens of modes (called *ṭibaʻ*, nature; *naghamāt*, notes; or *maqāmāt*, places).[5] The compass of an Arab mode may be as few as five notes, or as many as ten. Basically, the modes consist of scales differing in their series of intervals, in which the fixed element is the sequence of tones of varying pitches.

> Each mode gives birth to fixed "motives," and this latter is the most interesting phase of the Arabian modal system, because these "motives" are traditional. Many of them carry in their structure the clear features of folk origin. . . . It is this folk element in Arabian music that makes its appeal universal. . . .[6]

On the other hand, the fact that all Arab music is modal means that the composition of a new piece of music must be executed within the narrow frame represented by the particular mode the composer chooses for his opus.

Thirdly, Arab music is homophonic, that is to say, the modal melody is carried purely in unison; usually a single voice carries the melody or, at the utmost, two tonal sources present the same melody at a distance of an octave. This contrasts sharply with Western music, which is polyphonic and combines a number of individual harmonizing melodies. As the Israeli musicologist Edith Gerson-Kiwi put it, in Arab music

> the elements of harmony and counterpoint are not known . . . and the whole of the creative forces concentrate around the evolution of melody and rhythm. Melody in Oriental practice, especially in singing . . . is not "composed" of single clear-cut notes, but proceeds in larger entities, tone-groups or tone-movements which are interwoven with intrinsic ornaments—leading to a somewhat spiral like procession. These ornaments are not additional as in European music, where they may or may not be observed, but constitute the very body of the music itself.[9]

These ornaments, or "gloss," as they have been termed, represent the fourth characteristic of Arab music. They are of supreme importance in it, are improvisations (as indicated above), and correspond in the musical field to the Arabesque and other decorative ornamental patterns in Arab architecture and visual art in general, to the filigree work in the gold and silver decorative objects, and to the colorful embroidered patterns on pieces of clothing. In all these visual art forms the same general patterns are reproduced again and again, but each time with some slight individual variation which is equally important for the artist-craftsman and the connoisseur. In music, no performing artist reproduces a musical composition in exactly the same fashion as he has heard it performed by the master under whom he studied and from whom he learned it; he must add his own ornamental improvisations, which is the way he demonstrates his own virtuosity.

Fifthly, Arab rhythm is different from traditional Western rhythm. Without becoming too technical, all we can say on this aspect of the difference between Arab and Western music is that for the Western-trained ear it is as difficult to respond to the Arab rhythms as it is to enjoy the Arab melodies built on quarter-tones. There are in Arab music eight rhythmic modes, each of which comprises several species.[10] To these difficulties can be added the specific traditional Arab musical instruments, which produce tone qualities that sound strange and often unesthetic to the Western ear. However, it should be stated emphatically that we cannot and must not judge Arab music by Western standards. It has its own standards and only after having thoroughly familiarized oneself with them—which for an outsider is an extremely difficult and lengthy process—can one judge the quality of Arab music, let alone enjoy it.

The question inevitably arises, What is the place and role of originality in Arab music? If it is based on fixed modes or motives, it could be (and, indeed, has been) argued that there can be no place in it for originality. This argument can be answered on two levels. One is that, given the purely homophonic nature of Arab music, it allows of a set melodic progression by means of fixed motives, which is "no different in unoriginality from the stereotyped sequences of Occidental harmonic music . . . With a scale which furnished a wider selection of notes and modalities, the Arab *virtuosi* were able to furnish more subtle moods for their auditors . . . ."[11] As to the performer, he is, in fact, allowed and even required to evince a much greater degree of "originality" than his Western colleague. The Arab musical performer (as mentioned above) is expected to produce improvised modulations and it is by the quality of these that his virtuosity is judged.

While technically the Arab musician thus has considerable leeway for originality within the framework of the traditional modes, there is quite a different ideational, or, more precisely, teleological, consideration in approaching the question of originality in Arab music. For, despite the richness of the Arab musical modes and rhythms, the composer working in the traditional idiom could introduce only relatively minor innovations in a composition of his own. He had to prove his mettle within one of the modes which he thought would best suit the musical idea he wanted to express, and this in practice meant that he had to work within the rather narrow confines of a fixed sequence of tones. Therefore, the main objective of the Arab composer is not originality (what his Western colleague strives for), but rather a significant refinement or improvement on the existing melodies within the modal framework—just as the decorative artist working in a geometric "mode" does not strive for originality but likewise for refinement, improvement, and perhaps an additional elaboration.

3. LITERATURE

Only a few words can be added here to show that the traits characterizing Arab visual arts and music can be found in Arabic literature as well. We have found that both the visual and musical expressions of the Arab artistic inclination are characterized by small units used as basic building blocks; in both, the whole work of art contains a seemingly endless repetition of one, or occasionally two, elemental units. Moreover, just as time is an undifferentiated continuum for the traditional Arab mind, so in his works of art the Arab does not strive for a crescendo which reaches a culmination, after which the creative surge diminishes and subsides, but finds his satisfaction in repetition, with minor modulations filling equally and evenly a physical space or time span. Occasionally—especially in the largest-scale works of art ever produced by Arabs, their architectural masterpieces—the single units which are repeated again and again to combine into an overwhelming whole can be quite complex in themselves; but the principle of many identical or almost identical units making up the whole is adhered to unfailingly.

A very similar set of features characterizes Arab literary expression, as has been noted by both Western students of Arabic literature and those Arab critics whose familiarity with Western literary forms has sensitized them to the phenomena. Among the former, Sir Hamilton A. R. Gibb expressed the observation succinctly when he stated that the Arabs' "physical environment has moulded their habits, thought, and speech, impressing on them those repetitions and abrupt transitions which are reproduced in nearly all aspects of Arab life and literature."[12]

With repetitiousness goes standardization. The early Arabic *qaṣida*, or complex ode, for example, whose "final object . . . is self-praise, eulogy of the poet's tribe, satire directed at rival groups or individuals, or panegyric of a patron" starts with a conventional opening theme, technically called *nasib*, in which

> The poet is supposed to be travelling on a camel with one or two companions. The road leads him to the site of a former encampment of his own or a friendly tribe, the remains of which are still visible. He beseeches his companions to halt for a moment, and sorrowfully recalls how, many years ago, he spent here the happiest days of his life with his beloved. Now life with its constant wanderings has separated them, and over the deserted scene roams the wild antelope."[13]

Fourteen centuries after these early *qaṣidas*, the poets of the Bedouin tribes still compose poems which are still called *qaṣāyed* (sing. *qaṣide*), and many of these still begin with a description of the deserted camping grounds of the poet's former beloved.[14] Since the tribal poets are still illiterate, no definite version of their poems is available in a written form. When a poet composes a poem, his friends learn it by heart, and then others learn it from them. This method of oral transmission has two consequences; one is that each poem, or each couplet in a poem, is known in different versions; those who recite them change the wording of the verses, or even substitute new verses for the original ones. This procedure, of course, is quite similar to that of the musical performer who changes the original form of a musical composition by introducing into it variations of his own. The second consequence of oral transmission is that poems, and especially long ones, are not recited by different people in exactly the same order as far as the verses are concerned." Such variations in verse order are, of course, only possible because there is no logical connection between one verse and the next, or procession from the one to the other, but each verse or couplet is an independent unit which expresses a separate thought; couplets can be arranged in many different orders. Here again we have an analogy between the structure of poems and that of musical pieces or elements in an overall decorative pattern.

The same phenomenon was observed by Professor Elie Salem, a foremost Arab literary critic, who has remarked of Arabic prose literature that "thought comes to the Arab in flashes . . . not in an unfolding, exhaustive, and full rational order," and that even in Arabic books dealing with political history there is little or no relationship between successive paragraphs.[16] Each paragraph here corresponds to the basic unit in decorative art and in music. The effect of the whole is based on the serial presentation of one piece after another. As to repetitiousness, without which neither Arab visual art nor Arab music can be imagined, its presence in Arabic verbal expression, whether oral or written, is too well known to need documentation.

Yet another similarity between the Arab visual and vocal arts and Arabic literary expression is that in both the major aim is not originality but the restatement of a well-established theme, preferably with some elaboration and refinement. One only has to read the medieval Arab authors to see that this trait is part of an old Arab literary tradition; and one only has to read modern Arab authors to observe to what extent repetition of what others have already said, and of what the writer himself has already said in an earlier part of his book, are common.

4. TOWARD WESTERN FORMS

Westernization is inexorably spreading in the Arab world. This means that the days of the old Arab artistic and musical tradition are numbered. Young Arab art students learn Western art forms in academies of fine arts such as the one in Cairo, founded as early as 1908, and aspiring Arab musicians study in Western-style musical academies. Both types of institutions teach Western forms, Western standards, Western techniques, and Western artistic trends. Most teachers at these schools consider the traditional arts and music backward and primitive, and instill into their students a hostility toward them, and contempt. Add to this the impact of Western magazines, books, films, radio, and television programs, exhibitions of the works of Western artists, and concerts given by Western musicians and orchestras, and you have an atmosphere suffused with the simplistic dichotomy which holds that Western art and music equals good, while traditional Arab art and music equals bad. This, in turn, leads to a total estrangement in these important aspects of culture between the tradition-bound rural majority of every Arab country and the Westernizing urban upper and middle classes. The upper and middle classes neglect native artistic traditions. As a result, native arts and crafts have generally declined. Deprived of their richest and most discriminating customers, the traditional craftsmen-artists no longer had the incentive to bend their best efforts in the execution of a piece of work. There followed a vulgarization and deterioration of the traditional skills, thus seemingly justifying the contempt for the traditional product entertained by the Westernized élite. The vital cultural arteries running between the top and the bottom of the social pyramid were severed.

Many music-loving Arabs who have had a European education despise traditional Arab music. The young Westernizing generation is captivated by jazz. In the Egyptian review *al-Majalla,* the Egyptian music critic Dr. Fū'ad Zakarīyā "writes despairingly of Arab music, judging it inferior to Western music as regards composition, performance and audience," and comes to the conclusion that "we need a new generation of musicians."[11] Dr. Husayn Fawzī, a physician, oceanographer, and musicologist, goes so far as to see in Western music the substance of a universal humanism, while denouncing the traditional music of his own country as nothing but a "titillation of feeling."[12] A survey of listeners to the Cairo radio showed that almost all the cultured class *("muthaqqafīn")* approved of Western classical music.[13] Similarly, most musicians and music critics incline toward Westernism. Some, like Rajā' al-Naqqāsh, see in the inferiority of traditional Arab music an expression of the sickness of which the Arab people suffer in general. Only general progress in all spheres can eliminate the "underdevelopment" in the musical realm. Others, like a young Alexandrian journalist, find that "Eastern [i.e., Arab] music is nothing but languor, the lowest form of sexuality. Western music describes, represents, makes reference to intellectual movements and schools. Many critics feel that while "everywhere else music had developed . . . with us it has remained stationary." Nevertheless, there is also an increasing interest in the traditional source of Arab folk music, as demonstrated by the efforts to make recordings of the work songs that accompany all or most activities in the rural areas, and even such songs and drumbeats as are used in exorcising ceremonies.[19] There can be little doubt, however, that this endeavor to record and save Arab folk music and to use its melodies as a basis for musical compositions is in itself a Western-inspired development.

In the visual arts, the impact of the West wrought a much more revolutionary change than in music. For one thing, entering in the field of sculpture meant for the Arab artist entering a completely new realm which had simply not existed in his artistic traditions. And even in painting, the very use of canvas and oils was something quite new. To these must be added the basic tension between art as decoration and art as representation; between art that was always a part of something else—a building, a piece of furniture, a book, a utensil, a piece of clothing—and art that is produced independently, solely for its own sake. The Westernized Arab painter and sculptor thus cannot find any roots in his own cultural tradition, and has no choice but to relate his work to Western traditions, with which he must first become well acquainted.

Under these circumstances, it is small wonder that the work of the first- and even second-generation modern Arab painters and sculptors was derivative, and in many cases nothing more than imitative. Within these limitations, every major Western school of art soon had its followers in the capitals of the more "advanced" Arab countries, in Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Cairo, and Alexandria, and in the lands of the North African Maghrib. The task of absorbing simultaneously all schools which the West itself had developed in the course of two centuries or more was not an easy one, and often proved confusing for the Arab artist. Interestingly, abstract art, which on the surface would seem to have more in common with traditional Arab geometric decorative art than any other Western school, has attracted relatively few Arab artists and has so far failed to stimulate them to the production of anything truly original or important. In traditional Arab art, originality in its full Western sense of creating something entirely new, without precedent or antecedent in past artistic development, simply did not exist. If the term "derivative" had been used in traditional

Arab art criticism, it would have been an accolade, an expression of the highest praise. But the artists are no longer working with these values. In adopting a Western art style, we now understand, the Arab artist is forced to adopt, among other things, criteria of good and bad which are the direct opposites of what traditional Arab connoisseurship has taught him or his predecessors. He must unlearn the old values, and accept new and contrary values in their stead. To be pronounced derivative has suddenly become a criticism of the strongest opprobrium; to be recognized as original, the greatest compliment.


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PLACES

Egypt occupies 385,000 square miles (1 million square km) of Africa's driest and most barren corner, where the Mediterranean to the north nearly touches the Red Sea to the east. They are divided from each other and bridged only by the Sinai peninsula, which is geologically African, but geographically belongs to Asia. South and west, beyond wide barriers of desert, stretches the great body of the rest of Africa, to which Egypt is umbilically connected, in addition, by the slender nourishing lifeline of the Nile.

As it crosses the Sudanese border into Egypt, the Nile has already traveled 3,000 miles (5,000 km). Leaving mountain lakes, it has roared down cascades, steamed through swamps, and finally carved a serpentine path through a thousand miles of rock and sand. The temple of Abu Simbel, its four seated guardians regally awaiting the dawn, has witnessed the Nile's passage from Egypt's southern frontier for more than three millennia. Although the temple now backs into an artificial mountain above an artificial lake, it has lost none of its power to awe.

The artificial lake, the world's largest, is Lake Nasser, stored up behind the High Dam, just south of Aswan, a 20th Century achievement that has changed the face and pace of Egypt forever. It is only below the High Dam that the rich Nile Valley blossoms into life.

An ancient frontier town, where the colors and smells of Africa blend with those of the East, Aswan itself marks the southern limit of navigation from the Mediterranean. Graceful lateen-rigged *feluccas* swish around the rock islands of the First Cataract, on one of which the famous temple of Philae stands. Cruise ships stop here and return from here northward, passing village after village, pharaonic temple after temple: Kom Ombo, Edfu, Esna, Luxor, Dendera and Abydos. At Luxor they pause in the center of the largest agglomeration of ancient building the world can offer, anchoring between the East Bank's great temple complexes of Karnak and Luxor and the West Bank's vast funerary cities, sited at the foot of the forbidding ridge that marks the beginning of the Sahara.

Further north, the river meanders timelessly on through fields fringed with date palms, dotted with ambling water buffalo. At length, with something of a shock, it swirls beneath the many bridges of Cairo. Fourteen million people inhabit this Arab-Mediterranean-African metropolis, whose vitality, variety, and sheer noisiness make them seem even more numerous. Here the medieval glory of Islam is preserved in domes and minarets, exquisite marble and metalwork. To the west of Cairo the Pyramids of Giza continue to present their mountainous geometry as they have for 200 generations, while the Sphinx erodes impassively at their feet.

At Cairo the Nile exfoliates into the Delta, spreading itself lushly until, much diminished, it finally reaches the Mediterranean Sea. Joined to the Nile by canals is Alexandria, Egypt's most important coastal city. Since its founding by Alexander the Great this celebrated seaport's fortunes have risen, fallen, and risen again in rhythm with those of the Mediterranean itself. From here a flat coastline stretches east and west, its fine white sand touched only recently by development.

The Nile and its Valley are not all there is to Egypt. Deep in the deserts and now accessible to the casual visitor lie miraculous islands of living green: the Oases. More life abounds in the salty depths of the Red Sea — which offers underwater sightseeing second to none, unsurpassed coral and teeming tropical fish — although it, too, is ringed by desert. And there is the Sinai peninsula, linking Asia and Africa at the head of the Red Sea, a landscape of striking beauty. Its rugged red mountains and odd verdant valleys have an other-worldly, almost magical quality. God certainly showed his usual flair in choosing such a place for his rendezvous with Moses. What is harder to understand is why he ever commanded Moses to leave Egypt.

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
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
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PEOPLE

When God created the nations, so Arab wisdom has it, he endowed each with two counterbalanced qualities: to the intelligence of the Syrians he thus added factiousness; to Iraq he gave pride, but tempered it with hypocrisy, while for the desert Arabs he compensated hardship with good health. And Egypt he blessed with abundance at the cost of humility.

It does not require a deep understanding of the past to feel that as far as Egypt is concerned God has withdrawn the first half of his covenant – or that, at any rate, He's made a new deal with the desert dwellers. As any Egyptian will explain, it is not many generations since Egyptian donations fed the poor of the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, in what is now Saudi Arabia. To the desert Arabs, however, God has recently given abundance, in the form of oil, while Egypt, formerly the land of plenty, has received unaccustomed hardship, in the form of war and overpopulation. Once the breadbasket of the Roman Empire, Egypt now follows only Japan and the Soviet Union as an importer of food and only India in the league of aid recipients.

Grace Under Pressure: Yet poverty is a relative thing and, perhaps because of their humility, Egyptians bear it with considerable grace. In the poorest hinterland of the south, a foreign traveler recently overheard a conversation between two venerable farmers: "These poor Europeans," said one, "They will do anything to escape their horrible climate. I saw one the other day who'd come all the way here on a bicycle." "Yes," replied the other, "their land is covered with ice all year round. Look at us. We've got sunshine, water, everything." "It is indeed terrible," concluded the first. "The *khawaga* I saw didn't even have money to buy proper trousers – he was riding about in his underwear!"

Egyptian humility takes many forms. One is a tragic sense of life, arising from a tragic view of history. While the West embraces the idea of progress as a solution to all man's ills, the Egyptians, who have a great deal more experience to draw on, have an impulse to turn towards a utopian past, perhaps to a time when Muhammad's successors, the four Rightly Guided Caliphs, brought justice, prosperity, and true belief to the land. Centuries of transitory regimes have sapped their confidence in the merely temporal. Belief in man made institutions is not firm.

The defeat suffered by Egypt in the 1967 war, one of the most humiliating in modern times, would have brought on a revolution in almost any other country. Yet when Nasser, in an emotionally charged speech, offered to resign, the response was dramatic: millions of Egyptians poured into the streets demanding that he stay. His willingness to share their humiliation brought forth instant sympathy from the Egyptian masses, who saw it as more important that his intentions had been morally right than that he had failed to realize them in actuality. His tragedy was, after all, theirs –– the tragedy of decline that is repeatedly embodied in their history.

Islam and Popular Piety: Any visitor to Egypt will be struck by the piety of its people. Humility is inherent in the very word *Islam*, the religion of nine-tenths of Egyptians. Islam (from the Arabic root *salima*, to be safe, *aslama*, to surrender *salaam*, peace) means "submission," whether it be to God, to fate, or to the social system framed by the Qur'an.

Most Westerners find the continuing dominance of Islam in what purports to be an age of reason perplexing. The important thing to recognize is that the Qur'an –– literally, a "recitation" — is the word of God in Arabic as directly transmitted by Muhammad. The power of the World thus has a strength in Islam unmatched by the literature of any other "revealed" religion, and the beauty of the Qur'an, by definition "inimitable," is cited as a miracle in its own right. It is not extraordinary that many modern Egyptian tastes, habits, and preferences are referred directly back to the Qur'an.

While there are many atheists and agnostics in Egypt, the vast majority stick tenaciously to belief in a supreme deity and the imminence of the Day of Judgement. The month long, dawn to dusk fast of Ramadan, still officially observed by the entire country, bears witness to Islam's pervasiveness, but even the Coptic minority, conscious of being members of one of the earliest Christian sects, maintains a degree of devoutness that is often bewildering to Western Christians. Re-

Preceding pages: group of *Saidis* or Upper Egyptians, Sohag; Wissa Wassef Art School in Giza. Left, an unusual moment of seriousness.

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ligious expressions of a kind that have almost vanished from European speech proliferate in everyday language. "God willing," "By God's permission," "Praise God," "Our Lord prevails," — all are as common as the word "Goodbye" is in English. But *Goodbye* long ago lost its original religious meaning while in Egypt such meanings have not been forgotten. The proper response to the typical greeting "*Salam aleikum*" (Peace be upon you) is thus "*Aleikum as-salam wa rahmat Allah wa barakatu*" (Upon you be peace and the mercy of God and his blessings).

Apart from piety, however, this exchange also reflects a point of Arab etiquette — any greeting must be followed by a response that outdoes the first speaker in punctilio — and religiosity, though abundant, is not always heartfelt. The 19th-Century chronicler Edward Lane observed that "it is considered the highest honor among Muslims to be considered religious; but the desire to appear so leads many into hypocrisy and pharisaical ostentation."

For many, particularly among the poor, belief in the supernatural extends beyond orthodoxy to a world of genies and spirits of the dead. Fertility rites are still held in Upper Egyptian temples; and magicians, witches and priests do a brisk trade in spells and potions. Although much of this activity — and particularly the *Zar*, a folk rite of exorcism by trance — is frowned upon by the official religious establishment, it enjoys continuing popularity.

Jest, Gibes and Practical Jokes: Egyptian piety is also balanced by a deep love of mischief. If anything can compete in public esteem with holiness, it is wit; and Egyptian humor holds nothing sacred. Political jokes are particularly sharp and irreverent, but Egyptians make use of the smallest incident to provoke laughter. The fullest laugh is a delight in itself, starting off low and gutteral and ending in a shriek of pleasure. In a cafe or bar, wisecracks are fired back and forth with increasing hilarity until the whole company falls off their chairs.

Sages have often remarked that while the condition that formulates much of Western behavior is the sense of guilt, arising from an individual "conscience," in the East in general it is shame, arising from a sense of public disapproval or contempt. Egyptian children, raised with the idea that whatever you can get away with socially is morally permissible, must rank among the world's most naughty. This trait sometimes persists into adulthood, where it is reinforced by a cultural backlog of wise-guy folk-heroes such as the legendary Goha, whose countless exploits are marked by both asinine failure and impudent success. More locally and historically Egyptian mischievousness has its roots in the legacy of centuries of repressive government. Numerous are the stories that celebrate the victory, through cunning and trickery, of the poor *fellah* over wicked pashas or foreigners.

This love of trickery has its drawbacks, as the 15th-Century Egyptian historian Al-Maqrizi noted in an unflattering portrayal of his countrymen: "That which dominates in the character of the Egyptians is the love of pleasure . . . They are extremely inclined to cunning and deceit: from their birth they excel in it and are very skilful in using it, because there is in their character a basis of flattery and adulation which makes them masters in it more than all the peoples that have lived before them or will live after them."

Maqrizi notes, among other things, that the Egyptians of his time showed a distinct disdain for study. This indifference to study, it must be said, is very pronounced to this day, in a tendency to attempt to achieve goals by means other than hard labor and careful planning, a habit of mind that even President Mubarak castigates in his fellow citizens. Although much of it can be attributed to overcrowding and a faulty educational system, the degree of cheating in Egyptian schools and universities is scandalous.



Left, village girl. Above, Bedouin gathering firewood.

Coercion and Conformity: Shame has other manifestations. Unjustly, Egyptians are generally not trustful of one another, believing that it is only by overt pressure that people can be prevented from overstepping the bounds of morality. This attitude explains, more than political exigencies, the heavy presence of police throughout the country. Belief in the need for coercion and forced restraint is strengthened by religious attitudes. It is commonly presumed that without the just guidance of Islam, society would fall apart. Yet many Egyptians rightly contrast the violence of American society and the high levels of suicide in other countries with the peace and security of Egyptian life. Where else in the world can two people let themselves go in argument and attack each other in the street, knowing that any passer-by who is a good Muslim is duty bound to intervene? For this reason few arguments turn more than gently physical, no matter how bloodcurdling the threats shouted may sound.

Attitudes to sex are also framed by the same phenomenon. Women are constantly pestered in the streets, largely because it is believed that really masculine men cannot resist the temptations of sex. The same is held to be true of women — perhaps even more so. Thus foreigners often find the Egyptian atmosphere highly charged sexually, which explains the Victorian view of Egypt as a land of licentiousness, a view that is still part of the Western mythology of the Orient in general. Until the Western sexual revolution of the 1960s, Egyptian views of the issue were certainly far more healthy and uncomplexed than those prevailing in the West. Sex in all its aspects is openly discussed by both men and women, but also lurks at the edges of even ordinary conversation. Since the Arabic language itself is full of sexual innuendoes, its richness lends a wonderful bawdiness to Egyptain talk and especially to humor.

The Mores of Matrimony: Marriage, however, is deemed an absolute prerequisite for sex, as well as for full adulthood and respectability. Particularly among women, whose freedom is still very much limited by rigid social norms, finding and keeping the right husband is thus the major focus of life. Since the 1920s, when the veil was finally discarded, substantial progress towards equality of the sexes has been made, but it is still the rule for a girl to remain in the care of her father until the day she is passed into the care of her husband.

Respect for parents and elders is so strongly ingrained that it is likewise uncommon for even a male child to leave home before marriage; and these days few urban Egyptians can afford to marry before the age of twenty-five. Despite Islam's flexibility on the subject — easy divorce and polygamy are both sanctioned — marriage is regarded as a binding agreement, made more absolute by economics. For this reason, young couples are expected to work out every detail of their future life — housing, furniture, a dowry for the wife as a form of divorce insurance — before signing the contract.

Extravagant weddings testify to the importance of the institution. Wealthy families will blow thousands of pounds on a binge in one of the five-star hotels, complete with a fanfare of trumpets, lurking video crews, famous belly dancers, singers and other entertainers. The weddings of poor families are equally extravagant — they too are expected to flaunt their pride and generosity — and much more fun. Whole streets are closed off and the affair takes place in the open air. Street musicians, acrobats, boy dancers, and slick masters of ceremonies keep things lively as the male guests tuck into the free beer, hashish, and opium. Eventually the bride and groom, the latter by now somewhat over-relaxed, climb into a flashy car draped in ribbons, to be borne through the streets with a triumphant blaring of claxons.

"Money and children," the Qur'an says, "are the embellishments of life." Egyptians adore children, and large families are the norm. In many ways, the family is more important than the individual as a social unit, extending not only over several generations but also to distant cousins. The fierce vendettas which still rage in Upper Egypt, often claiming dozens of lives over many decades, illustrate this point. Family honor and prestige are serious matters, particularly in the countryside. The crime columns regularly tell of adultery-related murders. "A woman's honor, according to a well-known saying, "is like a matchstick: it can only be used once."

In the cities, political and business alliances are often reinforced through marriage. Because numerous children enlarge the family's potential for wealth and influence, and also because it is believed that it is healthier for children to grow up with lots of brothers and sisters, family planners have had a hard time bringing down the birth rates.

Egyptian mothers are notoriously soft on their children. Centuries of high infant mortality, sexual roles that give house-bound wives complete responsibility for children, and lingering belief in the power of the evil eye mean that mothers are inclined to cater to their child's every whim for fear that some harm may befall him or her. This is particularly true in the case of favored boys. It is not uncommon, in fact, for a woman's strongest emotional tie to be with her eldest son rather than her husband. As infants, children are wrapped in swaddling and thoroughly doted upon. By the time they are old enough to walk, however, they are usually left to spend their time as they wish. This combination of coddling and freedom is often cited as a reason for the strength, self-confidence and even obstinacy of the Egyptian character. It has also been said that belief in the evil eye has a psychological benefit: it reinforces personality by giving people the feeling that they possess powers both to inflict harm and to attract the envy of others.

Life-Support Systems: Beyond the family, Egyptians have a strong attachment to their immediate community. Village solidarity — when not torn apart by blood feuds — is extremely strong. In the big towns the *hara* or alley is the main unit of social bonding. Partly because crowding in the poorer districts limits privacy, people help each other out in innumerable ways, lending money, sharing videos, and even testifying against strangers to the police.

The main function of *hara* solidarity is to defend the interest of the community. Gangs of local toughs, whose mandate varied from protection of neighborhood women against strangers to simple extortion rackets, formed part of the urban landscape until quite recently. One of the toughest gangs in Cairo ruled

Right, portrait of a man in full traditional garb.

the neighborhood around Bab Zuwayla and was run by a lady famed for her frequent exercise of knocking men out with a head butt. Such drama is rare nowadays, but it is nonetheless true that strangers are carefully watched. Foreigners are deemed unworthy of this kind of attention, since they are presumed to be unaware of the more difficult aspects of Egyptian life, but young unmarried Cairene males seldom venture into a strange neighbourhood alone.

Peculiarities of Places: Regional loyalties persist strongly as well. Each major town and province has its acknowledged characteristics, from Alexandria in the north to Aswan in the south. Like the inhabitants of other port cities, Alexandrians are known chiefly for their toughness and willingness to fight, but also for their cosmopolitan outlook and business acumen. The peasants of Lower Egypt and the Delta are regarded as hardworking, thrifty, and serious-minded. Rashidis, from Rosetta, are supposed to be kindhearted, while Damyatis, from the town of Damietta at the Nile's eastern mouth, are reckoned to be untrustworthy. Menufis, from their province in the heart of the Delta, the homeland of Presidents Mubarak and Sadat, are renowned for their cunning.

Cairenes, like New Yorkers or Cockneys, are seen as slick, fast-talking and immoral. Simply being from the capital allows them to sneer at less sophisticated compatriots, a Cairene habit that their country cousins do not find endearing. Uneasy and often downright miserable away from city streets, Cairenes on vacation are apt to pine for the bustle and crowds of the metropolis.

The Saidis are the Polacks of Egypt, with the difference that the traits attributed to them — simple-mindedness, credulity, and impulsiveness — have a remarkable ring of truth. Saidis joke even about themselves, being too open-hearted to pass the buck. A sample joke: an Alexandrian, a Cairene and a Saidi are dying of thirst in the desert, when a genie appears and allows each a single wish. The Alexandrian says, "I wish I were on the beach at Montaza surrounded by girls," and vanishes. The Cairene says, "I wish I were praying in the mosque of Hussein in Cairo," and vanishes. The Saidi, looking dismayed, turns to the genie and says, "I'm so lonely. Couldn't you please bring my friends back?" On the positive side, Saidis are noted for their generosity, courage, virility and sense of honor.

The dark-skinned Nubians of the far south, an ancient people with their own languages, are considered to be the most gentle and peaceful of Egyptians. Long isolated by the cataracts that made the Nile above Aswan impassable, Nubian life, relaxed and carefree, had a unique charm. Nubian villages are spotlessly clean, the spacious mudbrick houses always freshly painted, and both men and women are apt to be more enterprising than their Egyptian neighbors.

The desert Bedouin, of which there are numerous tribes, have not given up their

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ancient occupation of smuggling, despite increasing sedentarization, and fierce tribal loyalty is still maintained. The Bedouin are feared, scorned, and envied for the wild aristocratic willfulness of their ways. The old rivalry between these freewheeling bandits of the desert and the hardworking peasants of the valley has all but died out — largely through intermarriage — but their pure Arab blood and the beauty of their women still inspire admiration.

Pride and Prejudice: But this catalog of accepted regional differences obscures an essential homogeneity of attitudes and feelings. Despite differences and despite the bitter legacy of imperialism — of defeat, occupation and dependence — pride in Egypt and "the Egyptian way" is fervent. An old Arab adage: "I and my brothers against my cousins, I and my cousins against my tribe, and I and my tribe against the world" serves to illustrate this point. The purpose of all allegiances, it is felt, from the family to the neighborhood to the region to the nation and even beyond, is to prevent being pushed around. For this reason, few Egyptians were surprised when Sadat, to the astonishment of the rest of the world, reversed a decade of cooperation by expelling Soviet advisors in 1972.

Left, three generations of a Cairo family. Above, man, beast and waterwheel.

It is characteristic of the Egyptians — with the exception, naturally, of the Saidis — that they prefer compromise to conflict. By inclination, habit, and training, Egyptians are tactful and diplomatic, even to the point of obsequiousness. The proverb "Eat what appeals to you, but wear what appeals to others" embodies a cardinal rule. This rule governs not only what Egyptians wear — all but the poorest of the poor take care never to appear in public unless clean and neatly dressed — but also all but the most intimate of conversations: speech with a stranger should thus adhere to the formulas of flattery and light-heartedness. It likewise governs the Egyptians' attitude to any agent of the powers that be, whether it be the boss, a wealthy foreigner, or the President of the Republic.

Forms of address in Egypt are complex and varied, as befits a highly stratified society. A taxi driver may be addressed, for example, as "O Chief Engineer" or "O Foreman." (Note that, when sitting in a taxi, one is a temporary guest and not merely a fare: it is therefore insulting for a lone male passenger to sit in the back seat by himself.) A person of high social standing should be addressed as "Your Presence," while a person of respectable but indeterminate standing is "O President" or "O Professor." An older person is "O Teacher" or "O Pilgrim," the latter referring of course to someone who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca. Even Turkish titles —

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bey, *pasha*, *hanem* — survive, though they have no legal standing, and are used for courtesy's sake or humorous effect.

This diversity, while lending a great deal of charm to the simplest exchanges, in fact underlines the cohesiveness of the society rather than its disparateness: the Egyptian world-view sees all men as equals, but allots to each a specific status and with it a role. It is often remarked how Egyptians act out these roles with a sense of the dramatic. Nowhere are bureaucrats so bureaucratic from head to toe, rich men so fat, criminals so comically sinister, movie stars so glitzy, intellectuals so full of *Angst* or mothers so haplessly maternal. In the West, people seek individuality in the clothes they wear and in the mannerisms, speech and opinions they adopt. Egyptians prefer to look like what they are.

Making Do: As in many other Third World countries, sharp disparities of wealth exist. There are some 50,000 millionaires, and for a time in the late 1970s, poverty-stricken Egypt was importing more Mercedes cars than any other country in the world. On Cairo's streets the contrast between the elegance of imported luxury and the rolling slum of a packed bus or the pathetic heap of a trash-collector's donkey cart is often shocking.

Trash collectors, known as *zabbalin* or "garbage people," live in conditions of appalling squalor, their homes nestled among putrid mounds of refuse, which they bring from the city, sort through and sell for recycling. The *zabbalin* represent the absolute bottom of the social pile, but their very existence testifies to general poverty. It would take the average worker a year to earn the price of a Cairo-New York round-trip ticket. As in Dickens' London, the vast majority are poor — and conscious not only of their poverty, but also of their majority.

Display of wealth in Egypt is often, to Western eyes, vulgar. But the flaunting of riches only confirms that, in a society forced to count pennies, money carries a special prestige. As a rich merchant, whose life-style is otherwise modest, commented, "Yes, I would rather have spent my money on something other than a Mercedes. But you wouldn't believe how much it saves me. I don't have to waste time — or money — proving myself. I get instant respect."

Open Doors, Closed Options: Materialist ostentation has been particularly rife since the mid-1970s, when President Sadat reversed 20 years of socialist legislation with the announcement of his *Infitah*, or Open Door policy. Before him, Nasser had worked to redistribute the country's wealth, parceling out the great feudal estates, seizing the property of the richest families and reinvesting it in new state industries. Nasser's policies brought dignity to the majority at the expense of the few, but also frightened off private initiative. Not many landlords bothered even to paint their houses, for fear of attracting the tax man, while the state absorbed the burden of having to feed, clothe, house and employ its people. With *Infitah*, the lid was abruptly removed, and luxury imports boomed as money came out of Swiss banks or from under the floorboards. Fortunes were made overnight and a new class of fat cats replaced both the Nasser-era technocratic elite and the pre-Revolutionary landed gentry.

Allowing Egyptians underpaid at home to work profitably abroad, *Infitah* has brought improved living standards generally in the form of more TVs, more cars, better clothing, and a richer diet, but it has also inflated expectations and undermined social cohesiveness. Neither the poor nor the old elites approve of the *nouveau-riche* of today; and now that the quick money has been made, a new generation must face the prospect of a life of toil unrelieved by dreams of socialist utopia or the simplicity of the good old days.

Left, funeral in the Fayum. Above, native scene of a wedding. Tapestries are woven by children.

A country without dreams can be a depressing place. The primary condition of Egypt — too many people — doesn't help. In 1968, when Israel was reveling in its conquest of the Sinai peninsula and half a million inhabitants of the cities along the Suez Canal had been made homeless, a journalist asked President Nasser what his major worry was. Without hesitation, he replied, "The thousand new Egyptians born every day." A generation later, the population pyramid looms still more menacingly on the horizon. Schools in Cairo already operate three shifts and a new school must be built every day.

Four wars in 30 years, after three of which the army had to re-equip from bootstraps to fighter aircraft, imposed an immense sacrifice on the Egyptian people. Shortage of cash meant that no more than temporary relief could be found from the burdens imposed on an already inadequate infrastructure by a burgeoning population. Only when the flow of foreign aid began to pick up in the late 1970s could the government begin to tackle such basic and long-term problems as sewage, electricity, telephones, drainage, traffic and drinking water. Cairo's air pollution and Alexandria's sewage remain monumental health problems, while neglect of education has led to a frightening plunge in the already low literacy rate.

Products of a school system that stifles curiosity and promotes learning by rote, more and more young Egyptians feel a sense of frustration regarding the future. Among men, those who do not go on to university or manage to obtain an exemption must face three years of military service, often under conditions of extreme hardship. In the bigger cities, many younger women find jobs before marriage, but the majority stay at home and hope for the best. Better prospects await the one in ten young Egyptians of both sexes who attend university, but the country's dozen institutions of higher learning are appallingly overcrowded, understaffed and disorganized.

Despite rigid examinations, many graduates emerge barely qualified for the professions they hope to enter.

Until recently, the government nevertheless followed a policy of providing employment for every university graduate. The result has been that the Egyptian bureaucracy and public-sector industry, which together employ half of the non-agricultural workforce, is catastrophically overstaffed. Various studies have shown that the average government employee actually works for between six and 30 minutes a day. Low salaries and lenient employment policies have encouraged apathy and abuses at every level — obstruction and obfuscation, absenteeism, corruption, or simply intolerable rudeness to the ordinary taxpayer, who foots the bills.

New Anxieties: Low pay and a general loathing for the bureaucracy has meant that government jobs have lost must of their prestige. Increasingly one finds university graduates working as taxi-drivers, plumbers, mechanics and the like. The money is better and tradesmen stand a likelier chance of saving in order to get married, though with inflation and the limited availability of decent apartments, many are obliged to scrimp for years before they can establish a household. In the past decade over three million Egyptians — a people famed for their love of home — have gone abroad, most of them with the sole purpose of saving enough money to get married. Since typical salaries in Egypt range from 75 to 150 pounds a month, emigrants can often earn as much in a couple of years in the oil rich Gulf as they would in a lifetime at home. Remittances from expatriates have become the key foreign currency earner for Egypt and the relative wealth of returning emigrés has been a major factor in pushing up prices.

Universally aspired to in Egypt, marriage provides no passport to a life of ease. The typical lifespan is not long — perhaps 55 years — and many Egyptians appear to die of worry or grief before they reach the stage when they require medical care, which is frequently inadequate anyway. Money, in particular, causes endless anxieties: feeding, educating and underwriting the marriages of numerous children is not cheap, especially when respectability must be maintained at all costs. While families and neighborhoods provide a degree of support unimaginable in the West, they also eliminate privacy; and the smallest problems quickly become everybody's business. The housing shortage means that too many people are often cooped up in the same house; and there are districts of Cairo where the average density is three to a room. In such conditions, already living under constant emotional and physical strain, many Egyptians additionally face the sort of calamities that in other countries have been relegated to sensationalist fiction: collapsing buildings, bursting sewers, bizarre accidents caused by murderous traffic or industrial hazards, Kafkaesque lawsuits or bureaucratic tangles.

Compensations: An atmosphere of melancholy pervades life, but strangely enough, the salient characteristic of the Egyptians is their cheerfulness. They are past masters at coping. Life's perpetual torment is approached with a sense of drama. All problems and situations are so endlessly discussed and analyzed that they end by becoming mere topics of amusement. The tales of intrigue, frustrated love, good fortune or catastrophe that even the simplest people relate in connection with their own personal lives retain a quality of wonder reminiscent of *The Thousand and One Nights*. Everyone has a story.

One of the reasons Egyptians therefore love crowds is that — far more, somehow, than in other countries — each face has a distinct expression, an emotional vitality reflecting depths of personal experience, much of it unhappy. The protective structure of society, based on the strength of family ties, allows Egyptian men and women to give free rein to their emotions. Families, neighbors and countrymen at large can all be relied on for compassion, commiseration or help. This

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solidarity makes Egypt one of the safest countries in the world. When someone shouts "Thief!" on the street, every shop empties as all and sundry help to chase the culprit, who is almost invariably caught and hauled off to the nearest police station by a gesticulating mob. Throughout Egypt, fewer murders are committed in a year than take place annually in any typical large city in America — a comparison reflecting the fact that Egyptian society allows fewer people to be marginalized. Every person has his recognized place, his special niche in the scheme of things.

Among the few who are pushed to the margin are the intellectuals, those who take the facts of life or the issues of politics too seriously. Burdening oneself with principles runs contrary to Egypt's propensity for enjoying the moment. Laughter heals all wounds; and if Egyptian wounds are more than most other people's, so likewise are there few other people who laugh so easily.

Left, an *erqsual*, a vendor of licorice drink. Above, pottery kiln.

Time Out: Egypt's true carnivals, in the form of *mawulid* or saint's days, offer a glimpse of this street energy in concentrated form. Push-carts hawking everything from plastic machine guns to chick peas sprout overnight, vying for space with the tents and sleeping bodies of country pilgrims. On the Big Night, while dervishes dance to exhaustion to the rhythms of the *dhikr* (chanting in remembrance of God), local kids try out the swings, shooting galleries and assorted tests of strength, as their elders look on benignly. For a whole week the town or neighborhood around the tomb of the saint will resound with an ebullience of excitement and good will.

But even fun is not what it used to be. Respectable middle-class folk scorn the dowdy and unorthodox *mawulid*. Video tapes or television, with their fare of tinny, overdramatic soap operas, trashy foreign serials and official sloganizing, now provide the entertainment of the majority. These appurtenances of modern life have a powerful effect in a largely traditional society. Glorifying the bourgeois and "liberal" attitudes of the city, homogenizing Egyptian life, television has also deprived it of much of its vitality.

It will be a long time yet, though, before the Egyptian people lose their appeal. Sensitivity and kindness still abound. Solicitous for the welfare of their fellows, Egyptians are invariably helpful, hospitable and friendly — indeed, almost to a fault: asking directions needs care, for example, since the response may be generated by a sense of social duty rather than by actual knowledge. Generosity is taken so much for granted that it is considered unseemly to offer thanks too profusely for a gift for fear of being insulting.

The warmth of human relations brings Egypt a *douceur*, a soft sweetness, that has always been the best part of its charm.

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ENDANGERED MONUMENTS

Until 1965, when the Aswan High Dam held back its first flood, very few of the millions of structures built by Egyptians throughout their history were ever intended to last more than a few months or at most a few years. Imhotep's architectural revolution at Saqqarah made the permanence of building in stone possible as early as the third millennium B.C., but for most of the ensuing centuries the idea of permanence was extended only to religious structures. Even the pharaohs' palaces, for example, which must have been delightful, were built of perishable materials, essentially no different from those that went into the making of any typical villager's house before 1965. Ancient dwellings have therefore disappeared, while ancient religious structures, the pharaonic tombs and temples, remain, their survival an anomaly. They are the most tangible link between modern Egypt and its ancient past, a link that may often look massive, but is in reality all the more precious for being tenuous and very vulnerable.

Apart from the obvious motives provided by the necessity for maintaining Egypt's cultural heritage, the question of conserving pharaonic monuments involves two major considerations: archaeology and tourism. Once a building has been thoroughly documented, its archaeological purpose has been fulfilled; and as far as archaeologists are concerned it can then be filed away for future reference. When the Secretary-General of the Egyptian Antiquities Organization officially requested a distinguished Belgian expert in 1946 to outline the best method for conserving a pharaonic tomb or temple, the answer was that a well-sealed door should be installed and that the whole monument should be reburied beneath the sand. And this method has actually been used, not only between digging seasons, but as a long-range tactic. In 1969, for example, the French Archaeological Institute, working in collaboration with the Antiquities Organization, excavated and cleared an extraordinary sixth-Century monastic complex near Esna, secured the necessary data, then reburied it, publishing a complete report three years later. The site has thus been saved for future generations.

Putting the Sphinx on Show: The Sphinx, which has become an endangered monument, might have been preserved by this tactic. Though cleared many times in its earlier history, it had been allowed to rest safely under sand until 1925, when it was cleared again and repaired. Since its stone is very soft, however, it is subject, once exposed, to massive erosion by the sand-blast of Giza's incessant winds. Wear was observed and the most up-to-date steps were taken. Chemical injections, intended to harden and consolidate the stone, were made, though the long-term effects of such treatment were still unknown. Unfortunately, it resulted in weakening the Sphinx rather than strengthening it; and subsequent erosion has proceeded at such a rate that there are now fears that its head may topple off.



Left, paw and head of sphinx. Above, Cleopatra, detail from the Temple of Dendera.

The Sphinx, like the Solar Boat and many of the painted tombs at Luxor, is thus rapidly being sacrificed to tourism, which is not only an important industry in general for Egypt, but also specifically supports the Antiquities Organization and all its multifarious activities, including excavation, restoration and conservation. Egyptian archaeologists therefore face a dilemma. So do many foreign archaeologists, as well, for unless they are supported by their government (like the Germans, the Poles, the Egyptians and the French) or by an endowment (like the Swiss), they are dependent (like the British and the Americans) upon private donations, which are often linked with tourism.

The problem of the Sphinx underlines some of the other ironies surrounding reconstruction of pharaonic monuments, more and more of which is being undertaken primarily for the sake of tourism, rather than for purely archaeological reasons. Reconstruction may be archaeologically desirable and even necessary at certain sites, such as Saqqarah or the great temple-sites of Upper Egypt, where much of what the contemporary sees is the result of painstaking reconstruction by archaeological experts, who cleared away sand and reassembled jumbled heaps of stones in their search for knowledge. Once documentation has been completed, however, most [illegible] archaeologists can bring themselves to accept even a building's complete destruction with a certain equanimity, as they have had to do at Kelya, the great Christian site in the Western Delta, or at Fustat on the edge of Cairo, which is being covered with new public housing.

Philae and Abu Simbel: The archaeological outcry over the Nubian antiquities doomed by the construction of the High Dam at Aswan thus had less to do with the wish to preserve what had already been recorded, for example, than with the loss or destruction of vast amounts of physical data that had not yet been archaeologically surveyed.

Philae was famous throughout the Mediterranean world in antiquity and could therefore, like Mont St. Michel or Patmos, exercise a special claim to "preservation," as representing a vital part of an international cultural inheritance. But motives for moving the rock-cut Abu Simbel temples, unknown until 1813, are best understood as a mixture of the aesthetic, the commercial, and the purely sentimental. There were eccentrics among the archaeologists, indeed, who argued that the best way to preserve both Philae and the Abu Simbel monuments within the cultural heritage was to let them drown, as Philae had annually since completion of the first Aswan dam in 1902: their fabric would thus have been saved not only from the dangers of dismantling and reconstruction, but from the far worse ravages of tourism.

It was precisely for the benefits of tourism, however, that both Philae and the Abu Simbel temples were moved to their present positions. Though Egyptologists are even more thrilled than other people by these two sites, neither of them represents the cutting edge of modern archaeological research; and the sums finally expended on these two projects — nearly US$30 million for moving Philae and more than US$40 million for Abu Simbel — probably amounted to far more than the total that has been spent on archaeology itself since the beginnings of Egyptology as an international discipline a century ago.

Urban Conservation: Generally standing on rural or desert sites in isolation from present-day communities, pharaonic tombs and temples have little significance for local people unless they can be exploited for immediate

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material gain. Living and working near these sites long before the emergence of such modern abstractions as "the cultural heritage," Egyptian villagers have therefore traditionally used them only for their own evolving purposes, ignoring them otherwise, as photographs and drawings from the 19th Century plentifully demonstrate. Local indifference allowed them to tumble or be buried under sand, but also created an absence of environmental complication that has since made many of them relatively easy to excavate, clear, reconstruct, record, restore and eventually conserve.

This situation contrasts totally with that of Egypt's medieval and modern monuments, nearly all of which stand in the urban setting of Cairo. The ancestors of Cairo, moreover, were not only the mudbrick towns of the Old and New Kingdoms, but also the cities of the Hellenistic world, typified by Ptolemaic Alexandria, where the notion of architectural permanence had been extended for the first time in Egypt to secular buildings, making it a "city of marble." Burnt brick and stone thus became the materials of the new metropolis. Coupled with a remarkable history — Cairo has known earthquakes, plagues and fires, but (uniquely among Middle Eastern cities) has never undergone the utter devastation that follows political, economic, or cultural irrelevance — these materials have insured that Cairene buildings dating from the seventh Century onward still remain more or less intact.



Left, scene at Karnak Temple, Luxor. Above, the Temple of Abu Simbel on Lake Nasser.

Secular buildings frequently fell victim throughout the middle ages to new architectural schemes, but street patterns were maintained and religious buildings were often restored by succeeding generations, embedding them so firmly in the urban environment that they largely define it. Conservation of Islamic streets and individual monuments thus involves not only questions of cultural heritage, archaeology and tourism, but also a host of other considerations, including all the usual concerns of the city-planner, ranging from sociologial issues to problems of rehabilitation, water-supply, electrification and sewerage.

Egypt's first conservation organization, the Khedivial government's Committee for the Conservation of Monuments of Arab Art, was set up in 1881 specifically to protect medieval Islamic buildings, which had not only fallen into dilapidation, but were additionally threatened by new development. Many had in fact already been sacrificed to Ali Mubarak's master plan under the Khedive Ismail (see the historical section), while work on reconstructing pharaonic monuments, by contrast, had hardly begun. The committee's criteria and techniques were identical with those of similar European organizations and are now quite outdated, but during the 70 years of its existence it completed some remarkable tasks, beginning with an index of 800 buildings.

In 1952 it was absorbed into the Antiquities Organization, which carried out almost no urban or medieval restoration or conservation for nearly 30 years, largely because it had no access to its own revenues. The result, by 1980, was near-disaster. Apart from the conditions caused by modern traffic, industrialization, declining cultural and economic levels, and increasing population density, the city's water delivery and sewerage systems had collapsed, raising the water-table in some places almost to the surface, well above the impermeable footings so cleverly installed by medieval builders. Walls soaked up water or drew it up by capillary action and began to disintegrate chemically, while badly restored or unrepaired roofs began to collapse.

Great changes have taken place since 1981. There is no program for urban rehabilitation, a normal component in any large-scale restoration scheme, but the Antiquities Organization has at least tackled the problem of the medieval monuments themselves. Gaining access to its own revenues, it has spent millions of pounds from 1982 onward and has been largely successful in carrying out not only restoration but urgently needed repairs. There is still a great deal to be done and the basic conditions of life in the medieval areas of the city, which make them look like slums, have hardly been touched.

But Cairo's special flavor comes from its combination of the medieval and the modern: its 19th- and early 20th Century buildings are as important to its character as its great Mamluk monuments, to which they are often directly related. Many of these buildings, like Ismail's elegant streets, parks and squares, have already fallen victim to tasteless and shoddy development. Awareness of their value to the city as a whole, however, has spread recently even into the public sector. A stiff new law passed in 1983 brought previous regulations up-to-date, covering all historic buildings and their environs with new protection, but excluding those less than 100 years old from registration on the Index except by specific decrees of the prime minister. The fate of Cairo's later neo-Islamic, Beaux-Arts, Art Nouveau, and Art Deco buildings thus still hangs in the balance. Moratoria on building permits, arising directly out of public dismay at what seemed to be the city's wholesale destruction, have slowed the pace of their disappearance dramatically, however, and a campaign mounted since 1985 has already succeeded in indexing a handful of the most important.

Egypt has thus brought itself back in line with the theories and practices currently employed in Europe and in Turkey, where conservation is a national concern. Techniques are gaining in finesse and legislation has been appropriately readjusted. The conservation of entire areas, now the norm in European or American practice, has not yet been tried in Cairo except in limited zones — such as the Citadel or the enclosure of Babylon at Misr al-Qadimah (Old Cairo) — where the Antiquities Organization is in complete control. No other agency seems willing or able to assume any part of the necessary planning or decision-making burden, thus leaving the organization to effect what it can within its own mandate.

Beyond all these concerns, of course, is the question of caring for the environment throughout Egypt as a whole. Today's tourist, Western or Arab, is less likely to be a monument-hunter than to be searching for a pleasant spot to recharge and recuperate. He is attracted by precisely the same qualities that will make the country likewise attractive to future Egyptians themselves. To squander natural and cultural resources now is therefore to make the country not only less liveable in the future, but also less viable as a place anyone would want to visit. That fact is beginning to be thoroughly understood.

Above, Al Azhar, the world's oldest university, undergoing restoration. Right, the mosque of Al-Hakim.

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JOSEPH PIRO

EGYPTIAN JOURNALISM: AN OVERVIEW

I.Brief history of the Print Media in Egypt

- (1) Dates back to the later Eighteenth Century when Napoleon began the "Courrier de l'Egypte"
- (2) Two journals published by the Egyptian government:
  - 1827—Journal al-Khadyu
  - 1828—al-Waza'i al-Masriyya
- (3) Later rise of Egyptian-based newspapers
  - al-Ahram ("The Pyramids"): 1875
  - al-Akhbar (:The News"): 1952
  - al-Gumhuriyya ("The Republic"): 1953
  - al-Masa' ("The Evening"): 1956

II General functions of the Arab media

- (1) To convey news and information of general interest to its readership
- (2) To interpret and analyze news events
- (3) To reinforce social and cultural norms
- (4) to provide a communications vehicle for advertising
- (5) To entertain

III. Conditions affecting Egyptian and oher Arab News Media

- (1) Weak Economic Base
  - (a) High cost of printing
  - (b) Relatively small circulation due, in large part, to low literacy rates and greater accessibility of broadcast media
  - (c) Short supply of resources such as newsprint and other raw materials
  - (d) Exception may be Egypt's "al-Ahram", where a "conglomerate" publishing house has successfully diversified its operations
- (2) Politicization
  - (a) Close alignment of many information media to politics—mostly for economic reasons
  - (b) Tradition of alignment dating back to Napoleon's "Courrier de l'Egypte", whose major objective was to inform and instruct French expeditionary forces
  - (c) Undue control exerted by the government
  - (d) Arab-Israeli conflict sometimes used as a rallying point to "justify" government press intervention
- (3) Cultural Influences
  - (a) Historically strong ties of newspapers in Egypt to Arab culture
  - (b) The "mission" of some journalists to reinforce socially acceptable norms, especially those of the intellectual elite
- (4) Continuing government patronization
  - (a) Weak economic base has led newspapers to seek financial support from government organizations
  - (b) More pervasive in broadcast journalism than in print media due to higher operating costs and greater viewership
- (5) Media credibility and Prestige of Journalist

(a) As a profession, some feel it has not achieved the same status as in the West
(b) Somewhat more "risk" in press involvement: e.g. political, economic, or social repercussions
(c) Prestige of many journalists is relatively low in comparison to other countries but it is gaining

IV Freedom of the Press and Censorship Questions

(1) Post 1952, a publishing house of the revolution was established in Egypt to make the policies of the new leadership known
(2) Government "licensing power" over the press was exercised as a means of control
(3) Journalists not reflective of an acceptable political position were frequently jailed—e.g. Ihsan Abdul-Quddus
(4) Sadat's Egypt was more tolerant of newspaper publishing freedom, but Sadat was quoted as stating "I wanted freedom of the press. At the same time, I want it to be a dedicated press."
(5) Present-day Egyptian press tends to be predictable fare with, as one journalist put it, "only one relevant reader . . . the President."

V. The role of the Egyptian Press in Contemporary Society

(1) Basically a loyalist-type press with some notable exceptions
(2) More freedom of opinion is allowed although readers take it upon themselves to read between the lines
(3)Because newspapers employ other writers such as journalists or novelists, opinions can be expressed in more subtle ways
(4) In the 1970's the power and influence of the press was greatly affected by the Haykal-Sadat relationship. Hassanein Haykal, a writer for "al-Ahram" and confidante of Sadat was removed from his position after criticizing Sadat's foreign policies
(5) During the current administration in Egypt, newspapers tend to have relatively free if predictable rein. The long history of journalism, relatively high pay and high status of journalists have contributed to this development

VI Extracts from an Interview with Mohamed Sa'id Ahmed, a writer for the Egyptian paper "al-Ahram"

—The history of the press in Egypt has been a complex one.
—He attributes his staying power to a confluence of events both social and political
—He feels that in the press, there are those who would argue that in Egypt there is one relevant reader: the President
—Under Mubarak things have improved considerably for the press
—He feels that each readership for each newspaper knows what to expect from it and is good at "reading between the lines"
—He feels that government has a tighter rein over broadcast than with print journalism, probably due to broadcasts' vastly greater audience
—Although he has experienced periods of what could be called "control", he is relatively sanguine about the future of the Egyptian Press

Fulbright Seminar
Bill Predmore

Contemporary Egypt: Peace without Prosperity

My academic background in Modern Latin America as well as my responsibilities in non-Western history, including contemporary political and economic developments in the Third World, inclined me toward an exploration of Egypt's contemporary relationship with both the Western and the non-Western world, as well as her approach toward modern economic development. It became apparent as I did background reading that I could find what I wanted by focusing on on the pivotal Camp David Accords, the subsequent Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of 1979, and the and the consequent special relationships developed with the United States. Rather than confining myself to the treaty itself, my approach was to ask two general question:

1) What factors led Anwar el Sadat to move toward this highly significant agreement? and
2) What have been the political and economic results of this peace with Israel and the connected relationship with the United States?

This study is obviously somewhat limited and it does not seek to propose any definitive conclusions. It is merely an exploration. The content is based upon the use of written materials which time and availability have allowed me to consult as well as on general information and opinions obtained from lectures by Professors Salwa Gomaa, John Swanson, Hossan Al Tawil, Hoda Ragheb, and Adel Beshay of the American University in Cairo as well as those of Major General Ahmed M. Abdel Halim, journalist Mohammed Said Ahmed, author and educator William Quandt, and William Ramsey and Peter Eicher of the U.S. Department of State.

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I.

> "The legacy of Nasser left me was in a pitiable condition." (Sadat, p. 210)

> "Great leaders are unique figures who cannot be replicated and have to be followed by successors in a different mold with their own style."
> (Derek Hopwood, P. 105)

Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954-70) was a charismatic leader tremendously popular in Egypt, widely respected in the Arab world and, along with Sukarno, Nkrumah, and Nehru, one of the major leaders of the non-aligned nations. In Egypt he had brought about the redistribution of massive amounts of farmland to previously landless peasants, made university education free, applied rent control, provided subsidies for the poor and nationalized industries. He was a hero who made Egyptians proud and he gave the Arab world a unifying savior. Nasser's sudden death in 1970 brought to the presidency Anwar el Sadat (1970-81), an unknown quantity who would have to find a way to prove that he was a worthy successor.

What factors led to Sadat's support for recognition of the state of Israel and his inclination to fashion a special relationship with the United States? If we are to take Sadat at his word (his autobiography is quite uncritical), his main reason for change was based on his evaluation that Nasser's administration was largely a failure. For Sadat the defeat of Egypt in the 1967 war with Israel was both a national shame and a sign of the hollowness of Nasserism. "I myself was completely overwhelmed by our defeat", said Sadat, "I thought about it day and night." (p. 184)

Moreover, Sadat felt Nasser left him with a collapsing economy, a repressive political state, poor relations with the United States and Western Europe, and saddled with a special but difficult relationship with the Soviet Union. "The Soviets," claimed Sadat, "had thought at one point that they had Egypt in their back pocket and the world had come to think that the Soviet Union was our guardian." (p. 23)

Setting the twin goals of " Peace" and "Prosperity" Sadat will ultimately set about to end the conflict with Israel, presumably because peace could reduce military costs and because it would allow him to turn his attention toward the economy. When Sadat stunned the world by going to Israel in November 1967, he regarded it as related to reviving a struggling economy. The Sinai with its oil reserves could be regained, money would not be spent on military ventures and the United States would substantially increase its financial support. (Sadat had already expelled 15,000 Soviet advisors in 1972). Sadat also spoke of the "infitah" ("opening up") which would open the economy to privatization of some industries and encourage foreign investment.

Perhaps most interesting, however, was Sadat's need to rise out of his predecessor's shadow. "Nasser," says Derek Hopwood, "was worshipped and respected and brought Egypt back to Egyptians. Egypt basked in his glory. He was a colossus." (p. 184) It is easy to see that in addition to Sadat's need to prove himself there was also an utter frustration over the fact that despite the disastrous defeat of 1967 and the poor condition of the economy, Nasser's popularity remained high - insulated by a myth-hero cover. He was like a "living corpse" between 1967 and 1970 according to Sadat but he retained his popularity after defeat and even after his death.

The October War of 1973 and Egypt's early success against Israel had provided Sadat with a new standing. He was referred to as "the Hero of the Crossing." Nasser might still be larger than life, but it was Sadat who restored Egypt's pride. It was with this enhanced reputation that Sadat felt he could go the further step in pursuit of "Peace and Prosperity" by speaking before the Israeli Knesset in November 1977, agreeing to the Camp David accords in February 1979 and signing the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty of March 1979. There is little doubt that in addition to receiving material benefits for his country he was hoping to focus more attention upon himself and help to bury the myth of Gamal Abdel Nasser.

II.

> "Egypt is both the Arab world's most accomplished state and one of its poorest - a tough combination, difficult on Egypt's pride and on those states in the Arab world that have to deal with Egypt."
> (Fouad Ajami p. 14)

> "Sadat added a dramatic sense in history, a willingness to step outside the normal limits set by his own society. This was both a strength and, ultimately a weakness." (Quandt p. 318)

Sadat's strategy achieved notable benefits. Among these was the retrun of the Sinai region - a boost both to Egypt's pride as well as to her economy. It also guaranteed peace in the forseable future after Egypt had suffered significant casualties in four previous wars.

Equally significant was the increase in aid from the United States (presently 2.3 billion per year). While much of this aid goes toward the military (more than 50%), Egypt now receives close to $1 billion in economic assistance per year (though by AID admission, at least 40% is used to purchase American products). This economic assistance is directed toward four general goals:

1) repairing a deteriorated infrastructure
2) improving technical and scientific ties with the United States
3) helping to revitalize a stalled economy and
4) improving health and educational standards.

The range of activities is extensive and impressive and is catalogued in the substantial AID publication Status Report: United States Economic Assistance to Egypt (November 1989). More specifically, funds from this program have financed repair work on the Suez Canal, expanded electrical power output, improved telecommunications, reduced infant mortality, built schools, improved water and sewage treatment, financed irrigation projects and funded research for improving agricultural productivity.

However, Sadat's strategy has also come with liabilities. His move confused the rest of the Arab world and it reacted bitterly by expelling Egypt from the Arab League, severing diplomatic relations, and stopping the flow of annual subsidies. President Nasser had led the Arab world by preaching nationalism and resistance to the West. Sadat swerved toward a close relationship with the United States while showing little regard for Arab feelings. Critics have asked whether the risk was too great for Egypt and whether it left the Arab world without balance.

Further criticism has been directed twoard the question as to whether Egypt has rapidly moved toward becoming a dependent state - seeking a solution to its problems by sacrificing its independence. Another criticism has focused on the fact that Egypt has allowed itself to be used by the United States to facilitate American interests in the Middle East. As a consequence Palestinian interests have been sacrificed. With Egypt at peace the threat of Arab attacks on Israel has diminished and Israel has less incentive to come to terms with the Palestinians.

It is quite evident that the current state of the economy hardly approachesthe goal of prosperity as sought by Sadat. David Lamb provides one of the most dismal evaluations on record:

> "The capital is sinking under the weight of people, people, and more people, and Egypt seems in danger of becoming a Bangladesh on the shores of the Mediterranean, an impoverished land gripped by lethargy and decay." (p. 26)

How much of this should be blamed on Sadat's legacy of creating dependency is debateable. One might advance the argument that a nation which sustains a 2.6 population growth rate is fighting a losing battle no matter what economic solutions are applied. The statistics are, in fact, astonishing. In Egypt a baby is born every 19 seconds. Cairo grows by 1,000 people per day. The population of Egypt has doubled in the last 30 years (now 55 million) and will double again in the next 25 years. (Lamb, p. 36) According to AID figures only 38 % of Egyptian women are currently using any form of birth control. (Status Report p. 105)

There are other considerations. What are the economic possibilities for a nation where 98% of the population lives on 4% of the land and where there are limited natural resources? Additionally it has been argued that economic mismanagement associated with a bloated and inefficient bureaucracy created during the Nasser era is principally to blame.

A final note must be added in evaluating Sadat's legacy. Most recently Egypt has been readmitted to the Arab League and each Arab nation has restored diplomatic relations. This turn of events may very well signify a growing acceptance of Egyptian policy. As Fouad Ajami has noted : "Sadat's diplomacy dragged Arabs, with most of them screaming and feeling defiled, into an honest encounter with the problem of Israel." (p. 107) It has forced Arab nations to recognize the serious differences which exist in the Arab world and the fact that Pan Arabism may very well be a myth - the storm over Sadat's move was partially due to the desire to keep this myth alive.

Egypt, partly because of its political stability and national unity has successfully asserted her own independence, serving notice that it will follow a policy best suited to her own needs. She can rightfully feel that she has in the past paid her dues toward Arab unity and has the scars to prove it.

Concluding Remarks

It is still not entirely clear whether Sadat's policies were correct for Egypt as events continue to unfold. Any evaluation must include an array of factors and will inevitably be based on one's own bias or perception.

Despite American assistance, Egypt has hardly achieved the prosperity of which Sadat dreamed. Moreover, there are signs that Egypt is slipping toward the economic predicament of many Latin Americn nations who owe colossal sums to foreign creditors (Egypt's foreign debt is now $50 billion). It is also clearthat while Egypt may have made a mature political choice by recognizing the political state of Israel, she has been dissappointed by the response of the United States - a nation crippled by an immense ignorance of Arabs and Islam and, as George Ball has noted, with a "peculiar indulgence" and an "idiosyncratic and uncritical defense of all Israeli actions." (Ball, pp. 1, 4)

It is still an open question as to whether or not Egypt's patient optimism regarding the U.S. ability or willingness to eventually rein in Israel and secure a commitment to autonomy for the Palestinians will pay off. A full evaluation of the Sadat legacy will hinge on the answer to this question.

July 17, 1990

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Suggested Sources

A History of the Modern Middle East

Fred W. Sakon

I. Introduction:

The purpose of my attending the seminar in Egypt and Jordan this summer is to begin collecting information which will be helpful developing a course in the history of the modern Middle East. The initial step in this endeavor is to prepare a bibliography of selected sources to prepare lectures which could be included in this course and serve as suggested readings for my students.

While not presuming to suggest any organization for anyone else's class, I envision that this course will be organized along the same lines as a current course which I teach --A History of the Modern Far East. In this course, therefore, I will emphasize the geography of North Africa and Southwestern Asia and its effects on the history of the area, the Islamic influence in the Middle East, and the modern history of some of the countries. Because of the breath of such a course, I will have to eliminate certain countries. As a result, there are no works cited on Turkey or the Magreb in this bibliography-- although many good works exist for these countries as well.

I have tried to organize the bibliography chronologically; however, the sections dealing with individual states do not lend themselves to this. I am afraid the user will find these sections a bit jumbled. Finally, when I could find comments about a source or had enough time to read enough to form an opinion of it, I have briefly annoted the entry.

II. General Textbooks:

One of the first problems that is encountered when preparing a new course is to select a textbook. The problem with choosing one for this course is that there are only a few works which are organized so that they can be used as a textbook. As a solution to this problem, I would suggest three: LOIS A. AROIAN and RICHARD P. MITCHELL, The Modern Middle East and North Africa (Macmillan Publishing Co., 1984), COLBERT C. HELD, Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics (Westview Press, 1989), and SYDNEY NETTLETON FISHER and WILLIAM OCHSENWALD, The Middle East, (4th ed., McGraw Hill Publishing Co., 1990).

Each of these works have their own strengths so when chooisng one of them keep in mind its particular focus. Aroian and Mitchells' book emphasizes the history of the modern Middle East since well over half the text deals with the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is organized chronologically so that students should have no problem associating contemporary events. The bibliography, which are organized by chapter, are extremely useful. The Middle East by Fisher and Ochsenwald is an old standard text. It would be helpful if you wanted to emphasize the total Scope of the history of this area because almost half of the text is devoted to pre-nineteenth century history. Coverage of the twentieth century is topical and would be extremely useful if you plan to use a country by country approach in your lectures. The bibliography is very extensive and includes a large number of journal entries. It is also annotated which in particularly helpful. Finally Helds' book emphasizes the current socio-economic-political problems faced by each of the states in the Middle East while giving only summary descriptions of their history. The content and organization of the work would be particularly helpful in generating discussions if you are interested in the problem solving approach for your class. It also includes an extensive bibliography although it has no particular organization.

For my course. I have decided to use The Modern Middle East and North Africa by Aroian and Mitchell because it corresponds most nearly to the way I will organize my course. In addition to emphasizing the modern history of the states in the Middle East, the first four chapters deal with geography, people, and the Islamic heritage of area.

III. Supplemental Reading

No one textbook can cover all aspects of the history of a country or an area. As a result, I plan to use several works as collaterial reading for my students. Obviously, the choices are numerable, but I would offer the following:

A. John Esposto, Islam, The Straight Path
(Oxford University Press, 1988)
This work which is written by one of the best known scholars in the field, emphasizes

the traditional and modern influences of Islam in the Middle East.

B. Philip K. Hitti, Islam: A Way of Life (Regnery Gateway, Inc., 1987) Written by a distinguished scholar, this book examines Islam as a religion, a state, and a culture. It is particularly valuable because of its emphasis on Islamic culture.

(NOTE: I have included two works on Islam. Obviously, I feel that every student should be exposed to this important part of the heritage of the Middle East. For your purposes, you may wish to choose only one of these4 works. Either of them would serve your purpose)

C. Fouad Ajami, The Arab Predicament (Cambridge University Press, 1984) This work is a very thought provoking account of the crises in Arab political thought since 1967. Parts of it are particularly enlightening about the growth of the Islamic fundamentalist movement and the current position of

Egypt in the Arab World.

D. David Lamb, The Arabs: Journeys Beyond the Mirage (Vintage Books, 1988)
Written by a Middle East correspondent based in Cairo, this book is a good effort at examining the problems of the Middle East. From Cairo to Beirut, Lamb offers his firsthand observations. The work is written with the journalist in mind, but students of the Middle East would find it interesting.

IV. Selected Reading List

A. The Arab Awakening in the Nineteenth Century

Anderson, Matthew S. The Eastern Question, 1974-1923. (St. Martins Press, 1966)
A detailed study of European deplomacy as it relates to the Ottoman Empire and the Middle East.

Antonius, George. The Arab Awakening. (I.e. Sippincott, 1939)
Even though this work is somewhat dated, it is still one of the best at explaining the foundations of Arab nationalism in the Nineteenth century.

Dawn, C. Ernest. From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism. (University of Illinois Press, 1973)
This work shows some of the more subtle aspects of the Arab revolt and Arab Nationalism. It brings out many misconceptions about both and is a good contrast to The Arab Awakening.

Marlowe, John. A History of Modern Egypt and Anglo-Egyptian Relations, 1800-1956) (Archon Press, 1965).

Sharabi, Nisan. Arab Intellectual and the West: The Formative Years: 1875-1914. (John Hopkins Press, 1970).
An explanation of the intellectual and idealogical background which results in the transformation of the Arab World.

B. World War I

Busch, Briton C. Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894-1914. (University of California Press, 1967.
This study uses extensive primary sources to analyze the formation and implementation of British policy in the Persian Gulf.

Helmreich, Paul C. *From Paris to :*
The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at
The Peace Conference of 1919-1920.
(Ohio State University Press, 1974)

Kent, Marion, ed. *The Great Powers and the*
End of the Ottoman Empire (George Allen
Unwin, 1984).
A good survey of European diplomacy and the
partition of the Middle East after World
War I.

Lawrence, T.E. *Seven Pillars of Wisdom.*
(Jonathan Cape, 1935).
The account of his activities during
World War I.

Mousa, Suleiman, T.E. *Lawrence: An Arab View.*
(Oxford University Press, 1966).
A revisionist study of the importance of
Lawrence during the war.

Nevakivi, Jukka. *Britain, France, and the Arab*
Middle East, 1914-1920. (Oxford
University Press, 1969)

Sachar, Howard M. *The Emergence of the Middle East:*
1914-1924 (Knopf, 1969)
A good survey of the period, but it has a
decided European slant

Toynbee, Arnold J. Survey of International Affairs,
1925 Vol. I. *The Islamic World Since*
the Peace Settlement. (Oxford University
Press, 1927).

c. World War II and After

Boutros-Ghali, B.Y. *The Arab League 1945-1955.*
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1955).

Enayat, Hamd. *Modern Islamic Political Thought*. (University of Texas Press, 1982). This work is not for the faint at heart, but it does contain agood discussion of the Sunni and Shi'ite views.

Khadduri, Majid. *Arab Contemporaries: The Role of Personalities in Politics.* (John Hopkins Press, 1973). A survey of the personalities of twelve post-war Arab leaders including Nasser, Jumblat, Aflaq and Baqdash.

Rubin, Barry. *The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1941-1974: The Road to the Cold War.* (Frank Cass, 1980).

Sachar, Howard. *Europe Leaves the Middle East, 1936-1954.* (Knopl, 1972) A good work to consult concerning European withdrawal. The last five chapters deal with the Palestinian problem.

Voll, John Obert. *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World.* (Westview Press, 1982). This is an outstanding work dealing with the relationship between modern fundamentalists and those of earlier periods.

D. Egypt

Bergue, Jacques. *Egypt: Imperialism and Revolution.* (Faber and Faber, 1972). A study of the rise and fall of England in Egypt.

Daly, M.W. *Empire on the Nile: The Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1898-1934.* (Cambridge University Press, 1986). An excellent study which includes chapters on education, economics, health, the British, and politics.

Halt, Peter. *Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922.* (Cornell University Press,1966).
A good survey written by an authority in the field-particularly good on Ottoman-Arab relations.

Hopkins, Harry. *Egypt: The Crucible.: The Unfinished Revolution in the Arab World*. (Houghton Mifflin, 1969).
Covers from the revolution in 1952 up to 1969. Good sections on Arab socialism and the Palestinian problem.

Hopwood, Derek. *Egypt: Politics and Society, 1945-1984).*
(Allen and Unwin, 1985).
A good standard survey ofthe period.

MARSOT, AFAF LUTFI AL-SAYYID, *Egypt in the Region of Muhammad Ali.* (Cambridge University Press, 1984).
A valuable political biography of this important figure in the early period of modern Egyptian history.

________. *A Short History of Modern Egypt.* (Cambridge University Press, 1985).

Vatikiotis, P.J. *The History of Modern Egypt.*
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A detailed book on Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Egypt. It is particularly strong on social and intellectual movements in the rise of Egyptian nationalism.

Waterburry, John *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes*
(Princeton University Press, 1983).

Zayid, Mahmudy. *Egypt's Struggle for Independence*.
(Khayats, 1965).
The author taught at the American University in Be it. The book is a good analysis of the revolution of 1952 and is particularly valuable for the background of the revolution.

E. Israel, Palestine, and Arab/Israeli Conflict

Bernstein, Narver H. *The Politics of Israel: The First Decade of Statehood.* (Princeton University Press, 1957).
The best study of early government, administration, and politics.

Cobbon, Helena. *The Palestine Liberation Organization: People, Power, and Politics.* (Cambridge University Press, 1984).

Cohen, Michael J. *The Origins and Evolution of the Arab-Zionist Conflict.* (University of California Press, 1987).
A well written and concise study of British Policy to 1948.

Elon, Amos. *The Israelis: Founders and Sons.* (Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1971).
A stimulating account of the personalities, idealogy, and feelings of the zionist movement.

Herzog, Chaim, *The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East.* (Random House, 1982).
Covers war of attrition, 1982 war in Lebanon, and others. A valuable and detailed military account.

Khouri, Fred J. *The Arab-Israeli Dilemma.* (Syrause University Press, 1985).
Best work on the subject.

Laqueur, Walter and Barry Rubin, eds. *The Israeli-Arab Reader: A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict.* (Penguin Books, 1987).

Palk, William R. *The Elusive Peace: The Middle East in the Twentieth Century.* (St. Martins Press, 1979).
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Avery, Peter. *Modern Iran.* (Praeger, 1970). A good general survey with emphasis on period from 1850 to 1900.

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Banani, Amin. *The Modernization of Iran, 1921-1941.* (Stanford University Press, 1961). Survey of the importance of Reza Shah on his country from Iranian sources.

Binder, Leonard. *Iran: Political Development in a Changing Society.* (University of California Press, 1962). A very important study of society and politics in recent Iran.

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Ismael, Tareq. *Iraq and Iran: Roots of Conflict*. Syracuse University Press, 1982.

Keddie, Nikki R. *Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran.* (Yale University Press, 1981).

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This book includes insightful essays on economics, religion, ideology, women, Khomeini, and foreign policy.

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An excellent survey.

_______ The Gulf War: The Origins and Implications of The Iraq-Iran Conflict.
(Oxford University Press, 1985).
A detailed book on the war from Iraqi point of view.

Lenczawshi, George. *Iran Under the Pahlavis.*
(Hoover Institution, 1978).
Very favourable view of the Shahs' accomplishments in social change, economy, oil policy, land reform, education, and culture.

Marr, Phebe. *The Modern History of Iraq.*
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Fine survey in series that deals with Middle Eastern Countries.

Wilbur, Donald. *Iran, Past and Present.*
(Princeton University Press, 1982).
A Classic.

Zabih, Sepehr. *Iran Since the Revolution.*
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G. Jordan, Lebanon, and Suyria

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Cobban, Helena. The Making of Modern Lebanon
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An excellent general survey.

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Outstanding study of growth of nationalism in
Syria.

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Jordan, 1800-1980
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A stimulating study of normadic tribes and
their interactions with the Ottoman Empire
and the national state in the Twentieth century.

Russsell, Malcolm B. The First Modern Arab State:
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The best work in English concerning the
foundations of the modern state.

Seale, Patrick. The Struggle for Syria: A Study of
Post-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958. (Tauris
and Company, 1986).
A scholarly work built around the thesis that
domination of the Middle East must be contingent
upon control of Syria.

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A well written biography of this controversial
leader.

Zamir, Meir. The Formation of Modern Lebanon. (Croom Helm, 1985). This study concentrates on the 1920's and the role of the Maronites and French.

H. Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States

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Abir, Mordechai. Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era. (Westview Press, 1988).

Cottrell, Alvin J. ed. The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey. (John Hopkins Press, 1980). A massive study which includes Saudi Arabia as well as the Gulf States.

de Gaury, Gerald. Faisal, King of Saudia Arabia. (Praeger, 1967).

Howarth, David. The Desert King: Ibn Saud and His Arabia. (McGraw-Hill, 1964). A well written but sympathetic account.

Netton, Ian Richard, ed. Arabia and the Gulf: From Traditional Society to Modern States. (Barnes and Nable, 1986). The edition contains insightful essays on the history, politics, economy and society of Saudi Arabia.

Peterson, J.E. The Arab Gulf States: Steps Toward Political Participation. (Praeger, 1987).

Shwadran, Benjamin. Middle Eastern Oil Crises Since 1973. (Westview Press, 1986). An especially valuable study of the politics of oil diplomacy concentrating on the period from 1979 to 1985.

Troebler, Gary. The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa'ad. (Frank Cass, 1976).
This work is particularly valuable for the period from 1910 to 1926.

Winder, R. Bayly. Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century. (St. martins' Press, 1965).

Yassini, Ayman Al. Religion and State in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (Westview Press, 1985).
An indispensable study for understanding the the role of Islam in one of the most orthodox of the Arab states.

CAIRO AS THE CENTER OF WORLD TRADE AND COMMERCE DURING THE MIDDLE AGES

Lesson Module

prepared by

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Fulbright Hays Summer Seminar, 1990
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CAIRO AS THE CENTER OF WORLD TRADE AND COMMERCE DURING THE MIDDLE AGES

BACKGROUND

Geographic Connection

Until the advent of the Greco-Roman period of history, Egyptian civilization developed in relative isolation from other world cultures. This period of isolation was a result of two major factors: deserts to the east and west of the Nile River Valley that cut off trade with civilizations in the Fertile Crescent\Tigris Euphrates River Valley and the shallow Mediterranean coastal waters to the north that prevented trade and commerce with civilizations of the Mediterranean world. As a result Egypt failed to benefit from or be affected by the cultural transmission of ideas from surrounding areas.

The development of the Hellenistic City of Alexandria opened Egypt to the culture of the Greeks and Romans. Trade through Alexandria passed through a coastal area between the Pharos Island and the mainland that had been dredged to facilitate entry by deep-hulled merchant vessel unable to navigate the naturally shallow waters before this time. In addition to this, the Ptolemies built a canal connecting Lake Maeortis with the coast. A second canal was built to allow goods to pass from this lake to a tributary of the Nile. This resulted in Alexandria's becoming one of the busiest and wealthiest ports in the world. (The physical geography of this area has been altered significantly during the intervening centuries by the changing course of the Nile River and shifting in the delta area. Lake Maeortis is known as Lake Maryut today and is much smaller than it was at that time.) In A.D. 644, following the arrival of the Muslims in Egypt, an ancient pharaonic canal that connected Egypt with the Red Sea was opened allowing trade to develop between Egypt and the Levant, as well as providing access to an all water route for trade with the East through India.

Political/Historical Connection

By A.D. 642, the Islamic conquest of Egypt was complete. From 642 to 868 Egypt was ruled first by the Umayyad then the Abbasid dynasties, the strongest ruler being Ibn Tulun (868-882). During this time Egypt's capital was located at al-Fustat, a sector of modern-day Cairo. In 969, the Shi'ite Fatamids came to power and established their capital in al-Qāhira, from which we get the name, Cairo. During the reign of the Fatamids, the oldest existing university of the

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Western world was established in Cairo at the Mosque of al Azhar and a wall was built to fortify the al-Qahira area. In 1168, Fustat, the business center of the area, was destroyed by the Crusaders, and Cairo was left as the political center of Egypt. Soon after, Cairo began its development as a center of world trade and commerce. In fact the Crusades aided the development of a symbiotic relationship between the Christians and the Muslim merchants who supplied them with goods from the Orient (Abu-Lughod, 1989). Under the rule of Saladin, the city began to expand enormously. The Citadel was built signifying Egypt's political independence. In 1250, following a series of military coups, the Mamluks came to power. These rulers who were the sons of slave-warriors ruled through military coup and with much brutality, but, in spite of this, they made enormous contributions to Islamic architecture, building no less than twelve major mosques, mausoleums, madrasas and khanques. They succeeded in taking the last Crusader stronghold at Acre and defeated the Mongol force in Palestine. By the 14th century, Cairo had expanded to the boundaries it was to fill for the next 400 years and its population grew to over a half million. It is against this historical backdrop that Cairo is seen in the throes as a world center of trade and commerce lasting from approximately the tenth to the early sixteenth century.

Economic Development

By the eleventh and twelfth centuries many parts of the world participated in an economic exchange that had synergistic benefits to all. The peak of this exchange came about between the end of the thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth centuries. During the thirteenth century the Eastern hemisphere was dominated by eight different but intersecting trade routes (See map, Abu-Lughod, p. 34, 1989). These eight subsystems of trade can be divided into three major groups: Western European trade, Middle Eastern trade and Far Eastern trade. By this time even Europe and faraway China had established direct contact with each other (Abu-Lughod, 1989).

The modern world economy actually finds its routes in the thirteenth century in a system that is quite different from that of the sixteenth century. This system contained no single hegemonic power in contrast to that which the Italian city states dominated three century later. It involved a trade system that was far more complex than any that came before, and to some extent, it can be said that it resembles the global world economy that exists today (Abu-Lughod, 1989).

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Although this economic system was worldwide, it was, a narrow network of exchange. Specialty and agricultural items, particularly spices represented a significant proportion of the exchange, however manufactured goods were at its heart and without these, the system could not sustain itself. This system involved a wide variety of merchant communities. Currencies varied: languages and measuring systems were different and calendars were not consistent. Still goods were exchanged, prices and barter exchanges were agreed upon, contracts entered into, credit extended, partnerships formed, and agreements honored.

For a number of geographic, economic, and political reasons, direct contact between sub-systems was not generally possible. Given the limited navigational technology and the time consuming aspects of a long journey of the thirteenth century, few of the major cities did business directly with each other. Ports and oases between places served as exchange and distribution terminals, while, at the same time, production of any given commodity took place in a single location. Sea lanes, rivers and overland routes bound places together.

By the time the Europeans entered this economic system, the Crusades prevented any partnership other than with Constantinople and Egypt. The strength of the Mamluk state in Egypt blocked direct Italian trade beyond the Red Sea. However through Egypt, the Italians had access to trade items from areas throughout the Middle East, China and India. As a result of trade between the Italians and Northwestern Europe, England and the Flemish states were also able to participate in this economic system (Abu-Lughod, 1989).

Gradually during the second half of the thirteenth century Middle Eastern centers of trade, other than through Egypt were being cut off. This was due to the fragmentation of the Islamic Empire, waves of the "Black Death," internal insurrections, and the Crusades. The reduced status of Baghdad caused Cairo to become the capital of the Muslim world. The Mamluk sultan was able to rout the Crusaders from the Middle East and European traders were forced to operate out of Crete nd Cyprus with access to only two functional routes to Asia, overland from the Black Sea or through Egypt to the Indian Ocean, the second route becoming the preferred one. The result of this was that Egypt became the most important commercial power of the Middle East, a circumstance that lasted through the sixteenth century and resulted in Cairo gaining the title of "Mother of the World" (Abu-Lughod, 1989).

From its very beginning, Cairo was organized as a commercial center. As early as the ninth century, Ibn Tulun began to have plans drawn up for market places surrounding

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the mosques. These rows of markets were extensive and were distinguished by their individual commercial specialties. Special buildings were set aside to store and display merchandise as well as to lodge merchants. These buildings had a variety of names, **khans**, **qaysaria**, **fonduqs**, and **wikalas**. These buildings had a somewhat uniform structure. Each was erected around a large paved courtyard and had a portico which supported a gallery. The ground floor was made up of spacious stores: on the second floor were apartments or cells to house the merchants. The merchants had to provide their own furniture and prepare all their meals in these cells. Everything was done to encourage business and to protect the merchandise. A typical **wikala** contained twelve shops, ten booths, fifty-eight stores, six large rooms, a court, five attics. seventy-five rooms for lodgers. In Cairo during the fifteenth century, there were seventy such buildings. Each building was highly specialized with merchants of a single ethnic group frequently all selling the same type of merchandise (See slides taken in Cairo at the Wikala El Ghury.)(Weit, 1964).

These **wikalas**. although mingled in with the **suqs** (bazaars) were quite distinct from them. Each **suq** or market place consisted of hundreds of outdoor stalls fronting the living and production quarters of the local merchant. Each suq specialized in its own type of product. There were vegetable **suqs**, live animal **suqs**, **suqs** that specialized in baked goods, grain products and spices. Prepared foods such as roasts or fried foods were'sold each day at the **suqs**. In addition there were the camel **suq**, the cloth merchants suq, the candlemaker and tentmaker **suqs**, the book dealers, the comb makers and the jewelry bazaars, just to name a few. These marketplaces were sources of products both for the local populace and the foreign merchants (Weit, 1964).

Suqs are interesting because they are still a part of commercial Cairo today. Both tourists and people indigenous to the medieval section of Cairo rely on them for much of what they buy. There is an architecture there that has persisted that was basically a response to the climatic and economic needs of the Middle Ages. Tall building with extremely narrow streets blocked out the heat of the sun, while endless additions to the fronts of the buildings accommodating the needs of the growing enterprise contained therein encroached on the streets so as to close them off and create an endless maze of deadend passages navigable only by foot. (See slides of medieval Cairo.) (Abu-Lughod, 1971).

In addition to the architectural elements which facilitated this international trade, the culture of the Muslim people was conducive to working with informal agreements and the sense of trust that a merchant must place in his trading partners in other locations. This informal cooperation is termed **sadaqa**. It refers to the arrangements

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with correspondents to accept and sell goods as profitably as possible, to make payments to specified persons, to purchase local goods according to a list or at his own discretion, to process the goods before they were shipped, to pay for them and to ship them within a reasonable time, in a seaworthy ship. This relationship was NOT based on monetary compensation but on mutual service (Goitein, 1970). These informal arrangements frequently became formal partnerships often between family members. It was not uncommon for marriages to be arranged so as to extend the area within which trade was conducted (Goitein, 1967).

In addition to the exchange of cultures which took place between areas based on the arrangements between merchants, the influx of foreign craftsmen to Cairo and other Mediterranean ports also led to a diffusion of traditions in the crafts and arts (Goitein, 1967).

Of all of the trade among the various ports, it was the trade with the Rum (Western Europe and Byzantium) that most affected the economy of Cairo. Europeans were valued traders whose patterns were studied and understood by the Egyptians. To maintain friendly relations with these merchants was of upmost importance. A quote from the Geniza documents of the twelfth century nicely demonstrates this point. "The sultan [al-Malik al Afdal] imprisoned the Genos, which caused great consternation among the Rum [Europeans in general] and no goods can be sold because of this. It looks as if this recession will last long, so that everyone's business has come to a halt (Goitein, p. 45, 1967)."

This trade pattern resulted in great achievements in arts and crafts coupled with intellectual accomplishments in both the East and the West. Technological innovations created a surplus which in turn led to increased international trade and this trade even further intensified development. Improved technology and knowledge of navigation as well as political decision-making facilitated contact among distant cultures. As this world economic system developed and informal as well as formal contact increased, cultures changed, especially those in Western Europe.

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Areas That Need Further Research and Explanation in the Background Section of this Lesson:

1. A section needs to be researched and written outlining the cultural changes beyond those of architecture that impacted Cairo.

2. A section is needed on the way the government of Cairo both accommodated and taxed the foreign merchants.

3. Further suggestions for improvement would be very welcomed.

4. Primary source quotations, and slides are absent from the lesson materials and will be included later

PROPOSED LESSONS ABOUT THE DEVELOPMENT OF MEDIEVAL CAIRO AS A WORLD CENTER FOR TRADE AND COMMERCE

Objectives

1. The students will be able to understand and explain the economic role of Cairo as a center of world trade during the Middle Ages.

2. The students will be able to explain how trade and commerce affected the geographic, economic and cultural development of Cairo.

3. The students will be able to explain how geographic and cultural factors affected trade and commerce in medieval Cairo.

4. The students will be able to compare medieval Cairo as it is today to medieval Cairo as it existed in the eleventh through the early sixteenth century and speculate about reasons for change or lack thereof.

Outline for Suggested Lessons

1. Using the map of world trade patterns (Abu-Lughod, 1989) have students answer questions which will help them to develop hypotheses about overlapping trade routes and the impact of geographic and political conditions on these routes, e.g. If a Venetian merchant wishes to buy spices from India, in what ports would these spices have to be traded to eventually reach the Venetian merchant? Where do you think the largest trade centers would develop? Why?

2. Using slides made from travel books about Cairo and copies of woodcut prints (Lane-Poole, 1902) (Lambert and Lambelet, 1990) ask students to compare medieval Cairo as it looks today with the way it looked during the Middle Ages citing both similarities and differences. Ask them to draw conclusions about change in Cairo, based on their comparisons.

3. Using slides, pictures, a diagram of the wikala (khanque), and primary source descriptions (Ibn Battuta, 1983) ask students to hypothesize about reasons for the

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"architectural" development of medieval Cairo.


Bruges
Troyes
Genoa
Venice
I
Caffa
Black Sea
Constantinople
II
Caspian Sea
Tabriz
Bukhara
Samarkand
Karakorum
III
Peking
Baghdad
Basra
IV
Hormuz
Alexandria
Cairo
V
Aden
Arabian Sea
Cambay
VI
VII
VIII
Hangchow
Zayton
INDIAN OCEAN

FIGURE 1. The eight circuits of the thirteenth-century world system.

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This source provides a description of political and economic conditions and their relationship to the expansion and eventual decline of Cairo as a trade center.

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This is an excellent source for maps that show trade patterns and the interrelationship of these routes throughout the world during the Middle Ages.

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This book was generally helpful in terms of providing a concise review of the history of Cairo during the Middle Ages.

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Goitein, S.D. A Mediterranean Society: The Jewish Community of the Arab World As Portrayed in the Documents of the Cairo Geniza, Volume 1: Economic Foundations (Berkeley: University of California Press) 1967.
This source is particularly useful in providing primary source descriptions of trade arrangements and agreements as well as descriptions of trading conditions among the Jews of the Geniza and the rest of the world during the eleventh century.

Hanna, Nelly: An Urban History of Bulaq in Mamluk and Ottoman Periods: Supplement Aux Annales Islamologiques. Cahier No. 3 (LeCaire: Institut Francais D'Archeologie Orientale) 1983.
This book is a study of the Bulaq sector of Cairo where the actual port of Cairo came to be located during the late Middle Ages and where it is still located today.

Ibn Battuta: Travels in Asia and Africa, 1325-1354 (London: Rutledge and Kegan Paul) 1983.
This is a primary source that provides some vivid descriptions of Cairo during the Middle Ages.

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Lambelet, Kurt and Edcard Lambelet: Ancient Cairo Illustrations: Original Drawings by Owen B. Carter Architect - Cairo 1830, Calendar, 1991 (Cairo: Lehnert and Landrock) 1990.
This calendar provides a number of prints of medieval Cairo including two of Khan el Kalili and one of each of the principal gates into the medieval city, Bab Zuwaleh. and Bab El Nasr. These are useful in helping students to make comparisons between the medieval city during the eleventh through the sixteenth century and the medieval city of today.

Lane-Poole, Stanley: The Story of Cairo (London: J. M. Dent and Company) 1902.
Aside from being generally useful in providing a description of Cairo's history, there are several good woodcut images in this book which can be copied to provide students with a look at the craftsmen and the merchants of Cairo during the Middle Ages.

Weit, Gaston: Cairo: City of Art and Commerce (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press) 1964.
This was the best general description of trade and commerce in Cairo during the Middle Ages. It provides numerous primary source descriptions from the "travel books" of those on pilgrimages and trading expeditions in Cairo during the Middle Ages. It also provides excellent descriptions of the wikala arrangement for traveling traders.

JANE SMITH

FACTORS RELATED TO EMPLOYEE PRODUCTIVITY IN EGYPT: A CASE STUDY

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Objective 1
Method 1
Interview Contents 1
Conclusion 4
Bibliography 4
Appendix After p. 4

Objective: To determine what factors enhance or inhibit the productivity of Egyptian employees

Method: Interview employees in the profit and non-profit sectors in Egypt. Also interview American corporations engaged in business in Egypt as well as Egyptian employees. Interviews were conducted with:

(1) Larry Coleman, Human Resources Manager, General Dynamics—Tank Program, Cairo
(2) Ted Cudnick, Human Resources Specialist, General Dynamics—Armor Program, Cairo
(3) Nancy Elias, Elias Printing Company (Elias Modern Press), Cairo
(4) Dr. Robert Brown, Dean of Continuing Education, American University in Cairo
(5) Dr. George Gibson, Provost, American University in Cairo

Interview Contents

Dr. Robert Brown

Question: What does your organization do?

Answer: We are the continuing education arm of the American University. We began in 1920 offering programs, courses, and training in credit and non-credit education. We have twelve locations throughout Egypt. In our Division of Public Service we offer career-related programs and teach approximately 25,000 students English. We also have a program geared to educators in particular subject areas. All commercial and industrial training off site are offered through the Division. We do a large amount of computer and business training through this Division.

Question: How is your staff organized?

Answer: The organization is a simple hierarchy with the President at the helm with the Dean of the Faculty and the Dean of Continuing Education reporting to him. I have three directors reporting to me. There is a governing committee that ultimately makes all decisions. A staff committee makes recommendations to the Governing Committee. The Staff Committee is composed of secretaries, maintenance, etc. The whole university is dominated by administrators. There is little participation from the staff and there is a ruling clique.

Question: What systems of reward are offered to good performances of employees?

Answer: There is no reward for productivity.

Question: What factors affect productivity?

Answer: We are strapped by the labor laws of Egypt which provide an employee employment for life after an initial probationary period. There is nothing in the law requiring good to exceptional work but if an employee steals or commits other deeds specified in the law there is some avenue for action. The prospect of life-long employment definitely effects the productivity negatively in many cases especially since we do not have a specialized reward system.

Dr. George Gibson

Question: I recently talked with Dr. Brown at AUC and he told me about the tenure law in Egypt. Do you believe the law affects the productivity of employees?

Answer: Yes, I believe that it does cause problems or at least has an effect on employee attitudes. For example, when I first came here I saw a student (or perspective student) wandering around campus obviously in search of something. I started talking with him and determined he was thinking about coming to AUC but wanted to know more about our curriculum. I took him over to admissions and stood at the desk for an interminable amount of time until finally demanding some attention. When a person responded I said that this young man needs a university catalog. The clerk responded by saying he could buy one at the bookstore. Since there was a stack of them behind the desk I told her to give him one immediately. She did. Later I then talked to her supervisor who explained his dilemma under existing laws.

Question: As dean of the faculty is there anything you do to enhance the contributions of your faculty?

Answer: The first thing I did when arriving was establish an open-door policy between me and the faculty. I encourage dialogue as often as possible. I am restricted by the AUC budget; consequently I spent time looking for outside funding to enrich our offerings. I have increased the size of the faculty since my arrival which eases some faculty burdens. There is always more that can be accomplished.

Mr. Ted Cudnick

Question: Tell me about your organization and your job here.

Answer: I work for General Dynamics Corporation. It is a company based in the United States that manufactures and maintains weapons of war. The division I work with is the Services Company that presently is under contract to service the Egyptian armory.

Question: There is an Egyptian labor law that guarantees life-long employment. Does this have an effect on your organization?

Answer: Not really. We find that there are many avenues available for ensuring productivity and when necessary terminating an employee.

Question: I was not aware that there were many options available to an employee. What are these options?

Answer: When we are dissatisfied with an employee we terminate him, and usually the employee goes to a tri-partite committee that reviews employee terminations. The committee consists of three representatives: a company representative, an employee representative, and a labor board representative. On the case of an Egyptian employee before the board, the labor board rules 90% of the time in favor of the employee. In the case of a foreign employee before the board, the board rules 1005 of the time in favor of the employee.

Question: Do you have to face termination very often?

Answer: Actually no. There is an inherent goodness in the Egyptian people that permeates the work environment.

Question: Is the law ever circumvented in the corporation's favor?

Answer: We try very hard to work within the laws of a host country. However, I have heard of cases in other corporations where the law is circumvented. Some companies give employees an undated letter of resignation to sign upon employment in the event a termination is needed. When the legal limits have expired, an employee has the letter dated and submitted. Actually, I'm not exactly sure how this is done but I have heard of the occurrence. Some organizations also have a resignation bonus that is enticing to an employee. We have the resources through our legal department to work within the laws of the land; so, consequently, we adhere closely to these laws.

Question: How do you assure to the best of your ability a productive work force?

Answer: We begin by monitoring very closely employees just hired. (See Appendix A.) We have periodic reviews and require close attention from our supervisors to employee performance.

Question: Does the law have any effect on productivity in your organization?

Answer: I believe that the educated Egyptian in our employ appreciates the opportunities afforded him in the private sector of the economy. They know performance brings merits, promotions, and higher pay. If we have a problem it is more with the less-skilled work force. I'd also like to think that the interactions and incentives offered to all employees transcend the legalities of the tenure system.

Mr. Terry Coleman

Question: What is done at this facility?

Answer: We as a division of an American company, General Dynamics, assist the Egyptian government to overhaul and produce tanks.

Question: What can you tell me about the Egyptian tenure law and your workforce?

Answer: Our workforce is very good and productive. I think it is inherent in the Egyptian employee who takes pride in his work. There are rare occasions when an employee has to be terminated. We at General Dynamics do not keep an unsuitable employee. We work within the law and its mechanisms but we maintain a high performance among our workforce. We do this with appropriate compensation and an interactive participative organization. Each employee is valued for his/her contribution.

Regarding the tenure law—when in the rare occasion that we terminate an employee, we amass considerable documentation and present our case to the labor board. The case then inevitably goes to the courts where a severance fee is determined and General Dynamics pays the fee. As mentioned by my colleague, American companies are ruled at fault 100% of the cases. Thus, we pay. The amount required is fair and we this to be the cost of maintaining a productive workforce.

Question: After having seen this law (Appendix B) are there any aspects of it you find noteworthy?

Answer: Yes, there is a section that automatically affords women up to 50 days off with pay to give birth to a child and up to 18 months an hour off each day to nurse the baby. I find this an interesting reflection of the society and its values. (See Appendix C.)

Ms. Nancy Elias

Question: Tell me about what you do in this organization.

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Answer: This is a printing and binding company hiring approximately 40 Egyptian people. We have been in existence for three years and are considered a high-quality print shop. I am one of the owners.

Question: How do you enough about printing to get into this business?

Answer: My family has been in the publishing business for many years.

Question: When you opened your business what criteria did you have in hiring?

Answer: In the binding area we hired people we knew being particularly careful not to pirate employees from other printing houses. With both the binders and the printers we told friends and printing contacts of our needs, and applicants came to us. Printers are in demand and by most other standards are paid well. Therefore, we chose our employees carefully. What I looked foe in an employee most specifically was a person I could communicate well with. Interpersonal rapport was most important.

Question: Does salary affect the productivity of an employee?

Answer: Salary very definitely has a bearing on productivity. I first determine salary by experience, then years of employment followed by productivity. If an employee exceeds my expectations or the norms of the workforce I pay extra. The system works well.

Question: Knowing the laws of tenure can you dismiss an employee?

Answer: Things in Egypt have a way of functioning within themselves. I have respect for and rapport with my employees. They are my friends. On occasion I have had to dismiss an employee and I have done it by putting so much pressure on him he resigned. On the whole that is the method I use and it works. I've not had to face the labor board or the courts. We work within our own system.

Conclusion: The Egyptian labor laws inhibit productivity when resources or cultural connections are limited. In the case of the Egyptian firm the productivity was more culturally connected than legally. In the case of the American company, the laws were adhered to but ultimately circumvented with financial resources. In the case of the non-profit organization lacking both traditional cultural connections and the financial resources to pay a levied fee, the law seemed to have an effect on productivity. However, regardless of laws and rules employees who are empowered by administrators with a sense of self-respect do their work well whether in Egyptian or foreign organizations.

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GENERAL DYNAMICS SERVICES COMPANY
EGYPTIAN ARMOR WORKSHOP 101

PROBATIONARY PERIOD

LOCAL EMPLOYEE EVALUATION SHEET — تقرير دورى عن العاملين المصريين

NAME: ______________________ : الاســـم

CLASSIFICATION: ______________________ : الوظيفــة

EMPLOYMENT DATE: ______________________ : تاريخ التعيين

DEPARTMENT: ______________________ : الادارة

EVALUATION BASED ON WORKING PERIOD OF: — تقرير دورى بعد مـــدة عـمـل :

30 DAYS ☐ ٣٠ يــوم
60 DAYS ☐ ٦٠ يــوم
80 DAYS ☐ ٨٠ يــوم

	ضعيف POOR	عادى FAIR	جيدجدا V.GOOD	ممتــاز EXCELLENT	
QUANTITY OF WORK :	☐	☐	☐	☐	كميـة العمـل
QUALITY OF WORK :	☐	☐	☐	☐	درجة اجادة العمـل
TAKEN INITIATIVE :	☐	☐	☐	☐	مدى تقدمه فى العمـل
KEEPS ORDERLY WORK PLACE:	☐	☐	☐	☐	تنظيم مكان العمـل
FOLLOWS SAFE WORK HABITS:	☐	☐	☐	☐	اتباعه لتعليمات الامـن
COOPERATES WITH OTHERS:	☐	☐	☐	☐	مدى معاونته مع الاخرين

SUPERVISOR'S COMMENTS: ______________________ ملاحظات الرئيس المباشـر:

EVALUATING SUPERVISOR: ______________________ الرئيس المبـاشـر

DATE ______________ التاريخ ______________

DEPARTMENT HEAD REVIEW: ______________________ رئيس الادارة

DATE ______________ التاريخ ______________

HUMAN RESOURCES REVIEW: ______________________ مدير شئون العامليـن

DATE ______________ التاريخ ______________

FILE: PERSONNEL FILE. — الملف بادارة شئون العاملين

Appendix B

CHAPTER III

INDIVIDUAL LABOUR RELATIONS

Section 1 - INDIVIDUAL LABOUR CONTRACT

Art. 29 - The provisions of the present chapter shall apply to the individual contract whereby the employee undertakes to work at the Employer's under his supervision and management against a salary of whatever nature.

Art. 30 - The labour contract shall be established in writing and worded in Arabic, in triplicate, one copy to each of the two parties, the third going to the Social Insurance concerned.

The contract shall indicate, in particular :

a) the name of the Employer, and address of his workplace.

b) the employee's name, qualification, profession, domicile and whatever can confirm his person.

c) nature and kind of work stipulated in the contract.

d) the salary agreed, terms and timing of payment, all cash and benefits in kind agreed.

In the absence of a written contract, the employee - alone - can prove his rights by all means of proof. He shall be given receipt for such papers and certificates as he may have deposited with the Employer.

Art. 31 - Probation period shall be fixed in the contract. No employee may be appointed under probation in excess of three months, nor can he be probationer with the same Employer more than once.

Section II - Salaries

Art. 32 - The minimum salary of an employee subject to the provisions of this guarantee is the threshold salary as may be determined by such laws as the State may promulgate in this connection.

The threshold salary may be increased in respect of employees engaged in certain industries or crafts or jobs or in certain

geographical areas as the committees stipulated in article 79 of the present law may determine.
Donation and such meals as the employee may be served shall not be accounted as part of the threshold salary.

Art. 33 - Salaries and other amounts as may be due to the employee shall be srved in the current legal tender currency.

Art. 34 - Salaries shall be paid in one of the working days, due regard being taken of the following :

A - Salary-earners shall be paid at least once a month.

B - If wage is by work piece, and the employee has been on the job for more than two weeks, the employee shall collect wages each week - in a single payment - consistent with the work achieved, the balance being payable within the one week dating from delivery of his assignment.

C - Apart from what has been mentioned above employees shall receive their wages once a week, possibly also once a fortnight, or once a month in case they should agree in writing to such mode of payment :

Art. 35 - The Employer's obligation to pay the employee's salary shall be cleared only when the employee has acknowledged receipt of his salary by signing the payroll register or statement or a formal receipt, with indication of the various individual constituents of the salary.

Art. 36 - If the employee attends at the workplace at the fixed working time, ready to start his job, but was prevented from so doing by causes stemming from the Employer, he shall be deemed to have discharged his duties and entitled to full pay.

However, should he be prevented from attending to the job by emergency causes beyond the Employer's control and volition he shall be entitled to half pay.

Art. 37 - The Employer may not transfer a salary-earner to the category of journeyman, or of wage-earners paid by the week, the hour or piecework except by written consent of the employee, in which case the transferred employee shall be entitled to such rights as he may have acquired while he was a salary-earner.

Art. 38 - If the work relationship is terminated, the employee shall be entitled to receive on the spot all the amounts due to him except if he should leave the job of his own free will, in which case the Employer shall pay him his salary and all other sums due within a maximum time limit of seven days dating from his leaving the job.

Art. 39 - The employee shall not be forced to buy food or other commodities from a given shop or from the Employer's range of products.

Art. 40 - The Employer may not deduct more than 10 % from the employee's salary against cash loans received while the contract was running its course, nor can he levy interest. This provision shall apply to salaries paid in advance.

Art. 41 - Neither the first LE.9 of salary nor the first P.T. 30 of the daily wage may be attached or ceded except up to one fourth of the salary or wage in consideration of alimony debt or against sums due for supplies (food and clothing) provided to him or to his dependents. However what is in excess of that percentage may be attached or ceded against any debt exceeding one fourth, preference being given to alimony debt in the event of concurrence.

The above provisions shall apply to all sums due to the employee by virtue of the present law.

In case part of the employee's salary is deducted in accordance with the provisions of the present section, the remaining portion subject to attachment or cession shall be added to the outstanding balance of salary after substraction of the deducted sums.

Art. 42 - Without prejudice to any better scheme, employees in establishments employing five hands or more dating from promulgation of the present law or dating from appointment after that date shall be entitled to an annual increment of 7 % of the salary against which social insurance is contributed, amounting to a minimum LE.2 up to a maximum LE. 7 over a period of 20 years starting from the first increment in implementation of the provision of the present article.

The Employer may deprive the employee of annual increment, wholly or partially, in implementation of the Penalties Regulations stipulated in article 59 of the present law which sets the professional or behavioural guidelines for entitlement to the periodical increment.

Section III- LEAVES

Art. 43 - A 21-day annual leave with full pay shall be accorded to whoever has been on service for a whole year, leave rising to one month after 10 consecutive years' service. Employees over 50 years are entitled to one month. Leave is reduced to 15 days in the first year's service following the lapse of six months dating from going into service.

The Minister of Manpower and Training may raise the period of leave by a maximum of seven days in favour of employees engaged in hard or dangerous labour and in such remote area as the Minister may determine.

The employee may not cede his annual leave.

Art. 44 - The employee may casually absent himself for a maximum three days during the year, such absence to be discounted from the annual leave to which he is entitled.

Art. 45 - The Employer shall fix the timing of ordinary leaves as the circumstances of ongoing operations may permit but he may not curtail, defer, or cut leave except for compelling reasons dictated by the work in hand. In all cases, however, the employee must obtain a minimum six-day uninterrupted annual leave.

The employee shall be entitled to determine the time of his annual leave if he is to sit for examinations in any phase of learning on condition however that he advises the Employer of his going on leave two weeks at least in advance.

At the written request of the employee, the annual leave in excess of the six days referred to may be lumped up on condition however that leave does not exceed three months in the aggregate.

The provision stipulating subdivision, lumping up or deferment of the leave shall not apply to minors.

Art. 46 - The Employer may deprive the employee from his salary relating to the period of leave or recover such salary as he may have given for that period if it is established that while he was on leave he was engaged in a job for another Employer.

Art. 47 - The employee shall be entitled to salary relevant to the leave owing him in proportion to that portion of it that he could not exhaust because he left the job prematurely.

Art. 48 - The employee shall be entitled to leave with full pay on the occasion of such feasts as the Minister of Manpower and Training may decree, on condition however that, in the aggregate, these leaves are not in excess of thirteen days per annum.

But the employer may require the employee to remain on the job during these festive days, if so needed by the work in hand, in which case he shall be paid double salary.

Art. 49 - The Employer may grant the employee who has been on his service for three consecutive years, leave with half pay for a maximum period of one month in order to go on Pilgrimage or to visit Jerusalem only once during his service period.

Art. 50 - The employee who can establish his illness shall be entitled to sick leave with 75 % of his salary during the first 90 days, rising to 85 % over the following ninety days during the one and same year.

By derogation to the provision of the preceding paragraph, the employee of an industrial establishment subject to the provisions of articles 7 & 8 of Law No 21/1958 (Organisation and Promotion of Industry) shall be entitled to sick leave as indicated hereunder every three years passed on the job - if he can prove that he is actually sick.

One month with full pay, followed by eight months with 75 % of pay, then three months without pay in case the competent medical authority declares that he may recover.

The employee shall exhaust the frozen portion of his annual leave alongside the sick leaves he is entitled to, and he may request the sick leave to be converted into annual leave if he still has an outstanding balance of annual leaves permitting such conversion.

The employer may not terminate the employee's service due to illness unless the period referred to has been exhausted.

Art. 51 - By derogation to the provision of the preceding article, the employee afflicted with tuberculosis, leprosy or mental illness, or any chronic disease shall be entitled to sick leave with full pay until recovery or until his condition so stablilises as to enable him resume his job, or that he is proven to be totally incapacitated and unable to engage in any profession or craft.

These diseases shall be determined by declaration from the Minister of State for Health in conjunction with the Minister of Manpower and Training.

Art. 52 - Without prejudice to the provisions of the Social Insurance Law, physical unfitness for work shall be declared by the proper medical authority, and proof to the contrary shall be established by medical certification, in which case either party may request the proper administrative authority to refer the case to a Medical Arbitration Panel set up by virtue of a decision emanating from the Minister of State for Manpower and Training who shall also determine the procedures of arbitration and the fees due of a maximum P.T. 100.-

The proper administrative authority shall inform both the Employee and the Employer or the concern of the outcome of arbitration when once it is available. Both parties shall then comply with the obligations set by the Arbitration Panel.

In all cases, however, no employee may be dismissed or his contract terminated for physical unfitness except in conformity with the current Social Insurance Law.

The work contract may not be terminated by the Employer except on the employee's attaining a minimum sixty years of age, and without prejudice to the provisions of the Social Insurance Law.

In case age cannot be proven by the birth certificate or official abstract of that certificate, proof shall be established by medical certificate, in which case either party may resort to the medical arbitration referred to in order to settle such dispute as may arise in this connection between them.

Art. 53 - The proper medical authority or the physician of the Medical Insurance Authority shall forbid the employee mixing with a patient afflicted with contagious disease to proceed with his job for such period as may be appropriate. This period shall not be discounted from the annual leave of the employee who shall levy his salary in full.

Section 17 - REGULATIONS GOVERNING INDIVIDUAL WORK RELATIONS

Art. 54 - The Employer may not deviate from the restrictions of the conditions enshrined in the agreement, or assign the employee to a job other than the one agreed except in cases of necessity in order to prevent accidents or to repair what has resulted therefrom, or in the event of force majeure, on condition that such assignment is temporary. He may however assign the employee to a job other than the one agreed if it is not fundementally at variance and provided that the employee's material rights are not impaired.

Art. 55 - The Employer shall open a dossier to each employee, stating his name, his profession, rating of his skills, domicile, social condition, date of starting service, salary, and such modifications as may ensue; penalties inflicted, leaves, date of end-of-service and cause of termination.

He shall file into the dossier investigation minutes, the superiors report on work performance, and such papers as may be relevant to the employee's service.

He shall keep the said dossier for at least one year starting from the employee's end-of-sevice.

Art. 56 - The Employer shall transport the employee from the area where contract was concluded with him to the workplace and from the workplace back to that area within three days dating from termination of the service contract for any cause whatsoever, for any of the causes indicated in the law, or during probation period, unless the employee should in writing refuse to return during the period referred to.

Should the Employer fail to do so the administrative quarter shall - at the employee's request - return him to the area where contracting was effected, at its own expense, and recover what it has disbursed through administrative lien.

Art. 57 - If the Employer should entrust another with execution of one of the jobs within the field of his work, and that such job was in a single worksite, the latter shall settle all rights with the employees of the original Employer who shall be held jointly liable.

Section V - EMPLOYEES OBLIGATIONS AND DISCIPLINARY MEASURES

Art. 58 - The employee shall

1.- do his job by himself in accordance with the directives of the Employer and under his supervision and also in conformity with what is set down in the contract, as stipulated by the provisiions of the law, work regulations and collective contracts, exerting such attention and care as may be expected from an average man.

2.- comply with the employer's instructions regarding execution of the job within the province of his duties or profession as agreed, except if such instructions are in violation of the contract, the law and public morality, and provided that obedience shall not expose him to danger.

3.- take care of the means of production placed at his disposal, preserving them with the caution and attention of the average man through such procedures as may be required to safeguard them.

4.- refrain from divulging work secrets.

5.- always strive to develop his skills and expertise, professionally and culturally, in conformity with such regulations and procedures as the Employer may formulate in conjuction with the proper trade unions organisations and within the framework of the means available.

6.- refrain from using work tools outside the worksite except by permission from the Employer,putting away such tools in their proper places.

7.- carry out all directives relevant to occupational safety and health fixed by the concern either in implementation of the law, the individual or collective contracts, work regulations and rules, and the instructions received.

Art. 59 - The Employer whose workforce numbers five or more hands shall post in a conspicuous place the set of regulations governing work, disciplinary measures, the work system duly retified by the proper administrative authority who shall seek the advice of the trade union organisation to which the employees of the concern are affiliated before endorsing the regulations in case the administrative authority refrains from ratifying these regulations or objects to them within thirty days dating from submission, they shall be deemed executory and the Minister of Manpower and Training shall issue model regulations and penalties as guidance for Employers.

Art. 60 - The Employer shall refrain from inflicting for a single infringement fine in excess of the salary of five days or lay him off by way of disciplinary measure for a period in excess of five consecutive days for a signle infringement or deduct more than five day's salary in the one and same month against fines or lay him off for a period of more than five days in the one and same month.

Nor can he inflict disciplinary measure later than thirty days after infringement has been established on salary-earners and fifteen days on other employees.

Furthermore, no disciplinary measure shall be taken against actions which are not mentioned in the set of regulations.
The disciplinary penalties, the rules and procedures of disciplining shall be determined by decision emanating from the Minister of Manpower and Training.

Art. 61 - No employee may be dismissed except for grievous mistake, notably in the following :

1.- if the employee should assume a false personality or submits forged certificates or recommendations.

2.- If the employee has committed such gross mistake as has entailed grievous loss to the Employer, on condition however that the Employer advises the proper authorities accordingly within four hours from his knowledge of the fact.

3.- if the employee fails to comply with the directives issued to ensure safety of the workforce and of the concern, in spite of the written summons served, on condition however that these directives are in written form and posted in a conspicuous place.

4.- if the employee has kept away from the job on no legitimate grounds for more than twenty discontinued days within the one and same year or more than ten consecutive days, in the first instance, and five days in the second instance.

5.- if the employee refrains from discharging the crucial duties incumbent on him by virtue of the work contract.

6.- if the employee should divulge secrets relating to the concern where he is operating.

7.- if the employee has been definitively convicted for crime or serious offence affecting honesty, loyalty or public morality.

8.- if the employee should be found in an obvious state of drunkeness or under the influence of addiction to narcotics.

9.- if the employee should assault the Employer or the executive manager or another one of the superiors while on the job or because of it.

Art. 62 - If a grievous disciplinary mistake entailing dismissal has been attributed to an employee, the Employer shall - prior to deciding on dismissal - apply to the three-member committee composed of the following :

A - The Director or Deputy Director of the Manpower Dept ..... President

B - Workforce representative selected by the trade union concerned ..Member

C - The Employer or his representative ...... Member

The Employer's application shall be accompanied by the employee's service dossier and memo describing the grounds of dismissal.

Art. 63 - The committee shall look into the application within a maximum two weeks dating from submission; the committee's president shall serve notice to the employee, the Employer and the workforce representatives indicating the date and place of the meeting, by registered mail with acknowledgement of receipt within three days dating from receipt of the application by the committee's secretariat. Signature of acknowledgement by the person concerned shall be deemed in lieu of notice.

Should the Employer or his representatives fail to attend in spite of the notice served to him, his application shall be deemed null and void. If the workforce's representative should fail to attend the employee shall be his own representative on the committee (or whatever person he may choose); and if the employee or his representatives should fail to attend the meeting despite the summons, the President of the committee may approve stoppage of further payments (of salary).

The employee and the workforce representative shall be advised of a new date for the meeting of the committee, and if both should default then the application shall be examined in absentia.

In order to proceed with its assignment the committee shall first accord hearing to the employee's own defence, call witnesses for evidence, and review such documents, papers statements and registers as it may deem necessary.

Art. 64 - The committee's decision which shall be passed by majority vote shall be of a consultative character; the committee shall draw up minutes of the proceedings in triplicate (original + two copies) reporting declarations expressed in the hearing and the motivated opinion of each member. Copy shall be delivered to the Employer for filing on the employee's service dossier, copy to the workforce representative for filing with the trade union organisation, the original going to the Labour Office within the district of the workplace.

Art. 65 - The employer may not dismiss an employee before putting his case to the three-member committee referred to in article 62, otherwise his decision would be deemed null and void and he would be bound to pay the employee's salary.

Art. 66 - The employee who has been dismissed on no motivating grounds shall press for stay of execution of dismissal and apply to the proper administrative authority within the district of the workplace within a maximum time limit of one week dating from the Employer's notice by registered mail. This authority shall take steps to settle the dispute amicably, and if no settlement is reached it shall refer the application within a maximum two weeks to the Court of Summary Proceedings within the district of the workplace, or to the magistrate of the competent court of first instance concerned with labour affairs, in his capacity as adjudicater of urgent affairs in towns where these courts already exist or are due to be set up, reference being accompanied by memo in five copies comprising summary of the dispute and the pleas of the two parties, as well as the remarks of the proper administrative authority.

The Clerk's Office of the Court shall then within three days dating from communication of the application to the Court fix the date of a hearing to look into stay of execution within a maximum of two weeks dating from such communication. The employee, the Employer and the proper administrative authority shall be duly notified by registered mail, notice being accompanied by copy of the memo of that authority.

The magistrate shall adjudicate the application for stay of execution within a maximum two weeks dating from the first hearing, and his ruling shall be definitive. If he should rule in favour of stay of execution, he shall at the same time condemn the Employer to pay the employee a sum equivalent to his salary dating from dismissal, and refer the case to the competent court within the district of the workplace or to the court concerned with labour affairs in towns where such courts exist. This court shall settle the dispute by compensation, if there be ground for compensation, within a maximum period of one month dating from the first hearing. If the substance of the suit is not adjudicated within the time limit set in the preceeding paragraph the Employer may - instead of paying the employee his salary - deposit an equivalent amount with the court cash office until the case is adjudicated.

The sum of money that the employee had obtained in execution of the sentence of the magistrate of Summary Proceedings or from the Court's cash office from the amount of compensation that the employee would be adjudged, or from any other amounts due to him. The court shall rule in favour of the dismissed employee's return to his job, if he had been dismissed for trade union activity.

Onus of proof that dismissal was not on that account shall lie with the Employer.

Appeal against sentences stipulated in current laws shall apply to rulings returned over the case. Appeal shall be filed within ten days and the court shall adjudicate within a maximum one month dating from the first hearing.

Art. 67 - If the employee has been charged with criminal or serious offence affecting honour, loyalty or public morality, or any other serious offence within the scope of work, the Employer may lay him off, as a precautionary measure, and put the case before the committee referred to in article 62 within three days of layoff.

The said committee shall adjudicate the case within one week dating from submission of the application. If it should endorse layoff the employee shall be paid one half of his salary, but if layoff is not endorsed, the employee shall be paid full salary.

If the proper authority finds that there is no call for arraigning the employee, or clears him off the charge, the employee shall be returned to his job, failure of which shall be deemed arbitrary dismissal.

If it should be established that the charge had been fabricated by the Employer or by his executive deputy in charge, the rest of the salary due on the period of layoff shall be paid and if it should over to the proper authority or the court that fabrication did in fact occur, such fabrication shall be pointed out in its decision or sentence.

The employee shall likewise be entitled to the balance of his salary during layoff in case he should be cleared.

In this event, one half of the salary shall be paid until the committee issues its decision.

If the committee's decision does not endorse desmissal or termination of service the other half of the employee's salary shall be paid upon his return to the job, and layoff shall not impair any of the employee's rights stipulated by law or the work contract.

In this event, layoff shall not be deemed disciplinary penalty, whether or not layoff or termination of service is approved by the committee.

Art. 68 - If the employee as a result of his own mistake has caused the loss, damage or destruction of equipment or machinery or products belonging to the employer or entrusted to him, he shall have to provide counterpart of the loss, damage or destruction.

After investigating the matter and advising the employee, the Employer shall deduct the countervalue referred to from the employee's salary, up to a maximum five days' wages per single month. The employee may contest the Employer's estimation before the committee referred to in article 77, and in cas the workforce is fewer than 50 hands, opposition shall be made before the committee referred to in article 62 of the present law.

In both cases the committee's decision shall be subject to appeal within ten days dating from issue before the Court of Summary Proceedings within the district of the workplace. If Judgement does not corroborate the amount of compensation estimated by the Employer or that a lesser amount was assessed, he shall refund such surplus deduction as he may have effected within seven days dating from declaration of the judgment or from endorsement of the committee's decision.

However the Employer may not redeem his claim through deductions, as per the stipulations of the present article, if the sum involved amounts, in the aggregate, to two months' salary.

t. 69 - The provisions of the present section shall not impair the guarantees stipulated in the Trades Unions Law in favour of members of the board of trade unions organisations, such guarantees being equally applicable to members elected to the board on behalf of the workers.

rt. 70 - The employer shall record in an ad hoc register such cash penalties as he may inflict on the employee, stating the cause and also his name and amount of his salary. Proceeds of thse penalties shall be entered in an independent account to be used as the Minister of State for Manpower and Training may decide in conjunction with the Trade Unions Federation.

Section IV - TERMINATION OF WORK RELATIONSHIP

rt. 71 - Work relationship shall be terminated for one of the following causes :

First : A - End of the work contract if it stipulated a fixed period.

B - End of the season of the seasonal employees.

C - End of temporary work or work assigned to a sick employee.

Second : Death of the employee, either actual or by judgement. Declaration of death by judgement shall be by virtue of a definitive court sentence.

Third : Resignation of the employee.

The employee's absence from the job for more than 10 consecutive days or 20 non consecutive days during the one and same year without acceptable excuse, shall be deemed resignation on condition however that notice is served to the employee after an absence of five days, in the first instance, and 10 days in the second instance, in which case the matter shall be referred to the Committee stipulated in articel 62.

Fourth: Total incapacity of the employee to do his original job or partial permanent disability when it is proved that there is no other job available, on condition however that this is duly established in conformity with the Social Insurance Law.

Fifth : Proof of negative probation.

Art. 72 - If the contract is for a fixed period and the two parties pursue execution after effluxion of the period, the contract shall be deemed renewed for an indefinite period.

Renewal would also be deemed for an indefinite period even if renewal comprises new conditions.

Casual, temporary and seasonal work shall not apply to foreigners' work contracts.

. 73 - If the employee should die while he is in service, the Employer shall pay to his family what is equivalent to two months' full salary to defray funeral expenses at a minimum LE.50, plus a grant-in-aid amounting to full salary of the month of decease and the two following months as stipulated by the Social Insurance Law No 79/1975.

The Employer shall equally assume preparation and transport of the corpse to the area whence he engaged the employee unless the family should request transport of the corpse to another area at its own expense. Expenses incurred by the Employer shall be deducted from the funeral allowance referred to in the preceding paragraph.

t. 74 - The Employer shall give the employee at the latter's request and free of charge a "character" syndicating date of his going into service, date of his going out of service, the nature of his job, amount of salary, and fringe benefits, if any.

A certification of expertise stating his professional skills and performence shall also be delivered free of charge to the employee while the contract is running its course.

The employer shall return immediately upon the employee's request, such papers or certificates as may have been lodged with him.

Art. 75 - After attaining 60 years of age, the employee shall be entitled to an end-of-service gratuity of one half month salary to each of the subsequent five years, unless he should be entitled to other rights from that period relating to old age pension, incapacity and death, as prescribed by the Social Insurance Law promulgated by virture of Law No 79/1975.

Chapter IV

WORK GROUP RELATIONS

SECTION I - CONSULTATION & COOPERATION.

Art. 76 - By virtue of a Presidential Decree a Higher Consultative Council shall be set up under the chairmanship of the Minister of State for Manpower and Training comprising members (due to their positions) and an equal number of members representing the Employers Association and members representing labour. The Council's prerogatives and competence shall be determined by the P/D.

Art. 77 - Joint consultative councils shall be set up in enterprises with a staff of fifty employees or more comprising six members, half of them representing the enterprises and the other half representing labour, the latter half to be selected from the employees of the enterprise by the trade union committee at the beginning of each year, preferably representing all the sections of the workplace, as far as this may be possible.

The committee, or the representative of the workforce, or the enterprise may invite one representative of the proper administrative authority to attend its meeting when vexed matters are being examined.

Within fifteen days of their constitution the said committees shall have formulated internal regulations regulations organising the manner of selecting its chairman from among the Employers and labour in alternate rotation to preside over its meetings. In cases when a delegate from the administrative authority is invited, chairmanship shall be assumed by that delegate. The internal regulations shall also indicate how the meetings are to be organised, their timing, the place where meetings are to be held and must be ratified by the proper administrative authority.

If this committee has not been formed within three months dating from implementation of the law, the proper administrative authority shall select its members.

Art. 78 - The committee referred to in the preceding article shall be competent to issue directives about the following matters:

1 - proposals regarding organisation of work and improvement of productivity.
2 - improvement of working conditions.
3 - overseeing professional training plans within the framework of general topical levels.

4 - organising social relations between labour and emploers, and affording opportunities of cooperation between them to promote joint interests.

5 - assessing the sums needed to repair what the employee may have damaged in conformity with article 68.

Art. 79 - The Minister of State for Manpower and Training shall set up - by dicisions - consultative or cooperation committees in the fields of employment, vocational training, salaries-at the Republic, governorate or sector levels.

The Minister's decision shall determine the competence of these committees, the manner of running their affairs, and to what extent their resolutions shall be mandatory.

The committees referred to shall comprise representatives from the proper adminstrative authority, the Employers, labour and whoever may assist by their experience.

SECTION II - COLLECTIVE LABOUR CONTRACTS AND AGREEMENTS

Art. 80 - The collective (group) labour contract is an agreement formulating the working conditions and circumstances between one or several trade union organisations and one or several Employers or whoever employ labour affiliated to these organisations or employers' Organisations, in a bid to provide better conditions, benefits or circumstances.

The employer may delegate the Federation of Industries, the Chamber of Commerce or any Organisation to which he is affiliated to conclude the contract on his behalf.

Employers Organisations may likewise conclude these contracts as representatives of Employers.

Art. 81 - In case several Trade Union Organisations should be involved as party to a collective labour contract, they must represent allied or kindred crafts or industries or crafts, and industries engaged in the manfacturing of one product.

Art. 82 - Collective labour contracts shall be written failing which they shall be null and void. They must likewise be agreeable to two-thirds of the Board of Directors of the contracting Trade Union Organisation.

Art. 83 - The collective labour contract shall not be binding except after it had been revised and recorded with the proper administrative authority. If the proper adminstrative authority should contest the contract it shall advise the interested parties of the motivating causes of its opposition within thirty days dating from submission. If no opposition is declared by the administrative authority within the time limit of opposition, the contract shall be deemed executory.

Any party to the contract may appeal the decision of the administrative authority before the Court of Summary Proceedings of the district of the authority within thirty clear days dating from opposition.

The parties concerned shall be given an abstract of appeal after payment of such fees as the Minister of State for Manpower and Training may decide.

Art. 84 - Non contracting Trade Union Organisations, Employers of Organisations representing them may join the contract after it has been recorded upon agreement between the two labour parties requesting affiliation, without further agreement of the original contracting parties, such affiliation to be applied for, duly signed by the two parties to the proper administrative authority.

Art. 85 - The provisions of collective labour contracts shall apply to :

A - Trade Union Organisations, Employers, the organisations representing them or the enterprises which would be party to the contract at the time of its conclusion or joining it after its conclusion as shown in the preceding article, as well as the Organisations substituting for the contracting Organisations and substitutes of contracting employers.

B - Workers affiliated to a Trade Union Organisation which would be party to the contract or the agreement, or to a Trade Union Organisation that would have joined it after conclusion.

Employees on whom the provisions of this article apply shall remain subject to the provisions of the contract or the agreement throughout its duration even if they should have retracted membership from these organisations prior to effluxion of its duration.

Art. 86 - Any conditions enshrined in the collective labour contract that may be in violation of any of the provisions of the present law shall be null and void, unless it affords better advantage to the employee.

Art. 87 - Any condition enshrined in the collective labour contract likely to impair security or jeopardise the economic interest of the country or be in violation of the provisions of current laws and regulations or the general order and public morality shall be null and void.

Art. 88 - Each party to the collective labour contract shall petition for ruling terminating it in if crucial changes in the working conditions occur which would justify termination on condition . however at least one year has elapsed since implementation.

Art. 89 - A collective labour contract may be concluded for a limited period or for such period as may be necessary to finalise a given project on condition, however, that the period in both cases is not in excess of three years.

If the period has elapsed, the contract shall be deemed self-renewed for another year unless the contract should provide otherwise.

The contract shall come to an end with the effluxion of its original or renewed period if either party should one month at least ahead of end of the contract, advise the other party or the proper administrative authority that it does not wish to renew it.

If one of the two parties to the contract is determined, effluxion of its duration in respect of one of them shall not entail termination in respect of the rest.

Art. 90 - The Register where contract is recorded shall be annotated according to whether the contract has run its course, been renewed, terminated or extinguished.

Art. 91 - The provisions of the collective labour contract concluded by the Trade Union Organisation shall apply to all the workforce of the enterprise even if some of the employees are not affiliated to the Trade Union Organisation on condition however that the trade unionist members of the workforce come in for one half of the enterprise staff at the time when contract was concluded.

Art. 92 - The Trade Union Organisations that are party to the collective labour contract shall file all suits arising out of violations of the said contract on behalf of any one of its members, no Power of Attorney being required in this instance.

That member may join litigation, as he may also bring a separate case.

Section III

AMICABLE SETTLEMENT - ADJUDICATION OF COLLECTIVE LABOUR DISPUTES

Art. 93 - The provisions of the present section shall apply to any conflict or dispute regarding work or its conditions that may arise between one or more Employers and all the workforce of a team of that workforce.

Art. 94 - If any conflict should arise of a nature subject to the provision of the preceding article, the two conflicting parties or their representatives shall seek amicable accomodation through collective negotiations.

Art. 95 - If the two conflicting parties fail to reach settlement of the dispute, wholly or partially or that either of the two parties should decline to enter into collective negotiations, either party may refer the dispute to local committees or the central council concerned with settlement of disputes that shall be created by virtue of a decision emanating from the Minister of State for Manpower and Training, providing for their setting up and specifying their competence and procedures.

If settlement cannot be reached within sixty days dating from application, the papers shall be referred to the proper Arbitration Panel within one week of failure to agree on settlement.

Art. 96 - If the application referred to in the preceding article is filed by the Employer, it shall be signed by himself personally or by his authorised emissary.

If application has been filed by the employees, it shall be submitted to the Head of the Trade Union Organisation to which they belong, subject to the approval of the Board of Directors of the Trade Union Organisation. In case they should not belong to any Trade Union Organisation, the application shall be filed up by the majority of the workforce or the majority of the employees of the enterprise division who are concerned with the dispute, such application to comprise names of those who will negotiate for an amicable solution and adjudication on behalf of the Trade Union Organisation or the employees on condition, however, that they do not number more than three.

The proper administrative authority involved shall give receipt in acknowledgement of the application, duly signed by its President or his Deputy wherein date of reception shall be specified.

Art. 97 - The Arbitration Panel shall be composed of :

1 - One of the Circuits of the Appeal Court that the General Assembly of each Court shall determine at the beginning of every Judicial Year.

2 - Representative from the Ministry of Manpower and Training detailed for that purpose by the Minister.

The Head of the said circuit shall act as Chairman.

Art. 98 - If the dispute concerns employees of one of the branches of the enterprise engaged in operations in various areas, arbitration of the dispute shall lie with the panel within the district of the Head Office of the enterprise.

Art. 99 - The President of the Arbitration Panel shall determine the hearing of adjudication within a maximum fifteen days dating from receipt of the papers of the dispute from the Disputes Settlement Council. The members and representatives of the disputing parties shall be advised by registered letter at least three days ahead of the date of the hearing.

Art. 100- The two members of the Arbitration Panel shall take the oath before its President that they will discharge their duty in bona fide and truthfully.

101 - The Arbitration Panel shall look into the dispute referred to its attention and adjudicate it within a maximum period of 20 days dating from communication.

The two parties shall attend before the Arbitration Panel in person or through their respective deputies.

The Panel shall call witnesses after swearing them in, delegate experts to survey the plant and workplace, get access to all the documents and account books referring to the dispute and take such proceedings as may enable the panel members to arbitrate.

The Panel shall inflict such penalties as are stipulated by current laws, if one of the litigating parties should fail to submit the documents and memoranda in support of his defence or if the witness should - without acceptable excuse - fail to attend, refuse to take the oath or reply.

102 - The Arbitration Panel shall apply the current laws and may ground its decisions on the provisions of Sharia (Islamic Law), usage, and the principles of justice in accordance with the socio-economic conditions of the area.

The Panel's resolution shall be passed by majority vote, duly motivated and deemed ruling returned by the appeal Court after drafting it in executory terms from the Clerks' Office of the competent Appeal Court.

Either party to the dispute may counter-appeal the resolution before the Supreme Court, in accordance with the conditions, terms and procedures stipulated in current executive laws.

The President of the Panel shall notify the two parties to the dispute by communicating copy of the Arbitration Resolution by registered mail within three days of its adoption.

The Arbitration Panel shall relay the dossier of the case after notifying the two parties to the dispute, as indicated in the preceding paragraph, to the proper administrative authority to have the wording of the resolution recorded in an ad hoc register. The dossier shall be deposited in its archives from which extracts may be issued to whoever may be concerned.

Art. 103 - Resolutions emanating from the Arbitration Panel shall be subject to the provisions regarding correction of judgements and their interpretation stipulated in laws in force. Rejection of the members who are not Justices and their dismissal shall be subject to what applies to the President of the Panel in respect of the provisions governing rejection of Justices and their dismissal stipulated in these laws.

Art. 104 - Problems of execution shall be referred to the Arbitration Panel in its capacity as Justice concerned with urgent matters if what is required is a temporary formality. These problems shall be subject to the provisions relating to execution problems stipulated in laws in force.

Art. 105 - Termination of the labour contract or dismissal of the representatives of employees or the Trade Union Organisation shall not preclude discharge of their duties before the local committees or the Disputes Settlement Council or the Arbitration Panel so long as the employees or the Board of Directors of the Organisation has not provided others.

The arbitration authority shall send the fi.

of the matter after announcing the two disputant. parties as prescribed above to the competent administrative authority to have the version of the sentence entered in a special register and to deposit the file with their archive while giving authentic copies to the people concerned.

Art. 103: The provisions related to rectifying and explaining judicial sentences stipulated by laws in force shall apply to the sentences adopted by the arbitration authorities also those provisions in respect of waivering the non judge members of the arbitration authorities stipulated in such laws in force

Art. 104 : Any complexities arising from execution shall be submitted to the arbitration authority in its capacity as an urgent matters Judge in a case a momentary procedure is required and the measures in force as regards execution complexities stipulated in the laws in force shall be

Art. 105 :- The termination of the labour contract, the dismissal of the workers or the syndical organisation shall not prevent them from continuing to perform their jobs before the local committees, the dispute settlement council or the arbitration authority unless the worker or the syndical organisation board shall choose others.

Art. 106 :- The Minister of Justice in agreement with the Minister of State for Labour Force and Training shall specify the number required of arbitration authorities, their localities and the local functions for each in addition to hearing attendance fees for the representatives of the concerned ministries sitting

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PART FOUR

Art .I07- The premier minister shall issue a decision forming a Committee to determine the applications of firms to totally or partly suspend work, to change the scope of the firm or its activity in a way that will affect the labour volume and such a decision shall specify the functios of the comnottee, its procedures and the ministries and authorities to be represented in this committee.

Employers shall not suspend work wholly or partly or change the labour volume of the firm or its activity unless they obtain the approval of such a committee.

Any provision contrary the above stipulation shall be considered as void and be cancelled.

CHAPTER FIVE

Vocational Health and Safety

Part One - Definitions and Scope of Application

Art. 108 - On the application of this chapter's provision a firm shall mean:-

Any project or utility owned or managed by one of the persons of the general or special law.

Art. 109 - The provisions of the present chapter shall apply to all the firms of the private sector-the units of the public sector and the state administrative machinery as well

Appendix C

Section III

EMPLOYMENT OF FEMALES

Art. 151 - Without prejudice to the following provisions, female employees shall be subject to all the texts governing employment of male workers, without distinction between the two.

Art. 152 - Female employees may not be put to work between 8 h. p.m. and 6. h. a.m. except in such jobs and circumstances as may be determined by the Minister of State for Manpower and Training.

Art. 153 - No female employees may be assigned to jobs as may be bodily and morally harmful to them, nor in arduous and other jobs as the Minister of State for Manpower and Training may determine.

Art. 154 - The female employee who has seen service for six months with her employer shall be entitled to a delivery leave of fifty days with full pay, such leave to comprise prenatal and postnatal periods on condition that she submits a medical certificate indicating the date of delivery.

The female employee shall not be entitled to this leave more than three times, throughout her service period.

The female employee may not be put to work during the forty days following delivery.

Art. 155 - Within the eighteen months following date of delivery, the female employee who gives suck to her infant shall be entitled - additionally to the rest period s.t - to two additional periods for that purpose, each of not less than half an hour. The two periods may be lumped into one period.

These periods shall be counted as part of the working hours and shall entail no reduction from salary.

Art. 156 - In the enterprise whose workforce comprises fifty or more hands, the female employee shall be entitled to leave without pay for a maximum period of one year, to bring up her infant. Only three such leaves shall be granted throughout her service period.

Art. 157 - In case the Employer should have one or several female employees on his staff he shall post the regulations governing female workers in a conspicuous place.

Art. 158 - The Employer who has one hundred female workers or more on his staff acting in a single workplace shall set up a nursery as per the terms and conditions that the Minister or State for Manpower and Training shall specify.

Likewise, the enterprise which has less than one hundred female employees on its staff shall be bound to the text of the foregoing paragraph as per the terms and conditions that the Minister of State for Manpower and Training shall determine.

Art. 159 - Female workers engaged in purely agricultural pursuits shall be exempted from the provisions of the present chapter.

Chapter VII

INSPECTION AND JUDICIAL REPORTING

Art. 160 - Employees who are vested with judicial status in the implementation of the provisions of the present law and its executive decisions shall visit the workplace to ascertain the proper execution of the law.

These officials and their superiors shall take the oath from the Minister of State for Manpower and Training when appointed, to the effect that they shall discharge their duties honestly and loyally and that they shall refrain from divulging any secret pertaining to ongoing operations to industrial patent that they may have had access to by virture of their position, even after they have retired.

Art. 161 - Officials who are vested with judicial status

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